"The blessed chere of our Lord God works this in us by Grace" : a psychobiography and soteriology of mirroring in Julian of Norwich's Showings by Ratcliffe, Holly Elizabeth
Université de Montréal
“The blessed chere of our Lord God works this in us by grace”:
A psychobiography and soterïology of mirroring in Julian of Norwich’s Showings
par
Holly Elizabeth Ratcliffe
Faculté de théologie
Thèse présentée à la Faculté des études supérieures
en vue de l’obtention du grade de
Philosophi Doctor (Ph.D.)
en théologie
février, 2007
©HoÏly Elizabeth Ratcliffe, 2007
o
\[.ÔOI
o
Universftt j
de Montréal
Direction des bibliothèques
AVIS
L’auteur a autorisé l’Université de Montréal à reproduite et diffuser, en totalité
ou en partie, par quelque moyen que ce soit et sur quelque support que ce
soit, et exclusivement à des fins non lucratives d’enseignement et de
recherche, des copies de ce mémoire ou de cette thèse.
L’auteur et les coauteurs le cas échéant conservent la propriété du droit
d’auteur et des droits moraux qui protègent ce document. Ni la thèse ou le
mémoire, ni des extraits substantiels de ce document, ne doivent être
imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans l’autorisation de l’auteur.
Afin de se conformer à la Loi canadienne sur la protection des
renseignements personnels, quelques formulaires secondaires, coordonnées
ou signatures intégrées au texte ont pu être enlevés de ce document. Bien
que cela ait pu affecter la pagination, il n’y a aucun contenu manquant.
NOTICE
The author of this thesis or dissertation has granted a nonexclusive ticense
allowing Université de Montréal to reproduce and publish the document, in
part or in whole, and in any format, solely for noncommercial educational and
research purposes.
The author and co-authors if applicable retain copyright ownership and moral
rights in this document. Neither the whole thesis or dissertation, nor
substantial extracts from it, may be printed or otherwise reproduced without
the author’s permission.
In compliance with the Canadian Ptivacy Act some supporting forms, contact
information or signatures may have been removed from the document. While
this may affect the document page count, it does flot represent any loss of
content from the document.
Page d’identification du jury
Université de Montréal
Faculté des études supérieures
Cette thèse intitulée:
“The blessed chere of our Lord God works this in us by grace”:
A psychobiography and soteriology of mirroring in Julian of Norwich’s Showings
présentée par:
Holly Elizabeth Ratcliffe
a été évaluée par un jury composé des personnes suivantes:
Denise Couture
Président-rapporteur
Jean-Cl aude Breton
Directeur de recherche
Guy-Robert St-Arnaud
Membre
Elisabeth Koenig
Examinateur externe
Thèse acceptée le:
SOMMAIRE
Cette recherche relève les fonctions de l’activité du miroir dans les Révélations de
Julienne de Norwich.
L’activité du miroir, telle que comprise par D.W. Winnicott, est habituellement une
fonction de la qualité du regard de la mère, et, chez l’enfant, un élément du développement
d’un sentiment initial du soi, nécessaire autant pour la capacité de négocier une séparation,
d’accepter la réalité, et de construire un symbole, dans une aire intermédiaire de l’illusion,
qu’il appelle l’espace potentiel. Un transfert thérapeutique en miroir est nécessaire, selon
Heinz Kohut, là où cette activité parentale a été continûment absente.
Appuyée sur ces théoriciens de la psychanalyse relationnelle,’ cette recherche met de
l’avant notre compréhension de Julienne de Norwich et de ses Révélations de deux
façons. De plus, dans un troisième mouvement, cette lecture des Révélations de Julienne
peut aussi fournir des éléments de réponse à la crise de la sotériologie contemporaine.
Premièrement, à partir d’une méthodologie psychobiographique particulièrement
sensible au contexte historique, notre recherche propose une esquisse de la Julienne d’ avant
les visions et identifie des signes d’une crise indiquant un manque précoce de l’activité du
miroir. Elle relève de plus la maturation de son besoin de l’activité du miroir, selon les trois
étapes thérapeutiques de Kohut, comme cela se dégage du transfert en miroir dont elle
investit le Jésus de ses visions. Je décris cette maturation comme un déplacement du
subjectivisme fiisionnel au réalisme relationnel.
En deuxième lieu, cette recherche étend le recours à la théorie psychanalytique de
l’activité du miroir à l’examen de la sotériologie des Révélations de Julienne. La prémisse,
ici, est que le besoin précoce, chez Julienne, de l’activité du miroir, dont on retrouve des
échos dans le régime de négligences et d’abus de la culture religieuse anglaise de la fin du
14 siècle, a favorisé chez elle une crise soténologique pré-oedipienne et peut-être même la
maladie.
Dans cette perspective, l’analyse utilise une méthodologie de corrélation. La
sotériologie contemporaine éprouve aussi une crise de crédibilité. La prémisse
Ce mot sert à désigner la théorie des relations d’object (Winnicott), ta psychologie du soi (Kohut) et la
psychanalyse féministe américaine. MITCHELL, Stephen et Lewis ARON, Relational psychoanalysis:
The emergence of a tradition, Hillsdale NJ, The analytic press, 1999, pp. x - xii.
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méthodologique est que la psychanalyse relationnelle peut être mise à profit pour une
réponse libératrice à cette crise sotériologique. La description, par Elizabeth Johnson, des
trois étapes d’appropriation dans une herméneutique féministe de la libération encadre cette
application aux Révélations de Julienne. La sotériologie psychanalytique de Sebastïan
Moore et sa relecture féministe par Cynthia Crysdale permettent d’identifier, chez Julienne,
les motifs et les traits de l’appropriation d’une sotériologie de l’activité du miroir dès ses
débuts dans son identification fusionnelle avec les souffrances de la passion du Christ. Le
chapitre de la thèse d’Elisabeth Koenig sur l’activité du miroir appliquée au chere, ou
regard, du seigneur dans l’exempÏum de Julienne et l’analyse de Derek Anderson de la
théologie non-violente de l’activité salvatrice de la Trinité à travers l’incarnation du Christ
m’ont servi d’appui pour proposer que l’activité du miroir non seulement suscite la pratique
d’appropriation de la sotériologie de l’exemptum de Julienne, mais aussi sa compréhension
mûrie de l’oeuvre salvifique de la Trinité par le Christ à même la création dans le passé,
dans le futur et au présent.
La lecture psychobiographique de l’activité du miroir dans l’histoire personnelle de
Julienne peut être utile à la découverte de l’histoire de Julienne de Norwich, et aussi à une
meilleure appréciation de sa maturation psychodynamique dans ses Révélations et de
l’évolution historique de sa compréhension et appropriation du salut.
Cette corrélation soténologique contribue à la redécouverte de cette tradition perdue
grâce à une compréhension historique plus profonde de la motivation et des forces de la
sotériologie trinitaire inscrite dans son exemptum.
Dans un troisième temps, cette lecture en corrélation aide à rendre la soténologie de
Julienne de Norwich plus accessible comme ressource contemporaine pour s’approprier
l’oeuvre de salut du Christ et pour mener une réflexion théologique sur le salut, d’autant
que ses écrits sont susceptibles de susciter une activité du miroir chez ses lecteurs actuels.
mots clés:
Julienne de Norwich, le salut, la psychohistoire, la vie spirituelle, le féminisme, la théorie
des relations d’objet, la psychologie du soi, le miroir, le maternage
VABSTRACT
This study traces the function of mirroring in Julian of Norwich’ s Showings.
Minoring, as understood by D.W.Winnicott, is usually a maternai function, and a
necessary element in the infant’ s development of a nascent sense of self, as well as for the
possibility of negotiating separation, reality acceptance, and symbol formation in a creative,
illusory realm he cails transitional space. A therapeutic mirroring transference, according to
Heinz Kohut, is necessary in cases where this parental function lias been chromcally
missing.
Drawing on these relational psychoanalytic theorists,2 this study advances our
understanding of Julian of Norwich and her Showings in two ways. And in a third move,
this reading of Julian’ s Showings may also contribute toward a response to the
contemporary crisis in soteriology.
First, using a psychobiographical methodology which is sensitive to the historical
context, it gives a profile of the pre-visionary Julian, and finds evidence for a crisis
recapitulating an early lack of mirroring. It then traces the maturation of lier need for
mirroring, through Kohut’ s tbree therapeutic phases, as this manifests itself in the
mirroring function with which the Jesus of her visions is seen to be invested. I describe
this maturation in terms of a movement from merged subjectivism to relational realism.
Second, this study extends the use of the psychoanaiytic theory of mirroring to an
examination of the soteriology of Julian’ s Showings. The premise here is tliat Julian’ s
early need for mirroring reverberated at a systemic level of neglect and abuse in late
fourteenth century English religious culture, prompting a pre-oedipal soteriological crisis,
and perhaps even lier illness.
At this level, the analysis uses a correlative methodology. Contemporary
soteriology is also suffering a crisis in credibility. Tlie metliodological premise here is that
relational psychoanalysis can be enlisted as part of a liberationist response to this
soteriological crisis. Elizabeth Johnson’s formulation of tlie three stages in the
appropriation of a feminist liberation hermeneutic frames this application to Julian’ s
2 This term is used to describe the approaches of object relations theory (Winnicott), self psychology
(Kohut) and American psychoanalytic feminism. MITCHELL, Stephen and Lewis ARON, Relationat
psychoanalysis: The emergence ofa tradition, Hillsdale NJ, The analytic press, 1999, pp. x - xii.
vi
Showings. Sebastian Moore’s psychoanalytic soteriology and Cynthia Crysdale’s feminist
rereading of Moore help elucidate the motivation for, and contours of, Julian’ s
appropriation of a soteriology of mirroring from its beginnings in a merged identification
with the suffering Christ’s Passion. Elisabeth Koenig’s thesis chapter on the mirroring
function of the chere or face of the lord in Julian’ s exemptum, and Derek Anderson’ s
analysis of Julian’s non-violent theology of the saving activity of the Trinity through
Christ’s Incarnation, assist me to argue that minoring dynamizes not only Julian’s practice
of appropnating her distinctive exemptum soteriology, but also her mature understanding
of the Trinity’s saving work tlirough Christ in creation, in the past, in the future and in the
present time.
It is hoped that the psychobiographical reading of mirroring in Julian’s personal
history can contribute to the searcli for the historical Julian of Norwich, as well as to a
greater appreciation of psycliodynamic maturation in lier Showings and of tlie histoncal
evolution of lier understanding and appropriation of salvation.
The sotenological correlation may contribute to the retneval of this lost tradition by
means of a profounder liistorical understanding of tlie motivation for, and the dynarnics of,
the trinitarian sotenology embedded in lier exemptum.
In a third move, this correlational reading may help make Julian of Norwicli’ s
sotenology more accessible as a contemporary resource for appropriation and tlieological
reftection on salvation, not least because lier wnting is intended to engage tlie mirroring
dynamic in lier readers in the present time.
Keywords:
Julian of Norwicli, salvation, psycliohistory, spirituality, feminism, object relations theory,
self psychology, mirroring, mothenng
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RÉSUMÉ
Cette thèse se situe à la fois en histoire de la spiritualité et en théologie. Elle cherche
à répondre à trois questions. Premièrement, est-il possible d’écrire une psychohistoire de
Julienne de Norwich utile à des études historiques et théologiques de ses Révélations?
Deuxièmement, comment est-elle arrivée, ou qu’est-ce qui explique, sa soténologie? Et,
troisièmement, à partir de la réponse fournie par cette thèse aux deux premières questions,
comment les acquis de cette recherche peuvent-ils contribuer à répondre à la crise de
crédibilité que vit la sotériologie contemporaine?
La réponse à la première est habituellement non. Dans l’introduction de la thèse,
j’énumère les trois raisons de cette réticence et mes réponses à chacune d’elles. Je prétends
que non seulement l’approche psychanalytique relationnelle peut s’adapter de façon critique
et non réductrice à la nature du sujet, mais qu’il y a en plus une raison pour laquelle ne pas
entendre une telle démarche contribuerait à maintenir la tendance à se satisfaire d’un
manque de conscience historique dans les efforts pour s’approprier aujourd’hui la
spiritualité de Julienne. Un des fruits de la dimension psychohistorique de cette thèse,
j’espère, sera de fournir une saisie plus claire de sa motivation et de l’enracinement
historique de sa sotériologie.
Ma première hypothèse méthodologique est que, d’une part, avec ce que Julienne
dit elle-même, et ce que, d’autre part, les outils de la psychanalyse relationnelle offrent pour
soutenir une démarche psychohistorique sensible à une conscience historique, il sera
possible de dégager des faits nouveaux qui pourront servir les autres objectifs de la
présente thèse et, éventuellement, d’autres recherches historiques et théologiques sur
Julienne de Norwich.
La matière des révélations personnelles de Julienne étalées dans le temps dans ses
Révélations conduit à une application à double entrée de la méthode psychohistorique
utilisée ici. La première consiste à extraire, dans une approche de psychanalyse
relationnelle, une esquisse de l’histoire de la Julienne d’avant les révélations à partir des
indices qu’elle nous offre. La deuxième utilise les trois étapes de la démarche thérapeutique
de Heinz Kohut pour chercher comment Julienne entre, poursuit et mature dans un transfert
en miroir avec le Jésus de ses visions, ceci à partir du récit des seize visions dans la version
courte jusqu’à celui de l’exemptum dans la version longue. De plus, en raison de la nature
vifi
imaginaire de ses visions et de sa réflexion ultérieure sur celles-ci, et parce que ces visions
sont le fruit et l’objet permanent de sa pratique de la prière, ou ce qu’elle appelle beholding
(la contemplation), le concept d’espace potentiel de Winmcott devient un outil
méthodologique significatif pour considérer l’ensemble de ses textes comme un lieu
permanent de cette intégration psychodynamique.
Cette application double s’ appuie sur l’hypothèse psychohistorique que le chere (le
regard) du seigneur dans 1’ exemplum est chargé d’une fonction compensatoire de l’activité
du miroir (hypothèse mise de l’avant par Koenig3 en 1984), et que cela peut guider la
recherche d’indices supplémentaires témoignant autant au début de l’histoire de Julienne
d’un manque de l’activité parentale du miroir, que d’une évolution de la maturation
psychodynamique de cette fonction et de son intériorisation dans les Révélations.
La recherche montre que la maturation psychodynamique à travers ce transfert en
miroir de Julienne est évidente à la longueur de ses Révélations dans une transformation
développementale ou maturation, ce que j’appelle le passage d’un subjectivisme fusionnel à
un réalisme relationnel. Cette découverte peut être utile pour établir une corrélation entre la
maturation spirituelle et psychodynamique face au besoin de l’activité du miroir dans le
reste de la recherche et dans d’autres applications.
La deuxième question, à savoir comment Julienne a élaboré sa sotériologie, est
reliée à la première. Plusieurs spécialistes de Julienne ont relevé l’originalité de différents
aspects de sa théologie. Mais l’approche que j ‘entends favoriser, tout en tenant compte du
corpus des débats sur d’éventuelles influences, et même en soulignant certaines sources de
redécouverte de la tradition, cherche aussi à dépasser l’unicité de sa sotériologie pour
atteindre ce qui l’a motivée. Mon hypothèse ici prolonge celle de la psychohistoire en
proposant que le manque de l’activité parentale du miroir s’est installé à un niveau
systémique, sociétal, et codifié dans l’enseignement commun de la Sainte Église. J’analyse
les textes pour trouver des indices suggérant que Julienne aurait pu expérimentée une crise
sotériologique dans sa condition humaine frappée de désespoir à l’époque de sa maladie, et
qu’elle est parvenue au long des années à une solution satisfaisante dans la sotériologie de
son exemptum. Je m’inspire d’Elizabeth Johnson pour interpréter ses Révélations comme
une démarche de conversion ressemblant aux trois étapes de la structure herméneutique de
la théologie de la libération.4
KOEMG, Elisabeth, The “Book of showings” ofJutian ofNorwich: A testcase for Paul Ricoeur’s
theories of metaphor and the imagination, Ph.D. dissertation, NY, Columbia University, 1984, eh. 7.
JOHNSON, Elizabeth, She who is: The mystery of God in feminist theotogicat discourse, NY,
Crossroad, 1992, eh. 4.
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Cette deuxième question implique aussi une hypothèse méthodologique à savoir
qu’une corrélation, telle que menée dans les Révélations, entre les discours contemporains
en psychanalyse relationnelle et l’herméneutique de la libération en soténologie peut être
très fructueuse. Ces discours n’ont pas été mis en dialogue depuis longtemps, aussi leur
langage commun de corrélation est relativement sous-developpé. L’espoir est de faire
avancer l’échange.
L’application de la méthode de corrélation à ce point de l’analyse mène à
l’hypothèse suivante. À partir de ce que Julienne nous dit dans ses Révélations, et avec
l’aide de théoriciens de la soténologie comme Sebastien Moore et Cynthia Crysdale qui
empruntent à la psychanalyse relationnelle, je suggère qu’une des clefs pour comprendre ce
qui soutient la sotériologie de Julienne tient au fait de lire ses Révélations comme une
appropriation de ce que j’appelle sa sotériologie de l’activité du miroir.
Les discours en psychanalyse relationnelle, en psychohistoire et en sotériologie sont
tous profondément patriarcaux. Un défi méthodologique confronte mais aussi supporte la
présente thèse, soit de lire ces discours «du point de vue féminin». De ce point de vue, tel
qu’appliqué à l’étude de Julienne de Norwich, le discours de la psychanalyse relationnelle
sur l’activité du miroir dévoile un lien inattendu avec celui de la sotériologie, qui renverse
les perspectives traditionnelles sur le narcissisme et le péché.
La recherche montre qu’un argument en faveur d’une démarche de conversion,
selon l’herméneutique d’appropriation de libération féministe, est fourni dans le
renversement par Julienne du sens et de la logique de la théorie de la satisfaction
d’Anselme, dans sa redécouverte du symbolisme médiéval du miroir, et dans sa pratique de
la vocation d’anachorète, qui impliquent aussi un renversement des présomptions
sotériologiques habituelles. L’exemplum, la pierre d’assise de sa sotérïologie, conserve à
la fois la situation contrastante entre la condition humaine de Julienne frappée de désespoir
et sa résolution libérante. La fonction de la constance d’objet de l’activité du miroir du
seigneur dans sa relation au serviteur permet à Julienne de maintenir le transfert en miroir
qui est essentiel au mouvement du processus thérapeutique. Mais en plus elle lui permet de
clarifier pour elle-même le sens du péché et de la souffrance, d’exercer un renoncement à sa
préoccupation pour la souffrance du Christ, de développer une anthropologie plus
adéquate, et de découvrir la Trinité tout entière à l’oeuvre dans la restauration de la création
par l’incarnation. Le fait que ses réflexions sur la Trinité à partir de l’exemplum doivent la
conduire à la reconnaissance du Christ comme mère (et comme mère Église) est une autre
preuve que l’activité du miroir du Jésus des Révélations de Julienne oriente l’évolution de
sa sotériologie.
XLa troisième question soulevée par cette thèse porte sur l’utilité des découvertes
enregistrées dans les deux premières parties pour fournir un apport à la crise de crédibilité
de la sotériologie contemporaine. L’hypothèse méthodologique dans ce cas suggère que
l’application de la psychanalyse relationnelle en lien avec la sotériologie peut contribuer à
rendre les Révélations de Julienne de Norwich plus accessibles et plus utiles comme
ressource pour la recherche contemporaine en sotériologie. Ce troisième projet imprègne
tout notre effort, mais ne peut aucunement être mené à terme dans ce projet. Toutefois, les
Révélations de Julienne nous fournissent un exemple si concret de ce qu’une femme
mystique, dont les écrits témoignent d’une maturation psychodynamique et théologique si
profonde, peut apporter à notre compréhension du salut et de la théologie, que quatre
questions doivent être explorées, même si c’est à des degrés différents.
Premièrement, les résultats de l’hypothèse selon laquelle Julienne a vécu une
conversion sotériologique dans sa compréhension du sens du péché et de la passion et de la
souffrance du Christ suggèrent que la lecture du développement de sa sotérïologie de
l’activité du miroir peut aider à soutenir l’opinion croissante que la sotériologie trinitaire de
Julienne offre une réponse significative à la crise de crédibilité de la sotériologie
contemporaine au sujet du sens de la croix.
En retraçant la sotériologie de l’activité du miroir de Julienne dans ses ultimes
réflexions sur la Trinité et la christologie, cette thèse montre, en deuxième lieu, comment ce
qui a soutenu la soténologie de Julienne peut représenter la nature compréhensive et
intégrale de sa sotériologie ainsi que la genèse historique de sa théologie de la Trinité et de
la maternité du Christ, et, troisièmement, que cela rejoint aussi la requête contemporaine
d’une cohérence entre les activités créatrice et salvifique de Dieu.
Enfin, le dernier chapitre de la thèse s’intéresse surtout à l’apport particulier de
Julienne à la question de la cohérence entre les sotériologies subjective (appropriation) et
objective (l’oeuvre salvifique du Christ). Ce problème est au coeur de la demande
postmoderne que la sotériologie soit réelle, c’est-à-dire susceptible d’être expérimentée au
présent. Les découvertes ici sont peut-être l’apport le plus important de cette thèse.
L’analyse de l’activité du miroir clarifie comment la sotériologie objective dans le
passé, le futur et le présent (le présent étant la soténologie subjective) s’hannonise dans
l’exemplum de Julienne. Elle permet une appropriation contemporaine du salut autant en
manières de penser que d’éprouver et dans des pratiques qui transforme la connaissance
relationnelle de soi et de Dieu en cette vie. La recherche souligne que Julienne attribue à la
chere de Dieu notre Seigneur le travail en nous de l’activité du miroir par la grâce.
xLa thèse est organisée de la façon suivante. Le premier chapitre identifie les
fondements herméneutiques de la présente recherche, et les questions principales et
hypothèses retenues pour cette recherche, de même que les méthodologies utilisées. fi situe
alors la problématique foncière occupée à chercher une réponse à la crise de crédibilité de la
sotériologie. À partir des travaux de Roger Haight, Elizabeth Johnson et autres, il ébauche
les questions majeures auxquelles la sotériologie contemporaine doit répondre en même
temps que les exigences postmodernes qui alimentent ces questions, le tout exigeant la mise
en oeuvre d’une méthode de corrélation critique. Ce chapitre identifie des éléments de
réponse sur ce qu’est l’oeuvre salvifique du Christ et au comment cette oeuvre est reçue, eu
égard à la structure de l’herméneutique de la théologie de la libération féministe. fi montre
ensuite comment la psychanalyse relationnelle est devenue un partenaire dans ce dialogue
théologique. Enfin, il reconnaît la signification de la présente recherche pour une
réhabilitation des mystiques en vue de l’appropriation en notre temps aussi bien que dans la
démarche théologique.
Les chapitres 2 et 3 fournissent les fondements méthodologiques de l’application de
la psychanalyse relationnelle au projet psychohistorique.
Les chapitres 4 et 5 répondent aux questions sur qui est Julienne de Norwich. Le
premier des deux identifient les manuscrits et les preuves historiques de son existence. fi
repasse ensuite les principales questions sans réponses au sujet de son état de vie, son
éducation et la composition de ses deux écrits, pour lesquelles tout spécialiste de Julienne
doit mettre de l’avant des pistes d’ interprétation. Le chapitre 5 propose une première
application de la méthode psychohistonque aux premiers chapitres des Révélations pour
dégager les traits psychodynamiques de la Julienne d’avant les révélations.
Le reste de la thèse est organisé en une série de diptyques. La raison de cette
stratégie organisationnelle tient au fait que la corrélation proposée ici implique plus d’un
niveau d’analyse. Le dialogue encore peu développé entre la psychanalyse relationnelle et la
soténologie s’ajoute à cette raison. Ainsi le chapitre 6, l’introduction aux diptyques,
présente un bref survol de la structure et de l’orientation de chaque ensemble de diptyques.
Le premier chapitre de chacun des diptyques (soit les chapitres 7, 9 et il) propose
l’application des trois étapes de la méthodologie thérapeutique de Heinz Kohut selon le
transfert en miroir à l’étude psychohistorique des deux versions des Révélations de
Julienne. Le deuxième chapitre de chaque diptyque (soit les chapitres 8, 10 et 12) propose
alors la corrélation sotériologique en ayant recours à la structure de la démarche de
conversion en trois étapes de l’herméneutique de la libération féministe de Johnson à partir
des mêmes textes.
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What does the baby see when he or she looks at the mother’ s face? I am suggesting that,
ordinarily, what the baby sees is himself or herseif. In other words the mother is looking
at the baby and what she looks tike is related to what she sees there. Ail this is too
easily taken for granted. I am asking that this which is naturally done weil by mothers who
are caring for their babies shah flot be taken for granted.
D. W. Winnicott
“Mirror-role of mother and family in cbild development”
And what can make us to rejoice more in God than to see in him that in us... he has joy?...
And this makes the soul which SO beholds like to him who is beheid, and unites it in rest
and peace.
Julian of Norwich LT 68
INTRODUCTION
This thesis attempts to respond to three questions. First, is it possible to write a
psychobiography of Julian of Norwich which will be helpful for historical and theological
studies of lier Showings? Second, how did she corne up with, or, what rnotivated her
soteriology? And third, based on how this thesis answers the first two questions, how
might the findings help contribute a response to the crisis of credibility in conternporary
soteriology?
As for the first question, the answer is usually no. I identify three reasons for this,
and my response to each.
Julian specialists have been relatively reticent to speculate about this anonymous
author, precisely because so littie is known of her. And yet, every study of lier texts must
make interpretive decisions with respect to who Julian of Norwich was, often on the basis
of implicit historiographical assumptions. The fertility of the field of psychohistory lias not
been extensively exploited with regard to Julian, perhaps because it is also a field whose
understanding of evidence and objectivity is challenging, and open to various criticisrns,
such as reductionisrn. However, relational psychoanalysis is a theoretical perspective
which is able to appreciate religious pathology and maturation, and even offers a
framework for understanding visionary experience critically, and non-reductionistically.
The biographical information about the person we cail Julian of Norwich is mostly
what she herseif has written, which is to make the usual psychobiographical analysis
impossible or, at least, very limited. However, from another perspective, what we do have
is what she herseif teils us in the two versions of her revelations (the Short Text and the
Long Text of the Showings), the writing of which was separated in tirne by at least twenty
years. In Julian’s Showings it is she who is spealdng and projecting herself into lier
writing, which, considering she is a medieval woman, is itself extraordinary and potentially
more revealing than the accounts of secondary sources would be. Moreover, a sensitive
psychohistorical study will draw on other sources of sociohistorical data, such as
contemporary cultural and literaiy studies which are producing new knowledge about
women in the later middle ages.
Finally, perhaps this reticence is also because of a hagiographical awe of its subject:
Julian of Norwich is held in such high esteem (flot exclusively, but particularly by women)
as a spiritual writer and theologian, that few have ventured far to explore a pre-visionary
psychobiographical profile and its evolution through the two versions of the Showings.
The problem with this reticence is that, as Julian’ s work is increasingly being recognized
and appropriated as theology, specifically as a soteriology, a Christology and a trinitarian
theology, there is scholarly unevenness as to our understanding of the historical genesis
and evolution of that theology.’ One of the fruits of the psychobiographical dimension of
this thesis, I hope, may be to contribute to a clearer sense of the motivation for, and
historical genesis of her soteriology.
My first methodological hypothesis is that, with what she herseif says on the one
hand, and with the tool of relational psychoanalysis to support an historically grounded
psychobiograpliical method on the other, it will be possible to extract new evidence for a
psychobiographical interpretation of her two texts, and that this evidence can contribute to
the other objectives of this thesis, and to other historical and theological studies of Julian of
Norwicli.
The subject matter of Julian’ s seif-revelation over time in lier $howings leads to a
two-pronged application of the psychobiographical method used here. The first application
involves extracting a relational psychoanalytic profile of Julian’ s pre-visionary history from
the hints she gives us. The second application uses the three phase therapeutic method of
Heinz Kohut to explore how Julian engages, works through and matures in a mirror
transference with the Jesus of her showings from lier account of the sixteen showings in
the Short Text through to the exemptum in the Long Text. Moreover, because the
visionary nature of lier sliowings and lier subsequent reflections on tliem are the fruit and
ongoing subject of lier prayer practice of what slie cails behotding, Winnicott’s concept of
transitional space is a significant methodological tool for engaging the whole of lier
‘Carolyn Walker Bynum wntes soberingly as both a feminist and medieval historian that
[al good deal of what seems to me irresponsible theologizing about women bas been done recently,
based on a superficial understanding of the history of Christianity; and certain daims about
women’s need for female symbols or for affectivïty or for the unstmctured are among the most
empty and ill-informed.
BYNUM, Carolyn Walker, Fragmentation and redemption: Essays on gender and the human body in
medievat religion, NY, Zone, 1992, P. 50.
Likewise, in bis study of the trinitarian hermeneutical “principles [governingi the relationships between
Julian’s memory of ber revelation, ber subsequent meditations on it, and the wntten accounts that attempt
to articulate it”, Nicholas Watson observes that “a kind of fundamentalism” exists in much of Julian
scholarship, motivated in part by the desire to confirm that ber vision is “in some final sense right”.
WATSON, Nicholas, “The trinitarian hermeneutic in Julian of Norwich’s Revelation of love”, The
medieval mysticat tradition in England, ed. GLASSCOE, Marion, Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 1992, p. 80. Exeter symposium V. I do not deny that that motivation continues in the present
study. But my hope is to give some account for why Julian’s work is approached tbis way.
3visionary experience, lier memory of and meditation on it, and the texts she composed, as a
sustained locus for this psychodynamic integration.
This two-pronged application is based on the psycliobiographical hypothesis that
the face of the lord in the exemptum is invested with a compensatory mirroring function, (a
hypothesis proposed by Koenig in 1984),2 and that this can orient the search for further
dues as to both Julian’s early history of a missed parental function of mirroring and the
evolutïon of lier psychodynamic maturation and intemalization of this function in tlie
Showings.
The second question, how did Julian corne up with lier soteriology, is related to the
first. Many Julian specialists have cornmented on the originality of various aspects of lier
theology. But the approach I intend to take, while incorporating the body of debate on
potential influences, and even higifiigliting certain sources for retrieval, also attempts to get
behind the uniqueness of lier soteriology to what motivated it. My hypothesis liere extends
the psycliobiographical one, to propose tliat tlie missed parental function of mirroring was
compounded at a systemic, societal level, and codified in tlie common teacliing of Holy
Churcli. I explore the texts for dues suggesting that Julian miglit have experienced a
soteriological crisis in lier human predicament of despair at tlie time of ber fflness, and that
slie worked tlirougli it to a satisfying resolution in the soteriology of lier exemptum. To do
this, I draw on Elizabeth Johnson to interpret lier Showings as a conversion process
bearing resemblance to the three stage structure of the liberation liermeneutic of
appropriation.
This second question engages a methodological liypotliesis as well, which is tliat a
correlation between the contemporary discourses of relational psyclioanalysis and the
liberation hermeneutic in soteriology, as applied to the Showings, could be very fruitful.
Tliese discourses have flot long been in dialogue, and so the sliared language of correlation
is relatively undeveloped. The hope would be to advance tlie conversation.
Applying the correlative method at this level of the analysis leads to tlie following
hypothesis. With what Julian teils us in the Showings, and with help from soteriologists
Sebastian Moore and Cynthia Crysdale who draw on relational psychoanalysis, as well as
those wlio have articulated the contours of the liberation liermeneutic of appropriation, I
propose tliat a key to understanding what motivated Julian’s soteriology lies in reading lier
narrative and long-term process of interpretation of the exemplum as her appropriation of
what I cail a soteriology of minoring.
2 KOENIG, Elisabeth, The ‘Book of showings’ of Julian oJNonvich: A testcase for Paul Ricoeur’s
theories of metaphor and the imagination, Ph.D. dissertation, NY, Columbia University, 1984, ch. 7.
4The discourses of relational psychoanalysis, psychohistory and soteriology are ail
profoundly patriarchal. A methodological challenge compounding, but assisting this thesis
is to read these discourses “in the feminine case”. From that vantage point, and as applied
to this study of Julian of Norwich, the relational psychoanalytic discourse of mirroring
reveals an unexpected relationship with that of soteriology, reversing the conventional
perspectives on narcissism and sin.
The third question this thesis poses asks how the findings from the first two
questions might help contribute a response to the crisis of credibility in contemporary
soteriology. The methodological hypothesis here is that the application of relational
psychoanalysis in dialogue with soteriology will help render Julian of Norwich’ s $howings
more available and usefiil as a resource for contemporary soteriological research. This
third undertaldng pervades the whole exercise, but can by no means be accomplished in
this project. Nonetheless, Julian’ s Showings give us such a concrete example of what a
woman mystic, whose writings witness to profound psychodynamic and theological
maturation, can contribute to our understanding of salvation and theology, that four of
these questions must be recognized, if in varying degrees of rigour.
First, the findings from the hypothesis that Julian underwent a soteriological crisis
in lier understanding of the meaning of sin and Christ’s suffering and Passion, suggest
that the exemptum mirrored a coherent narrative reflection of that crisis and its potential
resolution. I suggest that reading the development of lier soteriology of mirroring in terms
of a liberation hemieneutic may help contribute to the growing view that Julian’s trinitarian
soteriology offers a significant response to the contemporary soteriological crisis of
credibility.
By tracing Julian’ s soteriology of mirroring througli her later trinitarian and
christological reflections, the thesis shows, secondly, how what motivated Julian’s
soteriology can 5e seen to account for the historical genesis of her theology of the Trinity
and the motherhood of Christ, and thirdly, that it also responds to the contemporary
demand for coherence between the creative and saving activity of God.
Finally, I explore Julian’ s distinctive contribution to the question of the coherence
between objective and subjective soteriology (with help from Julian specialists Elisabeth
Koenig and Derek Anderson in the final chapter), a problem which is at the heart of the
postmodem exigency that soteriology be real, that is, capable of being experienced in the
present time. The findings liere are perliaps the most significant part of the thesis.
Before outlining the thesis chapters, I believe it may be helpful to the reader to
situate my interest and motivation to pursue the subject of this thesis. In 1991 I found
5myseif in a critical situation in which the emotïonal supports in my life were taken out from
under me. At that point I had been ministering as an ordained Anglican priest for several
years. My formation in the secular atheism of social sciences was strong. The spiritual
resources available to me from my past, for a response to this crisis, were siim. However,
at that time I was receiving Ignatian spiritual direction and was guided to meditate using
scripture and to be attentive to the products of my imagination. I was discovering just how
distant and abandoning my unconscious image of God had been. As well, I began
attending a twelve step group for codependents. I was also at that time enrolled in a
masters programme in spfrituality in NYC and was privileged to take two courses from Dr
Elisabeth Koenig which have had a permanent influence on me, one which introduced me
to relational psychoanalysis and its theological response, the other on the English mystics
of the fourteenth century. A masters thesis directed by Dr Elisabeth Koenig, enabled me to
bring together ah these influences in an initial application of the relational psychoanalytic
theory of mirroring to Julian of Norwich’ s Showings, followed by a self-study of some of
the imaginative material which my meditations had generated.
I would like to report one of the meditations used for this self-study, as I believe it
addresses, in a visual way, the contemporary soteriological preoccupation with the
incredibility of the tradition’s accounts of the meaning of the cross which mns through this
thesis, as this intersects with the issue of appropriation.
In a meditative exercise I followed on heahing one’s image of God, the following
image presented itself in my imagination. I saw myseif in the presence of a large, dark and
obscure body. This Other had one arm around my back to comfort and support me. The
other ami was extended in front of me, and held a hand minor before my face.
In the mirror, with the eye of the heart and mmd, I saw a somewhat shrouded
image of what I understood to be the experience of death-in-Jesus. I resorted to
using the cross as a short form for this. Although I felt the potential of fear to look
and see what was there in the mirror, another newer feeling predominated. It was
the feeling of new identification with the suffering and death of Jesus in me. The
feeling of this identity revealed in the mirror had the character of being in me and in
God.3
As the reader of this thesis will see, this image is pertinent to much of what
fohlows. But my intention in including it here is to underline my devehoping preoccupation
with contemporary soteriological issues. At the time, and in the masters thesis, I was
preoccupied with the psychoanalytic implications of this image for my personal history and
spiritual integration. But increasingly I have found that the image also engages a deep
RATCLIFFE, Holly, Mourning and kenosis: Mirroring of God and self in transformation, S.T.M.
thesis, NY, General Theological Seminary, 1997, p. 133, emphasïs in text.
6ambivalence with regard to the meaning of the cross. I was developing, by then, a vivid
meditational experience of death in Jesus as part of my grief process. The tomb meant
mucli to me. But the image of the cross in the mirrror was shrouded and did flot feel as if it
connected with what I had corne to experience as meaningful, transformational. The cross,
as symbol, did not connect either with what I was naming as sin for myself or with the
suffering I was experiencing.
What lias become clearer in the meantime is tliat the difficulty I had connecting with
the cross is endemic to our time, and that my experience of ambivalence has significant
parallels to that of other women seeking an authentic appropriation of the Christian faith
tradition.
When I finished that masters thesis I knew I wasn’t finished with the subject of
mirroring or with Julian of Norwich. The present thesis represents a more extensive
psychobiographical exploration of the person we cail Julian of Norwich, and of what I cali
Julian’ s mirroring transference with the Jesus of lier Showings, with tlie lielp of tlieorïsts
D. W. Winnicott and Heinz Koliut.
However, tliis tliesis introduces anotlier level of correlation, drawing on the
contemporary responses by Sebastian Moore and constructivist feminists to the crisis of
credibility in soteriology. Was there a crisis of meaning for Julian at the time of lier illness,
too, whicli was in some sense botli psyclioanalytïc and soteriological, to whicli she
received lier sixteen showings as a response? Could this be what motivated ber lifelong
preoccupation witli appropriating the meaning of Christ’s Passion in a way that could make
sense to lier? Did lier method of beholding prayer enable lier mirroring transference to
continue to function and evolve, particularly in lier ongoing meditation on the exemplum,
over the decades following the visions, into an incarnational trinitarian theology? Is tliere
more to the historical evolution of lier trinitarian and motlierliood of Clirist tlieology tlian
meets the eye?
Most of tliese questions address tlie soteriological problem, but enlist
psyclioanalysis as a partner in tlie dialogue. Whereas tlie psychoanalytic and
psycliobiograpliical analysis privileges tlie liistorical subject and can lielp shed needed light
on Julian’s shrouded personal history and development, contemporary soteriological
questions address tlie problem of tlie meaning of the cross at a compreliensive level.
As will be seen below, this study uses tlie correlative metliod botli to understand
Julian of Norwicli in lier time and to enable lier Showings to be more available as a
theological resource for us in our tirne. Tlie correlative metliod lias an uneasy alliance witli
theology. And I am proposing to use a social science tliat lias a history of a particularly
7uneasy alliance. How can relationai psychoanalysis be a resource for a profounder
understanding of what Breton calis “les assises anthropologiques”4 of Julian of Norwich
and for the retrieval from her mystical theology for the soteriological questions we face?
The thesis is stnictured in the following way. Chapter 1 identifies the
hermeneutical foundations for the present study, and identifies the main questions and
hypotheses with which the study is concemed and the methodologies which have been
used. It then situates the primay contemporary problematic of seeking a meaningflul
response to the crisis of soteriologicai credibiiity, as this motivates the present thesis.
Drawing on work by Roger Haiglit, Elizabeth Johnson and others, it outiines the major
questions to which contemporary soteriology must respond, along with the postmodem
exigencies which are driving these questions, ail of which require the appiication of a
mutualiy critical correlative method. The chapter identifies elements of a response for what
the saving work of Christ is (objective soterioiogy), and for how that work is appropriated
(subjective soteriology) in terms of the structure of the feminist liberationist hermeneutic. It
then turns to show how relational psychoanalysis lias become a partner in this theological
dialogue. Finally, it acknowledges the significance of this study for the retrieval of the
mystics for appropriation in the present time as weli as for the theological enterprise.
Chapters 2 and 3 provide the methodological foundations for the application of
reiational psychoanalysis to the psychobiographical project.
Chapters 4 and 5 begin to respond to the question who was Julian of Norwich.
The first of these two chapters identifies the manuscripts and the extemal historical
evidence of lier existence. It then rehearses the major unanswered questions conceming
her state of iife, education and the composition of the two texts, to which every Julian
specialist must make some interpretive response. Cliapter 5 makes an initiai application of
the psychobiographical method to the early cliapters of Juiian’s Showings in order to reveal
a psychodynamic profile of the pre-visionary Julian.
The rest of the body of the thesis is organized into a series of diptyclis. The reason
for this organizational strategy is because the correiation being attempted here is at more
than one ievei of analysis. The relativeiy undeveloped dialogue between relational
psychoanaiysis and soteriology aiso contributes to this need. Thus, chapter 6, the
introduction to the diptyclis, gives a brief overview of the structure and direction of each set
of diptych chapters. The first chapter in eacli diptych (i.e., chapters 7, 9 and 11) advances
‘ BRETON, Jean-Claude, “Retrouver les assises anthropologiques de la vie spirituelle”, Studies in
RetigionlSciences Religieuses 17, 1988, 97 - 105.
$the application of the three stages of the therapeutic mirroring transference metliodology of
Heinz Kohut to the psychobiographical study of the two versions of Julian’s $howings.
The second chapter in eacli diptych (i.e., chapters 8, 10 and 12) then advances the
soteriological correlation using the three stage structure of the conversion process in
Johnston’ s feminist liberation liermeneutic of appropriation in these same texts.
The examination of the function of the minoring dynamic in Julian’ s transitional
relationship with the Christ of lier Showings reveals a transformation wliich is traceable
both in lier self-understanding and in lier appropriation of Clirist’s saving work.
Moreover, her grasp of tlie coherence between tlie objective soteriology whicli emerges
from tlie exemplum and lier appropriation of the saving work of Christ’ s chere in this
world is such that slie seems to be offering lier visionary texts as a locus for tliat
transformative mirroring dynamic to be engaged in lier readers.
Let us tum now to tlie present time, to tlie problems this thesis is addressing, and in
particular, to tlie situation of soteriology in whicli we find ourselves.
CHAPTER 1
PROBLEMS IN CONTEMPORARY SOTERIOLOGY
1.0 Introduction
This chapter begins by establishing the hermeneutical foundafions of this
ïnterdisciplinary study. It identifies the questions, the main hypotheses proposed in this
study and the methods to be used. The rest of the chapter focuses on the situation of
contemporary soteriology, reviewing the major themes in soteriology and the postmodem
exigencies which impel them, as presented comprehensively by Roger Haight in his recent
study Jesus, symbol of God. The structure of the liberationïst hermeneutic for a credible
contemporary understanding of the process of appropriating salvation is explored in
feminist terms, after Elizabeth Johnson. The chapter then makes the case for including
relatïonal psychoanalysis’ as a dialogue partner in soteriology within this liberationist
dynamic and reviews the proponents who will feature later in this study. Lastly, the
chapter acknowledges the contemporary feminist search for models of authentic spiritual
life and practice among women mystics in the Christian tradition. The chapter closes by
proposing that this study of mirroring in Julian of Norwich may be able to contribute to the
larger project of the retrieval of the mystics for a soteriology which facilitates appropriation
and seeks the mature flourishing of women’s spiritual lives in the present time.
2.0 Hermeneutical foundations
The present thesis situates itself in both the history of spirituality and theology. On
the one hand, it studies Julïan of Norwich to try to understand something of the
psychodynamics of the unknown personality and situation of this mysterious and brilliant
l4th century woman through her Showings.2 When I speak of a psychobiography of
mirroring, it gives some indication of the interdisciplinary nature of the study which will
This term is used to describe the approaches of object relations theory (Winnicott), self psychology
(Kohut) and American psychoanalytic feminism. MITCHELL, Stephen and Lewis ARON, Relationat
psychoanalysis: The emergence ofa tradition, Hillsdale NJ, The analytic press, 1999, pp. x - xii.
2 When I speak of Julian’ s Showings I am refemng to her two texts of visions or “showings” which she
composed. (See chapter 4, below, concerning these texts.) When I speak of her showings, I am using a
modem English translation of her middle English word “shewing” (singular) or “shewings” (plural) to refer
to the visions themselves.
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follow. One might speak of this aspect of the study as potentially contributing to the search
for the historical Julian of Norwich and to a greater appreciation of the “assises
anthropologiques”3 which motivated the psychodynamic maturation in the particular
religious experience we associate with Julian of Norwich’ s Showings.
But the present thesis also studies Julian ofNorwïch’s soteriology, largeiy in order
to interpret her l4th century text in terms which might render its truths more accessible for
understanding and appropriating Christ’s saving work in our own day, particukrly, though
flot exclusiveiy, for women. The methods of studying spirituality these days are diffuse,
and for many good reasons to be discussed, some of them sliy away from talk of Jesus
Christ, particulariy his Passion and death, as saving humanity.4 Clearly, Julian’s
spirituality is a reflection of her person embedded in lier historical environment. However,
spirituality, for lier, as it was for the earliest Desert fathers and mothers, is soteriology,
focused on the constitutive scriptural tradition of the life, death and Resunection of Jesus
Christ. And that soteriology, as she understood it, was comprehensive; it was intended for
ail who experienced the human predïcament as she did. Reading Julian inspires me to
want, with her help, to understand soteriology afresh, to help untangle it from that
complicated and compromised history, and enable it to speak in new ways as the core of
the Christïan spiritual life.
But here the titie of the thesis becomes obscure. I am saying that this study of
Julian of Norwich’ s Showings is also a soteriology of minoring. At this point in time, this
is a nonsensical phrase in the discipline of soteriology. Mirroring is a relational
psychoanalytic concept, referring to an eariy narcissistic need on the part of the infant in the
matemal-infant relation. Soteriology and psychoanalysis do flot have a good correlational
track record,5 though, as will be seen below, this is changing, with Winnicott, Mice Miiler
and theologians ïnspired by relational psychoanalysis. My hope is that, by the end of this
BRETON, Jean-Claude, “Retrouver les assises anthropologiques de la vie spirituelle”, Sciences
religieuses 17, 1, 1988, pp. 97 - 105.
Sandra Schneiders acknowledges the “complicated histoncal relationship between theology and
spirituality” which bas lcd to different understandings of the function of theology in the contemporary
discipline of spirituality. SCHNEIDERS, Sandra, “The study of Christian spirituality: Contours and
dynamics of a discipline”, Christian spirituality bulletin, Journal ofthe society for the study 0f Christian
spirituatity 6, 1, 1998, P. 5.
The researcher in the present intellectual horizon is formed by the discourses of Freud (and Marx), and the
heritage of hermeneutical suspicion dialectical discourses have grown up around them. These discourses,
where they have addressed Chnstian understandings of sin, satvation and the spiritual life, have reduced them
to social and psychological pathology, respectively. From its side, theology bas feit threatened by the
reductionistic approach of psychoanalysis to religious experience. McDARGH, John, Psychoanalytic
object relations theory and the study of religion: onfaith and the imaging of God, Lanham MD, University
Press of America, 1983, p. xiii.
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study, David Tracy’s comment, about the value of theology being in dialogue with other
disciplines, might be seen to apply in some measure here, that “after any genuine dialogue,
what once seemed merely other now seems a real possibility”.6
The work of Hans-Georg Gadamer in hermeneutics is significant for the present
study in recognizing the historicality of ail interpretation, theological, social scientific and
literaiy alike. Gadamer understands that “understanding aiways involves something like
applying the text to be understood to the interpreter’ s present situation”.7 Gadamer’ s
notion of the “fusion of horizons” between the historicality of the text and the historicality
of the present situation of the interpreter consciously acknowledges the tension between the
two. At the same time, he acknowledges that every act of interpretation itself becomes
“recombined” and embedded in the continuing historicality of the matrix of tradition. Thus,
for Gadamer, the central problem of hermeneutics is the problem of “application”.8 This
hermeneutical stance points us toward the possibility of a mutually critical correlational
conversation between contemporaiy human science and Christian tradition.9
What is significant about the historicality of our present North Amencan situation is
that we do tend to interpret the world through a psychological or psychoanalytic lens.
Jean-Marc Charron writes that psychohistory, for example,
est une entreprise de compréhension du passé sur la base d’une sensibilité
contemporaine à savoir l’intérêt pour l’univers affectif, la vie émotionnelle,
l’élaboration de la personnalité... etc. A cet égard, elle est de son temps, de notre
temps. H.-G. Gadamer suggérait que quiconque veut comprendre doit poser des
questions, qu’il n’y a pas de méthode pour apprendre à questionner et que ces
questions, tout autant que les voies de réponse qu’elles ouvrent, appartiennent au
monde de celui qui les assume: on comprend dans et pour son monde. Notre
monde est traversé par la préoccupation “psy” et on comprend, dès lors, combien
pertinente peut être l’interrogation quant aux profils psychologiques des générations
passées.1°
The hunch behind this study is that the relational psychoanalytic language of
mirroring bas something to contribute to contemporary soteriology.
6 TRACY, Davïd, “The uneasy alliance reconceived: Catholic theological method, modernity and
postmodernity”, Theotogical Studies 50, 1989, P. 562.
GADAMER, Hans-Georg, Truth and method, NY, Continuum, 1999, p. 308.
8 GADAMER, 1999, pp. 306-307.
See TRACY David, The anatogical imagination: Christian theotogy and die culture ofpluralism, NY,
Crossroad, 1981, 467 p. Also HAIGHT, Roger, Jesus, Symbol of God, Maryknoll NY, Orbis Books,
1999, p. 45 fn. 35, where he says “Correlation [as theological methodJ involves among other mechanïsms a
fusion of horizons and appropriation”.
10 CHARRON, Jean-Marc, “Psychohistoire et religion: Perspectives défis et enjeux”, Retigiologiques 1, 2,
1990, p. 73. He draws on GADAMER, 1999, p. 306.
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3.0 The questions and hypotheses of this study
This hermeneutical foundation leads me to the three questions which this thesis
asks. First, is it possible to write a psychobiography of Julian of Norwich which will be
helpftl for historical and theological studies of her $howings? Second, how did she corne
up with, or, what motivated lier soteriology? And third, based on how this thesis answers
the first two questions, how might the findings help contribute a response to the crisis of
credibility in contemporaiy soteriology?
The psychobiographical question I am pursuing is this: What type of psychoanalytic
function is fulfihled by the Jesus of Julian of Norwich’ s Showings? What type or types of
relationship does Julian enter into with the Jesus of her visions, and, how are they
transformed? In effect, how does the Jesus of Julian ofNorwich’s showingsfunction to
bring about heating andflourishing in her Ïfe as recorded in her texts? Cari this give
us a clearer psychobiographical understanding of the function of the psychoanalytic
dynamic of the maturation of the need for mirroring as this is reflected in lier Showings?
My hypothesis is that it can, and that it can be helpful for other studies including the
soteriological project of this study.
The soteriological questions concem the saving work of Christ and the human
graced response of appropriation. In effect, these too are “how” questions, which also
atternpt to get at the dynamics which are operative in Julian’s soteriology. How, according
w Julian ofNorwich ‘s Showings, does Jesus save? And how, according to her texts,
does humankind appropriate this saving work, in ways that are liberative? As I ask
these questions of lier Showings, however, I wiIl bring my relational psychoanalytic
reading of mirroring in lier texts to bear on my reading of what might have motivated her to
shape lier soteriological response to these questions in the original way that she did. Here
again, my hypothesis is that this can help us understand the historical evolution and
dynarnics in Julian’s Showings of how the Jesus of lier showings functions salvifically.
Moreover, ail these disciplines, psychoanalysis, psychohistory and soteriology are
implicated in the effects of patriarchy which neglect and distort the experience of women.
In the present attempt to trace the function of minoring through these different levels of
analysis, I seek also to be attentive to the feminist voices which are addressing that neglect
and distortion in each of these fields.
At the core of the Christian tradition’ s understanding of the spiritual life is the
salvific work of Jesus Christ, witnessed in personal human testimonies and liberative social
transformations throughout history. In terms of the present study, to interpret Julian’s
Showings psychoanalytically and soteriologically in terms of the function of mirroring is to
13
engage consciously in the hermeneutical activity of fusion of horizons and application.
Julian liad great difficulty in appropriating the meaning of the showings for lier life
as they stood in such contrast with the doctrinal horizon of lier situation, yet the same
visions were the means she was given to appropriate a soteriology which was credible to
lier in lier experience of the human predicament of sin and human suffering. Can this study
help us to identify the contours of wliat we might cali an implicit psychological and
soteriological crisis being expressed and worked through to resolution in the $howings?
The evidence I propose suggests tliat it can.
Can the present study of mirroring in Jutian ‘s Showings atso hetp us understand
her]4th century text in terms which might render its truths more accessible for
understanding and appropriating Christ’s salvfic work socially and personaÏty in our
current situation? The main hypothesis of this study is that it can.
4.0 The methodologies
The methodological approacli of this thesis is psychohistorical and correlational.
The psychohistorical metliod draws on primary textual and other sources of
evidence available to delve into the unconscious motives for an histonc person’ s attitudes
and actions with the help of psychodynamic theory. As part of a larger movement called
the new history, it recognizes that every object of study is affected by ffie subjective
interests of the student. It lias a certain fertility as well as potential weaknesses, which will
be discussed in cliapter 3.
Most psychohistorians indicate that a “disciplined subjectivity” is needed in order to
avoid countertransference, that is, the projection of tlie student’ s unconscious needs onto
tlie object of study which potentially distorts the data and their interpretation by the
psychobiographer)’ To have access to the interiority of others the student is required to
have “plumbed the deptlis of their own subjectivity, and this in a relatively non-defensive
way”.12 In this way a hermeneutical objectivity is possible which respects the primacy of
understanding the historical context under study.’3 Only to that extent is explanation, as a
goal of psychobiograpliy, appropriate.
‘ KOHUT, Thomas , “Psychohistory as history”, American historicat review, 91, 2, 1986, p. 342.
12 KOENIG, Elisabeth, “Review symposium of Jesus, the liberator of desire by Sebastian Moore”,
Horizons 18, 1, 1991, p. 112.
13 See Sandra Schneiders’ careful distinction of hermeneutical subjectivity and objectivity from that in
ontology, epistemology and methodology, in SCHNEIDERS, Sandra, “The paschal imagination:
Objectivity and subjectivity in new testament interpretation”, Theological studies 43, 1982, pp. 52 - 68.
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As noted above, there is admittedly an “uneasy alliance” of epistemologies in the
methods of this study.’4 Thus, another dimension of the methodology must examine the
basis on which such an alliance is possible, and what its advantages and limitations are.
On the one hand, the choice of a Chrïstian mystic as the material object of this thesis
is motivated by the need for some form of “transcendental reflection”.’5 But as David
Tracy observes, “insofar as ail modes of reasoning are linguistically rendered (as they are),
they are historically embedded. Any transcendental method needs to pay greater attention
to that fact than many forms of theology, both classical and modem, characteristically
do”.’6
On the other hand, there is built into the method of psychohistory, a self-critical
requirement of the student to be aware of her subjectivity, as integral to the possibility of
any objective discemment.’7 Focusing on the maturation of mirroring needs is itself a
study in how subjectivity and objectivity become more integrated in their relatedness in a
non-defensive way. In fact, the maturation of the mirroring need is about recognizing and
accepting one’s embeddedness in a matrix (family, tradition, history etc.) as a feature of
negotiating one’ s relationship with the maternai selfobject. And narcissistic maturation as a
whole is about the dying of grandiose and omnipotent archaic selfstructures to give way for
a more realisfic and creative acceptance of self and reality within a trusting (familial or
therapeutic--and also perhaps ecclesial?) relationship. So in an unusual way, the pragmatic
method of the object relations school of psychoanalysis may contribute to theology a means
by which to assess for these features in a hermeneutical methodology sensitive to historical
consciousness.
To articulate this complementarity, I will draw on Tracy’s understanding of the
importance of a mutually critical correlational method for a systematic theology.’8 Tracy
above aIl is comrnitted to the challenge of dialogue between theology and our pluralist
contemporaiy situation. He draws on the concept of analogy to justify a dialogue between
disparate reaims of discourse. A major critique of analogy as it has been used
theologically has been that in finding relationships between phenomena it ignores real
differences between them. Tracy is keen to recognize dialectical languages of rupture as
embraced within an adequate analogical language. Analogies must allow for “real
‘ TRACY, 1989, pp. 548 - 570.
15 TRACY, 1989, p. 559.
16 TRACY, 1989, p. 559.
‘ See chapter 3 below for discussion of this point.
TRACY, 1989, pp. 24 - 27, 374 - 376.
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similarities-in-real-difference”.’9 The present study will seek to honour both as these
emerge in the subject matter.
The use of relational psychoanalysis in contemporary soteriology and in the history
of spirituality is relatively undeveloped to date. Therefore, the rest of the present chapter
aims to provïde a theological justification for the methodological strategy of enlisting
relational psychoanalysis as a partner in the correlatïve project of a) developing a
soteriological response which embraces a liberationist hermeneutic of appropriation, and b)
drawing on the mystics as a resource for developing a credible soteriology which can be
experienced in our time. However, I will flot attempt to outiine in any more detail either
relational psychoanalysis or psychobiography in this chapter. Rather, I devote a separate
chapter to each. Chapter 2 will describe the theory of relational psychoanalysis (Winnicott’s
object relations theory, Heinz Kohut’ s self psychology) and the directions of the
psychology of religion which have emerged from this psychoanalytic orientation. Chapter
3 will examine the strengths and weaknesses of the psychobiographical method and the
appropriateness of the choice of relational psychoanalysis for the subject of the present
study.
5.0 The contemporary crisis of credfbility in soterioiogy
In his recent, seminal text Jesus, symbol of God, Roger Haight poses the central,
multifaceted problem of a credible Christian soteriology for our postmodern era in this way:
Many of the traditional expressions of how Jesus saves resemble myths that nolonger communicate to educated Christians; some are even offensive. Many of the
traditional theological “explanations” of salvation through Christ do no better.
Often treatments of salvation are devoted to rehearsing traditional theories or
presenting models or types which seem to inject some order in the disarray. But
one cannot assume that the traditional language sounds credible today; it may
function as an obstacle to faith, and too little attention is given to critical
reinterpretation of it. Given the pluralism of conceptions, is there a way
systematically to establïsh a center of gravity on the salvation mediated by Jesus that
will be clear and definite but open and flot exclusive? In the face of the confusion
about the nature of salvation, can one formulate today’s questions and crises to
which Jesus mediates a salvific answer? Given the incredibility of the mythologieal
language when it is read at face value, can one find a symbolic formulation of this
doctrine that is intelligible and doser to actual human experience?2°
TRACY, 1981, p. 409. For a more extensive discussion of the strengths and limitations of the
mediating theology of Paul Tillich and David Tracy see RATCLIFFE, Holly, “Analogy and correlation in
Paul Tillich and David Tracy”, unpublished paper, Faculté de théologie, Université de Montréal, 1999,
23 p.
20 HAIGHT, 1999, pp. 335 - 336.
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Haight’ s response to this question is extraordinarily comprehensive and it sets the
parameters for the approach to soteriological issues to be used in this study.
5. 1 The epistemological problematic in soteriology
In the first place, Haight spends considerable time articulating a religious
epistemology which he cails “symbolic realism”.2’ At the same time, Haight proposes a
henneneutical methodology that seeks “to overcome a radical historicism and to reflect in its
theory of knowledge the deep continuity in human existence that is continually mediated by
history”.22 Haight’s whole project is grounded in a mutually critical correlative method
that seeks to “balance faithfulness to the tradition” with “present interpretation that actually
engages today’s questions” in “a theological language that combines a symbolic, mystical
dimension with historical and political realism”.23
Haight actively embraces the pluralism which marks the postmodem mmd, but is
not content with settiing down to any easy relativism.24 His project is “modest” in the
postmodem sense of being truly apologetic, “from below” and deeply respectful of the
differences along with the similarities to be found in the dialectical, mediated structure of ail
tensive symbolism and human existence generally. He takes seriously the presence of
subjectivity in every attempt at objectivity as discemed by means of the correlative method.
At the same time and as an act of application of this “symbolic realist”
epistemology, Haight’ s project belongs to the constructive (as distinct from deconstructive)
brandi of postmodem reflection on soteriology. The heart of this constructive project is to
be found in his chapters 12 and 13. In chapter 12 Haight offers a description of the
elements necessary for an objective soteriological account which might be credible to the
postmodem mmd; “objective” in the sense that it focuses on the work of Jesus. Then in
chapter 13 he draws on “family resemblances” he finds in the hermeneutical structure of
liberation theologies as a structure for the process of the subjective appropriation of
salvation for our time. from these two core chapters Haight proceeds to outiine elements
21 HAIGHT, 1999, pp. 11, 472. This is Haight’s expression by which he recognizes the tensive,
historically mediated character of ail religious language. On the one hand, ail theology is symbolic; its
assertions are flot direct statements of information or objective data about God. This is important because
“theologians are sometimes so drawn into the linguistic, textual, and cultural world of a tradition that
meaning becomes taken for granted and begins to function like ordinary non-symbolic language”. To this
extent, Haight is moving away from the idea that tradition, as a source for theology, can somehow be
understood “literally”. On the other hand, “symbols draw human consciousness and life into a deeper world
of encounter with transcendent reality. This represents epistemologically a symbolic realism”. HAIGHT,
1999, pp. 9, 11.
22 HAIGHT, 1999, p.41.
23 HAIGHT, 1999, pp. 490 - 491.
24 HAIGHT, 1999, pp. 188, 428.
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of a constructive, postmodern Christology and trinitarian theology. Before we tum to a
doser look at his constructive project, however, some further orientation to the way in
which Haight examines the Christian tradition conceming soteriology and its narrative
nature is in order.
5.2 The Christian tradition of soteriological narratives
“The term ‘salvation’ refers to the most fundamental of ail Christian expefiences.”25
Yet, concerning the hïstoiy of soteriological accounts of how Jesus saves, Haight observes
that an “extravagant pluralism” of narratives has been proposed, and that, unlilce the case of
christology, no council bas ever formulated a definition or provided a universally accepted
conception of salvation.26 “Because of the fullness of the experience of salvation and the
amplitude of ils existential reality, no single definition of salvation can confine its meaning”
for ail times and places.27 Haight observes, and I agree, that “[p]eople interpreted who
Jesus was on the basis of what he did; Christology is dependent on soteriology”.28 This
structure of prÏority helps us understand the historical genesis of doctrine.
To substantiate the pluralism of narratives historically, in chapter six Haight briefly
outlines no less than five Christologies and their implicit soteriologies in the New
Testament.29 Fie goes on in chapter eight to describe an even larger number of the classical
soteriological narratives from early Eastern and Western patristic, through medieval and
reformation sources, which draw on these Biblical themes in different ways and develop
them in terms of the christological formulations of Nicaea and Chalcedon. From these
narratives, lie retrieves anaiytically an “ideal” experience of salvation which underlies
them.3°
25 HAIGHT, 1999, p. 335.
26 HAIGHT, 1999, p. 335.
27 HAIGHT, 1999, p. 335. Nonetheless Haight offers bis own definition of Christian salvation for this
postmodern era as “the encounter with God in Jesus of Nazareth; Jesus makes God present in a saving
way”, p. 338. He also approves of David Tracy’s definition of salvation as “the experience-acceptance of a
releasement from the bondage of guilt-sin, the bondage of radical transitoriness and death, the bondage of
radical anxiety in ail ils forms TRACY, David, “The Christian understanding of salvation-liberation”,
Face toface 14, 1988, p. 39.
28 HAIGHT, 1999, p. 340. This structure of the “priority of soterioiogy to christology is flot agreed upon
by ail theologians”. HAIGHT, 1999, p. xii.
29 HAIGHT, 1999, pp. 155 - 184. These Christologies include the Last Adam Christology of Romans 5
and 1 Corinthians 15, the Son of God Christology of Mark, the Spirit Christology of Luke, the Wisdom
Christology of Phiiippians 2, and, the Logos Christology of John. The presence of, or allusion to, several
of these themes in Julian’s Showings is addressed fully in NUTH, Joan, Wisdom ‘s daughter: The theology
ofJutian of Norwich, NY, Crossroad, 1991, eh. 3.
30 From among the narratives of Irenaeus, Athanasius, Augustine, Anselm, Abelard, Luther and Calvin,
Haight abstracts seven propositions descriptive of the idealized experience of salvation: 1) Jesus the teacher
is experienced as revealing God; 2) God is encountered in Jesus; 3) God is experienced as a loving Creator;
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Haight’s project is constructive, a henneneutics of retrieval. 11e admits at the outset
that some of these narratives have corne historically to lose touch with their symbolic,
multivalent and dialectical structure and take on an ontological, “literai” status.3’ Over
time, this reduction of their narrative depth lias resulted in their becoming obstacles, instead
of invitations, to a deeper appropriation of the salvation of God in Jesus.
It needs to be emphasized here that this lias become a major reason for the crisis in
soteriological credibility today. Among the narratives whicli Haiglit considers, the
Anselmian ontological argument for a satisfaction theoiy of redemption came to dominate
the Western Church. As Elizabeth Johnson observes,
I sometimes think that Anselm should be considered tlie most successful theologian
of aIl time. Imagine having an almost one-thousand-year mn for your theological
constmct! It was neyer declared a dogma but miglitjust as well have been, 50
dominant has been its influence in theology, preachin, devotion, and the
penitential system of the Cliurch, up to our own day. 2
It is flot Haight’ s intention to go into critical detail as to how aspects of tlie
“idealized” experience underlying salvation in Anseim’ s Cur Deus homo became distorted.
I note, however, Anderson’s briefer and more critical account of the “violent” character of
this and a number of the classical soteriologies.33 And as Elizabeth Johnson observes, the
“effective histoiy” of Anselm’ s theological construct has been quite different from the
“idealized” experience. She criticizes the satisfaction theory
for its focus on tlie death of Jesus to the virtual exclusion of Fils ministry and
resurrection, tlius truncating the biblical witness; for its methodological mistake of
literalizing what is meant to be, in tmth, a metaphor, tuming it into an ontological
reality; for its promotion of the value of suffering, easily exploited to maintain
situations of injustice; and for its effective history which lias fostered the idea of an
angry God who needs to be recompensated by the bloody death of his Son.34
Thus, Schullebeeckx observes that late medieval devotion to, and imitation of, the suffering
Jesus represented a movement in the Christian interpretation of suffering into
a phase in which the symbol of the cross becomes a disguised legitimation of social
abuses, albeit to begin with stiil unconsciously.... “Suffering in itself’, no longer
suffering through and for others, took on a mystical and positive significance so
4) The devil represents an experience of a priori evil to which human existence is in bondage; 5) Divine
fidelity is experienced in Jesus’ human fidelity; 6) Jesus is experienced as the archetypal human being, the
final Adam; and 7) Jesus’ resurrection is the promise that meets the hope of human existence. HAIGHT,
1999, pp. 237 - 243.
31HAIGHT, l999,p. li.
32 JOHNSON, Elizabeth, “Jesus and salvation”, Proceedings ofthe Cathotic theotogical society of
Arnerica 49, 1994, p.5.
‘ ANDERSON, Derek, Jutian ofNorvich’s nonviotent account of satvation, Ph.D., Loyola University,
Chicago, 2005, ch. 1.
JOHNSON, 1994, p. 5.
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that instead of having a critical power it really acquired a reactionary significance.
Suffering in itself became a “symbol”.35
Soteriology is “intrinsically narrative”.36 Haight notes the transformational
character of the experience of salvation in narrative:
A narrative involves an event that moves things from one state of affairs to another.
In this case, human existence is affected and changed through the event of Jesus
Christ. Soteriology is an interpretation of the story of Jesus Christ by retelling, or
redescribing, or expanding or augmenting it, with the resuit that the particular
salvific point of the story is highlighted. The unity or coherence of the story of
salvation, its salvific point, is the movement from the problem in which human
existence finds itself to its resolution by the event of Jesus Christ.37
Haight observes that each soteriological retelling of how human existence is
changed in a saving or liberating way by the event of Jesus Christ can be judged as to its
effectiveness: “It is successful in the measure in which it corresponds to the event of
Jesus, and the people to which it is addressed are drawn into it, and recognize its relevance
in their own existence”.38
To get at the experience underlying each narrative, Haight asks such questions as
Just what is human existence being saved from? What exactly did Jesus do for our
salvation, or what did God do in or through Jesus? What is the “being saved” or
the saved state of human existence? And how are people involved or drawn up into
this story so that they are a part of it, and it is their story?39
These questions and the answers they elicit will become very helpful in reading the
soteriological narrative embedded in Julian’s exemplum of the servant and the lord.40
SCHILLEBEECKX, Edward, Christ: The experience of Jesus as Lord, NY, Seabury Press, 1990, p.
699. David Aers’ study of the humanity of Christ in Julian of Norwich and other “oppositional traditions”
in late fourteenth century England asks pointedly whether his own appropriation of this liberationist critique
is a form of “presentism”. The same will, no doubt, be asked of the present study. Aers finds, rather, that
“these questions must be answered in the negative. The projects of many late medieval Christians included
a response to the Gospels, and to current orthodoxies, quite congruent with aspects of commentary by
Segundo and Schillebeeckx”. AERS, David, “The humanity of Christ: Reflections on orthodox late
medieval representations”, in AERS, David and Lynn STALEY, The powers of the hoty: Religion, politics
and gender in the late medieval Engtish culture, University Park PN, Pennsylvania state University Press,
1996, pp. 41 - 42. Although Aers’ methodology differs from mine, the rigour of his historical
consciousness contributes to the persuasiveness of the present thesis’ correlative project.
36 HAIGHT, 1999, p. 214. Cf. ROOT, Michael, “The narrative structure of soteriology”, Modem
theology 2, 1986, p 146.
‘ HAIGHT, 1999, pp. 214 - 215.
HAIGHT, 1999, p. 215.
HAIGHT, 1999, p. 215.
° SLUSSER, Michael, “Primitive Christian soteriological themes”, Theotogical studies 44, 1983, pp.
555 -569, applies these questions to the soteriologies of the New Testament with distinctive responses in
each case.
Haight does flot consider Julian’s text among the sotenological classics he analyzes, though it will
become clear that it responds to many aspects of the idealized experience he describes. In the final chapter
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Haight approaches the classical soteriological narratives with the balance lie desfres
to achieve. His preference for “retrieval” as the resolution for “suspicion” of the tradition is
clear. But it is on the basis of the criteria of today’s needs and the liermeneutic awareness
of the structure of human knowledge and existence that bis assessment of the tradition is
made. It is in the sarne spirit that the current study will be attempted. We tum now to look
more closely at bis assessment of the postmodern situation and soteriological themes.
5.3 Currents in contemporary soteriology and postmodern
exigencies
Haiglit identifies a number of themes in contemporaiy soteriology as a discipline
which indicate a shift taldng place from modernism into postmodernism.4’ Within each
theme, I will also identify the postmodern exigencies or questions to which these themes
are attempting to respond.
First on the list is the shift to an historical imagination, which, focused in
soteriology on the life and ministry of the person Jesus of Nazareth, began with
Schleiermacher. This represents a significant departure from the mythic style of language of
the classic soteriological narratives which view redemption as some kind of objective event.
Elsewhere in the book, Haight traces the evolution in western Christianity of Logos
Christology, which took on a life of its own entirely apart from the biblical narratives of
Jesus, and presumed that knowledge of the life of the Trinity in se was available to human
nature. Mselm’s satisfaction theory of the Logos as the means by which God’s honour is
repaired after the damage done to it by human 5m, would be an example of this kind of
mythic language of objective event, which is no longer believable.
Conscious of the hermeneutical dimension inherent in any “life of Jesus”, Haight
lias nonetlieless laid the groundwork for the appreciation of the “concrete symbol” Jesus,
as against, in this case, the “conceptual symbol” of tlie Logos of a Christology from
above 42
The salvific character of Jesus’ action must be found precisely in bis historical
action, lis this-worldly comportment. It cannot be understood by projecting
actions and beliaviors of Jesus outside this world, about which in principle we
know nothing.43
of this thesïs I will be better able to show how her exemplum narrative responds to a number of the current
exigencies raised by Haight himself. I argue there that her text can no longer flot be considered in any
serious discussion of the classics, or of a credible soteriology for our time.
The following account of these themes and exigencies is found in HAIGHT, 1999, ch. 12, “Jesus as
savior”, pp. 335 - 362.
42 HAIGHT, 1999, p. 344.
‘ HAIGHT, 1999, p. 338. GALVIN, John, “From the humanity of Christ to the Jesus of history: a
paradigm shift in Catholic christology”, Theotogical studies 55, 1994, p. 260, traces this paradigm shift
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Moreover, this shift to historical imagination extends to the influence of Jesus, or
the spirit of God present in him, on lis followers and the institution of the Church “which
is the medium of this historical influence”. Thus the doctrines conceming Jesus also are to
be seen genetically, emerging historically in relation to contextual exigencies in the Church.
Salvation is flot privatistic but unfolds in and through the community. It must be able to be
described phenomenologically, though symbolically, recognizing that the reality of
salvation from God can only be expressed in an historically mediated way.
Correlative to the theme of historical consciousness are two observations in
Haight’s own construction of objective soteriology. Salvation, he holds, must be integral.
[IJt cannot touch a so-called spiritual dimension of a person’s life and flot include
lis or lier activity in this world. Salvation today cannot be interpreted as salvation
from the world.... The world is the full measure of the human body.... Salvation
must incorporate the world insofar as the world, although in one respect over
against the self, is also part of the self.44
Salvation must also be comprehensive. It must be interpreted socially as well as
individually. “The idea of an individual salvation apart from the salvation of the species is
incoherent”.45 The postmodern respect for the unintelligibility and mystery of evil as
witnessed this century in its collective manifestations is a major starting point for any
credible soteriology. Our implication in systemic forms of evil, sin, suffering, ignorance,
guilt and death requires a concommitant understanding of salvation. “There is no salvation
apart from being in relation with other human beings”.46
The pluralism, within the tradition, of soteriological responses to this question
“what is human nature being saved from?” bears some relation to the answers they give to
the question “what did Jesus do that saved us?” and “how did that make 50 great a
difference?” Slusser shows, with sensitive historical imagination, how different biblical
soteriologies respond differently to this question.47 Significantly, it is important to seek
responses which help “decomplexify” the experience of sin and salvation, where this has
been entangled with Church teachings which have produced false, unnecessary suffering
which bas occurred in the latter part of the 2Oth century. Previously, theological interest reflected on the
implications of the Chalcedonian formulation. The interest in the lesus of history however, began with an
increased interest in biblical matters, and bas developed out of a new integration of questions of fundamental
theology into dogmatic theology and with a questioning of the meaning of christological statements. This
will be a significant shift to remember as this study later tums to Julian of Norwich, for whom the
humanity of Christ was paradigmatic.
HAIGHT, 1999, P. 355.
HAIGHT, 1999, p. 365.
46 HAIGHT 1999, p. 365.
SLUSSER, 1983, pp. 556 ff.
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and served only to keep some groups of people in despair of appropriating the comfort and
joy of salvation.
The significance of these two exigencies in the postmodern world for Haight is
such that in bis subsequent chapter on the subjective appropriation of salvation this
dimension of salvation as integral to and and affectïng ail aspects of human action is taken
up as the very basis on which to ground Christian spirituality. Likewïse, salvation or
liberation of human freedom in action must take place in and be a response to society.48
The second theme which Haight identifies in modem soteriology shifting into
postmodemism, is that of salvation as revelation, championed by Karl Barth arid Karl
Rahner. It is not merely knowledge or explanation, it is the experience of encountering
God. Jesus reveals God; makes God present in a mediated way. The concept of revelation
here is not fundamentalistic or literalistic. It is both subjective and objective.49
The postmodem exigency to wbich tbis theme attempts to respond is that salvation
must be able to be actual and real, experienced now, and flot just a promise or an
exclusively future reality. What is at issue is that “secular societies generate a combination
of critical skepticism and naive trust.... Any deep and lasting notion of salvation must be
drawn from an experience of an objective mediation that is equally solid and enduring”.5°
The third theme in contemporary soteriology has to do with what Jesus did for our
salvation.
One of the most serious problems for understanding today what Jesus did for
human salvation is the traditional focus that Christians place on the suffering and
death of Jesus. Even more troubling is the positive valuation they place on Jesus’
death on a cross. How can the suffering and crucifixion of Jesus be anything but
evil? How can the strange and tortuous explanations of how the cross could have
been positive and salvific even begin to make any sense to a postmodem
imagination?51
Any literalized construal of the language of sacrifice, as encountered in the classical
soteriological narratives, begets misunderstandings and problems. Haight draws on the
writing of liberation theologian Jon Sobrino who argues from Paul’s theology of the cross
that it was flot Jesus’ death that was pleasing to God; it was flot the pain and suffeiing
Jesus underwent which produces salvation. Rather, what was pleasing to God was the
whole of Jesus’ life, that is Jesus’ faithfulness. The cross highlights “that this is how
48 HAIGHT, 1999, p. 389.
‘ HAIGHT, 1999, pp. 344 - 345.
° HAIGHT, 1999, p. 355.
HAIGHT, 1999, p. 345.
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Jesus’ life was”.52 Sobrino understands Jesus’ faithfulness as salvific for others because
God is at work in the ministry of Jesus. It is God’s faithflulness, God’s love for
humankind which is rendered transparent in Jesus’ faithfulness. The cross is revelatory of
God’s love by symbolic causality, not efficient causality.53 Further, tbis reveals that
conceming human existence, Jesus mediates what God wants human beings to be.
“Human beings, therefore, have a model to see what the human can be and should be”.54
Says Sobrino, “this saving efficacy is shown more in the form of an exemplary cause than
of an efficient cause”.55
This theme is at the heart of the postmodern demand for credibility in Christian
soteriology, which must begin from below, with the human, historical person of Jesus. It
is in une with the exemplar theme in Pauline soteriology which, as Siusser notes,
emphasizes the humanity of Jesus.56 Jesus must be an approachable example on which his
followers can model their lives, and through whom they can experience God’s salvation.
The fourth theme which Haight treats is related to the third. Just as Jesus’ whole
earthly ministry is important in bis saving action, so also is bis Resurrection, as described
by Pannenberg and Moltmann. “The salvific power of the resurrection is explained by
correlating it with the buman experience of hope”.57 Such hope is unequivocally joyful,
and flot a fearful expectation of an uncertain outcome of the Last Judgment. To describe
the salvific character of resurrection hope requires us to enter into a projection of the
transformation of the disciples before and after their realization that Jesus was risen. The
reversai of despair wbich is effected by that transformation, the exceeding of the fulfilment
of the void they had experienced in Jesus’ death, is flot merely a psychological state, but
the source of a significantly different vision of reality wbicb opens their vision of the future
to a new dimension of being and action.
Clearly this theme responds to the postmodem exigency that salvation be
revelatory, disclosive of an encounter with God mediated by Jesus which is transformative.
As well, it responds to the postmodem concem that history, and human freedom and
creativity within history, have ultimate meaning given to it by the finality of salvation.
52 SOBRINO, Jon, Jesus tise liberator: A historicat-theotogicat view, Maryknolt, NY, Orbis Books, 1993,
p. 228.
HAIGHT, 1999, p. 346.
HAIGHT, 1999, p. 347.
SOBRINO, p. 230.
56 SLUSSER, p. 567.
HAIGHT, 1999, p. 347.
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Human existence is intentional action that extends into the future and aiways effects
novelty, new forms of being.... Salvation in our world must address the
connection between human action and the ultimate state of things, the eschaton.58
The fifth theme in modem soteriology shifting into postmodemism examines the
question of what kind of causality can properly be attributed to Jesus’ saving action. The
appeal to classical narratives and even some twentieth century soteriologies, in which
Jesus’ saving action is narrated in terms of events as transactions occuning in another
world, appears mythological and unintelligible to the postmodem sensibility. However, a
simple appeal to experience in the context of a pluralistic world does not satisfy the
question of intelligibility either. How does Jesus save then? This question is conditioned
by the perspective of the postmodem historical and pluralistic awareness of the exigency of
responding to the fact and presence of other world religions.
Modem christology is spiit between those who retain the idea that Jesus caused or
causes the saivation of ail and those who do flot.... Only by means of a theoretical
or speculative metaphysical construction cari one attempt to understand how Jesus
Christ had a causal influence on the salvation of those who have neyer corne in
contact with him historically, or who existed before the appearance of Jesus.59
Haight proposes an answer to the question of the causality of Jesus’ saving action
as being “in the genus of symbolic or sacramental causality”.6° Because only God can
save, the “action of God as saving Spirit or grace occurs from without, because it is
transcendent, but within a person, because it is God’ s presence as saving power restoring
human existence”.61 Jesus represents, symbolically and sacramentally, God’s action and
thus makes it conscious and explicit to human beings in a way which would otlierwise flot
have been known consciously.
Christ causes the salvation of Christians by transforming God’s presence for
saivation into an explicitly conscious encounter. Jesus does flot cause God’s loving
presence to human existence which is there from the dawn of creation. But Jesus
causes it to be revealed, and thus formally accepted by human freedom, and thus
consciously effective.62
Thus, the work of Jesus’ saving action, which Haight describes as “objective salvation” is
intrinsicaliy a question of symbolic causality. The knowiedge of this objectivity is related
to its subjective appropriation. This does flot make it less “real”; rather, it acknowledges
openly the symbolic nature of that realism. Christians and non-Christians have salvific
58 HAIGHT, 1999, p. 356.
HAIGHT, 1999, p. 349.
‘° HAIGHT, 1999, p. 350.
61 HAIGHT, I999, p. 350.
62 HAIGHT, 1999, p. 350.
25
knowledge differently but those differences may be accepted without the need for co
ersion.
The sixth and final theme in modem-tuming-postmodem soteriology which Haight
treats concems the relationship between the creative and the saving activity of God.
Following Augustine, Barth sees these as activities of two radically different orders:
“salvation repairs an otherwise permanently damaged and fallen nature.... Reality itself has
been changed”.63 Rahner views them as distinct but inseparable. Schillebeeckx, however,
recognizes no real distinction between the creative and the saving activity of God, and it is
this perspective which Haight advocates as one whicli meets the postmodem exigency of
historical consciousness.
In a context of radical awareness of contingency and fragility of the human project
and the unintelligibility of evil, the root sense of salvation will not be isolated from God’ s
creative power: “Wherever there is wholeness, wherever there is healing, wherever things
go right, the condition leads back to God’s creative, saving power as source and
ground”.64 Moreover, in the postmodem context, one must say not only that God creates
in order to save, but also that “God saves in order to create”.65 That is to say, God’s
saving action “augments human freedom and releases it for creativity. Salvation is not
merely salvation from but also salvation for a renewed exercise of human freedom”.66
Recognizing God’s creative and saving activity as one is significant for responding flot
only to the fragility of the human project, but of the ecological precariousness of the earth
itself. Theologians such as Moltmann and Elizabeth Johnson are calling for a soteriology
which makes the object of salvation cosmic in this new sense.
The above whirlwind tour only begins to scratch the surface of engagement
between contemporary soteriology and postmodem context, but it gives a taste of the
mutually critical correlational method at work in contemporaiy approaches to objective
soteriology. A fair number of these problems and exigencies will take on new colour as we
revisit them in the final chapter of this study. Certainly Julian’ s understanding of the
meaning of the cross, the Resurrection and lier grasp of the revelatoiy nature of salvation
will stand out, but they are not the only issues she addresses by means of lier
understanding of the saving work of Christ. We tum now to Haight’ s articulation of a
credible subjective soteriology, the dynamism underlying liow that saving work of Jesus is
appropriated.
63 HAIGHT, 1999, p. 351.
M HAIGHT, 1999, p. 352.
HAIGHT, 1999, p. 353, following J. L. Segundo and Elizabeth Johnson.
66 HAIGHT, 1999, p. 353.
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5.4 The hermeneutical structure of appropriation: the case of
feminfsm
Given the exïgencies of the postmodem context to which contemporary soteriology
seeks to respond in the themes described in the preceding section, Haight tums in chapter
13 to the hermeneutical structure of interpretation found in liberation theologies for the most
adequate approach to understanding the dynamism of subjective soteriology, the
appropriation of salvation, for our tirne. This chapter is central to his conelative method
and religious epistemology. Among liberation, feminist and political soteriologies he
identifies a “family resemblance” in terms of their structure of the dynamism of
appropriation.67 The structure of interpretation common to liberation theologies is
threefold.
It begins with a negative experience of contrast or suspicion which elicits a question
or set of questions conceming some matter in the situation. There must be an existential
problem, a social evil which is unintelligible, and which cornes to be seen as needing
resolution. So, for example, in feminisrn, the negative experience is of the
sexisrn built into androcentric cultures, societies and patriarchal institutions. Often
the structures of inequality are blatant and obvïous. But when this sexism is written
deeply into a traditional culture, it often goes unnoticed, for it has roots in a long-
standing memory, ofien codified into law, and subsists in an intertwined network
of instances. In some cases the biases lie so deeply ingrained that they are
experienced as precisely what should be, even according to the will of God. Often
only the experience of the victims can witness to the negativity, to the demeaning
effects of the system.68
Secondly, the matter discloses a response to the question, fulfilling a positive
demand for intelligibility. “The ultirnately mysterious and unintelligible evil of these
situations touches the inquirer and thus becomes a religious question”.69 One of the three
religious questions Haight goes on to address has to do with the ground of hurnan identity.
In terms of systems and relationships of power, “What is the source of hurnan
personhood? Is the person any more than his or her social identity? Are groups of people
able to be defined, stereotyped and relegated to an inferior place in society?”7°
67 HAIGHT, 1999, p. 370. The following account is drawn from his ch. 13 “Liberation and salvation:
Christology and the Christian life” p?. 363 - 394. He draws extensively from JOHNSON, Elizabeth, She
who is: the mysteiy of God infeminist theologicat discourse, NY, Crossroad, 1992, ch. 4, where, on p.
62, she calis this structure the “dynamism of the conversion experience”. Johnson’s account wilI become
part of the structure of the diptychs in the final part of this thesis.
68 HAIGHT, 1999, p. 372.
69 HAIGHT, 1999, p. 373.
° HAIGHT, 1999, p. 373.
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The same social relationships that shape human beings also have the capacity to
submerge the individual, negate the person, destroy identity, rob whole groups and
classes of people of their autonomy, freedom and creativity. The... structures of
patriarchy that subordinate people because of their gender... attack human beings
as subjects: open, free and equal with ail others.71
This kind of question aiso probes what kind of God is behind this vision of oppression,
what interest this God has in human existence, and what the nature and quality of God’ s
will for human history is. By posing these questions to the negativity of the patriarchal
situation, the feminist liberation dynamic sets up a dialectical tension which demands a
positive intelligibility. What kind of God would indeed be believable from a woman’s
point of view?
The second religious question Haight identifies is that of the meaningfulness of
human history in view of the extent of innocent suffering in it. And the third addresses the
purpose of human freedom given the postmodem sense of “ambiguity and potential
destructiveness of what otherwise might be taken for values.... At what point does the
dynamic energy of freedom to achieve something pass over and become a quest for... maie
domination... ?72
Lastly, in the threefold structure of liberation hermeneutic theologies, the response
to these questions is appropriated into the situation of the questioner. The response
discloses the object of interpretation: God as mediated by Jesus Christ.
The historical figure of Jesus of Nazareth is the basis for most liberation theologies.
The oppressive situations against which liberation christology reacts require less a
logos of the cosmos and more a mythos of history.... Only a historical figure can
mediate meaning and salvation to precisely those historical situations that make no
sense for either the victims or the community as a whole.73
Haight notes however, that for some feminist Christologies, this becomes problematic
because of the tension between the genders:
If a fiindamental feminist christological question is how a maie figure can be a
savior for women and the problem in the question is located in a tension between
the sexes, there is less likelihood for an extensive appeal to the historical career of
Jesus. By contrast, feminist christology which is explicitly liberationist locates the
problem flot in gender per se, but in the ideological constnial of ender, i.e., in
androcentrism, patriarchy and more generally dominating power.
In liberationist Christology it is the Jesus of history who has a prophetic bearing on the
present day situation, and revealed through Jesus is God. For Haight, the nature of God,
7L HAIGHT, 1999, p. 373.
72 HAIGHT, 1999, p. 375.
HAIGHT, 1999, p. 377.
HAIGHT, 1999, p. 377 n. 20.
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is expressed in the main metaphor used by Jesus, of God as Abba, Father, which points to
God’s goodness and love for people as God’s children.75 It is God’s faithfulness and
trustworthiness which Jesus reveals; God’s non-authoritarian non-oppressive
transcendence and yet God’ s loving neamess to creation, actually touching and engaging of
human existence. Feminist Christologies have difficulty with the metaphor of the
fatherhood of God revealed through Jesus because in a patriarchal Christian society this
metaphor lias become deeply distorted. Dorothee Soelle, for example, asks
why it is that human beings honor a God whose most important attnbute is power,
whose prime need is to subjugate, whose greatest fear is equality.... Why should
we honor and love a being that does not transcend but only reaffirms the moral level
of our male-dominated culture? Why should we honor and love this being, and
what moral right do we have to do so if this being is in fact no more than an
outsized man whose main ideal is to be independent and to have power?76
Feminist theologians find a variety of sources by which to introduce femininity into the
veiy traits Sobrino attributes to God the Father as revealed through Jesus, in relation to
God’s chiidren. God’s nature as essentially related (as opposed to unrelated) to human
existence, and God, revealed in the crucifixion, as participant in human suffering (as
opposed to being the perpetrator of it), are found to be feminine, maternai traits.77
In the Ïast section of this chapter on the liberationist hermeneutic of appropriation of
salvation, Haight draws out its implications for a Christian spirituality. His stress, again,
is on the social character of sin, and thus also the social, integral and comprehensive nature
of soteriology which is needed to address it coherently.78
6.0 Relational psychoanalysis as dialogue partner with soteriology and
femini sm
This chapter now tums its attention to attempt to situate the potential place of
relationai psychoanalysis as a dialogue partner with soteriology and feminism.
At first glance, a post-Freudian relational psychoanalysis which came into existence
as a means of responding to the problems encountered in narcissistic personality disorders
and focusing on the pre-oedipal period in human psychodynamic deveiopment, may seem
to have little to do wïth Christian soteriology or feminism.
HAIGHT, 1999, pp. 381 - 382, after Sobrino.
SOELLE, Dorothee, The strength ofthe weak: Toward a Christianferninist identity, PhiÏadelphia,
Westmînster, 1984, p. 97. For other sources of feminist critique of the model of God as father see
JOHNSON, 1998, p. 282, n. 57.
JOHNSON, 1998, chapters 10 - 12.
78 HAIGHT, 1999, pp. 382 - 385.
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D. W. Winnicott of the Bntish school of object relations theory, however, opened
the way toward a greater ease of dialogue between post-Freudian psychology and religion.
The potential for this development lies in bis concepts of transitionai objects and transitional
space, as flot simply intrapsychic illusions, but as essential dynamics in the creation of ail
cultural phenomena, art, science, philosophy and religion.79 Winnicott’s contribution here
is multi-layered, but includes an epistemology of symbol formation as well as a relational
understanding of human nature.
Epistemoiogically, Winnicott’ s theory offers a means of understanding the genesis
of symbol formation and the dynarnism of the interrelatedness of subjectivity and
objectivity in ail symbolic formation.8° Transitionai space is the locus for the development
of symbols and ail culturai phenomena, which retain this quaiity of being both subjective
and objective, created and found. Object relations theory, while it draws on classicai
psychoanalytic concepts such as transference, critiques the Freudian judgment of illusion as
wishful thinking to be discarded in the process of maturation toward the goal of resignation
to the reaiity principle. Objective reality “out there” sirnply is flot available to human
structures of development and knowledge. Rather, ail knowledge of reality is infused with
symbolism, metaphor and illusion engaging self/not self.81 Ibis epistemology, although k
is a social scientific one, is flot uncongenial to the symbolic realist epistemology and the
conelative method described above, as well as to the psychohistorical method.
Relational psychoanalysis is founded on an understanding of human anthropology
as intrinsically relationai. One of the chief concems of these theorists is to show how
pattems of relating to the human “other” which evolve in the dynamics of our earliest
infant-maternai, and -paternal relations (symbiosis, separation, rapprochement, etc.), are
representationaliy paraileled in ail subsequent pattems of relating to others. Winnicott is at
pains to show that this is not simply a process of an intrapsychic nature: ail cultural as well
as personai creativity cornes from this source. Rizzuto shows that this also extends to our
pattems of relating to (unconscious) representations of the divine “Other”.82
WINNICOTF, D. W., Ptaying and reality, NY, Routledge, [19711 1989, chapters 1, 4, 7. Ris object
relations theory is discussed more fully in chapter 2.
80 As will be discussed at greater length in the next chapter, the earliest transitional objects of teddy bear,
blanket, etc. give the child the sense of object permanence of the mother’s breast and face and are invested
with both self/not self meaning. These objects give way and become diffused as other transitional objects
take on these meanings. The basic relationship of trust in the mother or maternal object, made possible by
“good enough” mirroring, is what facilitates the chitd’s creation, in the act of play, of a third space or
transitional space in which objects are “both found and created”.
81 See JONES, James, “Knowledge in transition: toward a Winnicottian epistemology”, Psychoanatytic
review 79, 2, 1992, pp. 223 - 227.
82 RIZZUTO, Ana-Maria, The birth of the living God, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1979, p. 88.
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As the dialogue between relational psychology and Christian theology is begiiming
to develop, the connections and ramifications of this theory for Christian soteriology
generally and for feminist soteriology in particular are emerging.
In a pïthy article entitled “Theological uses of psychology: retrospective and
prospective”, John McDargh brings the field of object relations theory directly into dialogue
with Christian soteriology.83 In the process, McDargh brings to life aspects of the
postmodem situation which the revised correlational method in theology seeks to address,
as we saw in Haight’s study.
McDargh argues that life is seeping out of contemporaly Christian soteriology. He
quotes John Macquarrie:
A religious tradition which seeks to insulate itself from ail connection with man’s
general experience and knowledge on the supposition that God is not to be
measured by the wisdom of the world, flot only shows impiety towards the divine
creation, but also runs the risk of losing its very life.84
McDargh goes on to say that
soteriology is the dialogue I once saw spray-painted on a subway wall. Someone
had written, “Christ is the answer”, in response to which an unknown wag had
later written, “Yes, but what was the question’?” Soteriology is the effort of the
believing community to identify the universal question of the heart for which Christ
was, is, or may be some kind of adequate answer. Where Christ is offered as an
answer to questions no one is asking, the spiritual life blood of the tradition drains
away
In effect, he says, Christianity needs relational psychoanalysis to help find a
language for a postmodem situation which will help to identify effectively its religious
questions and answer them in a credible soteriological narrative which can enable salvation
to be appropriated in our day.
McDargh draws on Jtirgen Moltmann, a German Protestant theologian, as a starting
point from which to identify the positive and specific contribution of psychology in helping
to identify the pathological distortions of human religion, and as a full partner in specifying
the soteriological norm for theology.86 According to Moltmann, psychology must do two
83 McDARGH, John, “Theological uses of psychology: retrospectïve and prospective”, Horizons 12, 2,
1985, p. 259 ff.
84 MacQUARRIE, John, Thinking about God, NY, Harper and Row, 1985, p. 136, cited in McDARGH,
1985, p. 259. We are reminded here of Haight’s identification of the postmodern demand for relating God’s
activity of creation and salvation.
McDARGH, 1985, p. 259.
86 McDARGH, 1985, p. 259. McDargh observes that Moltmann’s
awareness of psychoanalytic theory is almost exclusively limited to freud’s classic critique of
religious origins [and that hej does flot appreciate the psychological revisions which would serve
his theological project. Yet his cail for them is so clear that lis discussion is a useful place to
begin.
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things: First it must help name that essential human problematic to which the saving activity
of God’s Christ is directed; second, it must help render an account of the redemptive
process by which human brokenness or sin is overcome.87 The first of these two would
seem to amount to the kinds of questions Haight poses of objective soteriology, that is,
“from what is humankind being saved?”, “how does Jesus save?” etc. The second appears
to point to the requirement for an account of the dynamism of subjective soteriology, or
appropriation.
With regard to the first requirement, that psychology help name the essential human
problematic to which God’s saving activity in Jesus is directed, Moltmann is critical of the
(post-world war two) individualism and pnvatization of much theological existentialism,
and wants to ground bis discussion of the “liberative dynamics” of God’ s salvific action in
Christ in a sound understanding of psychological processes.88 This language of liberation
is significant, as it exposes the general direction toward which the dialogue between
soteriology and relational psychology is becoming oriented. Moltmann seeks a psychology
which can embrace a social, comprehensive understanding of soteriology.
For Moltmann the essential human problematic which psychoanalysis must reveal is
“the psychological barriers on which [Christian faith] can exercise its lïberating power”.89
Initially, Mohmann had in mmd Freud’ s critique of the “religion of anxiety” focused on self
salvation and perfection, with its attempts to avoid the terror of death and the awesomeness
of human responsibility.9° But beyond seeing psychology as a “bulldozer in the way of the
gospel”, Moltmann is calling for a therapeutic understanding of soteriology, beginning with
the negative question which is in effect, “If Jesus saves, but we are stili in our
psychological distress, so what?” Soteriology must in Moltmann’s eyes be able to address
the distress of our age, with help from psychoanalysis. The liberationist focus Moltmaim
identifies at work in this dialogue between psychoanalysis and soteriology situates it in the
general sector of the hermeneutical theologies of appropriation, which Haight finds most
able to respond to postmodern exigencies. Presumably because of the “individualism and
privatization” which was present, flot only in the existential theology of that time, but also
in Freud’s intrapsychic psychoanalysis, with which Moltmann was familiar however,
Moltmann was unable to draw out the liberationist theme in any extensive way. Perhaps
MOLTMANN, Jiirgen, The crucifled God: The cross oJChrist as thefoundation and criticism of
Christian theology, London, SCM Press, 1974, pp. 29$ ff, in McDARGH, 1985, p. 260.
$8 McDARGH, 1985, p. 260.
MOLTMANN, 1974, p. 298.
9° McDARGH, 1985, p. 260.
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this is why Haight does flot include the application of psychoanalysis to soteriology among
the liberationist theologies lie considers.
The limitations of Freudian theory to offer an account of the workings of Christian
salvation and its vision of the fulness of humanity brought Moltmann to the second
criterion of psychoanalysis for dialogue with theology, that it must help “render an account
of the redemptive process by which human brokenness or sin is overcome”.9’ Those
limitations reduced ail religion to pathology in a spirit of stoic resignation or apatheia.
Any form of religious or utopian hope must be given up as residues of illusions of early
wish fiulfilments. According to McDargh, for Moltmann
[cJlassical psychoanalysis errs precisely in its despising of the dreams of our
individual and collective youth, that is, in its failure to understand how the wishes
of infancy may ripen and mature into the mature hopes of adulthood, and yet remain
throughout life the creative source of what is new and renewing in human life.
Similarly Christian prayer... is incomprehensible --except reductionistically-- within
a psychology that does not understand the life-long function of fantasy and
imagination as an instrument to discover reality. But, if there were a psychology
that appreciated how the most vital and intense yearnings of the human infant for
connection, for relationship, and for recognition are not necessarily resigned in
maturity, but rather imaginatively reworked and reinterpreted to become a resource
for psychic renewal and spiritual discover1, then such a psychology might indeed
be a full partner in a soteriological project. 2
McDargh lias written elsewhere, and the next chapter of this study wïll show in more
detail, that object relations psychology “appears to offer a way of understanding the origins
of human religious sensibility... that finally does justice to religious maturation as well as
religious pathology, adult faith as well as childhood fantasy”.93 Moreover, what earlier
psychoanalysis viewed as private, intrapsychic mechanisms are now seen through the lens
of object relations psychology as interpsychic, interpersonal and potentially culturally
mediated phenomena. This bears directly on the power of this school of psychoanalysis to
address soteriological appropriation more fully in terms of the liberationist hermeneutic.
6.1 Sebastian Moore
It is at this point that McDargh draws on the work of Sebastian Moore’s
“psychological appropriation of the stoiy of Jesus” in the categories of object relations
psychology. Moore’s work will help significantly to articulate the liberation dynamic in
Julian’ s conversion process, beginning with the first diptych in the last part of this study.
McDARGH, 1985, p. 260.
92 McDARGH, 1985, p. 261.
McDARGH, John, Psychoanalytic object relations psychology and the study of religion: on faith and
the imaging of God, Lanham MD, University Press of America, 1983, p. xiii.
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Moore’ s problematic is explicitly soteriologicai: in an age of narcissistic longing for self
worth he asks “how is the crucifixion of Jesus salvific?” Moore, a British Roman
Catholic Benedictine monk, desires to translate into categories of interiority wliat people
mean when they give testimony to Jesus for transformations in their lives.94 At the same
time, Moore sees no way to recover a universai salvific significance from the story of Jesus
unless it intersects with the pre-religious story of human consciousness. This
consciousness Moore locates flot in some transcendentai reflection, but in the contemporary
postmodem psychoanalytic account of narcissism: the one universal human desfre is for
self worth, a desire “to know ourselves as loved, valued and the source of delight to a
beloved other” which amounts to a pre-religious orientation toward God.95 According to
McDargh,
Moore proposes... that ail human beings have a “pre-religious love affair with
God” insofar as the question of the heart “do you love me?” is ultimately asked flotjust to the significant others that are the human chiid’ s first interpersonai universe,
but to the horizon of ail meanings and existence -- the origin and end of human
becoming, in short, to God. With the postmodem psychoanalytic thinkers, Moore
sees these questions flot as infantile yeamings better outgrown, but as the persistent
crie de coeur [sic] of every liuman being which are dealt with throughout life in the
matrix of reai reiationships in the world as weli as in the experientially real inner
representational world in which we represent to ourselves in story and symbol the
uitimate answers we live by. The encounter in prayer, sacrament and community
with the living Christ is thereby given a psychological location and a reality that is
flot reductive, even though it is psychologically located.96
Clearly, relational psychoanalysis lias touclied a nerve in discerning tlie distress of
our age, and may foster the emergence of the kind of “re-mythologized” or symboiic
narrative Haight is caliing for as an effective soterioiogicai response to postmodem
exigencies. It may weil move toward the development of a credibie soteriological narrative
which is able to respond to the question “How does Jesus save?” with an effective
epistemoiogicai understanding of how that causaiity is symbolic.97
McDARGH, 1985, P. 262.
McDARGH, 1985, p. 262. See MOORE, Sebastian, Thefire and the rose are one, London, Darton,
Longman and Todd Press, 1980, 158 p.
96 McDARGH, 1985, pp. 262 - 263.
I would suggest this is being borne out concretely in relational psychoanalysis by the varieties of
approaches which are emerging at this nexus of dialogue. See for examples, the article by RANDALL,
Robert,”Soteriological dimensions in the work of Heinz Kohut”, Journal of religion and health 19, 1980,
pp. 83 - 91; and the cultural study of the “root” or “generative” metaphor oftheodicy and the redemptive
process as essentially a narrative one denving from “biblical theology and neo-platonic mysticism”, but
being mapped out anew in the discourse of anglo-american psychoanalytic theory, in KIRCHNER,
Suzanne, The religious and romantic origins ofpsychoanatysis: individuation and integration in post
freudian theoiy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 3 - 11.
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Moreover, McDargh is also sensitive to the privatizing Freudian legacy out of
whicli neo-psychoanalytic theory lias emerged, and proposes that relational psychoanalysis
is a means to redress what Haight lias higfflighted as the urgent requirement for social
compreliensiveness in any postmodem soteriology that would daim to ground Christian
spirituality in a liberationist structure of appropriation. McDargli draws attention to the
“intellectual and empirical pressures within modem psyclioanalytic theonzing which move
it in creative ways to engage political and social realities as essential and not accidentai
components in the formation of intrapsycliic life”.98 He includes here, significantly, the
work of Alice Miller on tlie impact of psychological and physical abuse in chuldhood on
psychic development as well as tlie long-term consequences for polifical and cultural life
which are perpetuated by such abusive family and chuld-rearing pattems. Object relations
theory, lie notes, is being extended in the direction of family tlierapy and general systems
theory.
Another area of serious significance, which McDargh does flot include explicitly, is
tlie development of feminist tliemes in relational psychoanalysis whicli bear on soteriology.
The final part of this chapter tums briefly to this area.
6.2 Cynthia Crysdale
Moore’s project is developed in feminïst terms by Canadian Anglican theologian
Cynthia Crysdale for an understanding of the process of appropriation of salvation which
does justice to tlie liuman predïcament of women. Her feminist reading of Moore is
grounded even more explicitly in a liberationist structure of conversion. I draw extensively
on lier work in the second diptych.
Cynthia Ciysdale’s appropriation of Moore’s soteriology is sensitive to both tlie
social location of women, and the concem to understand personal responsibility for sin in
tandem with the systemic causes and effects of sinY9 I will follow Crysdale’s description
of lier soteriology as a double-sided approacli to redemption.’°° In tlie first movement
Crysdale examines liow women and otliers on tlie underside of liistory can find tlie cross
an autlientic symbol of salvation when women can situate ourselves primarily as liaving
been victims of systemic 5m, and can identify with the cmcified ratlier tlian the crucifiers, a
difference in situation whicli lias important consequences for how sin and salvation are
experienced by sucli persons, at least initially.
McDARGH, 1985, pp. 263 - 264.
CRYSDALE, Cynthia, Embracing travail: Retrieving the cross today, NY, Continuum, 2001, 208 p.
CRYSDALE, 2001, p. 25.
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However, Crysdale is also concemed, as is Sebastian Moore, that only Christ is
tmly sinless. Victims of social and familial systemic sin participate nonetheless in those
systems, but can, with healing, become more responsible agents. It is thïs second
movement, which is concemed with articulating an authentic expression of what the
experience of sin and personal responsibility is for women and others who have no voice in
history, which rounds out Crysdale’s soteriology, and makes it even more interesting for
an application to one, who, I suggest, did undergo gracious healing of a systemic distortion
in lier understanding of sin, and maturation in human freedom and responsibility.
6.3 Elisabeth Koenig
Elisabeth Koenig, an American Episcopal’°1 theologian, has also been influenced
by Sebastian Moore’s soteriological project.’°2 Her doctoral thesis on Julian of Norwich
will be valuable in the final diptych both because of ber original identification of the
compensatory mirroring function operative in the exemplum, but also because of lier
intuition that it also contributed to Julian’s reshaping of other elements in the objective
soteriological tradition. Moreover, Koenig’s Ricoeurian approacli was motivated by the
same liermeneutical assumption as the present thesis, that the Showings can speak to our
contemporary situation.
7.0 Retrieving the mystics
As Haight sees it, the language of soteriology is the language of tlie Christian
spiritual life. The relative lack of dialogue between relational psychoanalysis and
soteriology is felt perliaps most keenly in the study of the history of spirituality. McGinn
writes that the
stand-off between empiricism and transempirical epistemology is as strong now as
it was at the beginning of the century. Even those, like myseif, who are convinced
that a purely empirical reading of mystical texts from a reductive psychological
perspective has only an ambiguous contribution to make to the present study of
mysticism, cannot but be troubled by the lack of conversation between
psychological investigators and those involved in studying the history and theory of
mystical traditions. Both sides seem equally at fault in this unrealized
conversation.’03
Lt11 The American Episcopal Church is part of the world-wide Anglican communion.
102 KOENIG, Elisabeth, “Review symposium of Jesus, the liberator of desire, by Sebastian Moore”,
Horizons 18, 1, 1991, pp. 112- 118.
103 McGINN, Bernard, Thefoundations of mysticism, NY, Crossroad, 1991, p. 343. The presence ofGod: A
history of western Christian mysticism 1.
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That the more serious problem for McGinn should be the fact of the lack of
conversation than the “ambiguous contribution” he believes such a conversation might
make, is significant. The lack of conversation is feit particularly as a reverberation of
the postmodem exigencies that salvation be real, revelatory, able to be experienced in the
present time, and also that it be integral and social, comprehensive.
The language of soteriology needs models of practice for women which are drawn
from the tradition and also facilitate or encourage healing and social liberative experiences
of self, God and community. Contemporary feminists are searching the tradition and texts
of women mystics for models of authentic spiritual life and practice which honour the
healing of what Beverly Lanzetta cails women’s “soul wounds” and make possible the
flourishing of women)°4 And some are seeking to reinterpret some of the more
ambiguous themes from the spiritual tradition in woman-affirming ways so as to reclaim
their profound spiritual truths.105 If the psychoanalytic discourse of mirronng correÏated
with Julian’ s soteriology can respond to these exigencies, then the study has more than just
academic significance.
It is flot incidentai that the subject of this study is a major female mystic and
theologian in the bistory of spirituality. The choice of this spiritual writer to study is partly
because of the particular difficulties attending any woman’s desire to grow in personal
maturity and theological integrity. Where is a woman to see the needs of lier nascent self
mirrored in soteriological narrative? The tendency which the tradition has inculcated is
rather for women to feel overresponsible for sin, which deeply conditions our image of,
and quality of relationship with, self and God. To accept that this is flot God’s will and
relinquisli overresponsibility can feel life-transforming, but somehow heretical.
Because of the psycho-spiritual maturation evidenced in Julian’ s life and text, it
might give us unusual “analytic access”106 to both the therapeutic dimension of, and the
integral conversion implied in, the process which that maturity entails. Julian’s vocation
as understood in her time was the rigourous one of anchoress. As will become clearer in
the latter part of the study, Julian’s soteriology of minoring does flot remain simply an
epistemological appropriation. Rather, it engages lier, and her readers, in a practice which
is intended to facilitate profound self-knowledge and the graduai transformation of human
affects in the present time. If it can be shown, by means of the methodology of this study,
04 LANZETTA, Beverly, Radical wisdorn. A feminist nzysticat theotogy, Minneapolis MN, Fortress,
2005, pp. 8- 11.
105 RUFfING, Janet, “Spiritual direction with women: Rec)aiming and reinterpreting key themes ftom the
spiritual tradition”, Presence, an international journal of spiritual direction 12, 3, 2006, pp. 36 - 46.
‘° HOMANS, Peter, The abitity to mourn: disitlusionment and the social origins ofpsychoanatysis,
Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1989, p. 5. KOEMO, 1991, pp. 112 - 113, appropriates the term.
37
that her soteriology of mirroring can have a socially and personally liberative,
transformative effect in people’s lives in our time, then the study will also contribute to the
retrieval of the mystics for a soteriology which seeks the mature flourishing of women’ s
spiritual lives.
8.0 Conclusion
The present chapter laid out the hermeneutical nature and challenges of the present
study, its problematics, hypotheses and methodologies. In drawing together the
theological resources which will be used for the soteriological dimension of the present
study, the foundation is laid for the application of mirroring theoiy to a study of Julian’ s
$howings in terms of the structure of a liberation conversion process.
But first, the next two chapters will look at what mirroring theory is, assess the
value of the theory for a psychohistorical study, and lay the groundwork for the parallel
structure of the Kohutian reading of the therapeutic mirroring transference in Julian’ s
Showings.
CHAPTER 2
THE PSYCHOLOGY 0F MIRRORING AND PSYCHOLOGY 0F
RELIGION BASED ON RELATIONAL PSYCHOANALYSIS
1.0 Outiine of the chapter
This chapter begins by situating the psychological concept of mirroring historically
in terms of two divergent developments from Freud which represent two philosophical
trends, humanist and antihumanist. It then outiines the psychology of mirroring, as it has
been developed along the humanist trend, both by Heinz Kohut in terms of a therapeutic
approach to disorders of the self, that is, narcissistically wounded adults, and by D.W.
Winnicott in terms of a theoretical understanding of the neglected importance of the
fiinction of mirroring in the maternai-infant relation in psychoanalysis for the healthy
development of the self, based on his paediatric studies of interactions between mothers
and their infants. The chapter then tums to explore the literature which has begun to
correlate relational psychoanalysis’ with a psychology of religion. Finally, it situates the
present thesis in this emerging field.
2.0 Mirroring: Situating humanist and antihumanist developments from
Freud
In classical psychoanalysis freudts great theoretical breaktbrough focused on his
concept of the oedipal complex.2 For Freud, the paternal element, focused in the oedipal
conflict between father and son, was the most important one in any psychoanalytic study.3
As noted elsewhere, the expression “relational psychoanalysis” witl be used to descnbe the targer
psychoanalytic movement which includes, among others, Winnicott, Kohut and proponents of American
feminist psychoanalysis. See MITCHELL, Stephen and Lewis ARON, Retationat psychoanatysis: 77ie
emergence ofa tradition, Hillsdale NJ, The analytic press, 1999, pp. x - xii. If the circumstances require
more precision, I wilI refer to Winnicott’s psychoanalytic theory as object relations theory, and Kohut’s as
self psychology.
2 See for example, Freuds Three essays on the theoiy of sexuality, in FREUD, Sigmund, Signwnd Freud
on sexuatity: Three essays on the theory of sexuatity and other works, ed. Angela RICHARDS, NY,
Penguin, 1977, pp. 149 - 150: “...the importance of the Oedipus complex lias become more and more
clearly evident; its recognition lias become the shibboleth that distinguishes the adherents of psycho
analysis from its opponents”.
FREUD, Sigmund, Totem and taboo, eU. James STRACHEY, Toronto, Hogarth, 1955, p. 147.
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By contrast, the pre-oedipal period, characterized by the infants early relation with the
mother, when he finally addressed it in his 1931 article “Female sexuality”, was for Freud
inaccessible to the methods of psychoanalysis.4 The oedipal complex remained for Freud
the context from which emerges the source of the religious sentiment. Freud rejected
Romain Rolland’s notion that the source of religious experience might have something to
do with the earliest infant-maternai relationship. In Civitization and its discontents Freud
acknowledged that an “oceanic feeling” of “an indissoluble bond; of being one with the
external world as a whole” may stem from the infant’s experience of the breast, but,
admitting that lie cannot “discover this ‘oceanic’ feeling” in himself, he rejects the
possibility that this might be a source of the religious and relegates it to being a later
connection. Rather, lie derives religious needs “from the infant’s helplessness and the
longing for the father aroused by it... I cannot think of any need in chuldhood as strong as
the need for a father protection”.5
Nonetheless, Freud’s theory has spawned two schools of psychoanalysis which
have focused on the pre-oedipal relationship between mother and infant, drawing on very
divergent tensions both present in Freud’s corpus, and with quite different consequences
for a theory of a psychology of religious experience. These tensions have been described
as developmental (humanist) and structural (antihumanist), and are opposed in their
understanding of the subject, and in their confidence (or lack of) in the individual
consciousness as locus of knowledge and truth.6
2. 1 French structuralist psychoanalysis
Jacques Lacans French strncturalist psychoanalysis focuses on the flindamental
fragmentation, rupturing or decentring of the self as the effect of language and as the
condition of meaning. Lacan is one of the masters of the hermeneutic of suspicion,
focusing on alienation and fragmentation in the subject. However, where this focus
becomes exclusive, it becomes difficuit to understand how there can be any psychoanalytic
“Everything in the sphere of this first attachment to the mother seemed to me so difficuit to grasp in
analysis-- so grey with age and shadowy and almost impossible to revivify...” FREUD, Sigmund, “Female
sexuality”, in Sigmund Freud on sexuatity: Three essays on the theory of sexuatity and other works, ed.
Angela RICHARDS, NY, Penguin, 1977, p. 373.
FREUD, Sigmund, Civitization and its discontents, cd. James STRACHEY, NY, Norton, 1962, pp. 12,
14, 19, emphasis added.
6 See FLAX, Jane, Thinking fragments: Psychoanalysis, feminism and postmodernism in the
contemporary west, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1990, p. 56.
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growth or development; hence, as noted above, the presence of both structuralist and
developmental tensions in freud’s corpus.
Lacan’s work has been developed and critiqued in very fruitful ways by French
feminists such as Luce frigaray, and by Jesuit historian Michel de Certeau. French
structuralist feminists stress the centrality of the mother-daughter relationsbip as a primary
and continuously determinative force in women’s psyche and activity. They see language
as a resuit of symbolic systems which constitute gender relations. However, they argue
that there are fundamental differences between men and women. They focus on the
difference of women’s sexuality and pleasure in its pre-oedipal modes and challenge its
repression in phallocentric culture.7
Michel de Certeau uses Lacanian psychoanalytic procedures but from another
philosophical position. He focuses on the formal parallels in the discursive practices of
mysticÏsm and of science, and has opened a way to retrieve the mystics from “objectifying”
scientific practices. The tendency of psychoanalytic science lias been to focus on
psychosomatic beliaviours or “mystical phenomena”, which tendency obscures the practice
of mystics and the nature of the reality which mystics encounter which escapes
objectification. De Certeau, rather, observes the parallelism of functioning formality
between science and mysticism as that of a “retum to an origin”, neither inherently
religious nor scientific. He wants to affirm the heterogeneity and irreducibility of mystical
experience. What distinguishes the individual mystic from psychoanalytic pathology is the
“grace” which the mystic displays to remain in a condition of rupture without seeking to
flee or repress it in illusions of union. At the same time, de Certeau recognizes that the
language and experience of mystics are culturally defined and that systems of meaning and
symbolism in the West have been shaped by the Christian tradition.8 He allows for a
locus of culture in the mystical experience, a point of commonality with object relations
psychology of religious experience as we’ll see below, despite their different
methodologies.
2.2 Relational psychoanalysis
The other school of psychoanalysis to emerge from Freud’s explorations is the
British school of object relations psychology and its American counterpart, the self
psychology of Heinz Kohut.
FLAX,1990, p. 169.
DE CERTEAU, Michel, “Mystique”, Encyclopaedia universalis, Éditeur à Paris, France, 1985, pp. 873
- 878.
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In relational psychoanalysis gender relations are seen as constitutive of symbolic
systems.9 Not surprisingly, the place of language figures far less highly in this school,
which studies the pre-oedipal dynamic of the mother-infant relation in its pre-linguisticality.
Winnicottian object relations theory focuses explicitly on maternai practices as constitutive
of the infant’s sense of self.
Winnicott and others in British object relations theory as well as Heinz Kohut in
American self psychology, share a humanist, developmental understanding of the self.
Depending on how development is understood, this approach can have the weakness of
underestimating human pathology, and maldng the social seem secondary to the individual.
Aware of this, I tum to the next section which will examine their approach at greater length.
3.0 A psychology of mirroring based relationai psychoanalysis
Consistent with the humanist orientation of object relations theory, Kohut refers to
the self broadly spealdng as the centre of the individual’s psychological universe.10
Specifically
the nuclear self is the basis for our sense of being an independent centre of initiative
and perception, integrated with our most central ambitions and ideals and with the
experience that our body and mmd form a unit in space and a continuum in time.11
In other words, as Kohut emphasizes repeatedly, the thrust or programme of the nuclear
self is toward a cohesive self.’2 However, Kohut also uses the term self in a nanow sense,
referring to a structure of the mmd understood as a mental apparatus.’3 It appears, from
this use of the term, to be comparable to the ego, one element in Freud’s map of the self.’4
His theory is based on “genetic reconstructions’ of pre-oedipal childhood
experience from aduit clinical psychoanalytic data. While others have observed how much
lis approach overlaps with that of the object relations theorists, such as Winnicott, Maffler,
FLAX, 1990, p. 169.
10 KOHUT, Heinz, The restoration of the self Madison CN, International Universities Press, 1977, p.
311.
‘1KOHUT, 1977, p. 177
12KOHuT, Heinz, How does analvsis cure? Chicago, Chicago Universities Press, 1984, p. 147. See
also JONES, lames, Conternporary psychoanalysis and religion, New Haven, Yate University Prcss,
1991, p. 94.
13KOHuT, Heinz, The analysis ofthe seÇ Madison, CN, International Universities Press, 1971, p. xv.
See also KOHUT, 1977, pp. 310- 311.
‘4Kohut describes what lie calis a complementarity between freudian drive psychology based on the
assumption of conflict within the self and his self psychology focussed on the will to cohesion within the
self, 1977, pp. 77 - 78, 310 - 311. This theoretical ambiguity around Kohut’s concept of self is
encountered consistently throughout lis work.
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Miller and others, Kohut acknowledges that he makes no attempt to co-ordinate bis theory
with the work of that school.’5 He does contrast the theoretical basis of bis work with that
of Margaret Mahler.’6 She studied the same pre-oedipal phase of self-development in
chiidren directly and posits a single une of development from early autism through
symbiosis to individuation. In her view of individuation, the narcissistic grandiosity of the
child’s symbiotic relationship with the maternai object gives way to (among other things)
the capacity for object love.’7 Kohut sees lis own clinical work, however, as supporting
the view that narcissism has its own independent lime of development quite distinct from
that of object love.’8
The mature capacity for object love, Koliut says, is to be able to recognize the other
as a separate “centre of independent initiative, not an extension of ourselves”.’9 Mature
narcissism, on the other hand, expresses itself among other things in the capacity for
empathy, that is the capacity to “experience oneseif in another person”.2° Kohut has much
more to say about empathy, as we will see below.
Mature narcissism, Kohut argues consistently, is to be recognized in self-structures
expressive of mature forms of self esteem and self acceptance, and in a sense of energy and
purpose in one’s goals and ambitions.21 The process of maturation of narcissism is
necessary and lias its own unique configuration; it is flot to bejudged as iii or evit.
This is a most significant point. Kohut is convinced that the narcissistic needs of
very young chiidren for phase appropriate mirroring and affirming of idealized grandiosity
15See JONES, 1991, pp. 16 - 18; also KOHUT, 1977, pp. xix - xx.
16MjjHLER, Margaret, On human symbiosis and the vicissitudes of individuation, NY, International
Universities Press, 1968, 271 p.
17KOHuT, 1971, P. 220.
‘8He varies as to how lie perceives this independence. Sometimes lie argues that narcissism is the
antithesis of object love, as in lis later book Self psychology and the humanities, NY, Norton, 1985, p.
99. Elsewhere in the same book he notes that they are flot inversely related, as on p. 127. Then again he
writes that the maturation of narcissism may make possible a “non-specific change” in the increase of
capacity for object love: “The more secure a person is regarding lis own acceptability... the more self
confidently and effectively he will be able to offer lis love without undue fear of rejection, humiliation,
etc”. KOHUT, 1971, p. 298.
19M0ss David. “Narcissism, empathy and the fragmentation of self: An interview with Heinz Kohut”, in
Pitgrimage 4, 1, 1976, p. 33.
20 MOSS, 1976, pp. 31 - 32. In that context Kohut says,
Empathy is an aspect of narcissism. It is flot to be contrasted with it.... [EJmpathy lias to do
with one’s capacity to experience himself in another person, to understand how lie feels. This is a
creative expansion of the self and therefore an aspect of the development of narcissism: one of the
aspects of healthy narcissism is to be capable to (sic) understand human beings on the basis of a
bridge of aÏikeness.
21KOHUT, 1971, p. 220.
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and omnipotence often go unmet in childhood and lead to the aduit narcissistic disorders of
the self. But lie is adamant that psyclioanalysis perpetuates the problem by applying
negative moral judgments to or flot taldng seriously these needs in the tlieory of, and
therapeutic methods applied to, disorders of the self.22
3. 1 The chuld’s healthy narcissistic needs
According to Kohut the two major narcissistic needs of chiidren beginning as early
as five to twelve months of age and older are mirroring and idealization.
First, the chuld needs to be mirrored by the maternal selfobject, ususally the mother.
The child at this age expresses “phase appropriate” grandiosity and exhibitionism as he
merges with the omnipotent self-object. In effect the child experiences himself as “I am
perfect and you are a part of me”.23 When the mother can attend in an affirmative way to
these needs of the child at this phase, the child feels a sense of the mother’s abiding
approval and affirmation of the chuld’s nascent self:
The most significant relevant basic interactions between mother and child lie usually
in the visual area: the chuldts bodily display is responded to by the gleam in the
mother’s eye.24
Compare Winnicott:
What does the baby see when she looks at the mothers face? I am suggesting that
ordinarily what the baby sees is himself or herseif. In other words, the mother is
looking at the baby and what she looks like is retated to what she sees there.25
The empathic mirroring of the child by the maternal selfobject, then, fulfihis the child’s need
to be seen, recognized and affirmed in bis first, phase appropriate, grandiose expenences
22KOHuT, 1971, pp. 178 - 179; 272, etc.
23KOHUT 1971, p. 27.
24KOHUT, 1971, p. 117.
25W’NICOEI’I’ D. W., “Minor role of mother and family in child development”, In The Predicament of
the Family: A Psychoanalytic Symposium, ed. LOMAS, P., London, Hogarth Press, 1967; reprint in
Ptaying and reatity, NY, Routledge, 1989, p. 112, emphasis in text. (In this and other articles which have
been reprinted in Ptaying and reatity, I will include the original source in the first citation. In subsequent
references to the article I will cite the reference in Playing and reality, but include the date of the article’s
first publication. So, for example, this article will appear as WINNICOTI’, [1967] 1989.)
In this article, on p. 111, Winnicott acknowledges his indebtedness to the work oflacques Lacan
in the area of the mirror in early infancy:
Jacques Lacan’s paper ‘Le stade du miroir” (1949) has certainly inftuenced me. He refers to the use
ofthe mirror in each individual’s ego development. However, Lacan does not think ofthe mirror
in terms of the mother’s face in the way that I wish to do here.
See LACAN, Jacques, “Le stade du miroir comme formateur de la fonction du Je telle qu’elle nous est
révélée dans l’expérience psychanalytique”, reprinted in LACAN, Jacques, Écrits, Paris, Éditions du Seuil,
[1949] 1966, pp. 93 - 100.
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of himself or herself. It contributes to the building of a cohesive sense of self. Winnicott
(as distinct from Kohut), observes that it is also necessary for “the infant to begin to
develop a capacity to experience a relationship to extemal reality [andJ even to form a
conception of external reality”.26
When mirroring by the maternai selfobject inevitably is flot perfect, or rather, as
Winnicott would say, as the good-enough mother “adapts less and less completely,
gradually, according to the infant’s growing abïlity to deal with her failure”,27 the chuld’s
sense of grandiosity and omnipotence in this relationship with the mirroring selfobject
suffers fragmentation. According to Kohut the child then needs to be allowed to idealïze a
parental selfobject, ususally the father. The child needs to be encouraged to project the
“lost” grandiosity and omnipotence onto an ideal or “perfect” parental selfobject. if the
idealized parent responds empathically to this need, the chuld will feel a sense of
“exhilarated approval” in relation to the idealized parent imago: “You are perfect, but I am a
part of you”.28
0f course, this idealization is flot perfect either. The parental selfobject who
empathically encourages the child’s idealization of him, also needs to allow the child to
leam that the parent is limited and flot the deity he was once perceived to be.
For healthy maturation of these narcissistic needs
[w] hat a chuÏd needs is neither continuous, perfect empathic responses from the
side of the selfobject nor unrealistic admiration. What creates tlie mati-ix for the
development of a healthy self in the child is the selfobject’s capacity to respond with
proper mirroring [and approval of idealizationJ at least some of the time; what is
pathogenic is not the occasional failure of the selfobject, but lis or lier chronic
incapacity to respond appropriately, which, in tum, is due to his or lier own
psychopathology in the reaim of the self.29
Kohut reconstructs that the healthy development of the young chuld in this crucial
period progresses by means of “optimal frustration” of these needs for mirroring and
idealization. The parents’ responses to the chuld are consistently, thougli not perfectly,
empathic, or “in-tune” witli the chuld’s experience of his narcissistic needs. And yet the
parents also know that for the chuld’s own health, he must leam to internalize the ability to
26wjco’rr D. W., “Transitïonal objects and transitional phenomena”, in International journal of
psycho-anatysis, 34, 2, 1953, p. 94, reprinted in Ptaying and reatity, NY, Routiedge, 1989, p. 11.
27 WINNICOTT, [19531 1989, p. 10. Winnicott understands that the mother “by an almost 100 per cent
adaptation, affords the infant the opportunity for the illusion that her breast is part of the infant”. (p. 11,
empliasis in text.) But he also understands that the mother gradually disillusions the infant of this illusion.
28KOHUT, 1971, p. 27.
29KOHuT 1977, p. 187. The reader will recognize the similarity ofthis idea to Winnicott’s concept of
the “good enough mother”.
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meet these needs himself so that as an adult he can “become empathic with himself’.3°
Through a graduai process of tolerable, non-traumatic frustration, the child gradually leams
to lay down within the main sector of lis ego, colesive structures of self.
By intemalizing the function of the mirroring maternai selfobject in this “bit by bit”
way, the chuld develops an ability to soothe himself and regulate tension, that is, deal with
the feelings of emptiness and deprivation which arise from the periods of frustration, with
an abiding sense of self esteem and self acceptance.3’ In adulthood lie is able to restrain the
drive to grandiose fantasies and redirect it in realistic ambitions.32
By intemalizing the fiinction of the idealized parent imago lie acquires lis own
internai goals and purposes.33 He also attains a stable sense of self sufficiency and
independence from the idealized selfobject.34 In adulthood these intemalized ideals are
longed for and loved.35
Kohut describes the self thus constituted as being bipolar, its structure determined
by these two basic narcissistic needs. Both the need for the self to be mirrored and the
need to have targets for idealization continue as the child matures into adulthood in,
respectively, realistic ambitions, and, ideals and goals. This graduai process of laying
down healthy structures of self is what Kohut cails “transmuting internalization”. 36
Transmuting intemalization means that what someone gets from tlie outside is
received so gradually, in sud a fractionated, detailed, bit by bit way that what is
inside tIen becomes adapted to one’s own needs. It has been transmuted...
Kohut speaks here as thougli the self is constituted from outside, i.e., poured into
the individual through interactions with parental selfobjects, for better or worse. Yet Kohut
also describes a sense in which the self has a virtual or rudimentaiy self, an “unknowable
essence”.38 With help, it naturally intends toward the integration of latent structures of self
30KOHuT, 1977, p. 125.
31KOHuT, 1971, pp. 49 - 56; KOHUT, 1977, p. 52.
32KOHUT, Heinz, Self psychology and the humanities, NY, Norton, 1985, p. 105.
33KOHuT, 1971, pp. 49 - 56.
34KOHUT, 1977, p. 44.
35KOHUT, 1985, p. 105.
36KOHUT, 1971, p. 49.
37Moss, 1976, p. 34. This quote continues with a graphic description of this process using the
biological analogy of protein synthesis.
38KOHUT, 1977, p. 311.
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into an “authentic self’.39 Then again, he speaks of the self as composed of self/selfobject
relations, and flot existing outside a “matrix of selfobjects”.4°
As Jones observes, this relational psychoanalytic approach understands that
[m]aturity... consists flot in the outgrowing of relationships but in the capacity to
form satisfying and self-sustaining ones, to pick appropriate rather than frustrating
and depriving objects for our emotional investments, and to be open and vuinerable
enough to allow them to nourish us.41
3.2 Narcissistic psychopathology
Individuals develop narcissistic personality disorders when one or both of their
parental selfobjects suffer from a chronic inability to respond phase appropriately either to
the child’s need to be seen and recognized approvïngly in lier grandiosity by the mirroring
selfobject, or, to the child’s boundless longing to admire the idealized patemal selfobject.
The selfobject’s failures to be empathic with the whole self of the young child lias
disintegrating results, that in consequence of the incapacity of the selfobjects to
respond to the whole self, the complex experiential configurations of which [the
whole self] is originally made up begin to fragment.42
A vivid description of the mirroring relationship and how it goes awry is given by
Winnicott, again in terms of what the baby sees in the mothers face. He addresses the
case of the baby whose mother reflects her own mood, or worse stiil, the rigidity of
her own defenses. In such a case what does the baby see?
[MJany babies do have a long experience of not getting back what they are
giving. They look and they do not see themselves.. . [T]he baby gets settled in to
the idea that when lie or she looks, what is seen is the mothe?s face. The mother’s
face is flot then a mirror. So perception takes the place of apperception, perception
takes the place of that which might have been the beginning of a significant
exchange with the world, a two-way process in which self-enrichment alternates
witli the discovery of meaning in the world of things seen.43
When these needs are flot met in childhood and transformed by transmuted
intemalization through optimum frustration into more mature self-structures, the individual
continues to seek to have these archaic pre-stnictural needs met in ah other relationships.
If the child does flot acquire the needed intemal structure lis pysche remains fixated
on an archaic selfobject and the personality will throughout life be dependent on
certain objects in what seems to be an intense form of object hunger. The intensity
39KOHUT, 1977, p. 210.
40KOHuT, 1977, p. 49. JONES, 1991 p. 20 holds that Kohut ‘s theory rests consistently on the concept
of self as matrix of self-object relations. I am flot sure how these views of the self, as matrix of relations
and as having an unknowable essence are to be reconciled.
41JONES, 1991, p. 19.
42KOHUT 1977, p. 247.
43wINNICO’rr, [1967] 1989, p. 112.
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of the search for and dependence on these objects is due to the fact that they are
striven for as a substitute for the missing segments of the psychïc stmcture.
In simpler terms, lie will look at others craving to see himself affirmed there, flot in order to
see the other in lier own right. This retardation or fragmentation of normal structural
development of the self is reflected in altemations of mood, “between unbridled ambitions
and a sense of failure, and, between grandiose vanity and searing shame”.45 Tliis
altemation is consistent with the fact that such persons are so vuinerable to the variable
responses of others.
3.3 The feminfne expression of narcissism
In recent literature conceming narcissism a neglect concerrnng differences in female
and male expressions of narcissism lias been detected. This neglect is systemic and
historical. Philipson observes that narcissism
is universally assumed to describe botli female and male experience.... Ibis gender
neutrality is brought into question, however, by the disproportionate representation
of men in the clinical case matenal tliat forms tlie basis of our understanding of
what narcissism is and liow it functions.46
Rossiter argues for a recognition of a feminine expression of narcissism which, whule flot
clinicaily recognized in tlie medical diagnostic criteria, is well-described as codependency
by the grassroots Twelve step movement. Groups for codependents are dominated by the
presence of women. Rossiter recognizes that women tend to be more focused on
relationships than on defending ego autonomy. He shows how, despite psychiatry’s
neglect to recognize it, feminine narcissism is expressed in terms of relationships, as the
need to control others in relationships. When looked at in that light, the diagnostic criteria
for narcissism (grandiosity, omnipotence, etc.) can be seen to be more applicable to
women.47
Since tins is a study of a woman, namely, Julian of Norwich, in using the concept
of narcissism I will be referring, from here on, to a feminine expression of narcissism,
after Rossiter.
44KOHUT, 1971, p. 45.
45KOHUT, 1971, p. 192.
46 PHILIPSON, Ilene, “Gender and narcissism”, Psychology of women quarterty 9, 1985, p. 213.
ROSSITER, Stanford Kent, Narcissism and codependency, Ph.D. thesis, The Wright Institute, 2004,
pp. 63 - 73.
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3.4 The three stages of Kohut’s therapeutic process
Kohut believes that persons with narcissistic disorders are stiil capable of laying
down new structures of self in psychoanalysis, through the process of transmuting
internalization, by means of the development of a mirroring (or idealizing) transference
relationship with the analyst. The therapy involves three phases: first, overcoming the
clients resistance to establishing the transference; then, working through the transference;
finally, separating or relinquishing the transference.
In the first phase, there is resistance on the part of the client to forming a minoring
transference with the empathic analyst. The absence of nuclear authentic self-structure at
this stage is identifiable in the two fragments of archaic prestructure which present
themselves altematingly and unconnectedly as narcissistic omnipotence or grandiosity, and,
searing shame. This phase ends at the point at which the individual’s trust of the empathic
analyst is sufficiently secure to accept to establïsh a mirror transference. This establishment
of trust allows the client to tolerate some degree of chaos in play, dream, imagination, etc.
in relation to the analyst.
The second phase involves working through the narcissistic rage and
disillusionment which emerge in the client as the analyst engages the client in a process of
optimal frustration, empatbically presenting the client with a “confrontation with reality”.
Gradually, through this confrontation, the client cornes to recognize the archaic
prestructures or the self-fragments which manifest as grandiose omnipotence and searing
shame in the client’ s behaviour. This phase is characterized as a working through the
narcissistic disillusionment with regard to what constitutes the true, or authentic sense of
self. In this phase, Kohut says that transmuting internalization of the function of the
mirroring mother weakens the clients propensity to react to frustration altematingly with
grandiose vanity or searing shame, and interiorizes the capacity for soothing, affect
regulation and perduring self acceptance and self esteem.48 Gradually through transmuted
internalizations of the analyst’s empathic mirroring, the individual can recognize what this
confrontation bas exposed in herseif and begin to lay down new self-structures in the
reality ego which are at once more realistic, cohesive and satisfying.
In the third and final phase of the therapeutic transference, the individual is enabled
to begin to reÏinquish the mirroring transference. The movement toward relinquishing the
mirroring transference requires that self and other become sufficiently distinguished that the
client can begin to interiorize the mirroring function herseif.
48KOHUT, Analysis, p. 199; KOHUT, 1977, p. 53.
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Kohut’ s therapeutic process will be used as the basis for the psychobiographical
analysis of Julian’s showings in the diptychs, below.
3.5 The therapeutic method of empathy
The analyst’s therapeutic method needs to match the early needs which were neyer
met in childhood. Hence Kohut is adamant that the use of rational interpretation, moralistic
judgments or didactic techniques is inappropnate with narcissistic disorders, as the
individual will flot develop the sense of being seen or recogmzed in his or her own
experience.49 The mirroring transference will thus be aborted. Rather, what is needed is
an attitude of empathy. The analyst is required to enter the experience of the client as if in
his or ber own shoes, which technique Kohut cails vicarious introspection.50 Thus
grandiosity, etc., is recognized and affirmed in the client in its phase appropriate
expression, and the client is drawn into a relationship of trust with the analyst in which a
mirror transference can develop.
3.6 Merging, twinning and mirror transferences
Depending on the severity of the infantile trauma, this transference may take the
form of merging, twinning or minoring proper.5’ Merging, or fusion, refers to the most
archaic form of minoring transference, in which the selfobject is merged with the grandiose
self, or is an extension of it. In the twinning transference, the selfobject is seen as like the
self. In the mirror transference proper, the selfobject is perceived as a separate person,
providing the affirmation of the “gleam in the mother’s eye”.52
The mirror transference in ail its forms thus creates for the patient a position of
relative security which enables him to persevere with the painful task of exposing
the grandiose self to a confrontation with reality.53
If the client does not feel mirrored in the analysis, her rage is flot a defense but rather the
cry of one who does flot feel understood.54 Elsewhere, however, Kohut says that
49KOHUT, 1971, pp. 179, 192, etc.
50KOHUT, “Introspection, empathy and psychoanalysis”, Journal ofthe American psychoanatytic
association 7, 1959, pp. 459 - 465.
51KQHUT, 1971, pp. 114- 115.
52KOHUT, 1971, p. 116.
53KOHuT, 1971, p. 191.
54KOHuT, 1977, p. 88.
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resistance to this process is also motivated by the client’s desire to avoid feeling
concommitant shame.55
Once resistance to establishing the mirror transference has been overcome, the
analyst needs to keep the transference activated through consistent affirmation of the
clients archaic grandiose self which so needs the feeding of recognition. Use of optimal
frustration is made as the means for the graduai appropriation of the need for recognition
and affirmation by the reality ego, through the process of transmuting internalization. In
other words, the analyst assists the client in directing the infantile drive for parental
acceptance through the discomfort its exposure creates, toward its integrafion mto the
mature and reality-adapted sectors of the psyche. This is accomplished
through the accretion of specific, new psychological structures which master the
drive, lead to its controlled use, or transform it into a variety of mature and realistic
thought and action pattems. 56
Thus in the working through phase, transmuting internalization of the firnction of the
mirroring mother weakens the clients propensity to react to frustration altematingly with
grandiose vanity or searing sharne, and interiorizes the capacity for perduring self
acceptance and self esteem.57
Kohut gives a significant (though technical) description of the growth in self
understanding in the client which can occur through the regulated discomfort experienced in
the process of transmuting intemalization:
The patient will gradually realize that the seif-experience in the horizontally spiit
sector of his personality
-- a setf-experience ofbeing empty and deprived
which, although underemphasized, has aiways been present and conscious-
constitutes his authentic seÇ and that the up to now predominant seif-experience
in the non-dichotomized sector--the seif-experience of overt grandiosity and
arrogance--did not emanate from an independent self but from a self that was an
appendage to the self of bis mother.58
Recall that grandiosity and shame are linked together as the two emotional
expressions of the same fragmentation of self. As the client grows in tolerating the self
experience of emptiness, that is of neither grandiosity nor shame, she makes room for the
recognition and acceptance by the reality ego of appropriate mirroring and idealizing needs
within the authentic self.59 This growth in capacity to “have empathy for herself’ signais
55KOHuT, 1971, p. 184.
56KOHUT, 1971, p. 197.
57KOHuT, 1971, p. 199; KOHUT, 1977, p. 53.
58KOHUT, 1977, pp. 210-211.
59KOHuT, 1971, p. 186.
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the point at wbich the mirroring transference relationship with the analyst can be
relinquished.
4.0 Contours of a psychology of religion based on object relations
theory
4.1 Kohut on religion
Kohut has only a rather limited use for religion, specifically organized religion,
which he occasionally disparages as having the function of keeping people at archaic levels
of narcissistic development.6° Even in bis “positive assessment of the role of religion”
Kohut would relegate Julian’s visions to “hallucinatory conjurings of the presence of the
idealized Godhead”.6’ The needs of what lie calis “guilty man” of nineteenth century
Victorian Christian and Freudian culture, suffering from the repression of self, are flot
Kohut’s interest. Rather it is the narcissistic needs of “tragic man” of the twentieth century,
primarily suffering from fragmentation of self, which concem him, and which make the
need for empathy as a psychoanalytic tool so important in bis work.62
Kohut, it seems, believes there is no religion which corresponds to this need. The
positive function of religion is reflected, however, in any experience “which uplifts the self
of man”, which can include many kinds of experiences flot necessarily viewed as religious
in a conventional sense.63 Even so, despite the centrality of the empathic relationship in
Kohut’s therapeutic approach and of lis high regard for the person of Jesus in this respect
as an empathic figure,64 religion according to Kohut is flot to be construed ultimately as a
relationship, nor “even a relationsbip wbicli constitutes flot oniy the meaning and
significance of life but the very self itself’.65
In bis later book however Kohut suggests that God may function as one pole of a
selfobject relation, and that in a successful analytic relationsbip, the capacity “to create
substitute selfobjects via visual imagery when extemal reality is devoid of tangible
selfobjects must be counted among newly acquired assets”. This, he acknowledges, leads
60KOHUT 1971, pp. 164, 316.
61KOHUT 1984, p. 76.
62K0HuT, 1977, pp. 132-133.
63PDjjL Robert, “Religion within the framework of self psychology”, Journal of supervision and
training in lninistry 5, 1982, p. 120.
64M0ss, 1976, p. 37.
65 RANDALL, 1982, p. 125. One wonders how excessively Kohut’s own “religious” expenence may have
been influenced by an idealization of a patemal godlselfobject without the necessary precedent of a mirroring
godlselfobject?
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to a “nonapoiogetically positive assessment of the foie and significance of art and
religion... which differs from the assessment of ciassical analysis”.66 Stili, Kohut only
sees such God selfobjects as serving to ground a sense of self. He does flot extend it into a
theory of religion.
4.2 Winnicott’s concept of transitional space
Clearly the justification for the foliowing study of Julian of Norwichs mystical
theoiogy, then, does flot corne from within Kohut’s theoretical framework. But neither
does it need to. Winnicott’s parailel work is able to entertain the notion that transitional
objects can evolve to include the creative, and flot just the pathological, dimensions of
religion.
In Winnicott’s view, the purpose of the early mirroring relationship is to affirm the
infants illusion of omnipotence in order graduaily to bnng about the process of
disillusioning it, to make way for the development of the concept of extemal reality and the
creative work of reiating inner and outer reaiity.67 Moreover, Winnicott’ s understanding
of the experiential aspect of the process of “disillusionment” dovetails with Kohut’s rich
description of the client’s first experiences of the authentic self as a “seif-experience of
being empty and deprived”. While Kohut believes there is no religion which puts the
restoration of the self at the centre of its concem, he is in better company than lie may
imagine.68
Kohut does at least recognize that mirroring needs are reflected at eveiy level of the
maturation of the self. Winnicott’s approach allows that transformation in the
understanding of self/not-self occurs in the early infant’s maternai mirroring relationship,
but also that in the reaim of religious experience transformation is possible in the
understanding of self and transitional godobject.
66 KOHUT, 1984, p. 76.
67WJNMCOyT [1953] 1989, p. 13.
68 See howevet KOHUT, 1984, p. 99, as noted in JONES, 1991, p. 99. As we’Il see below, theologian
Peter Homans, drawing on a Kohutian ftamework, picks up the idea of “mouming” as foundational to the
experience of individuation in relation to lost cultural and religious symbolism in the West. HOMANS,
Peter, The ability to mourn: Disitlusionment and the social origins of psychoanalysis, Chicago,
University of Chicago Press, 1989, 390 p.
I am reminded here of another theologian, Johannes Metz, who argues that what is fundamental to the
transformation of Chnstian religious experience is the Iong-resisted acceptance of our “poverty of spint” as
mirrored in Jesus’ kenotic Incarnation. Traditionally, this embracing of our human poverty of spirit has
been descnbed as our baptism into Chnst’s death... a death of the “old self’ which brings us into the life of
the new self (Romans 6). Metz understands die experience of one’s poverty of spint encountered in this
death as “the doorway through which men must pass to become authentic human beings”, in METZ,
Johannes, Poverty of spirit, transi. DRURY, John, NY, Paulist Press, 1968, p. 26.
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What makes this possible in object relations theory is Winnicott’s introduction of
the concept of transitional space, for which there is no clear parallel in Kohut’s conceptual
framework, in order to allow specifically for a psychoanalytic understanding of the
evolutïon of the early childhood reaim of play into cultural phenomena. According to
Winnicott, transitional space is a potentïal space that is created between the individual and
the environment. The emergence of a transitional space, and from there of true play
activity, retains certain characteristics and requirements. I have identified five
characteristics to describe here: Transitional space is both subjective and objective; it
depends for its existence on a trusting relationship; it is the stuff of illusion and paradox
understood in a positive sense; it can allow for the possibility of a positive relationship
between creativity and tradition; and lastly, that it opens itself to a new level of dialogue
with theology, faith and prayer experience.
First of ail, this potential or transitional space is neither simply subjective nor
simply objective. It is flot enougli to identify subjective “inner reality” to the individual as
distinct from an objective “outer reality” of interpersonal relationships. Winnicott holds
that a “third space” is needed:
The third part of the life of a human being, a part that we cannot ignore, is an
intermediate area of experiencing, to which inner reality and extemal life both
contribute. It is an area that is flot challenged, because no daim is made on its
behaif except that it shah exist as a resting-place for the individual engaged in the
perpetual human task of keeping inner and outer reality separate yet interrelated. ••69
The transitional phenomena which emerge in tins potential space between the infant and
mother stand for the mother’ s breast, which is first understood by the infant to be part of
him or herself, a situation made possible by the good-enough mother’s accommodation to
the infant’s need. As the mother gently disillusions the child of this illusion of
omnipotence, the child begins to weave “flot-me” objects ïnto the personal pattem.7° Such
items as the end of a blanket with the thumb or a soft teddy bear take on a vital importance
for the infant as a defense against anxiety and for comfort at bedtime. Winnicott
summarizes in great clinical detail the special quahities of the infant’ s relationship with the
transitional phenomena, which account for the foot of symbol formation, the joumey or
process of the infant’s becoming able to accept difference and simiharity.71 In Winnicott’s
view, the phenomena of tins third, intermediate space are both objective and subjective,
“found” and “created”.
69 WINNICOTT, [1953] 1989, p. 2, emphasis in text.
70 WINNICOYr, F1953] 1989, pp. 2 - 3.
7 1 WINNICOTT, [1953] 1989, pp. 91 - 92.
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As the cbild grows, the transitional space becomes the locus for the reaim of play.
The reliability of the mother’ s love gives the child a sense of trust or confidence in lis or
lier experiences of the self and the environment lie or slie is newly discovering. This is a
primary condition for the possibility of play, whether for the infant, the psydhoanalysand
or any individual who seeks to negotiate life’s circumstances creatively.
The potential space between baby and mother, between dhild and family, between
individual and society or the world, depends on experience which leads to trust. It
can be looked upon as sacred to the individual in that it is here tliat tlie individual
experiences creative living.72
Play is a non-purposive state, an experience of desultory formlessness or chaos. Winmcott
describes this state as a “sort of ticking over of the unintegrated personality”.73 This is only
possible in a state of relaxation which, lie holds, requires tIc context of the trusting,
reliable matemal or therapeutic mirroring relationship. Any anxiety in that regard inhibits
tlie possibility of relaxed play and the “creative readhing out” whidli it promotes.74 Finally,
for creativity to flow, the experience of play requfres a summation or reverberation by the
mirroring object:
It is only liere, in this unintegrated state of the personality, tliat that whidli we
describe as creative can appear. This, if reflected back, but onÏy if reflected back,
becomes part of the organized individual personality, and eventually this in
summation makes tlie individual to be, to be found; and eventually enables himself
or lierself to postulate the existence of the se 1f.75
Winnicott holds tliat tIc evolution of transitional space is witnessed in examples of
creative living sud as art, phulosophy, creative science and religion, eadli of which is a
third area of “illusoiy” experience, having botli subjective and objective dimensions, but
distinct from eadli. Winnicott treats the concept of illusion as a necessary, paradoxical
feature of human life:
I am... studying tlie substance of illusion, tliat which is allowed to tlie infant, and
which in aduit life is inherent in art and religion, and yet becomes the hallmark of
madness wlien an aduit puts too powerful a daim on tIc credulïty of otliers, forcing
them to acknowledge a sharing of illusion that is flot tlieir own. We can share a
respect for illusory experience, and if we wish we may collect togetlier and form a
group on tIc basis of tIc similarity of our illusory experiences. This is a natural
foot of grouping among liuman beings.76
72 WINNICOTT, D. W., “The location of cultural expenence”, International journal ofpsycho-anatysis
48, 3, 1967, part 3, reprint in Playing and reatity, NY, Routledge, 1989, p. 103.
73 WINNICOrr, D. W., “Playing: Creative activity and the search for self’, in Playing and reality, NY,
Routledge, 1989, p. 55.
wu’.rNicorr, 1989, p. 55.
7 WINNICOTT, 1989, p. 64, emphasis in text. Kohut’s empathic method is based on the same pnnciple.
76 WINNICOTT, [1953] 1989, p. 3, emphasis in text.
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Winnicott’s use of the term illusion is flot equivalent to Freud’s assessment of
illusion as unreal or ideosyncratically subjective wishful thinking. Rather, he understands
the phenomena of transitional space to be the locus of culmral creativity, potentially capable
ofbeing socially communicated (as well as potentially patliologically incommunicable).
Winnicott’ s location of the emergence of cultural experience in the transitional space
intennediate “between baby and mother, between child and family, between individual and
society or the world”, allows him likewise to balance the negative contemporay valuation
of “tradition” with the potential for a positive valuation as well. Conceming creative
originality, lie makes this interesting further observation that
in any cultural field it is not possible to be original except on a basis of
tradition. The interplay between originality and the acceptance of tradition as the
basis for inventiveness seems to me to be just one more example, and a very
exciting one, of the interplay between separateness and union)7
I suggest that in effect Winnicott is allowing that the particular way in which a person
experiences “tradition” (including religious tradition) is itself to some degree a reflection of
that person’s history of experience of transitional space and of the mirroring relationships
in which the capacity for entering into transitional space is either encouraged or impeded.
In a more recent posthumous publication, edited by his wife and others, Winnicott
was beginning to offer some exploratory observations, which have been taken up by more
recent theorists for a psychology of religion based on object relations theory. For example,
conceming the theological implications of his view of transitional phenomena, transitional
space and their adult manifestations in religion, Winnicott speculated:
.Is there a God? If God is a projection, even so is there a God who created me in
such a way that I have the material for such a projection? Aetiologicallly... the
paradox must be accepted, not resolved. The important thing for me must be, have
I got it in me to have the idea of God? -- if flot, then the idea of God is of no value
to me.78
This suggests avenues of exploration of this theological paradox which acknowledge, on
the one hand, the very real fact of the presence of anthropological creation and self-
projection in religious traditions, and their Iived expressions in faith and prayer. On the
other hand, it does flot deny de facto the possibility that human nature is created in sucli a
way as to have some potential for probing its self-transcendence in the religious endeavour.
WINNICOTT, [19671 1989, p. 99, emphasis in text.
78 WINNICOTT, D. W., “Ptaying and culture”, in Psycho-analytic explorations, eds. WINNICOTI’,
Claie, R. SHEPHERD and M. DAVIS, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 19$9a, pp. 204 - 205.
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4.3 The theological background of the historical antecedents of
Winnicott’s concept of transitional space
The forerunners of Winnicott in the field of object relations theory, W. R. D.
Fairbairn and his student Harry Guntnp had both had theological training. In lis noting of
this fact, John McDargh observes that the object relations theory recovery for
psychoanalysis of the “irreducible centrality of the human for reÏationship” reflected a
reappropriation of the influence of John MacMunay, Martin Buber and others who sought
to introduce the relational paradigm into fundamental theology.79 The object relations
theory revision of Freud’s psychoanalytic theory thus adopted MacMurray’s theological
agenda in seeking to understand the developmental blocks to our capacity for communion.
McDargh’ s quotes from these theorists indicates that they see the work of therapy as in
effect the work of “salvation from the past of bad object relations”.80 Ibis historical note is
flot insignificant for the present work of conelation between psychology and soteriology.
Moreover, McDargh outiines Winnicott’ s dissatisfaction with the scientific form of
“religious positivism” in Fairbaim’s and Guntrip’s theorization about inner and outer
reality. Inner reality developed, they argued, as a defensive process of the unconscious
“intemalization” of bad object relations from early life, which then distorts ail subsequent
object relations. Their view of maturation involved a kind of reforming of the inner world
such that the indivïdual might fully experience ail that is “really there” in the “extemal
world”. As McDargh puts it,
[w]hen one builds a theoiy of religion upon this structure one ends up with
Guntflp’s positivist notion that somehow one “finds” God or the universe rather
than simultaneously “creating” and “encountering” the reality of the divine in a more
complex process of introjection and projection.8’
Winnicott’ s contribution of the concept of transitional space is precisely to allow for
and affirm the simultaneously subjective and objective, created and found nature of aIl
transitional phenomena including religious experience and symbolism. Developmental
maturation in religious and object relations theory terms does not do away with the
presence of “illusion” in transitional phenomena, but rather, in Winnicott’ s understanding
of this term, requires an acceptance rather than a challenging of its paradoxical nature. The
possibilïty of creative playfulness within religious as with other kinds of tradition depends
on the presence of a tmsting, one might say matemal, environment.
‘ McDARGH, John, Psychoanatytic object relations theory and the study of religion: On faith and the
imaging of God, Lanham MD, University Press ofAmerica, 1983, p. 206, emphasis in text.
80 McDARGH, 1983, p. 207.
81 McDARGH, 1983, p. 212.
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4.4 A feminist object relations psychology of religion
In developing the links between object relations theoiy and a psychology of
religion, ït is important to recognize how this dovetails with “second wave” feminist
concerns.
In a significant article entitled “Object relations theory, mothering and religion:
toward a feminist psychology of religion”, Diane Jonte-Pace argues first that the historical
thrust behind the emergence of pre-oedipal, relational psychoanalysis dovetails with
feminist concerns: it rejected the androcentric basis of Freud’ s oedipal psychology.82
Second, she argues that relational psychoanalysis values positively three central foci of
feminist theological orientations: relationality, mature dependence and a revaluing of the
mother-infant relationship. From there she goes on to show how object relations theory
bas moved toward appropriating a feminist psychology of religion in explonng the
maternai-infant matrix as a psychological source of religious experience and religious ritual,
and in examining the pre-oedipal origins of the image of God.
Whule Freud had nothing good to say about religion, reducing it to projection and
pathology, what lie did say about it was from an androcentnc and even “patricentric” point
of view. Jonte-Pace observes that the criticisms of freud’s psychoanalysis by object
relations theorists resonate with some of the major concems of feminist thought.
First, Freud’s focus on drives relegated relations with the world and others as
derivative of the drives themselves. The foundation of Freudian psychoanalysis is
impersonal instinctual energies needing to be discharged, which is seen in some ferninist
thought to be androcentric. Object relations psychology, on the other hand, sees the person
as “a unique center of meaningful experience growing in the medium of personal
relationships”.83 Second, Freud’s theory rests on the assumption that dependence is a bad
thing. Oedipal developmental maturity is judged by the degree to which one attains
autonomous independence, renunciating dependencies and attachments as illusions. Object
relations theoiy challenges this assumption by showing that dependence, like illusion itself
is flot a need which is outgrown in life and that there are mature forms of dependence,
which co-exist with growth in autonomy. Finally, object relations theory challenges the
focus on the centrality of the oedipal conftict in Freudian psychology. “For Freud, in any
psychoanalytic study of culture or personality, ‘the paternal element [isJ the most important
82 JONTE-PACE, Diane, “Object relations theory, mothering and religion: toward a feminist psychology
of religion”, Horizons 14,2, 1987, pp. 311 -314.
83 GUNTRIP, Harry, “Psychodynamïc theory and the problem of psychotherapy”, British journal of
medicat psychotogy 36, 1963, p. 166.
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one’ and the oedipal conflict between father and son is the crucible of both health and
pathology”.84 The pre-oedipal, as far as Freud was concerned, was a stage inaccessible to
the methods of psychoanalysis and insignificant. Object relations theorists on the other
hand argue that the pre-oedipal period, during which the mother-infant relationship
predominates, is the context out of which the self is constituted, differentiated from other,
and yet nonetheless in relationship with the other.85 It is at this level that object relations
theory challenges the patricentrism of Freudian psychoanalysis directly.
Ml three of these critiques in object relations theory redress Freudian reductionism,
androcentrism and misogyny in a positive, complementary way, thus opening a way for a
convergence between relational psychology, “second stage” feminist theory and the smdy
of religious experience.86 In fact, Jonte-Pace shows that this thematic convergence reveals
feminist concems to have been explicitly at the core of the histoncal controversy over the
meaning of the castration complex, penis envy and gender differences, in the development
of object relations out of the Freudian school, thougli this was later forgotten.87
In the rest of the article, Jonte-Pace devotes space to showing how an object
relations theory helps us to understand the psychological origins of religious experience in
the maternai-infant matrix as well as the pre-oedipal origins of both ritual and the image of
God. The first and the third of these will interest us here.88
For Freud, the oceanic feeling of an indissoluble bond, while it might stem from the
infant’ s experience at the breast, was flot the source of religious sentiment. Fairbaim,
Guntrip and Winnicott on the other hand, “siwate the psychological origins of religious
experience in the maternai-infant dyad, each focusing on a different point along a
84 JONTE-PACE, 1987, p. 313, quoting FREUD, Sigmund, Totem and taboo, cd. J. Strachcy, Toronto,
Hogarth, p. 147. The standard edition of the compiete psychologicai works of Sigmund Freud 13.
85 JONTE-PACE, 1987, pp. 313 - 314. She observes that French psychoanalytic feminists Luce frigaray
and Julian Kristeva, both influenced by and critical ofLacan’s rereading of Freud, are aiso cntical ofthe
object relations theoretical tradition, but their emphasis on the pre-oedipal coincides with this latter school.
86 JONTE-PACE, 1987, pp. 314 - 315, acknowledges that not ail feminists wouid agree with this
argument. Drawing on Juliet Mitcheli’s terminology, she observes that some “first stage” feminists would
appraise mothcrhood and domestic activities associated with women as negative, sexist social constructions.
87 JONTE-PACE, 1987, p. 318.
88 JONTE-PACE, 1987, pp. 323 - 324 discusses the pre-oedipai origins of ritual and its positive, creative
eiements on the basis of the work by ROSS, Mary Ellen and Cheryi Lynn ROSS, “Mothers, infants and
the psychoanalytic study of rituai”, Signs 9, 11, 1983, pp. 26 - 39. That subjcct is significant bccause in
relation to the medievai devotion to the humanity of Christ, imagery of Christ’s maternai, nurturing
qualities were iinked explicitly to eucharistic feeding, ail of which was weil known to Juiian in ber time.
Sec BYNUM, Caroline Walker, Jesus as mother, Berkeley, University of Califomia Press, 1982, pp. 110 -
146. However, not ail object relations feminists hold to an unambiguously positive relation between
religion and mothers, as will be seen further below.
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continuum from undifferentiated unity of self and other to ‘separation-individuation”.89
Fairbaim located the origins of religion in the earliest experiences of symbiosis and
understood religion in terms of “mystical experience” thus understood. For Guntrip it was
in the development of human dependency and interrelatedness, slightly later in the mother
infant interaction, and religion was about the development of a cosmic sense of well-being.
Winnicott places the antecedents of religions experience in the transitional space created
during the penod of separation of self from other, and views religion culturally and
epistemologically. “Winnicott’ s rich understanding of transitional objects leads to a
psychological view of religion as illusion, wherein, one might say, God is both created and
found”. Whereas for Freud, illusion, like dependency, was to be renunciated, Winnicott,
as was shown above, holds that illusion and reality are “interpenetrating, mutuafly inclusive
categories.... By placing this process within the viscissitudes of the maternai-infant
relationship, Winnicott challenges Freud’ s patricentrism as well”.90
In the last section of lier article, Jonte-Pace looks at the pre-oedipal origins of the
image of God. Freud saw the development of the image of God as a father projection,
situated exclusively in the oedipal phase. Jonte-Pace looks at the work of Antoine Vergote
and Ma-Maria Rizzuto, to show evidence that questions this hypothesis. She concludes
that “these psychological reflections upon the latent maternai or feminine component in the
patnarchal images of the divine are particuÏarly striking in their resonance with projects
initiated in other areas of feminist scholarship”.9’ She sees that the attempt to link mother
infant relationships with religion enacts a radical shift in psychoanalytic thought and quotes
Shirley Garner as saying “b link the potential for reproduction in ail women with the
capacity for cultural production is to transform flot only the figure of the mother, but the
very bases of psychoanalytic theories in their oedipal orientation”.92
Jonte-Pace does flot discuss Kohut, since he does flot link bis self psychology with
the development of religious experience, and also probably because of androcentric
tendencies in the interpretation of narcissism. But neither is Jonte-Pace primarily
concerned with the therapeutic aspect of object relations theory for women. A more recent
89 JONTE-PACE, 1987, p. 320.
90 JONTE-PACE, 1987, P. 323.
91 JONTE-PACE, 1987, p. 326. See RIZZUTO, Ana-Maria, The birth of the living God: A
psychoanalytic study, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1979, 246 p., and VERGOTE, Antoine and
A. TAMAYO, The parental figures and the representation of God: A psychological and cross-cutturat
study, The Hague, Mouton, 1961, 295 p.
92 GARNER, Shirley, The (rn)other tongue: Essays infeministpsychoanaivtic interpretation, Ithaca,
Corneli University Press, 1985, Introduction, p. 9.
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article by Jonte-Pace situates critical, inclusivist and analytical approaches for a feminist
psychology of religion. The most prominent approaches which make use of object
relations theoiy are inclusivist and analytical.
The inclusive object relational approach typically assumes that religion is valuable,
adaptive and benïgn, and that a loving relationship with a good or “good enough”
mother... provides the psychological foundations of faith, mysticism, ritual and
God representations.
The analytic approach, on the other hand, assumes that religion sometimes
fiinctions as a carrier for psychological and cultural fears of destructive and
vengeful women, and that the psychological source of these fears and fantasies lies
in anxiety over the relation with the mother.... The analytic approach thus suggests
that neither mothers nor religions are unambiguously good or “good enough”.93
The psychobiographical dimension of the present study, insofar as it seeks to
identify a psychodynamic process of healing and restoration from an inadequate maternai
relation, situates itself in the more “ambiguous”, analytic approach. But insofar as I am
also suggesting that there had been some compensatory relation, and that the soteriology
which emerged from lier visionary mirroring tranference also drew from certain aspects of
the tradition and is a needed corrective in theology today, the study could also be said to
assume an inclusivist approach.
In short, the present study lias a developmental thrust: it finds both a therapeutic
and a conversion process at work in the Showings. I see Kohut’ s tliree phase tlierapeutic
process engaging a mirroring transference as helpful for articulating stages in the
compensatory healing and development of the self.
Moreover, Meissner’ s further elaboration on how transitional objects and
transitional spacefunction in religious experience whicli can be linked with object relations
theory will be particularly helpful for focusing on the changes in thatfunctioning in this
psycliobiographical study.
4.5 William Meissner and Peter Homans: New avenues of an object
relations theory exploration of religion
In the subsequent development of links between object relations theory and a
psychology of religion based on object relations theory, the Jesuit psychiatrist William
Meissner lias been among the first to recognize the applicability of Winnicott’ s tlieory to
religious experience and to develop this in theoretical terms since the late sixties. Freud
saw that the “structures, in terms of which personality organization and functioning can be
JONTE-PACE, Diane, “feminist analysts, critics and inclusivists: feminist voices in the psychology
of religion”, in Religion andpsychology: Mapping the terrain, eds. JONTE-PACE, Diane and William
PARSONS, NY, Routledge, 2001, p. 137.
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analyzed, have a genetic history”; similarly, Meissner states clearly what an object relations
theory approach to religious experience assumes: “that the shape of the faith experience as it
evolves developrnentally is contingent on and reflects, as well as conditions, the
developmental vicissitudes of both narcissism and object relations”.94
Meissner holds that “religion partakes of the character of transitional phenornena or
the transitional process and as such achieves its psychological reality and its psychic vitality
in the potential space of illusory experience”.95 He identifies four aspects of religious
experience which lend themselves to an analysis of their transitional and illusory aspects,
namely: 1) the faith experience as both subjective and objective; 2) the God representation
as transitional object; 3) the use of material objects as religious symbols, such that their
meaning and significance within a religious symbolic system only corne to “function”
symbolically to the extent that they become part of the transitional realm; 4) the experience
of prayer.96
McDargh’s published doctoral study focused on both the first and second areas,
showing how an object relations theory ftamework helps us understand flot only the
characteristics of individuals’ God representations, but also the psychoanalytic conditions
which make God representations available or unavailable for the experience of faith.97
Conceming the first area of the faith experience as both subjective and objective,
McDargh outiines cornplementary Protestant and Catholic definitions of faith, drawing on
theologicai representatives Richard Niebuhr and Karl Rahner, and relates these to the work
of psychoanalysts lames Fowier and William Meissner respectively.98 Out of this study he
explores six defining features of faith, drawing heavily on Winnicott and Meissner: the
sense of being real, the sense of being in relationship to a real and meaningfiil world, the
capacity to be alone, the capacity to tolerate dependence, the capacity to tolerate
ambivalence, and the capacity to becorne available for loving self-donation.99 These will
9 MEISSNER, W. W., Psychoanatysis and retigious experience, New Haven, Yale University Press,
1984, pp. x - xi. Not unlike Erikson or fowier, though with the help of object relations theory, Meissner
wants to show the developmental, epigenetic progression of religious experience, to create a typology of
religious experience which integrates the developmental unes of narcissism, object relations and faith into a
coherent schema.
MEISSNER, 1984, p. 17$.
96 MEISSNR, 1984, pp. 178 - 182.
See McDARGH, 1983, p. 18.
98 See McDARGH, 1983, chapter two, pp. 23 - 65.
McDARGH, 1983, p. 66.
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be helpful signposts in assessing for movements from lesser to greater integration of
subjectivity and objectivity in the Showings.
The second area, that of the God image or representation as transitional object, has
received considerable attention, beginning with Ana-Maria Rizzuto’s groundbreaking
relational psychoanalytic study of clients’ images of God, as Jonte-Pace observed
above.100 Rizzuto uses Kohut’s concept of a mirroring transference and his
understanding of the self as created in selfobject relations in order to hypothesize that the
early God representation emerges from the experience of the mother. For Rizzuto, the
early experience of mirroring and its formative influence in the cohesiveness of the sense of
self lie at the core of the individual’ s God representation.’01 McDargh extends Rizzuto’ s
work into a more theological exploration. Theological concepts are understood as being
transitional in quality: the concept of an “image” or representation of God is to be
understood flot as a conscïous picture of God, but as the “individual’s very personal,
dynamic relationship to this {conscious and unconscious] constellation of values,
impressions, memories and images”.102 McDargh holds that object relations theory thus
appears to offer a way of understanding the origins of human religious sensibility,
and in particular the creation and elaboration of our images of the divine that finally
does justice to religious maturation as well as religious pathology, adult faith as
well as childhood fantasy.’°3
The third area Meissner identifies as fertile for an object relations theory exploration
is that of the transitional quality of material objects imbued with the religious symbolism of
a belief system, or tradition. He names Christian examples (as one such tradition among
others) such as the crucifix, the bread and wine of the Eucharist, etc.
{TJhe objects as religious symbols are neither exclusively perceived in real and
objective terms, nor simply produced by subjective creation. Rather they evolve
from the amalgamation of what is real, material, and objective as ït is experienced,
penetrated, and creatively reshaped by the subjective belief and patterns of meaning
attributed to the object by the believer.104
Meissner is touching on the question here of how the symbols of religious traditions might
be conceived psychoanalytically which allows for the possibility of a positive relation to
100 See RIZZUTO, 1979, 246 p. See also PRUYSER, Paul, The play of the imagination, NY,
International Universities Press, 1983, 226 p., and JONTE-PACE, 1987.
101 RIZZUTO, 1979, 185 - 188.
102 McDARGH, 1983, p. 18.
103 McDARGH, 1983, p. xiii.
104 MEISSNER, 1984, p. 181.
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creativity, and flot simply in terms of a tendency to deceive. Just as an abstract religious
belief system would not be able to be sustained without sensoiy concretization,
[bjy the same token, the religious symbols would flot be able to serve their function
if they were flot received into the transitional reaim of experience of each
participating believer who brings to the reality of the crucifix, for example, bis own
creative impulse expressed in and through lis belief and its attendant faith.
Consequently, their meaning and significance are achieved only to the extent to
which such symbols become part of the transitional reaim of the believer’s illusory
experience.’°5
A significant study which contributes to our understanding of how critique or
hermeneutical suspicion can be integrated into this subject of how religious symbols
function meaningfully in transitional space, more specifically through their loss of
meaning, is found in Peter Homans’ The abitity to mourn: Disiltusionment and the
social origins ofpsychoanatysis. This is a fascinating study which explores how
contemporary Christianity bas suffered a “loss” of meaning in its cuÏturallreligious
symbols. Homans extends Winnicott’s thoughts within a Kohutian analysis of the
historical origins of psychoanalysis out of a religious matrix. He calis the large
psychological and social process he is describing “individuation”. Unlike Freud, Kohut
and the psychoanalytic movement in general, which views individuation
“individualistically”, Homans argues, following Winnicott’s lead, that in the process of
disillusionment or mouming of lost meanings
the response to loss opens up the transitional space, which is both social and
historical, and in this space persons construct a bridge of symbols between inner
and social worlds through fantasy and its implicitly narrative character.’°6
Interestingly, Homans neyer once uses the term “mirroring”. Freud’s creativity
sprang, lie says, from bis personal and cultural mouming of the loss of the “idealized”
objects of his religious and cultural traditions. But Homans wants to argue that sucli
objects are neyer completely “lost”. Rather, they become transmuted to an “object gain” in
the creation of new meaning.107 In the process of mouming, individuation and the creation
of new meaning, the ego cornes increasingly to recognize both its separation from the past
and its dependence on the past for the cultural symbols it lias been “given” as well as
“created” in that transitional space between self and social other.’° “The reality and
105 MEISSNER, 1984, p. 181.
106 HOMANS, 1989, p. 333.
107 HOMANS, 1989, p. 333.
108 HOMANS, 1989, p. 334.
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recognition of interdependence is the point at which a structure within the organism deeper
than the ego begins to take shape. It is best to cali this structure the self’.’°°
Homans is helpfiul here because he sees the whole history of western intellectual
curiosity since the late middle ages as the social, interpsychic expression of this process of
individuation. 11e exposes the limitations to the psychoanalytic assumption Kohut, for
example, liolds, that narcissistic seif-processes and their products are ultirnately private,
intrapsychic illusion. Hornans assists relational psychoanalysis in locating the social,
interpsychic reaim witbin the individual.
Homans approaclies lis study from a secularist perspective. “Individuation”, lie
says, “is I sense tliat he is sympatlietic to Ockham and bis
psychoanalytic nominalist descendents in the following statement:
The historical emergence of psychoanalysis was but a much, much later version of
Ockham’ s disillusionment witli religious reality. His God, the God of theological
absolutism, was the cosmological instauration of medieval, Christian men’s shared
propensity to totalize and constellate their grandiose, narcissistic potential around
and within a socially agreed-upon idealized object.”
The invaluable gain from the process of mourning and individuation is, according
to Homans, a greater sense of coherence or flexible interaction between inner and
outer worÏds, and it is here that lie will be most helpful in our study.
Any such deepening of interdependence between the ego and the realm of cultural
symbols is predicated upon an understanding of illusion as a creative as well as a
destructive force in development. Whenever a person cornes to recognize how
psychological are lis attachments to the common cultures of bis past, lie wffl also
corne to realize how psychological ail culture is. Through this recogmtion lie can
then corne to ‘own’ in a more conscious way the character of bis participation in
culture and lis commitments to its imperatives and consolations.”2
Mouming need not be conscious, in Homans’ view, to be life enhancing. Stiil, the
conscious experience and work of mourning which brings about this “owning” or
befriending of the psychological process and with it, a degree of relativization, is to be
preferred.
In the first instance products of culture are experienced unconsciously in an
undifferentiated and identificatory way and one is inclined to believe in thern, or --
as the case may be -- reject them entïrely. In the second instance, when
psychological understanding prevails, the products of culture do flot die simply
because their psychological significance is known; rather they ‘retum’ to the person
in the form of powerfiil illusions which the ego-self then uses as tlie raw material
for the construction of new meanings and a new relationship to the past.... The
109 HOMANS, 1989, p. 334.
110 HOMANS, 1989, p. 322.
111 HOMANS, 1989, p. 321.
1 12 HOMANS, 1989, p. 334.
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former absolutism continues to exist and is experienced as necessary, but it is also
recognized as ‘illusory.’ Such products are, in other words, ‘necessary
It is the work of mourning which “retums” to the individual an awareness of dependence
on cultural objects and allows the grip of denial conceming the illusory aspect of their
givenness to dissolve. It is the work of individuation and creation of meaning to “release”
new created meaning to these objects. While stiil illusory, they are recognized as in some
sense “real” and to some extent socially communicable.
Homans offers a brilliant and revealing summary of this process as regards
religious individuationlsecularization: “What was first experienced phenomenologicafly to
have been ‘on the outside’ (cosmology and myth) was retumed to its proper and natural
place ‘on the inside’ (psychology)”.”4 The creation of meaning thus understood would
seem to have a great deal to do with transmuting intemalizations, which I would argue,
would include the maturation of mirroring as well as idealization needs.
Homans does flot speak of what new meaning the God of the Christian tradition
and its cultural symbols may be found (and created) to have. But it is clear that bis critique
conelates well with both the analytic and the inclusivist object relations tbeoiy-based
approaches to some of these Christian symbols, in contemporaiy feminist theology and
psychology of religion.”5
It will be for Julian to show, and for the subsequent chapters of this thesis to
pursue fiirther, how individuation need flot simply be defined in secularist terms, but is
revealed to be at the heart of the new meaning of the Incarnation. “For Julian, . . .rneaning
is a process by which humanity cornes to the fulness of the complex mystery of God’s gift
ofbeing incarnated in human life”.”6
Meissner identifies prayer as the fourth area of potential interest to a psychology of
religion using object relations theory. Meissner sees prayer as a religious activity in wbich
the individual figuratively enters into the transitional sphere and meets bis or ber God
113 HOMANS, 1989, pp. 334 - 335. Perhaps this is one area in which Michel de Certeau’s and Anglo
American psychoanalytic differing methodologies of studying the mystics corne to similar conclusions.
114 HOMANS, 1989, p. 320.
1 JOHNSON, Elizabeth Johnson C.S.J., Susan A. ROSS and Mary Catherine HILKERT, O.P.,
“Feminist theology: A review of literature”, Theotogical studies 56 1995, p. 344: “No symbol is more
problematic for feminist theologians than the cross”.
116 GILLESPIE, Vincent and Maggie ROSS, “The apophatic image: The poetics of effacement in Julian of
Norwich”, in The medieval mystical tradition, ed. Marion Glasscoe, Cambridge, D. S. Brewer, 1992, p.
55, n. 8, Exeter symposium V.
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representation. This topic puts us directly into the reaim of transitional space, of accepting
to enter into the hermeneutic of relational trust. Meissner observes
In this activity, the believer immerses himself in the religious activity in a more
direct, immediate and personal way than in any other aspect of his religious
involvement...
It is here that the qualifies of the God-representation and thefr relationship to
the believer’s seif-representation become immediate.
Meissner continues:
The God he prays to is flot ultimately the God of the theologians or of the
philosophers, nor is this God lilcely to be in any sense directiy reconcilabie with
the God of scripture. Rather, the individual believer prays to a God who is
represented by the higffly personalized transitional object representation in bis
inner, private, personally ideosyncratic belief system.”7 Thus, ail the
unconscious and preconscious as well as conscious and reflective elements of the
individuai’s relationsbip to God and the characteristics of bis God-representafion
corne mto play. These rnay include elements that are more consciously mature and
seif-reflective but also elements that stem from earlier developmental levels and
have a more infantile, dependent, and even narcissistic quality.
One might say that in prayer the individual enters the transitionai space
where he meets bis God-representation. Prayer thus can become a channel for
expressing what is most unique, profound and personal in individual psychology.
Ail the elements of transference... can enter into the prayer experience and corne to
shape the individuais experience both of God and of himseÏf in its context.118
It is Meissner’s conviction that the illusory transitional dimension of religious
experience in prayer is flot reducible to Freud’s concept of “wishful” illusion of
transcendence. Transference there is, but there is also the recognition of the possibility of
self-reftection and, to that extent, seif-transcendence, within a relafional matrix:
We need only remind ourselves that for Winnicott the area of illusory
experience is a potential space whose foundation is ‘the babys trust in the mother
experienced over a long-enough period at the critical stage of the separation of the
not-me from the me, when the establishment of an autonomous self is at the initial
stage’. Within this potential space, then, man must revive the roots of tbis
capacity for creative living and for faith expenence.
But the assertion of faith carnes with it a transcendent element, addressing
itself to the most developed forms of religious experience. The assertion of faith
is flot mereiy a reassertion of basic trust; it is rather a creative assertion of
something beyond trust and far more significant. Its regression is, if anything,
recapitulative: it returns to the rudiments of trust in order to go beyond them....
This is the creative moment in the illusion of faith.’ 19
117 Sec the section above, however, for Peter Homans’ argument that this “private” intrapsychic reaim, if
it is to be truc to the objective and subjective dialectic of illusion in object relations theory terms, is also
social and interpersonal.
11 8 MEISSNER, 1984, P. 182. Interestingly, Jonte-Pace, in the article cited above, omits this area of
application of objcct relations thcory in a feminist psychology of religion.
119 MEISSNER, 1984, pp. 183-184, quoting WINNICOTT, 1989, p. 110; emphasis in text. Sec also
ERIKSON, Erik, Young man Luther, NY, Norton, 1962, quoted by Mcissner here as being on p. 262, on
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Discussing Meissner’s work, lames Jones lias proposed a shift in psychoanalytic
study of religion from smdying the individual’ s godobject or representation, to studying the
object relation one lias witli one’s God, that is, thefunction of such objects and the
interpersonal nature of the relationship of the self to them, in the psychological
“space” or experiential suite of consciousness ofprayer •120 This focus is more
consistent with Winnicott’ s own interest in the soothingfunction of transitional
experience. Thus as Burns-Smitli also observes,
Winnicott’s focus was on the space within which transitional objects are used, and
flot primarily on the objects themselves. The important concept here is that the
transitional space operates as the realm of relationality, the place wliere the
individual encounters ail Others.121
On the basis of Jones and Meissner’s work, Saur and Saur have begun to explore
aspects of the unconsious qualities of the relational flavour of transitional phenomena
encountered in prayerJ22 Their clinical study helps to “reaffirm and expand upon the
usefulness of Winnicott’s idea of the transitional spliere as a contemporary psychoanalyfic
framework for understanding religious experience” flot so much in tenns of studying the
individual’s image of God, as in studying the quaÏity of the highly personal object
relationship the individual lias with theïr God.123
trust and integrity. For an example of a theological dialogue with Erik Erikson on trust see BRETON, Jean
Claude, Foi en soi et confiance fondamentale: Dialogue entre Marcet Légaut et Erik H. Erikson,
Montréal, Bellannin, 1987, 358 p.
120 JONES, lames, Contemporary psychoanalysis and religion, New Haven, Yale University Press,
1991, pp. 41 -42, 59.
121 BURN5-SMITH, Charlene, “Theology and Winnicott’s object relations theory: a conversation”,
Journal of psychology and theotogy 27, 1, 1999, P. 13.
122 SAUR, Marilyn and William G. SAUR, “Transitional phenomena as evidenced in prayer”, Journal of
religion and health 32, 1, 1993, P. 56.
123 SAUR and SAUR, 1993, pp. 64-65. Saur and Saur studied two groups of peopie for the presence of
transitional phenomena: those who were active in a religious tradition and pray and those who were flot.
They found that those subjects who were flot active in a religious tradition tended flot to exhibit transitional
phenomena and indicated that they did flot pray. To photographs of people praying they gave responses in
which they expresssed emotioflal distance from the figure and could flot idefltify personally with the prayer
activity. By contrast, those subjects who were active in religious traditions and had active prayer lives ail
exhibited transtional phenomena in much the same way as Winnicott descnbed this behaviour and what was
happening psychologically between child and teddy bear. These subjects portrayed prayer as playful, and as
“feeling connected” in relation to God even when the figure in the photograph was physically alone.
Neither relational quality was present among those who did flot pray. See SAUR and SAUR, 1993, pp. 58
- 62.
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5.0 Conclusion
This chapter situates the relational psychoanalytic study of mirroring and highlights
the theories of both Winnicott and Kohut for the psychology of mirroring as they are beïng
extended into a psychology of religion.
Winnicott’s theory of transitional space is a profoundly helpful construct for
approaching Julian of Norwich’ s Showings. The epistemological flexibility of Winnicott’ s
theory of symbol formation makes it a valuable tool for the present study. The theory’s
challenging of patriarchal psychoanalytic assumptions makes it valuable for a feminist
psychology of religion.
The last two of the four aspects that Meissner identifies for exploring religion
through the “transitional” lens of object relations theory will be particularly important for
the present study, that is, how religious symbolism is appropriated and functions, and how
religious transifional objects function and undergo transformation in the experience of
prayer.
The relational psychoanalytic approach to religious experience allows for a subtlety
of understanding liow religious symbols function in transitional space and are appropriated.
It is attuned to recognizing experiences of mouming, transformation and maturation in this
reaim, notably through Winnicotts concept of disillusionment, taken up in Homans notion
of mouming lost meanings of cultural symbols. Thus, it can take seriously both pathology
and the possibility of maturation and creativity in the individual’ s interpsychic relation to
tradition. It can comprehend the place of hermeneutical suspicion as well as hermeneutical
restoration or construction within the gamut of religious experience, important elements in
any theological study which is sensitive to contemporary feminist concems. Moreover, it
allows for the potential integrity as well as the illusoriness of prayer experience. It can
understand the life of prayer as itself a kind of hermeneutics of transitional space,
dependent on a tnisting mirroring relation. Taldng it one step fiïrther, object relations
theory may offer a psychoanalytic tool for understanding how the relational, transitional
realm of prayer may be important for healing and for the creative work of theology.
Kohut’ s three phases in his therapeutic mirroring process wïll be a helpful tool and
structure for examining how Julian’s seif-experience and God relationship are transformed
over the course of lier lifetime.
A major thrust of what follows in this study of Julian of Norwich will be to read the
“genetic history” of lier pre-oedipal psychological life through lier prayer experience as this
is recorded in the two versions of the Showings, in which the central symbol of the crucifix
finds new salvific meaning for her. It will attempt to show how this woman’s mirroring
relationship in prayer, with the religious transitional object which she identifies as the Jesus
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she encounters on the crucifix, enables a transformation in both lier understanding of
herseif and of God.
At the centre of Julians progress is the transitional space of her visionary
experiences of 1373 and of lier subsequent years of meditations on them, in which she
cornes to know herseif to be mirrored in, or umted to, the Christ of lier showings in lis
self-emptying Incarnation. I will propose that this is integral to the therapeutic process by
which, according to Kohut, the “authentic self’ cornes to be recognized, experienced and
claimed. It also is the potential space in which Julian’ s creative appropriation of tlie
theological and devotional tradition is engaged. It is the source for her own theology as
well as her theological method.124 Moreover, as we will see, Julian seems intent on
sliaping lier text as an extension of that potential space for her readers.
124 See HIDE, Kerrie, Gfted origins to gracedfidfihtment: The soteriology ofJulian ofNonvich,
Colledgeville MN, Liturgical Press, 2001, pp. 23 - 42 who describes Julians theological method as the
“hermeneutic of behotding”.
CHAPIER 3
ON PSYCHOHISTORICAL METHOD
1.0 Introduction
This chapter gives a theoretical background and justification for the
psychobiographical method used in this thesis. It begins by simating the field of
psychohistory within the larger historical enterprise, then reviews the advantages and
weaknesses of the method, and offers a number of reasons for the choice of relational
psychoanalysis for the subject of the present study. Finally, it gives both personal and
textual reasons for the choice of the subject.
1.1 Psychohistory and the new history
Psychohistory, and more specifically one of its two branches, psychobiography, is
an area of contemporary bistorical research which focuses on the study of one individual in
history rather than a larger social process.’ Drawing on the primary textual and other
sources of evidence available, psychobiographical history seeks to delve into the
unconscious motives for historic persons’ attitudes and actions with the help of
contemporary psychodynamic theory.
This approach makes certain assumptïons about “interested” or subjective
objectivity in historical knowledge, and about the methodology it requires. These
assumptions locate psychobiographic studies within a larger movement called the new
history.2 They open psychobiography both to certain advantages and to potential
weaknesses of this contemporaiy approach to historical subjects. Before proceeding then,
a brief examination of the epistempological assumptions of the new history, as these relate
to psychohistory, is in order.
‘The other branch, group psychohistory, deals with psychological characteristics and/or formative
experiences of groups. RUNYAN, William McKinley, Lfe histories and psychobiography: Explorations
in theory and method, NY, Oxford University Press, 1982, p. 200.
2SHELDRAKE, Philip, Spirituality and history: Qtestions of interpretation and rnethod , NY, Crossroad
Press, 1992, pp. 20 - 21.
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1 .2 Historical objectivity, countertransference and disciplined
subjectivity
The new history is both a reaction to and a development of nineteenth century
historicism. Historicism, as a theory of history, sought to know the past objectively “as it
really was”, to understand the uniqueness of an historical subject and to describe it on its
own terms, rather than interpret or offer explanations of it in terms imposed by the
researcher.
With regard to historical objectivity, the new history is a reaction to historicism,
arguing that the very idea of disinterested, objective knowledge, unaffected by the
subjectivity or interests of the historian, is a chimera.3 Rather, the interests the observer
brings to her study “are constitutive of knowledge and not merely prejudices which imperil
it”.4 It is when these interests or assumptions about reality remain unacknowledged by the
historian that they have a more powerful, insidious influence on the selection and
reconstruction of the past than an honest admission of the validity, as well as the
limitations, of contemporaly questions.5
For example, Meissner, in the introduction to lis massive psychobiography of St
Ignatius of Loyola, describes both the legitimacy and the riskiness of the enterprise with
respect to the potential distortion of the data and their interpretation by the
psychobiographer, wherever countertransference, that is the projection of the student’ s
unconscious needs or attitudes onto the subject of study, goes unrecognized. 6
Rather, it is the conscious accounting for and appropriation of the
psychobiographer’ s countertransferential subjectivity as a tool of perception which makes
for the possibility of the
development and enlargement of the realm of the healthy observing ego
-- the
capacity to simultaneously be both subject and object -- [whichJ wil foster a
creative awareness and empathy with the object of study.7
To quote Loewenberg further:
The anxious clinging to “hard” facts and the refusai to view “facts” in any but what
is interpreted as the “obvious” way -- i.e., in the manner which a given researcher
can tolerate and therefore “see” -- is the scholarly analogue to the psychoanalyst’s
3SHELDRAKE, 1992, p. 22
SHELDRAKE, 1992, p. 22
SHELDRAKE, 1992, p. 17.
6MEISSNER, W. W., Ignatius ofLoyoÏa. The psychotogy ofo saint, New Haven, Yale University Press,
1992, pp. xvi - xx, 425 fn. 2. See also Thomas KOHUT, “Psychohistory as history”, American
historicat review 91, 2, 1986, p. 342.
LOEWENBERG, Peter, Decoding the past: The psychohistoricat approach, NY, Knopf Press, 1983, pp.
12 - 13. Similarly see KOHUT, Thomas, 1986, pp. 347 fn. 21.
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countertransference. Freud introduced the therapist’ s unconscious feelings into the
essence of the therapeutic situation; Einstein and Heisenberg placed the physicist as
an integral part of scientific experiment; but the historian as a person is yet to be
placed as a subjective consciousness in the historical enterprise. No phenomenon
has an inherent meaning. It becomes a datum by being assigned a frame of
reference which confers meaning... Distortion arises from the failure to account for
the observer in each act of knowledge....
My solution to this problem of cognition... is to bring the
countertransference feelings into consciousness and to use them as a tool of
perception. Ail research is unconsciously self-relevant, regardless of how distant it
appears to be from the self on a detached scholarly ievel. 8
Similarly Main Besançon can say
le contretransfert est l’ensemble de distorsions dans la perception et la réaction du
psychanalyste à son patient... Il est donc de même nature que le transfert qui
désigne les réactions du patient, c’est pourquoi il n’y a pas d’inconvénient à
employer ce dernier terme pour désigner le phénomène tel qu’il peut se produire
hors de la situation de cure....
Or le phénomène du transfert est général à tout savoir, à toute science. Cela
autorise l’espoir d’une application authentique de la psychanalyse, puisque sa seule
prétention, à cet égard, réside dans l’utilisation systématique et consciente du
transfert commun à tout chercheur.9
Most of the psychohistorians quoted above indicate explicitly that this kind of
“disciplined subjectivity” as Enk Enkson called it,1° requires the psychohistorian to
undergo lis or lier own analysis.” It isn’t something you can leam in school. As Koemg
comments in the context of studying discemment in the history of Christian spirituality,
8LOEWENBERG, 1983, p. 12.
BESANÇON, Alain, Histoire et expérience du moi, Paris, Flammarion, 1971, pp. 63 - 64. See also
Saul fRIEDLÀNDLER, Histoire et psychanalyse, Paris, Seuil, 1975, pp. 38 - 39.
10 STROZIER, Charles, “Disciplined subjectivity and the psychohistorian: A critical look at the work of
Erik Erikson”, Psychohistory review 5, 3, 1976, pp. 28 - 31.
‘ KOHUT, Thomas, 1986, p. 342. Loewenberg also observes that “[s]elf-analysis is the way that
historians can eliminate in themselves defenses against understanding portions of their materials of
research”. LOEWENBERG, 1983, pp. 6 - 7. Meissner, a psychiatrist, stops short of saying this, simply
quoting Freud that the work of future psychobiographers would Iikely be contaminated by “infantile needs
and wishes”. See MEISSNER, 1992, p. xviii. In a subsequent article, Loewenberg uses a personal example
to show how the psychohistorians appropriation of his own countertransferential subjectivity can become a
tool of perception, in his assessment of his own interest in the person of Walter Rathenau, who, in
Loewenberg’s estimation “behaved like a petson who wished to be murdered. But why?” Loewenberg
writes
Whereas traditional histonans purge or work around subjective sensations and build rigid barners to
the admission of feeling in the name of an ephemeral ‘objectivity’, todays historians realize that
their feelings, sensations and responses, both to the data and to its manner of presentation, are
themselves a preciously significant data [sic] of cognition....
[T]he reader will no doubt wish to know what are my own feelings toward Rathenau
and what the obvious and expressed frustration with his conduct means to me personally.... My
parents left Germany in September 1933.... [Rathenau’sJ books were on our shelves.... My
childhood was fflled with the emotional resonances of Hitter’s apparently unstoppable destruction
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psychologists point out that people will have access to the interiority of others(through psychic resonance) only and to the degree that they have already plumbed
the depths of their own subjectivity, and this in a relatively non-defensive way.
The discipline inherent in that project, along with its necessaiy sacrifice of ego
based illusion, indeed, the sheer suffering, results in its non-appeal to our mainly
extraverted culture. Nevertheless, many people through the centuries have
recognized that knowledge of one’ s own subjective structures, with ail their painful
and unflattering truths, is the necessary prerequisite for a discemment that is clear
and objective, whether one is deciding personal matters, or those that concem
tlieology, society and politics.’2
We may summarize this discussion thus far. Within the field of
psychohistory, as one expression of the new history, there is a consistent criticism of the
idea that the student can have an historically objective understanding of an historical person
which is independent of the student’s condition of self-awareness -- or lack of it. The
possibility of objectivity is opened only when the student of history can articulate
transparently lier horizon of particular subjective interest in the subject of smdy. The new
historian’s interior motivations must be named and claimed in order that the histoncal
person under study may be recognized as having a reality as a “centre of independent
initiative” which resists reduction to the historian’ s perceptions.
Herein perhaps lies the developmental continuity between historicism and the
discipline of psycliohistory, in that they both seek to understand the historical subject
witliout reductionism. Psychohistory sets the bar of “objectivity” at a more cliallenging
level.
1.3 Methodological consequences
Sheidrake identifies the new history lias having three characteristic methodological
consequences.’3
of democratic regimes and the intimidation and brutalization of democratic leadership. The
imperative to see reality and clearly assess danger, the unequivocal need to act, to take dec isive
preventative measures to insure seif-preservation, were the ineradicable survival messages of my
childhood. This is the emotional countertransference stance of my frustration with Rathenau and
my sensitivity to the issues of his life and death. LOEWENBERG, Peter, “Psychoanalytic ego
psychology and object relations and their uses for the historïan”, Psychohistory review 25, 1,
1996, pp. 30 - 31.
Sheidrake fails entirely to include the psychodynamic among valid contemporary theoretical approaches to
the history of spirituality where one might expect him to do so. See SHELDRAKE, 1992, p. 21. It
would seem that the history of spirituality has yet much to leam from contemporary psychohistory.
12 KOENIG, Elisabeth, “Review symposium of Jesus, the tiberator of desire by Sebastian Moore”,
Horizons 18,1, 199l,pp. 112- 113.
13 SHELDRAKE, 1992, p. 18.
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• The new history takes a revolutionary approach to historical evidence. It values the
minutiae of ail aspects of life as the integral context for historical understanding, and
thus critically challenges reliance on single kinds of source, or sources taken at face
value, and requires the validation of evidence in light of the particular questions being
asked.
• The new history challenges the primacy of elitist structures. It privileges a focus on
“lost traditions” and on groups or classes as opposed to significant individuals.
• It involves changes in methodology, challenging the view that history is what is
“documented”. Since it focuses on undocumented, lost traditions (eg. women, laity), it
looks to unwritten evidence (eg. art, oral history, etc.).
Not ail of these have been appropriated as fully as they might be in psychohistorical
studies to date.
With respect to the question of evidence on which psychohistorical studies are
based, psychohistory ciearly participates in the new history’s revoiutionary approach to
evidence. Psychohistory is fully committed to the integral nature of the human being, such
that by posing new psychologicai questions, new data emerge as sources of historicai
evidence. Loewenberg, for example, offers twelve techniques or methodoiogical signposts
for the use of ego psychology and object relations by the historian, based on ciinicai
technique and historical experience. They include affect, imagery, repetition of themes,
internai conflict, absence of material, action or inhibition, frustration toierance,
rationalization, polarization and spiitting, symbolic politïcs and anxiety, demography and
trauma, narcissistic rage.14 Friedlnder offers four criteria by which to validate evidence
used in psychohistoricai explanation: convergence (overdetermination), gestaiten (repetitive
character of behaviour), comparabiiity (over time and in whoie categories of personaiities),
and quantitative analysis.’5 Nonetheless he says, psychoanalytic expianation remains
indirect, a mixture of explanation and intuition or understanding.’6
With regard to Sheidrake’ s second characteristic of the new histoiy, that it challenge
the primacy of elitist structures, psychohistoiy as a discipline wïth its own history has not
been in the forefront. Because of the coherence of the individual personality, biography
lias dominated the genre of psychohistorical study.t7 An overwhelming majority of
psychohistorical studies have focused on significant historical figures, almost exciusively
14 LOEWENBERG, 1996, pp. 40 - 43.
15 fRIEDLÀNDER, Saut, Histoire et psychanalyse: Essai sur les possibilités et les limites de la
psychohistoire, Paris, Éditions du Seuil, 1975, pp. 45 - 51.
16 FRIEDLÀNDER, 1975, p. 51.
‘ FRIEDLÀNDER, 1975, p. 84.
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white, male leaders. The equally overwlielming reliance on the “universality” of the
oedipus complex as a structure of the human psyche, even among those who follow other
psychodynamic schools of thought than Freudian psychoanalysis (such as Erikson), lias
“focused historical attention on male leaders and their conflicts with their fathers; maternai
relationships have typically appeared as secondary, and female subjects have been rare”.’8
However, in more recent years, psychohistory is maldng more of the subjects of history
which are to be discovered among the lost traditions.
With regard to the third characteristic of focusing on undocumented sources of
evidence emerging from asking new questions of lost traditions, psychohistory lias only
begun to address women as individuals and as classes as historical subjects in their own
right, with questions from, for examples, the perspectives of women’s psychology and the
“primary institutions” of mother-infant relations.
2.0 Critiques of psychohistory and its responses
2. 1 Critiques by “traditional” historicists
Psychohistory is frequently criticised by traditional historians because of its
disregard for conscious purpose and the conjectural and reductionist nature of its
explanations of historical causality, based on incomplete evidence of early childhood
experiences and relations.’9
Ml psychohistorians are in agreement that the primacy of the historical context
under study must be respected. Thus while psychoanalytic theory may 5e applied to the
past for a fuller understanding and explanation of the past to 5e possible, the problem of
reductionism looms large if the pastis simply applied to the explanatory model.2°
18 HOFFMANN, Louise, “Object-relations theory and psychohistory”, Bulletin ofthe Menninger clinic
49,2, 1985, P. 114.
KOHUT, Thomas, 1986, P. 336.
20 KOHUT, Thomas, 1986, p. 338; MEISSNER, 1992, p. xx; SHELDRAKE, 1992, p. 21. Sheidrake
cails this subordination of history to present meaning “presentism”. SHELDRAKE, 1992, pp. 16, 22 - 23.
Runyan identifies three specific critiques of reductionism as applied to psychohistory: 1) that psychological
factors are emphasized at the expense of external social and historical factors; 2) that psychobiography
focuses excessively on psychopathological processes and gives insufficient attention to normality and
creativity; 3) that it tends to explain aduit character and behaviour exclusively in terms ofearty childhood
expenence while neglecting later formative processes and influences, whether in terms ofEnksons critique
of “originology” andlor Mack’s critique of the “critical period fallacy” or “eventism”. Runyan’s response is
to point to psychobiographers who are aware of and avoiding such dangers. RUNYAN 1982, pp. 208 - 209.
See also ERIKSON, Erik, Gandhi’s truth, NY, Norton, 1969, p. 98, and MACK, J. E., “Psychoanalysis
and historical biography”, The journal of American psychoanalytic association 19, 1971, p. 156.
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What makes psychohistory ail the more susceptible to the criticism of reductionism
is that the evidence deemed to be acceptable is, as noted above, of a necessarily broader
definition.2’ Specifically, with regard to psychohistory, where one is seeking to
understand and explain attitudes and behaviour of bistoric persons in terms of their
unconscious motivations, the notion of “hard” facts or evidence becomes much more
conjectural. At the same time, the approach to sources of histoncal evidence becomes more
critical.22
Likewise, causality was assumed by historicists to be simply linear, a sequential
narrative of events to be taken at face value. When psychoanalytic theory is applied to the
historical subject, however, the concept of cause and effect becomes much more
complex.23
The various critiques of psychohistory are potentially valid limitations to the
project. Yet the balancing question bas to do with whether historians, informed only by
“intuitive” psychological “common sense” and flot the fruit of a whole body of systematic
empirical and cimcal data, are in any better position in their interpretive task.24 This was
precisely the question with which William Langer challenged the American Historical
Association in 1957 in his presidential address which is hailed as the “birth of
psychohistory:
How can it be that the historian, who must be as much or more concemed with
human beings and their motivation than with impersonal forces and causation, has
failed to make use of these findings? Viewed in the light of modem depth
psychology, the homespun commonsense psychological interpretatïons of past
historians, even some of the greatest, seem woefully inadequate, flot to say naïve.
Clearly the time has corne for us to reckon with a doctrine that strikes so close to the
heart of our own discipline.25
KOHUT, Thomas, 1986, P. 338; SHELDRAKE, 1992, p. 1$.
22 SHELDRAKE, 1992, p. 18.
23 And among psychohistonans of different schools of psychoanalysis this problem of attributing causality
reveals the extent of its complexity. In the case of freudian psychoanalytic historians for example, the
cause of symptoms of disorder which is sought is the subjects’ internai oedipai conflict exclusiveiy,
whereas for historians of the relational psychoanalytic school, the cause is to be found at the level of
chronic expenences of pre-oedipal deficit, neglect or abandonment by the maternai selfobject, but also
includes larger societal influences of trauma which recapitulate those earÏy chiidhood experiences. See
SZALUTA, Jacques, Psychohistory: Theoiy and practice, NY, Peter Lang, 1999, pp. 158 - 159.
American university studies series xix, General literature 30.
24 SZALUTA 1999, p. 7.
25 LANGER, William L., “The next assignment”, in Psychoanatysis and history, ed. MAZLISH, Bruce,
NY, Grosset and Dunlap, 1971, p. 90. Langers address is singularly significant for the present study, in
that he goes on to speak of the application of Freudian psychoanalysis to the study of groups, and uses as
an example the period of epidemic during the fourteenth century known as the Black Death and ils effects on
the population. Me writes:
Ail men, as individuals, carry within themselves a burden of unconscious guilt and a fear of
retnbution whïch apparently go back to the curbing and repression of sexual and aggressive drives
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In the intervening fifty years, psychology lias become an even more pervasive
hermeneutical tool for interpreting experience in the western world. A major justification
for the psychohistorical enterprise, then, must rest, as Charron lias argued, on an open,
non-naïve recognition of the place of psychoanalysis among the contemporary
hermeneutical assumptions we carry.26
2.2 Critique from within psychohistory
In a critique of the method of psychohistory by a specialïst in the psychology of
religion, Diane Jonte-Pace observes that the discipline lias mucli to leam from biblical
scholarship conceming three problems insufficiently recognized: the subject of
psychohistory, the cultural context, and, related to this second problem, liermeneutics. In
lier review of a book of twenty psycholiistorical “lives of Augustine”, Jonte-Pace’s concem
is that a refusai to recognize these three problems in psychohistorical methodology leads to
a naïve psychohistorical literalism. For example, conceming the problem of the subject of
tlie psycliohistory, Jonte-Pace argues against the interpretation of tlie Confessions as
simply the autobiographical account of one individual. Ratlier, slie says, Augustine’s life
history “is made up, in part, of units of narrative borrowed from traditional literature and
scripture” and that it is also in part “a fictionalized self, constructed by a master rhetorician
to meet the structural, rlietorical, and tlieological needs of his narrative”.
Augustine... is flot just telling lis life story; ratlier, he is recounting a parable of
human piigrimage toward a conversion by “The Book” whicli lie hopes his book
will recapitulate in tlie souls of bis readers A “quest for the rhetorical
Augustine”, one miglit say, must precede tlie quest for the psychological
Augustine.27
The question of the self or subject must be posed of the text: Is tlie seif-portrayal “a portrait
of the inner life of an individual or is it a rlietorically constmcted account of a subject as
prototype or arclietype?”28 She argues for a liermeneutic of caution before accepting tlie
text at face value and interpreting it psychologically.29
in childhood and the emergence of death wishes directed against the parents. This sense of sin,
which is fundamental to ail religion, is naturalty enhanced by the impact of vast unaccountable and
uncontroïlable forces threatening the existence ofeach and every one. LANGER, 1971, p. 90.26 CHARRON, Jean-Marc, “Psychohistoire et religion: Perspectives, défis et enjeux”, Retigiologiques 1, 2,
1990, p. 73.
27 JONTE-PACE, Diane, “Augustine on the couch: Psychohistorical (mis)readings of the Confessions”,
Religion 23, 1993, p. 72.
28 JONTE-PACE, 1993, p. 73.
29 JONTE-PACE, 1993, p. 75.
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Secondly, she argues that psychohistorians tend to underestimate the differences
between cultural contexts of the author of the text, and our own. There is, she says, a
certain hermeneutical tendency to deny and/or pathologize the cultural altefity of the other,
in phrases such as that Augustine, in this case, lived in a period of history very much lilce
our own. What she wants to stress is that psychohistorians be aware and cautious of their
tendency to adopt a herrneneutics of sameness: “what appears different and pathological to
the contemporary reader... must be examined in its cultural context before difference can be
equated with pathology”.3°
She sees the problem of herrneneutics going even further, however, citing Peter
Homans, Michel foucault and others, as showing that psychoanalysis has taken over the
discourse of self, morality and culture previously articulated by Christianity. “This
disjunction, which is also a continuity, between religious discourse and psychoanalytic
discourse, militates against the simple application of a psychoanalytic methodology to
Augustines autobiographical, religious or theological texts” 31
Jonte-Pace holds that a psychohistorical approach which takes cultural studies,
hermeneutics and literary criticism seriously and sensitively as well as psychoanalytic
theoiy is possible. The text can be “both rhetorically constnicted and psychologically
determined”. Moreover, she offers certain suggestions as to what questions to ask of the
text. Recognizing the presence of borrowed narratives for example, the psychohistorian
might well “use psychology to interpret the choices [the authori made and the way he
narrated the stories he chose”.32 Psychological insight then could corne from recognizing
the authors unique way of describing inner states in, and his or her unique alterations of,
the bonowed narratives, rnuch like Freud argued back in 1908: “The writer retains a certain
amount of independence which can express itself in the choice of material and in changes in
the material chosen, which are often considerable”.33
Given that Julian of Norwich’s Showings are also rernarkable for their rhetoncal
and literary quality, this critique must be taken seriously in the methodology of the present
study.
° JONTE-PACE, 1993, P. 76.
‘ JONTE-PACE, 1993, p. 78.
32 JONTE-PACE, 1993, p. 79.
FREUD, Sigmund, “The relation of the poet to daydreaming”, in Culture and character, ed. RIEFF, P.,
NY, Collier Macmillan, [1908] 1963, p. 42. The Standard edition of the collected works of Sigmund Freud
9.
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3.0 The choice of psychodynamic theory for this psychohistorical study
3. 1 Criteria for choosing a theoretical framework
With a methodology which is as open to critique as is psychohistory, the choice of
psychological theory appropriate to the historical subject matter at hand is critical. Three
crfteria have tended to form the basis for the selection of psychoanalytic theory to be
applied to historical subjects. 1) The theory’s firndamental concepts must be compatible
with the basic modalïties of historical evolution: the evolutional character of the theory is
important. 2) The theory must be able to be applied to problems in human behaviour that
are quite complex so as to allow for an investigation of the kinds of major psychological
questions which the historian can encounter. 3) The theoiy must be sufficiently coherent
and structured to be useful.34
Szaluta provides an overview of the schools of psychodynamic theory which to
date have been used for psychohistorical studies: Psychoanalysis (Freud), Ego psychology
(Erikson), Object relations theory (Melanie Klein, Winnicott), Strncturalist psychoanalysis
(Lacan), and Self psychology (Heinz Kohut). He includes some positive and negative
features of each, and some examples of psychohistorical studies which have emerged in
most of these traditions.35
3.2 Reasons for choosing relational psychoanalysïs for the
theoretical framework for this study
I have chosen to draw on relational psychoanalysis (object relations theory and self
psychology) as the theoretical psychological foundation for this study. As indicated above,
the choice is neyer a simple response to the historical subject. Why have I chosen this
approach? I offer a number of reasons.
For one thing, the focus on the maternai-infant environment and its ramifications
for pattems of subsequent motivation and behaviour in women historical subjects, such as
these are accessible through the available texts and other sources of evidence, has hardly
been overworked in psychohistorical studies.
I FRIEDLÀNDER, 1975, p. 23. Psychoanalysis, in its beginnings with Freud, has been intnnsically
histoncal, taking a genetic, developmental approach to the individual and society. While some aspects of
his work have corne under increasing critique, such as his theory of early childhood psychosexual
determinants, many of lis conceptual formulations have passed into general use in other schools, sud as
the concepts of unconscious motives, conflicts, defense mechanisms, transference, etc. These rernain usefulin any psychohistoncal endeavour. See RUNYAN, William McKinley, “Alternatives to psychoanalytic
psychobiography”, in Psychologicat and historicat interpretation, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988,
p. 23$.
SZALUTO, 1999, chapters 2, 4, 5. Surprisingly, no examples of application of Lacan are included.
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For another, the relational psychoanalytic concept of the need for mirroring,
developed distinctively by both Winnicott and Kohut is a fertile and underdeveloped tool in
psychohistory. The focus on the consequences, specifically of chronically inadequate
fiinctioning of the mirroring maternai selfobject in bipolar patterns of emotional response in
women historical subjects needs much greater attention.
In this regard, I do flot find helpful $zaluta’s assessment of self psychology as
inadequately focused on early relational “deficit” (as distinct from Freud’s focus on internai
“conflïct”), and therefore, presumably flot able to fulfiil Friedilinder’ s criteria for the
selection of an appropnate psychoanalytic theoretical framework for psychohistory.36
Particularly in relation to women histoncal subjects, the systemic societal “neglect” of
women is so enormous, that any psychodynamic theory which might lielp at ail to redress
that neglect and deficit, if only to acknowledge and study their presence and effects more
explicitly, must be deemed a positive contribution which this school can offer the
psychohistorical enterprise.37 Szaluta concludes that although self psychology has brouglit
attention to a “wider segment of patient population, those... having severe narcissistic
disorders” it is simply flot as “broad in range and depth” as Freudian psychoanalytic theory
for use in psychohistory. I would hold that eacli theory lias its more appropriate histoncal
subjects of application. However, his negative judgment could be lield to be perpeniating
the tendency to dismiss the significance of women as appropriate historical subjects,
insofar as througli the centuries women have suffered systemically from unrecognized
forms of narcissistic deficit. I refer to the recent literature within the discipline of
psychology that acknowledges the systemic and historical nature of the neglect of what
Rossiter describes as the feminine expression of narcissism within the field.38
A third reason for choosing object relations theory and self psychology concems
the theoretical provision Kohut offers for the possibility of reconstructing the “therapeutic
process” at work over time, in his formulation of stages of maturation of minoring needs.
36 SZALUTO, 1999, pp. 158 - 159. Here Szaluto accepts the conclusions drawn by Greene in bis critique
of self psychology in GREENE, Marshall, A., “The self psychology of Heinz Kohut: A synopsis and
critique”, Bulletin ofthe Menninger ctinic, 1984, 48, 1, pp. 37 - 53.
See SZALUTO, 1999, pp. 158 - 159. See in this regard the critique offreudian based psychohistory
from an object relations theory perspective by HOFFMAN, 1985, pp. 120 - 121. Object retations theory
offers, she says,
an opportunity to redress the male gender bias implicit in eartier explanations and to redirect
attention toward expenences that previously were given littie weight... expand[ingJ the range of
questions and interpretations available to historians and biographers. It is also congruent with
current developments in family history.
38 See PHILIPSON, Ilene, “Gender and narcissism”, Psychology of women quarterty 9, 1985, pp. 213 -
228; and ROSSITER, Stanford Kent, Narcissism and codependency, Ph.D. thesis, The Wright Institute,
2004, 88 p.
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This corresponds to the fulfihiment of the critenon that the theoiy be compatible with
historical evolution. Kohut also offers distinctions in the modes of minoring transferences
which will be useful for the present work both for the psychohistorical study of maturation
of this basic narcissistic need, and for the subsequent reflection on its implications for our
understandïng of the sotenological dynamics with which, I hold, the chosen text presents
us.
It shouid be noted (since there is no mention of this school in $zaluta), that James
Fowier, Robert Kegan and Carol Giliigan have developed theories of human maturation
which are described as structural developmental and onented toward identifying stages of
human maturation. These theories are also being used for psychobiographical purposes.39
Object relations theory and self psychoiogy are distinguished from life-span
development theory, such as Erikson’s. My application of Kohut’s three phase therapeutic
process whïch engages a minoring transference will be for the purpose of disceming
psychological maturation of the need for minoring. To the extent that advances in the
phases of mirroring transference may not happen at ail, there is a link between the self
psychological and the structural developmental approaches. However, I am restncting
myself to Kohut (and Winnicott) because of the reasons listed above, and below.
Yet a fourth reason for the choice of relationai psychoanalytic theory with which to
broach this psychohistory concerns Kohut’s use of empathy. The clinicai method used in
self psychology, when adopted as a technique in psychohistory, aliows for a greater
possibility of understanding the historical subject.4° It should be evident at this point that I
do not imply that one historian’s “empathic understanding” of an historical subject could
exhaust ail interpretations which couid be made. But if it is a human narcissistic need to be
mirrored, affirmed, and understood, then perhaps empathy can be useful in the
psychohistoricai project, and particulariy so in the case of women subjects such as Julian of
Joann Wolski Conn describes her application of these theonsts to the life of a saint as a method for
correlating psychological structural developmental maturity with spiritual maturity:
Structural development of self is distintuished from ‘life-span development’, made famous by Enk
Erikson, by the fact that life-span development is rooted ïn tasks that arise inevitably, such as
identity and intimacy, whereas advances in structural development may flot happen at all. In a
structural ftamework, development is a process of detaching oneself from embeddedness in
restrictive relationships in order to love with more realistic self-knowledge and self-donation.
WOLSKI CONN, Joann, “Thérèse of Lisieux: Far from spiritual childhood”. Spiritus 6, 2006, pp. 69 -
70. The method was developed by Elizabeth Liebert. See LIEBERT, Elizabeth, “The thinking heart:
Developmental dynamics in Etty Hillesum’s Diaries”, Pastorat psychotogy 43, 6, 1995, pp. 393 - 409.
A study oflulian’s Showings using that theoretical framework would be helpful to confit-m or critique the
maturation process discemed in the present one.
° This is the proposal made by KOHUT, Thomas, 1986, pp. 336 - 354, a psychohistorian and son of
Heinz Kohut.
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Norwich, who historically have been systemically subjected to the negative judgment of
patriarchal terms of reference in the tradition. In self psychology, the validity of the
psychoanalysis is determined by the extent to which the client feels understood by it. Now
the historical subject no longer lives to give feedback whether she feels understood. But
Thomas Kohut argues that the validity of the psychohistorical smdy is determined by the
extent to which the reader feels he or she understands the historical subject.41 The goal of
empathic placing of self in the other for the possibility of understanding, and for the
validity of interpretation, is the saine in both fields, Thomas Kohut holds. Psychoanalytic
theory clearly does flot use the conscious language or have the conceptual universe of the
historical subject, and psychohistory understands that its interpretations are a result of the
practice of a disciplined subjectivity. Stiil, unconscious motivations made manifest
through empathy may reveal in the psychobiographical subject an enduring human need, at
least, to be understood “on one’ s own terms”, in the sense of being minored back, of
oneseif being revealed or disclosed to oneseif.
A fifth reason for the choice of relational psychoanalytîc theoiy for this
psychohistory concems the theoretical availability of this school to avoid reductionism by
accounting for adaptive, indeed creative, responses to the viscissitudes of life as well as for
pathological responses, as we saw in chapter 2. Whule allowing for the reality of
unconscious desires being in conflict with conscious purpose, object relations theory also
recognizes, by means of its distinctive concepts of false and true selves, the potential of the
human being for greater coherence and integration.
A sixth reason would be the relative capacity of Winnicott’ s and Kohut’ s theories to
avoid the other two kinds of reductionism mentioned by Runyan above.42 I would argue
that relational psychoanalysis is adequate to the task of integrating social and individual
determinants of history, as well as childhood and aduit experiences, in its application to
historical subjects who give significant evidence of narcissistic preoccupations. The
concepts of transitional space, narcissistic trauma and rage, disillusionment and mourning,
as well as the creative responses to loss in fantasy activity, illusion and narrative are ail
significant contributions to the power of this theoretical framework for the present study.
Specifically, the unique contribution of Winnicott’s concept of transitional space
must 5e recognized for grasping the subjective dimension of the historical life as a cultural
construction. Loewenberg argues that this should be taken as seriously as materialist
interpretations of hïstory. Object relations theory, lie says, ailows tlie historian to observe
4L KOHUT, Thomas, 1986, pp. 344 - 345.
42 RUNYAN, 1982, pp. 208 - 209.
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and explain the actual processes through which inner experience is formed and defined, and
to understand its cultural foundation and expression in social and historical groups, as welI
as in the integration of individuals in such groups. It shows how intention, fantasy,
motivation and adaptation work in history, and how these may be recognized in language
and behaviour, interpreted and given meaning.43
In the present case, the composition of the $howings can itself be seen as a fruit of
the work of transitional space. Whatever was the original occasion of the visions, it and
the ongoing life of meditation on the visions and the composition of the Showings can be
grasped, by means of the concept of transitional space, as being of one, albeit evolving,
piece, both personal and cultural.44 Given that the texts are about ail we have to work
with in our knowledge of the present historical subject, this particular dimension of object
relations theoiy dovetails well with the kind of question being posed and the evidence
available. It also can take seriously Jonte-Pace’s own criterion that psychohistory be
attentive to the autho?s psychology expressed through the unique use of the textts
borrowed elements from literary, biblical and theological sources.
Likewise, the focus on the effects of trauma, personal and societal, as expressed in
the symptoms of narcissistic injury, rage and even a wish to die, is a welcome contribution
to psychohistory through self psychology.45 How this is processed in women historical
subjects has received extremely littie attention.
Recent feminist attention has focused on women’s tendency, at once due to
psychology and to having no privileged status in society, to interpret our lives and religious
symbols in terms of continuity of experience as over against traumatic rupture or reversai,
as in men’s experience
-- and as in men’s interpretations of women’s experience.46
Drawing on Nancy Chodorow’s object relational feminist psychology, Carolyn Walker
Bynum writes that women
in general are less likely to use images of gender reversai or to expenence life
decisions as sharp ruptures because women, raised by women, mature into a
° LOEWENBERG, 1996, p. 43. It is to this end that Loewenberg, pp. 40 - 43, offers his 12 techniques
and signposts referred to above.
Compare BAUERSCHMIDT, frederick, Jutian ofNorwich and the mystical body potitic of Christ,
Notre Dame IN, University of Notre Dame Press, pp. 49 - 50 on the debates over the reiationship of
original expenence and subsequent interpretation of Juiian’s Showings, which debates, Bauerschmidt, like de
Certeau, sees as “produced by our particular way of using the text.... [TJhe text as it cornes to us is so
resistant to the separation of experience and interpretation. It is ail part of what is shown to Julian, thus it
is ail part ofthe ‘original experience”.
u KOHUT, Heinz, $etf psychotogy and the humanities, ed. STROZIER, Charles, 1985, NY, Norton,p.
163.
46 BYNUM, Carolyn Waiker, Fragmentation and Redemption, NY, Zone, 1992, pp. 27 - 51.
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continuous self whereas boys, aiso raised by women, must undergo one basic
reversai...
Bynum’s more central thesis is that historically, only men’s stories are full social dramas;
men use images of reversai to express iiminaiity-- to escape anxiety or self-doubt over
leadership or other responsibilities. (Francis of Assissi’s reversai, taking on symbois of
poverty and femininity, is classic.) Women, on the other hand, have historically neyer had
such elite privilege from which to need symbolic means of escape.48 In contradistincfion
to Victor Tumer’s anthropological theoiy of liminality, Bynum argues from lier knowiedge
of women’ s use of medieval symbolism, that such use of symbolism by women tends flot
to be symmetrically opposed to those of men, as men would suppose (i.e., women do not
undergo reversais taking on symbols of wealth or masculinity in a neat symmetry). Rather,
women’ s shifis in symbot interpretation tend to more polysemic images of identifying
with human suffering and with self-acceptance: “b medieval women, at any rate, Christ
on the cross was not victory or humility but ‘humanity’. And in eating and loving that
‘humanness’ one became more fuiiy oneself’.49 Bynum challenges Turner’s own
privileged social location in his concept of liminaiity:
Liminality itself... may be less a universal moment of meaning needed by human
beings as they move through social dramas than an escape for those who bear the
burdens and reap the benefits of a high place in the social structure. As recent
liberation theologians have pointed out, it is the powerful who express imitation of
Christ as (voluntary) poverty, (voluntary) nudity and (voluntary) weakness. But
the involuntary poor usually express their imitatio Christi not [in reversali as
wealth and exploitation but as struggie.5°
Let this flot lead us to imagine that women do flot experience personal and collective
rupture or are flot changed by such trauma throughout history. The structure of the
liberation hermeneutic of conversion lias its own dynamic shape. However, taldng
seriously this feature of continuity in women’s stories and symbols can perhaps help us
better recognize and give significance to the covert signs of the presence of massive
personal or collective trauma in shfts in symbol interpretation in women’s experience,
specifically in the present study.
In bis list of twelve “techniques and methodologicai signposts” useful for the
application of object relations theory and self psychology to individual and group historical
‘ BYNUM, 992, p. 43.
‘ BYNUM, 1992, pp. 33 - 34, 43.
‘ BYNUM, 1992, p. 50.
° BYNUM, 1992, p. 34. See GUTIERREZ, Gustavo, A theology oftiberation: History, potitics and
salvation, transi. INDA, Caridad and John EAGLESON, Maryknoli NY, Orbis Books, 1988, ch. 3.
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subjects, Loewenberg goes on at substantial length about the eleventh one, that of
“demography and trauma”:
We are now on the grounds of massive psychic trauma and its sequelae in the
posttraumatic stress disorders.... The evidence is clear: Given a large enough
social or collective traumatic event, no one escapes a posttraumatic stress disorder.
lis hallmark is a fixation on the trauma but with new variations and with an altered
conception of the self and the world. The symptoms are lifelong. No one is
immune. Adaptive and coping capacities are enfeebled. Massive trauma is a crucial
bridge to history. We are no longer spealdng of singular cases or a unique
psychogenesïs. Our history as humans ïs the stoiy of large scale traumas of war,
disease and epidemics, famine, dislocation and migration, economic crises,
drauglits, and pestilence. The psychoanalytical perception of anxiety as a signal of
the danger of helplessness and hopelessness is a political and social categoly of
understanding whose full implications have yet to be explored aid exploited by
social scientists. Trauma is the theoretical link from individual to group, cohort,
population, nation, the world. Here historians appropriately introduce their
categories for understanding groups and institutions.., traditions, civic culture,
myth, symbol, the artifacts of popular and high culture.5’
Again, how that anxiety will manifest itself in women needs to be factored in. But
within the context of the histoiy of Christian spirituality and the evolution of Christian
doctrine, I suggest that we have failed to pay sufficient attention to the effects of this
plienomenon, and to the distinctive responses which women have had in such contexts.
This may be a case of our denying the alterity of cultural upheaval, political and epidemic
trauma of the l4th century. One of the reasons then for the choice of theory to support the
present psychohistorical study is to attempt to redress this situation in some limited way.
Pursuing this question of narcissistic trauma may allow for a doser examination of
evidence of personal and societal trauma and mourning in the present psychohistorical
study.
3.3 Peter Homans on mourning lost symbolic meanings
Peter Homans, a psychohistorian of religion, formed in the tradition of object
relations theory and self psychology, lias explored a further characteristic of narcissistic
trauma and rage, which contributes to the choice of theoretical framework for this study.
Homans focuses on the rise of psychoanalysis as a result of the historical process of
disillusionment and mourning the loss of the symbolic meaning of cultural objects in
western culture. Homans argues that this process of disillusionment is the preconditïon
51 LOEWENBERG, 1996, pp. 41 - 42. The other techniques and methodological signposts he descnbes and
which are listed above in this chapter, while flot ail being exceptional to object relations theory or self
psychology oniy, do give a feel for the kinds of dues and evidence the psychohistonan seeks to devetop in
his or her hypothesis.
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for the possibility of individuation and autlientically creative responses to this loss.52 I
include here a brief description of his thesis.
Homans situates the rise of psychoanalysis itself in an historic context in the West
dating back to fourteenth century nominalist theology and seventeenth century science. His
epistemological argument is that the western mmd is individuaflng away from absolutism
toward relativism. At the level of psychoanalytic explanation, his argument depends upon
a fundamental process of “disillusionment” or mourning the loss of symbolic meaning of
cultural objects, including the religious experience of God.53 For Homans, this process of
disiilusionment is ubiquitous in western culture and in its individuals. Therefore Homans
argues, in both the structure and content of bis essay, that psychobiography and the larger
field of psychohistoiy are in themselves inadequate universes of discourse without the
extended historicai perspective of this cultural critique within western theology and
science.54
The mourning process can be avoided or addressed personaliy and cuiturally, but
inevitably it will intrude its presence in life. Its presence is received more welcomingly,
perhaps even into consciousness, he observes, wherever people on the margins of their
society have “analytic access” to this experience of ioss, as the transitional space in which
old symbols die and new ones are received and created.55
This necessary loss of self and cultural objects (and ultimately, godobject) Homans
holds to be fundamental in the Western human experience of individuation. One of the
fruits of individuation is a deepened sense of the relativity of one’ s knowiedge, that
subjectivity infuses ail objects of knowledge. I agree with this as far as lie goes with it.
But my sense is that Homans’ fertile concept of mourning and disillusionment as human
experiences can yield further fruit.
52 HOMANS, Peter, The ability to mourn: Disillusionment and the social origins ofpsychoanatysis,
Chicago, University of Chicago Press, l989,p. 3.
HOMANS, 1989, P. 3.
HOMANS, 1989, pp. 3 - 5.
Homans understands “analytic access” to refer to “the integrative and depth psychological probes an
individual can make with regard to into his inner world. It is by no means limited to psychoanalysis, for it
is found in introspective literature, in phitosophical reflection and religious experience, etc”. HOMANS,
1989, p. 5. He is indebted to Winnicott for the basis of his understanding of mourning as fundamental in
western history and contemporary life in terms of Winnicott’s concept of transitional space
intermediate between the self and the social other. ..I think that here in this marginal space or area,
analytic access and common culture have always intersected to fonn a genuine reality which exists
apart from and is also some part of ‘psyche’ and ‘culture.’ It is in this area that the formation of
symbols takes place and here creatïvity also occurs. This place is at once social and psychological.
HOMANS, 1989, p. 5.
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Paul Ricoeur wrote, in a now famous passage, that the psychoanalytic approach is
necessarily iconoclastic:
My working hypothesis... is that psychoanalysis is necessariiy iconociastic,
regardless of the faith or nonfaith of the psychoanalyst, and that this ‘destruction’
of religion can be the counterpart of a faith purified of ail idolatry. Psychoanalysis
as such cannot go beyond the necessity of iconoclasm. This necessity is open to a
double possïbility, that of faith and that of nonfaith, but the decision about these
two possibilities does flot rest with psychoanalysis.56
But as Vernon Gregson lias observed, “Paul Ricoeur has [alsoJ written that aithougli Freud
has served up to the present to foster unbelief, now is the time to use bis insights to foster
beiief.”57
Perhaps there is a link to be made here with the tension within the new histoiy
(inciuding psychohistory) as epistemoiogicaily agnostic and relativistic on the one hand,
and on the other, as appealing, consciously or otherwise, to some fundamental
(psychodynamic) human expenence by which to understand the historical subject “on its
own terms”. Despite bis expressed relativism, Homans privileges the process of cultural
mouming as, in effect, an ubiquitous human experience -- at least in western culture since
the l4th century. Certainiy, psychoanalytic iconoclasm is part of the Western process of
culturai disillusionment Homans is describïng. Given analytic access, tlie process of
disillusionment and mourning wili reveal false selfobjects and false culturai objects
including archaicaily ideaiized religious ones. I hold that the potential experience of new
meaning through mourning the death of the oid can open up the possibility of a new,
creative emergence of an individuated expenence of Christïan faith symbols and narrative
themes concerning salvation. A major thrust in the present thesïs wili be to seek traces of
this process at work in the $howings of Juiian of Norwïch.
Ultimateiy creative individuation, viewed through the lens of object relations theory
and self psychology, can become a means for understanding the history of mouming on its
own terms, and I think, provide a kind of transitional space for a fresh personai and
cultural appropriation of the meaning of Christian faith. Individuation thus understood
paradoxically does not deny but embraces the matnx of subjective interest out of which all
meaning is created and found, which when embraced allows that “clear and objective
dïscemment” to which Koenig encourages us to aspire.
RICOEUR, PauÎ, Freud and philosophy: An essay on interpretation, New Haven, Yale University
Press, 1970, p. 230. See MEISSNER, 1992, P. xxv.
GREGSON, Vernon, “Review Symposium of Psychoanalysis and retigious experience, by W. W.
Meissner”, Horizons 13, 1, 1986, p. 397. The reference to Ricoeur’s statement is flot cited in that text.
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In choosing a theoretical framework for this psychohistoiy which will allow new
forms of evidence to corne to light, I find that Homans offers a valuable developrnent of the
object relations concepts of transitional space, illusion, disillusionment, fantasy activity,
movement responses and narrative in the narcissistic response to loss.
Homans is at pains to extend Winnïcott’ s fertile concepts of transitional space and
illusion further into the realm of cultural phenornena. Homans argues that fantasy activity
is personal and social, “an intersubjective transitional form of mental activity”, somewhere
between the “polarities of inner and outer”.58
The perception of movement or “movement responses” in fantasy activity reveais
four components of psychological rnakeup: 1) deep bodily feelings, 2) issues of
narcissism and self esteem, 3) the capacity for empathy, 4) the capacity or readiness to
engage in fantasy activity.59 He goes on to say that movernent responses in fantasy activity
“display an incipiently narrative character”. A person
responds to the unconscious sense of ioss {imposed by ambiguous or unstrnctured
stimuliJ by beginning to teil a story.... [The individualJ “reach[esJ out for the
construction of plots, the essential element in narrative.., in order, in Shakespeare’s
well-known phrase, ‘to give airy nothing a habitation, and a name’ ,60
Homans holds that it is this combination of the presence of the social other in
fantasy activity and of movernent and narrative which constitute the nucleus of the “creafion
of meaning” or the “construction of symbols”. He aligns it with the Winnicottian sense of
play as building up meaningful structure.6’ 11e goes on to relate observations on the
psychoiogy of movement to the wider processes of mourning and individuation:
The response to loss opens up the transitional space which is both social and
historical, and in this space persons constrnct a bridge of symbois between inner
and social worlds through fantasy activity and its implicitly narrative character.62
Homans goes on to ask a fascinating question which with bis answer are so fertile with
implication as to warrant full quotation here.
What might the reiationship be between narcissism and narrative? It seems
reasonable to suppose that the work of narrative building transforms sorne bits and
pieces of the self s original, archaic narcissism (Kohut) and its residual,
unconscious memories of maternai and infantile omnipotence (Winnicott) into a
conversation with the social order. This supposition is grounded in the social
character of ail narrative, on the one hand, and its foots ifl depth-psychological
personal experience, on the other hand. The most common examples are the
HOMANS, 1989, p. 330.
HOMANS, 1989, pp. 330 - 331, drawing on the work of SCHACHTEL, Ernest G., Experiential
foundations of Rorschach’s tests, NY, Basic Books, 1966, 342 p.
60 HOMANS, 1989, p. 332.
61 HOMANS, 1989, pp. 332 - 333.
62 HOMANS, 1989, p. 333.
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keeping of a diary, the reading or writing of an autobiography or novel, and the
viewing (or writing) of a play or movïe. Complex as such experiences are, ail of
them include a fundamental transaction or interchange between individual,
unconscious fantasy processes and socially and historically grounded and shaped
events and figures which play out human relations, situations and predicaments,
over a set time span. In imaginatively entertaining such experiences, persons work
out and over and build up relations between thefr inner worlds and the world of
shared collective meaning and memory. As old meanings are sorted out and
discarded and new ones entertained and formed, the distance between the ego and
the social order at first lessens but then also deepens. Sucli activities facilitate
transformations in persons’ narcissistic organization.63
If this supposition is true, then it seems to me it would apply to the therapeutic context, to
the context of constructing creative social theory (which is Romans’ own particular focus),
and as well, to that of the particular histoncal development of Chrisfian soteriological
narratives. In particular, ït could apply to Julian of Norwich’ s soteriology in her
Showings, which grows out of prayer and meditation practices which incorporate and
encourage the use of imagination to construct meaning out of traumatic social and personal
events.
Both Julian’s Short and Long Texts are structured around their adherence to the
narrative quality of the visions. As narrative, involving the fruits of mystical vision, tectio
divina,64 prayer, meditation and dream, the Showings would fall within the genres of
writing which Homans identifies as helpful for transformation in narcissistic organization.
But they would not be limited to this. Evidence of the four elements of psychological
makeup which reflect such “movement responses” in the texts could be looked for at the
same time as indicators ofjust such a process at work in the unique contours of her
visionary narrative.
HOMANS, 1989, pp. 335 - 336.
64 Interestïngly, Vincent Gillespie points out that in fact a movement away from tectio divina to a lectio
domini was taking place in late medieval English piety, in which imagery, specifically the image of the
cmcified body of Christ, replaced the literary text as focus for the meditation. See GILLESPffi, Vincent,
“Strange images of death: The Passion in later medieval English devodonal and mystical wnting”, in Zeit,
Tod und Ewigkeit in der Renaissance Literatur 3, ed. HOGG, James, Salzburg, 1987, pp. 111 - 159.
Analecta Cartusiana 117. With regard to Julian, however, Oliver Davies bas noted (in a language
suggestive of the mediated reaim of transitional space) the extent to which scriptural text is infused into her
work: “Julian’s ‘revelation’ cannot but seem to take place within a space in which the Word of God is
everywhere present by virtue of its absence”. DAVIES, Oliver, “Transformational processes in the work of
Julian of Norwich and Mechtild of Magdeburg”, in The medievat mystical tradition in England, cd.
GLASSCOE, Marion, Cambridge, D.S. Brewer, 1992, p. 46. Exeter symposium V.
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4.0 The choice of subject
4. 1 Personal countertransferential issues
So why have I chosen to approach the soteriology of Julian of Norwicli’s
Showings from a psychohistorical perspective informed by object relations theory and self
psychology?
Ffrst, the kinds of narcissistic problems which emerge from a deficit in pre-oedipal
mirroring have becorne a central focus for my own self understanding, as well as for
understanding our culture. How these issues express themselves in women as distinct
from men is of personal interest. It has been a difficuit thing to recognize deficit in my
upbringing, because of the very isolative behaviour pattems which would flot allow me to
be close enough to others to recognize the lifelong effects of adequate (and inadequate)
mirroring and affirmation.
Second, a personal traumatic experience of abandonment in my late 30s which
resulted in the eruption of narcissistic rage and the loss of the illusion of grandiosity or
control of my environment, lias become a critical element in my personal history, self
knowledge and spirituality. It inaugurated a long period of mouming which I embraced in
a context of therapy, a 12 step support group, a practice of scripture based meditation,
joumalling and spiritual direction. The presence of mirroring others in the support group
and spiritual direction facilitated my entering more deeply into this mouming experience.
In fact, in the course of being encouraged to meditate on the Passion, I found myseif
entering into the death of Jesus. I experienced myself dying, and then for a number of
months afterward, dead with Jesus in the tomb. It was, as I came to see, a “necessary
death”.65 I encountered great resistance in maldng sense of the cross, as the traditional list
of sins, for which Jesus died, did flot seem to correspond to anything in this naked
experience of abandonment. And yet what I was experiencing was a process of traumatic
loss and the eventual creation of meaning out of that loss. It transformed my understanding
of myseif and the quality of my relatïonship to God encountered in that transitional space of
prayer. This experience lias helped me to recognize the importance of trauma, personal
joumalling, narrative out of prayer experiences, and the presence of mirroring others, for a
maturation to be possible along the axis of narcissistic mirroring needs. At the same time, I
have corne to see this as a praxeological process of appropriating salvation in Jesus Christ.
65 For accounts of these meditations from my journal at the time, as well as of my process of interpreting
them with help from both Julian of Norwich and object relations theory, see RATCLIFFE, Holly,
Mourning and kenosis: Mirroring of God and sef in transformation, S.T.M. thesis, NY, General
Theological Seminary, 1997, chs. 6 - 8.
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I bring this history to my psychohistorical interpretation of Julian of Norwich’s
soteriology.
I came to Julian’s writings, then, at a tirne in my life when my fundamentally
agnostic assumptions about the possibility of communication with God in prayer were
being challenged. That is to say, my godobject and I were moving toward a more
communicative relationality. The concept of prayer as transitional space helped that to be
possible, and lias highlighted for me the extent to which Julian’ s writings describe a shift
into a new communication, a relationality, taking place in the third reaim of prayer. Thïs
lias admitted hermeneutical consequences for how I read Julian -- as distinct from someone
reading Julian who does flot have an active prayer life.66
What is significant in this context is that I acknowledge that I corne to Julian as one
who is now receptive to transitional phenomena in prayer. Consequently I read the desire
for communication and relationality in prayer as pervading Julian’s writings and as
foundational to lier struggie to express this core orientation in lier theology.
In lis recent book on psydhobiograpliy, William Todd $dhultz argues that the
psychohistorian must seek to elucidate a mystery, a question in the rnaterial seeking an
answer, some “paradoxical, elusive phrase or episode requiring for its solution a leap to
another level of understanding”.67 Sornething in the question will be distinctive, flot just
66 RecalI the work (noted in the last chapter) by Marilyn SAUR and William SAUR, “Transitional
phenomena as evidenced in prayer”, Journal of religion and heatth 32, 1, 1993, pp. 55 - 65. These
psychologists studied differences in how people described what was going on in photographs of people
praying, and found that those who had no background of active involvement in a religious tradition or
prayer expressed the feeling of being emotionally distant from the figure in the photograph, of not
identifying with the prayer activity, and of not connecting any perceived comfort in the photograph of the
praying person with that person being in a relationship. In effect, the authors conclude that the
expenmental population who did flot have an active prayer life did flot manifest transitional phenomena in
their perceptions of the figures praying in the photographs. This was not the case with the other
populations, who had active religious traditions. In their case, many of the features of transitional
phenomena as described by Winnicott were evidenced in their responses. Among other things the
researchers noted that although the photos were of figures thought to be alone, the respondants reported that
the figures were relating to God, “feeling connected”. They perceived that suent communication was going
on in the photographs of the praying persons and that God could receive the communication.
The researchers conclude that their study
demonstrates Meissner’s suggestion that the study of prayer facilitates understanding of the deeply
personal object related nature of religious expenence [and] reaffu-ms and expands upon the
usefulness ofWinnicott’s idea of the transitional sphere as a contemporary psychoanalytic
framework for understanding religious expenence. SAUR and SAUR, 1993, pp. 64 - 65.
Might these same dynamics flot also be functioning in how contemporary people read and interpret literature
which was written as the fruit of and intended to stimulate prayer?
67 SCHULTZ, William Todd, ed., Handbook of psychobiography, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005,
p. 8.
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about the subject of the study however, but in attracting the attention of the psychohistorian
it will also say something about that person.
When I encountered Julian of Norwich, I found in ber writing someone who also
had to struggie to appropriate the meaning of the cross and death of Jesus, in a way which
could function salvifically to respond to ber deepest needs for affirmation and mirroring,
but through the jungle of the dogmafic tradition’s understanding of sin and its redemption
whicli was quite foreign to ber need.
I acknowledge that my story is flot the same as ber story; nor is my cultural context
the same as bers. The subject chosen for psychohistorical treatment is ultimately her
soteriology embedded in the Showings, flot ber personal history. But by focusing on ber
unique treatment of soteriological material, with some personal interest in why and how it
might have emerged and spoken to her, as it does to me and others of this generation, I
hope that some new psychohistorical light may be shed on ber text.
Countertransferential questions I pose to Julian’s Showings stem from this
problematic. The questions it prompts in me include the following:
• Why did Julian flot have to die in her symbiotic union with Jesus in hislher suffering at
the point of death?
• How is it that Julian of Norwich understands and articulates so intimately the feelings
of psychological distress in the condition of perceived abandonment, such that it is
fundamental to the dynamic of lier exemplum of the servant and the lord? Clieery,
optimistic personalities do flot have this empathic articulate understanding of such
difficuit emotions if they bave had experiences of abandonrnent but have avoided
embracing such trauma.
• Wliat is the unidentified element or movement behind ber exemplum wbich shifts the
servants (and Julian’s, and the reader’s) focus from bis seif-preoccupation with bis
condition of distress, to tuming to behold the face of the loving lord while in that
condition?
My personal countertransferential reasons for adopting a psychohistorical method of
interpretation lead me to want to explore empathically these and related psychodynantic
features of her Showings for what they may teil us about the genesis, development and
appropriation of her distinctive soteriology.
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4.2 The nature of the textual material of Julian of Norwich’s
$howings
4.2.1 Textual evidence conducive to a psychohistorical study
The choice of ifistorical subject appropriate to the kinds of evïdence made available
by the questions posed by the psychoanalytic theory is important.
The complaint is frequently made by psychohistorians that there is not enough “free
association and dream material” and flot enough evidence from the childhood of the
historical subject to make for a convincing psychobiography.68 k an early article Heinz
Kohut wrote of “applied analysis” (psychobiography) that it “must proceed without the
central instrument for the investigation of the unconscious: free association”.69 He
observes there that what is lacking is “the living ebb and ftow of the transference... the
interplay of interpretation and resistance...” Stiil, in that article he is reviewing four
psychobiographies of creative authors and artists, and is stmck by the amount of material a
prolific artist offers which is usable for psychoanalytic investigation. He observes in his
conclusions to the review that
[t]he analysand’s stories and those found, for example, in literary works of art
contain intricate mixtures of revelation and concealment; thus there is also a
structural parallel between the material investigated by the clinical analyst and the
subject matter of the worker in applied analysis.7°
There is very little known about the history of the person we have corne to know as
Julian of Norwich. The kind of documentation or evidence she has lefi behind in her
$howings does flot include explicitly any reference to lier early chuldhood. Any speculation
there would have to be corroborated by what little we know of pattems of maternai-infant
relations among the different classes in l4th century England. As well, it would have to
resonate with what Julian does “say” -- and omit to say -- in terms of the dues and traces
which can be discerned in her texts by means of the tools available to psychohistoiy.
But as for dream material and free association, liere the evidence in her Showings is
flot insubstantial. She does in fact recount one dream in LT 67. Moreover, if we consider
the subject of lier whole discourse, that is, tlie revelations she received on 8 May, 1373 and
lier lifelong meditation on their meaning, as the documentation of a kind of transitional
68 RUNYAN, 1982, p. 203.
69 KOHUT, Heinz, “Beyond the bounds of the basic rule”, Journal of the American psychoanatytic
association 8, 1960, p. 571.
° KOHUT, 1960, p. 585.
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space, then it could be argued that Julian is in this respect at least, a far more legitimate
subject for a relational psychoanalytic psychohistorical treatment than are many offier more
materially documented historical personages. In other words, there is an openly “illusory”
-- in Winnicott’s redeeming use of the word -- quality to the genre of the texts of the
Showings as we know them, which can be seen as psychohistorically valuable, even as it is
also infiuenced by, and must be read in light of, literaiy and devotional conventions.7’
In arguing for the recognition of Julian of Norwich’s Showings as the fruit of a life
of creative transitional space activity, I hold, in keeping with Winnicott’s insight into this
concept of a third space, that it contains and shapes both personal, subjective elements and
cultural and rhetorical borrowings which must inform the psychohistorical reading.
In this respect, it will be important to focus the study flot simply on the presence or
absence of features which, in psychoanalytic terms are “hot” issues (such as lier
identification of Jesus as Mother), as if they existed atemporally, but rather, on Julians
choice and unique treatment of materials which contain narrative or rhetorical units
borrowed from lier cultural environment of biblical, theological and ecclesiastical traditions.
The questions which need to be asked of her texts would include:
• What is unique or distinctive in the way in which she uses or reinterprets the
soteriological tradition at hand?
• How does she use scripture in unique ways?
• How does she retrieve and reinterpret elements of the anchoritic and mystical traditions?
• What psychodynamic functions or pattems can be seen in these uses, and what can they
teil us about the person?
4.2.2 The “lost tradition” of soteriological narrative embedded
in lier texts
We live in an age when theologians are seeking to retrieve lost traditions in the
history and evolution of Christian theology. That there is a lost tradition of Christian
soteriological narrative embedded in Julian of Norwich’s Showings is now undisputed.72
711 aknowledge that in the last several years a huge body 0f literary studies oflulian of Norwich has
developed, beyond what this study lias been able to integrate.
72 See NUTH, ban, Wisdom’s daughter: The theology of Julian of Norwich, NY, Crossroads, 1991, 217
p. PALLISER, Margaret Ann, o.p., Christ our mother of mercy: Divine mercy and compassion in the
theotogy ofthe Showings ofJutian ofNonvich, NY, Walter de Gruyter, 1992, 262 p. BAUERSCHMIDT,
frederick, Julian of Norwich and the mystical body potitic of Christ, Notre Dame IN, University of Notre
Dame Press, 1999, 290 p. ABBOTT, Christopher, Julian ofNorwich: Autobiography and theology, NY,
D. S. Brewer, 1999, 197 p. HIDE, Kerrie, Gfted origins to gracedfulfihtment: The soteriotogy ofJutian
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And that her soteriology speaks to people of our age is also undeniable.73 As noted above,
our age, for better or worse, is deeply influenced by the interpretive lens of
psychoanalysis. So if it is possible by means of a relational psychoanalytic
psychobiographical lens to shed further light on how it is that lier soteriology calis forth
sucli a resonating response in us, then this aspect of the thesis is more than simply a
psychohistorical case study of Julian of Norwich. It may enlarge our understanding of the
motivation for, and historical genesis of, lier soteriology. It may also make a contribution
to our contemporary soteriological reflection.
5.0 Conclusion
This chapter argues that an application to Julian’ s Showings of a relational
psychoanalytic psychobiographical method which is aware of its limitations as well as its
potential strengths, and recognizes the need to avoid a naïve psychohistorical literalism, is
justified. Tlie relational psychoanalytic application is found, for several reasons, to be
particularly suitable for the subject matter.
ofNoiwich, Collegeville MN. Liturgical press, 2001, 233 p. ANDERSON, Derek, Jutian ofNorwich’s
nonviotent account of satvation, Ph.D. thesis, Loyola University, Chicago, 2005, 269 p.
See UPJOHN, Sheila, Why Jutian now?: A voyage of discovery, Grand Rapids MI, Eerdmans, 1997, 132
p., for one example.
CRAPTER 4
A REVIEW 0F 111E HISTORICAL EVIDENCE FOR JULIAN 0F
NORWICH, THE MANUSCRIPT TRADITION 0F HER WRITINGS, AND
BIOGRAPHICAL SPECULATION
1.0 Who was Julian 0f Norwich?
Historical information about Julian of Norwich is gleaned from a few hints slie
gives in lier book, a few external witnesses, and what is known about late medieval
England and its religïous and social institutions. Over and above the lack of recorded
evidence which lias corne to be expected in studying women’s traditions in medieval
mysticisrn, Julian lias mastered the practice of effacing details about herseif. Even lier
name was most lilcely adopted by lier after she became enclosed as an anclioress at St
Julian’ s Church in Conisford, Norwicli. This Jack of information at every tum lias spurred
speculation and debates about several interrelated aspects of Julian’ s life which will be
reviewed further beiow, specifically: what state of life slie was in pnor to enclosure, what
lier educational background was, tlie date of lier enclosure, the dates of composition of tlie
sliorter and tlie longer versions of lier book.
Tlie information slie lierseif provides cornes to us in tlie form of two accounts of
lier sliowings or revelations, separated in time by a period of up to some fifteen to twenty
years during which slie continued to meditate and reflect theologically on her visions.
Tliese two versions, more familiarly known as tlie Short and the Long Text respectively,’
are ail tliat we have of the writing of this woman who is now recognized as liaving been tlie
first woman, and tlie first tlieologian of eitlier sex, ever to wnte a book in tlie vemacular of
the English people.
In the section below on the manuscript tradition and scholarship I wilI go into more detail about these
texts.
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What we do know of Julian’ s biographical background from lier book is that on the
sth or l3th May 13732 at the age of 30 and a haif, she lay dying of a very severe, life
threatening illness.3 Thus we can date lier birth to have been in November, 1342.
She teils us in lier first chapter that earlier in lier life she had prayed for three graces:
the first was to have recollection, a bodiiy sight of Christ’ s Passion, the second to have a
bodiiy sickness, and the third was to have, of God’s gift, tliree wounds. Moved by
hearing the story told by a man of Holy Church, of St Cecilia receiving three wounds,
Julian desired and prayed for the wound of compassion, the wound of contrition and the
wound of longing for God. In lier account of the bodily illness from which slie was
suffering (written some time after the fact), she interprets this iilness as sent by God in
response to this second grace she liad desired.
After three days and tliree niglits of physical suffering, she received the iast rites.
She describes liow slie continued to live in this deteriorating condition for two more days
and niglits and on the third niglit both she and those attending lier bedside, which included
her mother, believed tliat she was at the point of expiring. Those who were with lier sent
for the curate, who placed a crucifix before lier eyes. She turned lier eyes, which had been
looking up, to look at the crucifix. She saw the crucifix begin to bieed, the beginning of
her sixteen revelations or showings. The first fifteen of these showings continued until
noon of the day, during which the symptoms of lier iiiness disappeared; liowever tliey
retumed when the visions ceased. A man of religion came to see lier and she toid him that
slie liad been raving. However, lie took lier description of lier experience seriously and
respectfully. The following evening, after a demonic dream assauit wliule she slept, she
awoke, and recaliing wliat the Lord liad reveaied to lier tliat day along with the faith of
Holy Churcli, both the demonic apparition and the symptoms of lier disease vanished. At
that point, she received the final, sixteenth vision as a conclusion and confirmation of ail
that she had received previously. Tlius, Julian recovered from lier illness, and recorded
lier first account of lier near-death experience and the revelations or sliowings at some later
point.
Slie also at some point adopted the life of anclioress, whetlier before or after lier
visionary experience we do flot know. By 1393 and at least until 1415, however, Julian
was living in a celi attached to St Julian’ s Churcli at Conisford in Norwicli. These dates
2 One manuscnpt (S) reads “viii” while another (P) reads “xiii”. Benedicta Ward has made the argument that
a scribal error from x to y is more likely, in ber “Julian the solitary”, in Jutian reconsidered, eds. LEECH,
Kenneth and Benedicta WARD, Oxford, Fairacres, 1988, p. 35, n. 41. The Roman Catholic Church
remembers Julian on 13 May. However, in 1980 the Anglican Communion chose to commemorate Julian
of Norwich on 8 May, a reflection of this ambiguity in the texts, and the bistory of the manuscnpts.
Because of a variety of interpretations of ber illness, this will be treated in the next chapter.
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are attested to flot only in the first chapter of Julian’ s Short Text, in which the scribe asserts
that she is stili living as recluse at that point of copying the manuscript in 1413, but also by
the record of four wills in which bequests are left to provide for Julian’ s wellbeing. The
first of these bequests dates from 1393, twenty years after the visions, tlie Ïast bequest
from 14l5.
Finally, Julian’s presence in the anchorhold in Norwich is attested by the writings
of Margery Kempe, a contemporary mystic laywoman who wrote of lier visit Norwich at
some point between 1413 and 1415, to “an anchoress in the same city who was called
Dame Julian”.5 Margeiy telis us that Julian “was an expert in sucli things and could give
good counsel”, evidence which suggests that Julian enjoyed a reputation as a holy woman.
It is clear however that Julian “was flot well known as an author during lier lifetime”, from
the paucÏty of surviving manuscripts.6
2.0 The Julian manuscript tradition
The Julian manuscript corpus is limited to seven non-autographic texts, plus one
printed version contemporary with some of the manuscripts. 0f these sources, one sole
manuscript from the 1 5th century called the Amherst manuscript (A) after a previous owner
but known technically as London Britisli Library MS Additional 37790, exists of the Short
Text, the earlier account of her visions.7
The other six manuscnpts and the first pnnted edition are of the Long Text, the
account she produced after fifteen to twenty years of meditation and reflection on lier
visions.8 Only one of these manuscripts predates the dissolution: the Westminster MS
(W), located in the Westminster Diocesan Archives, dates from around 1500 thougli with
heavy 1 7th centuiy annotation. However, it is incomplete, being a series of extracts from
the Long Text for devotional use. It includes the theological reflection on tlie motherhood
of Christ, but omits explicit reference to the visions except in one place.9
‘ For details concerning the evidence from the wiils, see the Introduction to COLLEDGE, Edmund and
James WALSH, eUs., A book of showings to the anchoress Jutian of Norwich, Toronto, Pontifical Instïtute
ofMedieval Studies, 197$a, pp. 33 - 35.
KEMPE, Margery, The book of Margeiy Kempe, transi. B. A. WINDEATI’, Harmondsworth, England,
Penguin, 1985, cli. 18, p. 77.
6 BAKER, Denise, Julian ofNonvich ‘s Book of showings: From vision to book, Princeton, NJ, Princeton
University Press, 1994, p. 3.
This manuscript was largely unknown until 1909 when it was donated to the British Museum. See
BAUERSCHMIDT, Fredenck, Julian of Norwich and the mysticat body politic of Christ, Notre Dame,
Indiana, Notre Dame University Press, 1999, P. 207.
For a detailed description of the manuscript tradition see COLLEDGE and WALSH, 1978a, pp. I - 33.
BAUERSCHMIDT, 1999, p. 263, fn. 16. See below for Holloway’s alternative interpretation ofthe
composition of W.
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Three of the manuscripts of the Long Text, the Paris Bibliothèque Nationale MS
fonds anglais 40 or (P), the London Bntish Library M$ Sloane 2499 (51) and the
Upholland Seminary Library (U) fragment, along with the Serenus Cressy 1670 printed
text (C), date from the mid l7th century. The remaining manuscript, the London Bntish
Library MS Sloane 3705 ($2), is a late l7th or early lsth century copy of $1, collated with
either the P manuscript or Cressy’s pnnted edition. Another handwritten copy of the Long
Text, from the same time period as $2 and based on Cressy’s printed edition, is now
recognized as London British Library MS Stow 42.10
According to Colledge and Walsh, of the extant manuscripts of the Long Text, P
and Si are the only two independent witnesses.” Note that no pre-Reformation
manuscript of the long text in its entirety is known to exist, but given its early date, the
extract from the Long Text in W is being taken increasingly seriously. Since Colledge and
Walsh’s publication, Kempster lias clarified that W cannot be derived as a manuscript from
either Si or P and therefore must be the survival of an otherwise lost, third textual branch
of the stemma of the Long Text)2
Both P and S 1 date from about 250 years after Julian received lier visionary
experience and in different ways to some extent reflect modemizations in the Englisli
vernacular by scribal editors in the interim. Given the inconclusivity of the linguistic
characteristics of the manuscripts, Julian’s geographical origin may or may flot have been
Norwich.’3
The existence at ail of Julian’ s texts after the Reformation can be traced to
Benedictine devotion to Julian whicli preserved knowledge of her work, in the Counter
Reformation piety of Augustine Baker. This accounts for its circulation on the continent
specifically in the women’s Cambrai and Paris English Benedictine communities in exile,
and for its publication by Baker’s successor, Serenus Cressy.’4 Scribes who produced the
manuscripts were most likely nuns in these two communities. To my knowledge, Hide is
‘° See APPLEFORD, Amy, “Bibliography”, in The writings of Jutian ofNorwich: ‘A vision showed to a
devout woman’ and ‘A revelation of love’, eds. WATSON, Nicholas and Jacqueline JENKINS, University
Park PN, Pennysivania State University Press, 2006, p. 459.
“COLLEDGE and WALSH 1978a, pp. 25 - 26.
12 }ŒMPSTER, Hugh, ed., “Julian of Norwich: The Westminster text of A revelation of love”, Mystics
quarterty 23, 1997, pp. 177 - 245.
‘ See COLLEDGE and WALSH, 1978a, pp. 2$ - 33; BEER, Frances, ed., Julian ofNonvich’s
Revetations of divine love: The shorter version, ed. from BL Add. MS 37790, Heidelberg, Cari Winter
Universitatsverkag, 1978, pp. 14 - 28; and PELPHREY, Brant, Love was his meaning: The theology and
rnysticisrn of Jutian of Nonvich, Institut fur Anglistik und Amerikanistik, Saizburg, Universitat Salzburg,
1982, p. 19, who includes further references.
COLLEDGE and WALSH, 1978a, pp. 12 - 18.
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the only Julian specialist to hold and give evidence to support the idea that because the P
manuscript left England “it is less lilcely to have been edited according to the concems of
the reformers”.’5
Colledge and Walsh draw their versions of the Long Text, both the critical edition
in middle English and its translation into contemporary English, primarily from P, though
drawing on Si as needed.16 Marion Glasscoe’s 1976 editïon of the Long Text Jutian of
Norwich: A revetation of love, is based solely on Si, and represents a move toward
offering editions of the manuscripts as they exist in middle Enghsh, rather than as attempts
to harmonize or correct the different manuscripts.17 Her point will be well taken in this
thesis that Si better preserves the dynamic reality of Julian’ s religious experience of
salvation and of the psychological reality of theological statements. Glasscoe’ s text
however lacks a critical apparams and lias only a partial glossary. And, we are dependent
on other critics for a translation of Si into modem English.’8
15 HIDE, Kerrie, ‘“Only in God do I have ail’: The soteriology ofJulian ofNorwich”, Downside review
122, 2004, P. 57, fn. 10.
16For their critical edition see COLLEDGE, Edmund and James WALSH, eds., A book of showings to the
anchoress Jutian of Norwich, Toronto, Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1978a, 2 vols. The first
volume includes a lengthy introduction to Julian of Norwich by the editors plus their edition of the Short
Text. (Tlie present reference is taken from p. 26, i.e., of volume one.) The second volume contains the
Long Text, an appendix and glossary.
17 See GLASSCOE, Marion, ed., Jutian ofNorwich: ‘A revelation of love’, Exeter, University of Exeter
Press, 1976, l48p. Glasscoe gives convincing examples of lier preference for SI, in lier “Visions and
revisions: A further look at the manuscripts of Julian of Norwich”, Studies in bibtiography 42, 1989, pp.
113 - 114 and 119, where she holds that the P manuscript represents a diluting of the dynamism of the
theology of Si. Si conveys “the psychological reality of theological statements” and “a greater sense of
religious experience as a dynamic reality”. In terms of the manuscnpt itself, Glasscoe believes that “the
conservatism and lack of concem for appearances on the part of the SI scribe suggest that bis copy may
well be more reliable as a copy text than the carefully worked over and modernized P”. Colledge and Walsh,
however, deny that P is a modernization of an earlier manuscnpt. See COLLEDGE and WALSH, l978a,
p. 17. Their reason for choosing P has to do with the presence ofrhetorical structures, but Glasscoe
wonders whether this is notjust the effect of scnbal editing. See GLASSCOE, 1976, p. 119. On the same
page, Glasscoe concludes that an “eclectïc text” such as Colledge and Walsh’s “cntical edition”, is flot
viable in terms of the long-proven tradition of textual scholarship in Biblical and literary smdies,
particularly in that it misrepresents what Si actually says in places. For a history of editions, translations
and modemizations ofJulian ofNorwich’s texts, see BARRATT’, Alexandra, “How many children had
Julian of Norwich? Editions, translations and versions of her revetations”, in Vox mystica: Essays on
medieval mysticism, ed. BARTLErI’, Anne Clark et al., Cambridge, Brewer, 1995, pp. 27 - 39. Barratt
on p. 38, echoes Glasscoe’s textual concerns where she writes that “some recent studies of [Julian of
Norwich’sJ theology are perfectly happy to base themselves on existing translations rather than the Middle
English originals, a method that would be unthinkable in dealing with biblical or patristic texts”.
‘ See for one example, Clifton WOLTERS, transl., Jutian ofNorwich: Revelations of divine love,
Harmonsworth England, Penguin, 1966, 213 p., but frequently reprinted since then. His interpretation of
Julian, however, as merely an affective, devotional wnter simply is not adequate for fully understanding ber
contribution to theology. More recently in 1998, Penguin Press has published a new translation of both A
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In the course of writing this thesis, two new editions of the middle English
manuscripts have been published. As well as continuing the discussion around whicli
manusripts to draw on, these two new editions now reflect different theories about
practices of modemization.
In 2003 Julia Bolton Holloway, drawing heavily on Sr Anna Maria Reynolds’ 1956
thesis, published in Italy a lavish edition of W, P, Si and A, replicating the text as it
appears on the actual page of each of these manuscripts. For ail except for Si she provides
a parallel modem English translation. Photographs of pages from each manuscript, as well
as the inclusion of Hoyt Greeson’ s glossary of Si, enrich this large volume. Ostensibly it
is a major contribution to Julian textual scholarship in the direction of, as she puts it, a
“definitive edition”.’9
Holloway, however, holds a view of the sequence of composition of texts which
seems flot to have convinced anyone else in the field. She argues on the basis of “explicit
and implicit evidence” given in the Westminster manuscript, which bears the date of 1368,
that the Julian portion of W is flot a series of excerpts from the Long Text, but rather
Julian’ s first full, previsionary text, and reflects Julian’s brilliant theology of Christ our
Mother before she received her revelations. Holloway argues, on p. 9, that subsequently it
was the Long Text which Julian wrote next afier lier visionary experience, and that this was
then abridged in the Short Text (using the opening mbric of A as evidence that the work
was written in 1413), under threat of censorship by Church and State in the l5th century
under Archbishop Chancellor Thomas Anindel.
The primary evidence against this revised sequence of composition cornes from W,
and from the Long Text. W contains one reference to what Julian saw in the “ninth
revelation”. Holloway interprets this as an “interpolation” by the W scribe in 1500, who
knew lier Long Text. Others simply explain it as an omission to cut ail references to
Julian’ s visionary experience in the Long Text in a later period of English religious histoiy,
now suspicious of mysticism. Moreover, in tlie Long Text, Julian acknowledges that
deepened understanding of the meaning of the exemplum of the servant and the lord,
and the long text (Si) by Elizabeth SPEARING and A. C. SPEARING, by the same titie and designed to
replace Woiters’ translation. Earlier translations of Si include COLLINS, Henry, transi., Revetations of
divine love, shewed to a devout anchoress, by name Mother Jutian of Norwich, London, Thomas
Richardson and sons, 1877. WARRACK, Grace, transi., Revelations of divine love, recorded by Jutian,
anchoress at Norwich, anno Domini 1373, London, Methuen, [190111952, 208 p; and HUDLESTON,
Roger, transi., Revetations of divine love shewed to o devout ankress, by narne Jutian ofNonvich,
London, Bums and Oates, 1927, 256 p.
19 REYNOLDS, Sr Anna Maria and Julian Bolton HOLLOWAY, eds. ami transi., Jutian ofNorwich:
Showing of love, firenze, Sismel, Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2001, p. 5. Biblioteche e archivi 8.
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which leads to her theological meditation on Christ our Mother, required 20 years of
reflection foilowing the reception of the shewings themseÏves (LT 51). Bauerschmidt
critiques this view, nghtly I believe, as misrepresenting Julian, “with her theology having
littie connection with the visions”.20
Since, however, Holloway’s argument runs through mucli of lier annotation of the
manuscripts, it renders the use of this volume more difficuit as the preferred edition for this
thesis.
The other new edition of Julian’s texts by Nicholas Watson and Jacqueline Jenkins
represents a hermeneutical approacli to the texts which is at variance with the insïstence by
Glasscoe, Barratt and now Holloway (2003) that scholars of Julian of Norwich adhere to
the manuscripts as we have received them.2’ But their argument goes against recent
arguments conceming editting medieval texts which hold that ail the variant versions of a
work should 5e seen as equals and that “the ïdea of the ‘definïtive form’ of a work is
foreign to medieval manuscript culture, where ail works were more or less fluid. 22
Watson and Jenkins hold, rather, that that cultural context did flot see the work as a
resource to 5e adapted as others wished, but rather “as an authontative account of a divine
intervention in the world”. Because its author explored and expanded it, it may have neyer
attained a definitive form in practice, and have ied to variant texts (such as we have in P and
Si). Nonetheless, these editors argue on p. 29 that “the notion that the work aspires to
definitive form remains and deserves serious consideration in deciding what editorial
methodology to follow”. The approach Watson and Jenldns take is to draw on ail the
variants and to make textual and orthographic emendations as they see fit. A major
objective is to make the middle English more consistent and more accessible to the reader
so that translation into modem English would not be necessary. This they argue is what
Julian herself would want, that lier text be available to ail her even (fellow) Christians.
They acknowiedge the “artificiality” of their product but argue, in language reminiscent of
de Certeau, that this artificiality is a
sign of the distance that lies between the works and their modem readers and the
inevitable incompleteness of the attempt to think across that distance.... A strong
resonance vibrates between our incompletable attempts to interpret aright and
bers.23
20 BAUERSCHMIDT, 1999, pp. 263 - 264, fn. 16.
21 GLASSCOE, Marion, “Visions and revisions: A further look at the manuscripts of Julian of Norwich”,
$tudies in bibtiography 42, 1989, pp. 103 - 120; BARRAIT, 1995, pp. 27 - 39; REYNOLDS and
HOLLOWAY, 2003, p. 5.
22 WATSON and JENKINS, 2006, p. 28.
23 WATSON and JENKINS, 2006, p. 31. See their extended argument in their “Introduction” to this
edition, pp. 24 - 43.
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Despite its immediate appearance of artificial hybridity, being neither middle
English nor modem, the Watson and Jenkins editïon has one advantage over ail the others:
in their edition of the Long Text, the equivaient passage from the Short Text (where there is
one) is repeated below it on the same page, thus making comparisons between the Long
and the Short Texts much easier.
2.1 A note on the choice of version and method of citation used in
this thesis
With ail these versions of Julian’ s writings each competing for the role of being
used by Julian specialists to come, a decision must be made, and the consequences of that
decision must be lived wïth. I have chosen to draw on the Colledge and Walsh translation
primarily.24 First of ail, I have chosen their translation of $howings rather than a middle
English edition because it will facilitate the comprehension by French speaking readers as
well as English speaking readers unfamiliar with middle English. Secondly, for the
theological purpose of this thesis, I want to take advantage of the textual research which
has been done by Colledge and Walsh on potential sources and influences in the text,
especially as this has been used by many other Julian specialists since that publication. I
will draw on Colledge and Walsh’s edition for the middle English text where the language
is important to the argument. However, Holloway’s new edition will be helpful to see
what the existing texts look like, and to cite the text exactly as it appears in the manuscript,
where that differs from the Colledge and Walsh edition. The Watson and Jenldns parallel
edition of the Long and Short Texts will be useful for comparing the two versions. But,
unlike these latter two Julian specialists, I am flot fundamentally a literary scholar, I am a
theologian, who acknowledges both the contemporary intellectual distance from and the
contemporary spiritual responsiveness to Julian’s work.
As for citing the Long and the Short Texts, I have opted for a simple method,
which will work with Julian’s two texts regardless of the translation, the edition, or even
the translation into another language which the reader may be using as a reference. Since
only one of the chapters in Julian’s writings exceeds two pages in length, I propose simply
24 COLLEDGE, Edmund and lames WALSH, transi., Jutian ofNorwich: $howings, NY, Paulist Press,
1978b, 369 p. It was in the same year that these two editors published their critical edition (1978a) that
they published this translation of the middle English into modem English of both the Short and Long Texts
as the first volume of the series The classics of western spirituaiity.
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to identify the Long Text as LT and the Short Text as ST, followed by the chapter number
in Roman numerals. (The only chapter where this method is imprecise is in the case of LT
51.)
Since there is no system of italicization in Julian’s manuscripts, ail emphasis added
to direct quotations taken from her writings for this thesis may be assumed to have been
added by myseif unless otherwise noted.
3.0 A review of Julian’s historical context, influences and social tocation
Developing a sensitivity to who Julian was in relation to lier historical context is an
exercise in engaging in a pluralist historical consciousness as that is expressed in current
historical scholarship. The paragraphs which follow will review in broad strokes some
background as to what the anchoritic life was to which Julian was called, and what some of
tlie larger social realities of late l4th century England were, which must have affected lier.
Beyond this, liowever, our review of who Julian was will necessarily take us into diverse
and sometimes conflicting views of lier social location.
3.1 Julian and the anchoritic life
We can glean some idea of what Julian’s later life as an anchoress was like from
what is known of the anchoritic life generally. Whereas a liermit lived a desert solitude
wandering from place to place, and a recluse lived in seclusion from the world, the
vocation of anchorite (male) or anclioress (fernale) involved living in a populated area in a
celi built onto the side of a churcli.25 The vocation of anchoress was open to religious and
laity, whicli fact has made it harder to determine Julian’s state of life pnor to being
enclosed. Most of lier time would be spent in solitude in prayer, meditating on the
episodes of the Passion of Christ through the canonical hours, and in doing some
handiwork to make a littie money. An important function of the anclioress was to be
avaulable to give spiritual counsel to visitors, within the schedule of lier prescribed prayers.
for this reason, the ceil or “anchorliold” liad three windows. One window opened onto the
sanctuary of the churcli so the anchoress could see the mass and receive communion.
Another, covered witli a black drape with a white cross on it, faced the outside, to whicli
people would corne to speak with tlie anchoress and receive spiritual counsel. A third
25 Brant Pelphrey descnbes in some detail and with explicit reference to his sources, what is known about
the anchoritic life as Julian would have expenenced it, in bis published doctoral dissertation entitled Love
was his meaning: The theology and rnysticism ofiulian ofNorwich, Institut fûr Anglistik und
Amerikanistik, Salzburg, Universitat Salzburg, 1982, pp. 12 - 16. I also draw on the description and newer
sources provided by BAUERSCHMIDT, 1999, pp. 210- 211.
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opening served to receive food and pass refuse. The anchorhold might also have another
room for a servant.26
Whule research into wills shows that Norwich had had many anchorites in the
thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, in fact more than any other English city at that
time, for at least fifty years into the fourteenth century there is no evidence of anchoritic
presence in Norwich. However, during Julian’ s lifetime, the number increases again,
probably because of her influence.27
Much of the theory and practice of the anchoritic life is known to us from the
practical “rule” preserved in the form of the thirteenth century Norfolk text called the
Ancrene wisse, also known as the Ancrene riwie, written by a male cleric for
anchoresses. It describes the austere, yet moderate life of enclosure, prayer and the giving
of spiritual counsel, which it is thought Julian undertook to live.28
In the present context of a proliferation of literary and theological readings of
Julian’ s $howings and fascination with what Bauerschmidt describes as the “symbolic
marginality” of the anchoritic life, it is important to emphasize the “various associations
between anchoritic enclosure and death”.29 Both the anointing of the anchoress with
extreme unction and a mass of the burïal of the dead, in which the anchoress was locked in
to lier “tomb” from the outside by the bishop, were part of the liturgical rite of anchoritic
enclosure.3° It is difficuit to overemphasize for contemporary readership that the vocation
to the anchoritic life was one of living a liminal life of symbolic death.
At the same time, as Glasscoe observes,
[i]t is clear from the evidence of wills from ail social classes up to the sovereign
himself that society valued the spiritual input of those whose dying to worldly
values (at their enclosure the burial service was read over them) was not regarded
26 For a fuller description of anchoritic celis, see WARREN, Ann, Anchorites and their patrons in
medieval England, Berkeley, University of California Press 1985, pp. 27 - 39.
27 See TANNER, Norman P., The Church in late medievat Norwich, 1370-1532, Toronto, Pontifical
Institute of Medieval Studies, 1984, P. 58.
28 A recent translation of The ancrene riwie and other examples of anchoritic literature can be found in
SAVAGE, Anne, and Nicholas WATSON, transi., Anchoritic spirituality: ancrene wisse and associated
works, NY, Paulist, 1991, pp. 41 - 207. The ciassics of western spirituaiity 74. For a middle English
version see TOLIUEN, J. R. R. ed., Ancrene wisse, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1962, 222 p. Early
English Text Society 249. For another rule see AELRED 0F RIEVAULX, De institutione inctusarum,
eds. AYTO, John and Alexandra BARRATf, London, Oxford University Press, 1984, 193 p. Early English
Text Society, o.s. 287.
29BAJJERSCHMIDT 1999, p. 78.
30 For descriptions of different rites of anchoritic enciosure see CLAY, Rotha Mary, The hennits and
anchorites of England, London, Methuen, (1914), 1968, pp. 94ff., and DARWIN, Francis, The Engtish
medievat recluse, London, SPCK, 1944, pp. 71 - 78, as well as WARREN, 1985, pp. 97 - 100.
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with jokey discomfort as disturbingly eccentric, but valued as contributing a unique
gift to a total social welfare.3’
3.2 Social realities in l4th century Norwich
No account of the historical evidence of Julian of Norwich is adequate without a
serious regard for the larger situation in which she was living, as this conditioned both lier
psychology and her theology. Norwich was the second largest city in England and from
the medieval period it had attracted a number of religious orders who built houses, libraries
and developed magnificent religious art. It was now also a flourishing centre of commerce.
In the midst of this richness, Norwich, in Julian’ s lifetime, partook of traumatic events
which were changing the face of English society. The Hundred Years’ war began in 1337
and dragged on. The Black Death spread through England during the fourteenth century
and struck Norwicli in 1348-49, again in 1361, and yet again in 1369, ail three waves of
this epidemic taking place dunng Julian’s lifetime when she would have been aged 5, 18
and 26 respectively.32
Its psychological effect on the people was massive, both because of the shock
associated with mass deaths, and because of the theological climate of the time. Death
without the sacraments guaranteed damnation, but the deaths were too massive for the
priests to handie ail the rites. “The resuit was widespread fear and depression... The
assumption that salvation might flot be a possibility any longer, because of the evident
wrath of God, must have affected moral behaviour as well”.33 The Peasants’ Revoit
shattered Norwich in 1381, the first civil uprising of its kind in England, and signalling the
beginning of the breakdown of the structure of the feudal system.
Ail of these sources of heartbreak lend poignancy to Julian’ s desire prior to the
visions to die, to be ‘freed of this world’ ... and to her searchïng questions,
throuhout the Revelations, regarding the wrath of God and the evidence of bis
love.
Likewise, Roland Maisonneuve describes the political divisions and theological
tensions in the Church in Julian’ s lifetime whicli contributed significantly to lier
preoccupations:
31 GLASSCOE, Marion, English medieval mystics: Games offaith, London, Longman, 1993, p. 43.
32 See Appendix 1 for a graph which gives indication of the drastic population changes in England at this
time, taken from DYER, Christopher, Standards of living in the later ntiddle ages: Social change in
England c. 1200 - 1520, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 4.
This brief historical overview draws on PELPHREY, 1982, pp. 44 - 51 who is quoted here on pp. 47 -
48.
PELPHREY, 1982, p. 49.
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Lorsqu’elle naît, la Captivité de Babylone-- séjour des papes à Avignon-- dure
depuis 1305. Le Grand Schisme (137$-1417) éclate cinq ans après ses premières
visions. Avec l’élection de deux, puis de trois papes, elle voit l’Eglise devenir
monstre bicéphale, puis tricéphale. Le retour à l’union par la désignation de Martin
V, le 11 novembre 1417, suit ou précède de peu sa mort. Le petit peuple anglais
comprend mal la division de 1’Eglise. Remises en question théologiques et
contestations hérétiques se font jour avec âpreté. Wyciff (÷ 1 3$4) attaque la
papauté... fl proclame que T’Eglise doit renoncer à tout bien temporel. Il réaffirme
la primauté de 1’Ecriture et insiste sur l’illumination personnelle. Ses doctrines
corrosives, épousées par ses partisans, les tollards, contaminent le diocèse de
Norwich. Le lollard Geoffrey Lister attaque la ville avec une troupe nombreuse, la
met à sac, massacre des notables, s’installe avec sa horde au château, à moins d’un
demi-mile de la cellule ou demeure Julienne. L’évêque-soldat de Norwich, Henn
Despenser, le poursuit et écrase les rebelles. Lister est pendu, écartelé, dépecé en
quatre parties: l’une est accrochée devant la maison du lollard, une autre, à l’une des
portes de la cité. L’exécution terminée, l’évêque se rend à la cathédrale et y célèbre
une messe d’action de grâce. Dans l’intensité de sa foi et le frémissement de sa
sensibilité, Julienne n’a pu qu’ être frappée par tous ces évènements et confronter,
avec toute la lucidité de son)ntelligence et sa soif intérieure de vérité, justice et
miséricorde, foi et amour. Ecriture et enseignement de 1’Eglise, dogmatisme et
évangélisme, temps historiques et éternité, immutabilité de Dieu et vicissitudes
humaines, qui sont autant de thèmes du Livre des Révélations.35
Another insight into the cultural context of late medieval, pre-Reformation England
is given by Marion Glasscoe, who sensitively relates the theological tensions of the times to
the flowering of creative literary and mystical literature. One of these tensions was due to
the social dynamics which were contributing “to raise the profile of the individual within
society rather than submerge it in low relief within a predetermined authontarian
hierarchy”.36 Specifically, these social dynamics were giving rise to a growing desire
among the laity to appropriate a vernacular piety and forms of active and contemplative life,
as well as conciliar directives to the clergy to offer instruction to the laity in the
vernacular.37 “Among all levels of society
-- university teachers, those living in religious
communities, women with time on their hands from the new bourgeoisie
-- there was a
deep engagement with religious truth”. Glasscoe continues that another tension existed in
the world of learning,
between the intellectual arguments of scholasticism and the more experiential piety
of the monastic orders given a powerful voice by such men as Bernard of Clairvaux
and Hugo and Richard of St Victor, [which world] was preoccupied with the
MAISONNEUVE, Roland, trad., Julienne de Norwich: Le livre des révélations, Paris, Cerf, 1992, pp.
11 - 12. JANTZEN, Grace, Julian of Norwich, Mystic and Theologian. London: SPCK, 1987, pp. 8 -
12, also gives an account of this background. In particular she notes the charactet of the Bishop of
Norwich, who gained the nickname for himself in his lifetime as episcopus martius; this same bishop was
responsible forjudging Julian’s suitability for the anchoritic life.
36 GLASSCOE, 1993, P. 25. She draws here on MORRIS, Colin, The discovey ofthe individual, 1050 -
1200, London, SPCK, 1972, 188 p. Quotations from Glasscoe in this section are drawn from pp. 25 - 47.
GLASSCOE, 1993, p. 26
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relationship between the operations of reason and faith and a growing tendency to
see them as distinct rather than complementary experiences, a climate of thought
favourable to mystical theology.38
Julian is contemporaly with Geoffrey Chaucer and William Langland, two great,
early figures in Englisli vemacular literature, each of whom, according to Glasscoe, is
responding creatively to the “ambiguity” and “gap between the ideais of the faith and their
realisation within the social fabric of Church and State”. Julian is also one of a group of
five English mystics whose writings emerged in the late l4th century. Another one of this
group is also a woman who lias already been mentioned above, the mystic housewife
Margeiy Kempe, along witli Walter Hilton, Richard Roue and the anonymous author of the
Ctoud of unknowing.
One of the unique developments of this period of tension is in the area of women’s
traditions of piety. Current scholarly focus is helping us to see this dimension of Julian’ s
social context in fresh lights. In Europe various forms of lay women’s communities
developed. Glasscoe cites Catherine of Siena, the Belgian women mystics called
Béguines, who received spiritual guidance from religious houses, and the communities
which foliowed Bridget of Sweden, whose mie included unrestricted access to books.
These mutieres sanctae were known in England by the l4th century, although in England
there were no equivalent associations.39
What makes Glasscoe’ s treatment particularly sensitive, is that she is writing for a
contemporaiy audience of analytically minded literary critics and feminists for whom
Christian tmths and spiritual life may hold littie meaning or are even perceived to be
barriers to their understanding the l4th century English mystical literature. Given the
nature of the present study, it is difficuit not to find appealing this unannounced apologetic
strategy. Glasscoe traces through these social dynamics and the cultural moment how the
kinds of literature and liturgical pattems appropriated through primers and other resources
available to the laity promoted Franciscan affective meditation on, and imaginative
identification with, Christ’ s Passion and the mysteries of the Incarnation. The stress she
lays is on how the literature is shaped to fire the imagination and stir the emotions as to the
meaning of the scripture, and how the “ritual process enacts a pattem which can be
GLASSCOE, 1993, pp. 37 - 38, 42. Glasscoe cites substantial bibliographical references to important
feminist studies which contribute to a clearer grasp of cultural context of female spirituaÏity in the middle
ages on p. 56, fn. 140.
GLASSCOE, 1993, pp. 42 - 43.
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translated into inner experience in the contemplative tradition”.4° It is the transfiguration or
transformation of experience on the pattem of Christ, through suffering and death to
resurrection, which, although given unique expression at the hands of different mystics, is
at the heart of the l4th centmy, and 50 of Julian’ s, contemplative experience.
3.3 Speculations on Julian’s early learning, state of life and
social location
This section integrates briefly the research of a number of Julian specialists engaged
in the critical debate conceming Julian of Norwich’ s life history, specifically in terms of
what exposure to theological and literary education Julian might have had. The questions
which this debate raises inevitably prompt fiirther biographical speculation as to her state of
life prior to the showings, and furtlier, the dating of her entrance into the anchorhold, the
dating of the two texts and the process of composition of the Long Text.
Why is it important to go into detail about this debate? As will become clear below,
it is impossible for anyone’ s reading of Julian flot to be affected by the kind of assumptions
we make as to her social location
How one assesses lier education will clearly affect how one reads lier Revelation.
As Michael J. Write [sicJ points out, “it is unfortunate, but perhaps inevitable, that
the question of Julian’s early intellectual formation should become involved in a
battle of appropriations.”41
Indeed, biographical speculation in the latter 2Oth century about Julian of
Norwich’ s intellectual life history lias polarized between two extremes.42 On tlie one hand
there is the view of Colledge and Walsli, based on their detailed analysis of rlietorical
conventions in tlie texts and certain parallels in the syntax of lier scriptural allusions to tliat
of the Vulgate, that despite lier daim to be “a simple, illiterate or unlettered creature” (LT
2), Julian was indeed “lettered” meaning, to these editors, that slie was educated in Latin,
knowing the Vulgate, a number of spiritual and literaiy writings and theology.43 The main
GLASSCOE, 1993, p. 30, where she is showing how the liturgical hours of the primers were shaped to
move the meditator daily through the Passion story from Christ’s betrayal tbrough to bis entombment. See
also pp. 6, 33.
‘ BAUERSCHMIDT, 1999, pp. 204-205, citing WRIGHT, Michael, “Julian ofNorwich’s early
knowledge of Latin”, Neuphilologische Mittetlungen 95, 1, 1993, p. 42.
42 This was already observed by JANTZEN, 1987, pp. 15 - 20.
‘ COLLEDGE and WALSH, 1978a, pp. 43 - 59 where they interpret this phrase to mean she was simply
lacking in literary skills. Colledge and Walsh share with some of the feminist scholars such as Baker cited
below, the view that Julian’s assertion that she is unlettered is an example of captatio benevotentia, a
literary convention of humility common in that time and used by men and women. See the article by the
same editors, COLLEDGE, Edmund and James WALSH, “Julienne de Norwich”, Dictionnaire de
spiritualité 8, 1974, pp. 1605 - 1611.
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example they use to argue that she made her own translations of the Vulgate into the
vemacular is the occasion in the tenth chapter of the Short Text in which, they say, Julian
provides “an exact reproduction of the Latin syntax of Philippians 2:5”, that is, “each soul
should do as St. Paul says, and feel in himself what is in Christ Jesus”.44 From this
premise they argue that Julian was therefore likely to have entered a religious order from
early on in her life in lier teens, that she composed both the Short Text and the Long Text
before she became an anchoress, and that she entered the anchorhold around 1393 in her
5Oth year, the date of the first will naming lier as the recipient of a bequest. They stress
that she was immersed in the monastic prayer life of tectio divina from lier youth, that lier
knowledge of tlieology was flot influenced by the polemic or dialectic of the scholastics, yet
neither that she was self-taught. They acknowledge that it was improbable that any English
bouse for women religious in that era taught women the arts of discourse. Stili, they hold
that she was taught by some “scholar or scholars who perceived the fine quality of lier
intellect, and who encouraged and lielped her to acquire facility in tliinking and wnting in
figurae”.45
It should be recognized that Colledge and Walsh draw on, and extend, prior
research done by Anna Maria Reynolds in tlie Ï 950s.46 To encapsulate the breadtli of
literary, rhetorical, spiritual monastic and scholastic knowledge which Colledge and Walsli
attribute to Julian: as well as scripture and tlie Ancrene riwte, slie must have known the
devotional writings of otlier contemporary Englisli mystics such as Rolle, Hilton and the
author of The ctoud of unknowing and further, tlie German and Flemish mystics Eckhart,
Ruysbroeck and Tauler. There are indications that slie knew the work of Gregory the
Great, Bemard, William of St. Thierry, tlie Franciscan meditative prose and verse of
Bonaventure as well as tlie visual art inspired by that school. She seems to know The
harrowing of heu, The chastising of God ‘s chitdren, Qui habitat, Bonum est, and to
COLLEDGE and WALSH, 1978a, p. 45.
COLLEDGE, Edmund and James WALSH, “Editting Julian of Norwich’s $howings: A progress report”,
Medievat studies 38, 1976, P. 422. Nicholas Watson critiques this picture of Julian as one “serenely
confident in her magisterium as an author” which, he says, Colledge and Walsh create. Stili, Watson’s take
on Julian, structured around discerning traces of misogynistic gender stereotypes absorbed and transmuted by
Julian, requires her text to be “a sophisticated response to and critique of [that] tradition”, on p. 15 of
WATSON, Nicholas, “ Yfwommen be double naturetty’: Remaking ‘woman’ in Julian of Norwich’s
Revelation of love”, Exemplaria 8, 1, 1996.
COLLEDGE and WALSH, 1978a, p.vii, where they acknowledge ber contribution to the development of
their critical edition. With regard to Julian’s education see, for example, REYNOLDS, Anna Maria, “Some
literary influences in the Revelations of Julian of Norwich”, Leeds studies in English and kindred
tanguages 7 and 8, 1952, pp. 18 - 28.
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have read Chaucer’ s translation of Boethius. There are signs of lier knowing Augustine
and Anseim, and of using the philosophical categories of Aristotie and Aquinas. The
editors describe at length the influence on Julian of the traditions of the vemicle legend and
devotion to the sacred heart.47
Colledge and Walsh’ s view was received largely without critique for a number of
years. Thus other Julian specialists have proceeded on the set of assumptions established
by Colledge and Walsh.48
The problem with this view is that it goes against everything that we know about
the state of education of women --lay and relïgious-- in the l4th century, flot to mention
what Julian herseif andlor a scribe have to say. Thus, Marion Glasscoe, middle Englisli
scholar and editor of the Si manuscript published in 1976, takes Julian’ s statement that she
was unlettered at face value and argues that Julian was an uneducated laywoman wlio
became an anchoress after receiving lier visions. There is a textual difference in LT 2
between P and Si: whereas P states tliat “this revelation was made to a simple unlettered
creature”, Si says that “these revelations were shown to a simple creature that could no
letter”,49 a phrase which suggests more explicitly tliat Julian could flot read or write in lier
own vernacular, let alone in Latin. Glasscoe holds that Julian used an amanuensis, and tliat
lier written style lias ail the marks of an author thinldng aloud, witli the effect of engaging
the reader in creative primaiy mental process.5°
COLLEDGE and WALSH, 1978a, pp. 36 - 37, 44 - 59; also their analysis of the text on pp. 732 - 733.
48 For examples, MAISONNEUVE, Roland, L’univers visionnaire de Julian of Nonvich, Paris, O.E.I.L.,
1987, pp. 63 - 76; CLARK, John P. H., “Fiducia in Julian of Norwich, I”, The Downside review 99,
335, 1981, pp. 97 - 9$, NUTH, Joan, Wisdom’s daughter: The theology of Jutian ofNorwich, NY,
Crossroad, 1991, pp. 8 - 10.
See COLLEDGE and WALSH, 1978a, p. 285, fn. 2 concerning Si and 52, and GLASSCOE, 1976, p.
2.
° GLASSCOE, 1976, pp. xviii - xix. Examples of scholars who have explored this oral dimension of
Julian’s wntten style include felicity Riddy and Diane Krantz. Felicity Riddy argues that it is irrelevant
whether Julian of Norwich was a nun pnor to the visions or flot because what is significant is that both
nuns and devout aristocratic women participated in the same feminine Iiterary culture. This literary culture,
drawing from the clencal reading of texts, was a vernacular, oral and memonzing culture, sharing religious
books in small reading groups by word ofmouth: “The rhetoric ofJulian’s own prose must have been
influenced by the habits of speech developed in ‘holy dalyawns [conversation]’ with ber spiritual advisors
and female fnends”, in RIDDY, felicity, “Women taiking about the things ofGod’: A late medieval sub
culture”, in Women and literature in Britain, 1150 - 1500, ed. MEALE, Carol, Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 1993, p. 114. Riddy’s argument is all the more compelling in that it places Glasscoe’s
recognition of an oral tradition in Julian’s prose rhythms within a vernacular theological community of
women, and as Riddy puis it, challenges scholars such as Colledge and Walsh who “appropnate ber book to
a masculine clerical culture, analyzing the rhythms of ber prose in terms of Latin rhetonc”. RIDDY, 1993,
pp. 112- 113.
Diane Krantz offers a speculation based on literary structures of “enclosure” in the Long Text, to
argue that Julian was a laywoman when and after she had the visions. Drawing on Riddy’s analysis, she
argues on the basis of traces of both oral and literate forms of expression in the Long Text that Julian must
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Brant Pelphrey, Sr Benedicta Ward, Nicholas Watson, Fredenck Bauerschmidt and
others follow Glasscoe arguing that Julian was a laywoman pnor to the visions with no
education in Latin, although they differ among themselves on the question whether Julian
could write and when she wrote the two texts. They identify evidence that argues against
Colledge and Walsh’s view that Julian was a nun prior to and following her reception of
the showings.
Thus Pelphrey holds Glasscoe’s view that Julian went from being a laywoman (flot
a nun and flot educated at Carrow priory), to entering the anchorhold as a resuit of
receiving the showings, where she wrote both the Short and Long Texts. He cites
evidence from the life situations of Cathenne of Siena and of Margery Kempe to argue that
Julian of Norwich could also have been “illiterate” in the sense of not being lettered in Latin
or even able to wnte in English, and so dependent on a scribe, and yet simultaneously
“well-read” in having had scripture, theological and spiritual texts read to her.51
Historian and Anglican religious, Benedicta Ward, offers compelling evidence to
argue that Julian could flot have been a religious in her early life.52 Her argument is based
on internai and external evidence as well as the absence of evidence one might expect if
Julian’s early history had been associated with a religious house. Among other things, she
points to a number of contexts in which, had Julian had a history as a Benedictine, it would
have been made explicit in the historical record of that era. In its place there is silence. So
for examples, the scribe who copied the Short Text describes Julian as a recluse and
“devout woman” (ST 1), flot as a sister in religion. The bequests left to Julian in the wills
are ail direct bequests, maldng no mention of Carrow or any other priory. If she were
associated with a priory this would have been noted in the wills, as was the case with
another solitary, Juliana Lampit. Nor is there any record of Julian at any pnory. Ward
have held the memory of the revelations for years by means of mnemonics without access to writing
materials, until, fifteen years after the visions, she entered ber enclosure where she “had time” to practise
writing and compose the Long Text over the next five years in its final form. KRANTZ, M. Diane F., The
life and text of Jutian ofNorwich: The poetics of enctosure, NY, Peter Lang, 1997, pp. 46 - 47. Krantz
(following WATSON 1993, below) dates Julian’s act of entering the anchorhold and living that vocation,
some fifteen years after the visions in 1388, thus overcoming her prior psychological ambivalence around
that vocation, in KRANTZ, 1997, pp. 46, 56. Like Riddy, Krantz reflects the secularity of textual studies
which address theological dimensions ofJulian’s writing when she writes “The high proportion of priests
and religious among those who study Julian both reflects what any cntic should expect to find--that
religious works interest religious people--and requires that one should scrutinize these editions for
monolithic biases: do certain perceptions of what or why Julian wrote resuit from religious preconceptions
of ber editors?” pp. 6 - 7. The present study would agree, but want to apply that same critical question to
secular, presumably “non-religious” studies of Julian as well.
‘ PELPHREY, 1982, pp. 26 - 28, also noting the mixture of oral and literate expression in the $howings.
See also WARD, 1988, pp. 25 - 26.
52 WARD, 1988, pp. 17 - 26.
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notes, too, that if Julian had been associated witli a Benedictine community, the communïty
would have donc two things in view of the respect in which Julian came to be held. With
such a celebrated solitary among their numbers the pnory would have ensured that lier
hurlai be on their grounds, and that copies of her Showings be made and kept in the
scriptorium The anonymity of lier hurlai site must be reckoned with and the silence and
disappearance of lier work suggests that few copies were made. And the presence of
Julian’ s mother among others and a secular priest (the parson, her curate) at her deathbed
would flot be customary for an enclosed religious or anchoress.53
Ward speculates fiirther that Julian’s background prior to receiving the visions and
entering tlie anchorhold was as a wife, widow and perhaps even a motlier of a chuld who
died in tlie Black Death.54 Her view that Julian’s motherhood of God theology springs
from this background, despite Ward’s own acknowiedgement of Julian’s reiationship with
lier own mother wliicli “shows no warmth at ail”, suggesting that Julian’s “own motlier
totally misunderstood lier”, is questionable in terms of its psycliological credibility.55 Ward
downplays the value whicli any education at a religious house might have had. Slie secs
Julian rather as a literate laywoman writing in tlie vemacular for solitaries and tlie laity, part
of a “close-knit network of soutanes” and spiritual individualists in England at that time,
rather than as a nun writÏng for other nuns.56
However, the idea tliat Julian lias been deeply affected by grief in lier personal
liistory is significant. Wliat Pelphrey wrote in 1989 remains very significant:
.Julian wrote especially for women, and particularly for women wlio suifer from
exploitation or from situations of hoplessness or helplessness. More needs to be
said along these unes.... Julian will be especially helpful, too, to those readers
who grieve for loved ones or who themselves face the prospect, as she put it, of ‘an
end to this mortal life’.57
on this subject see Colledge and Walsh’s evidence of relaxed practices in the covents by the late middle
ages to defend their view, in COLLEDGE and WALSH, 1978a, p. 44.
WARD, 1988, p. 24. Others who think similarly include PELPHREY, 1982, p. 270; and McAVOY,
Liz, “The Moders service’: Motherhood as matrix in Julian of Norwich”, Mystics quarterty 24, 1998, p.
183.
WARD, 1988, p. 24. See Christopher Abbott’s argument that those, such as Ward,
who speculate, on the basis of her motherhood-of-God theme, that Julian may have borne chiidren
are on pretty shaky ground. Most human beings have some idea of what a mother is, and we
ought to bear in mmd that Julian’s description of God’s motherliness is written, as it were, from
the chitd’s side,
in ABBOTI’, Christopher, Julian ofNorwich: Autobiography and theotogy, Cambridge, Brewer, 1999, p.
2, emphasis bis.
56 WARD, Benedicta, “Lady Julian and ber audience: ‘mine even-Christian”, in The Engtish religious
tradition and the genius ofAnglicanism, ed. ROWELL, Geoffrey, Wantage, Ikon, 1993, pp. 47 - 63.
PELPHREY, Brant, Christ our mother: Jutian of Norwich, Wilmington Delaware, Michael Glazier,
1989, p. 15.
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Bauerschmidt’ s focus on the symbolic liminality of the vocation of anchoress leads
him to read lier early desire for a bodily sickness and the last rites as an indication of ber
early desire as a laywoman, educated in the vernacular, for the anchoritic vocation. He
holds that she became an anchoress in response to the bodily sickness, lier reception of
extreme unction and visions. At that time “it was widely and erroneously held that the...
reception of extreme unction was a sort of ordination or consecration, cutting the recipient
off from the normal activities of life, even should they recover”.58 Thus, Bauerschmidt
argues that Julian’ s statement that she hoped to live more to the worship of God because of
that sickness (LT 2) could well indicate
that she saw her reception of the last rites as a kind of consecration. In any case...
if ber fellow citizens shared the common view of the effects of extreme unction,
then even prior to lier enclosure as an anchoress she would have been marked for
them... as a kind of... sacred intruder from the land of the dead.59
Grace Jantzen gives a list of alternative life styles which have been variously
proposed to account for tlie belief that Julian received instruction, could probably read and
write in tlie vernacular, and perliaps could read some Latin, at least by the time of the Long
Text, though was not a nun.6° Apart from being a nun, or a married widow and mother,
Julian might have been a Béguine (as the one and only bouse of Béguines in England at that
time was in Norwich), or a devout woman of independent means, or a single laywoman
looking after lier mother until she herseif became sick.6’ Although slie is unwilling to take
any final position, Jantzen does observe two reasons for supposing that Julian had afready
made the anchoritic life lier state of life prior to lier visions:
First is the depth and profundity of lier prayer life and devotion to Christ, wlio was
lier entfre focus already at the time of ber illness. It is clear that this depth of prayer
liad been developed over some considerable time; and although it is... possible that
this could occur in a secular situation (or in a convent) it might well be thought that
this points already to the life of deep devotion of a recluse. The second reason ïs
the negative consideration of [liow Julian was living a retired life of prayer and
58 DUFFY, Eamon, The stripping ofthe attars: traditionat religion in England c. 1400 - 1580, New Haven,
Yale University Press, 1992, P. 313.
BAUERSCHMIDT, 1999, p. 78.
JANTZEN, 1987, pp. 25, 29, who holds that Julian was from a wealthier class and likely received an
education as a girl at the Carrow school, p. 18. This, she ackowiedges, is in spite of the histonans’ view
that by that time such an education for religious women or girls from the laity would flot amount to much
beyond embroidery. See POWER, Eileen, Medievat Engtish nunneries c. 1275 to 1535, Cambndge,
Cambridge University Press, [19221 1964, p. 168n.
61 JANTZEN, 1987, pp. 22, 25. See BRADLEY, Ritamary, “Juhan of Norwich: Writer and mystic”, in
An introduction to the medieval mystics of Europe, ed. SZARMACH, Paul, Albany, SUNY, 1984, p.
196, and BEER, frances, Wornen and nzystical experience in the middle ages, Suffolk, Boydeli and
Brewer, 1992, P. 130. Julian explicitly refers to ber mother being at ber bedside during ber illness in the
Short Text.
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meditation ail the time she was composing the two textsj: if she was flot an
anchoress, wliat was she?62
Most of the arguments that fail into this second perspective on Julian, as liaving
been a laywoman in her early years, at least initiafly uneducated in Latin, and differing on
the issue whether she was literate in the vemacular, tend to revolve around questions
concerning the social class from which Julian came if she were educated in Latin as a nun
or as a laywoman in the context of a priory school, which would affect assumptions about
the audience to whicli she was tlierefore speaking tlirough lier writings, and thus also affect
interpretations of the tlieology of salvation whicli she was expressing through tlie two
texts. Tliese arguments also imply or express explicitly a critique of any liistorical metliod
of source study which assumes a clerical tlieological appropriation of lier theology, in tlie
face of Julian’s vemacular background.
Pelphrey says any argument that she was educated in a religious liouse assumes tliat
she came from an elite class, and holds tliat her anonymity, the bequests, and lier repeated
phrase “even Christians” as consequently referring only to the higliest classes, are surely
evidence against this view. He argues that Julian neyer refers to any of the trappings
associated witli tlie religious life, but “on the contrary, she continually refers to lier even
Christians--implying, in the parlance of lier time, tliat slie was a laywoman writing for
other layfolk, ratlier than a nun writing for other contemplatives”.63 Actually this is not
quite true. As regards Julian’ s audience, Windeatt observes tliat Julian’ s aim in tlie Long
Text is not to talk just to lier fellow contemplatives but to simple folk, since slie makes
revisions from tlie Short Text in which lier experience is described as relating specifically to
contemplatives, to be more inclusive of a general audience in the Long Text. Windeatt cites
two examples in the Sliort Text wliere a third person reference to “every man and woman...
who desires to live contemplatively” (ST 4), and “every contemplative soul” (ST 13), as
revised in tlie Long Text, either does flot limit the address, or is replaced by a first person
plural “ouf soul”. (LT 5•)64
62 JANTZEN, 1987, pp. 24-25. The article by BAKER, Denise, “Julian of Norwich and anchoritic
literature”, Mystics quarterty 19, 4, 1993, pp. 148 - 160, would give further weight to this view.
63 PELPHREY, 1982, pp. 17 - 18, 22.
M WINDEATT, B. A., “Julian ofNorwich and lier audience”, Review of English studies new series 28,
1977, pp. 6 - 7. On p. 3 Windeatt observes that there is a consistent shift from the Short Text to the
Long Text toward greater universalism with regard to lier audience. According to Windeatt, this shift is from
greater self -preoccupation, anxiety about her position as author, insecurity and sense of the otherness of
sinners in the Short Text, toward a more universalist position in the Long Text, in which she reduces
attention to the particularities of lier personal selfhood, she is more confident of her authorial position and
understanding of lier material, and, lier occasional aloofness is cast aside in favour of accepting and uniting
herseif with simple folk.
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This could suggest that Julian’s early aduit life, prior to the visions, was formed by
her participation in the monastic life, in some form of enclosed contemplative community.
However, Nicholas Watson, who sees lis own argument as complementary to that of
Benedicta Ward, wants to make more precise links “between Julian’ s development and the
relïgious climate of lier day”.65 He regards the wnting of the Short Text as taldng place in
Julian’ s early years of anchoritic enclosure, and reflecting the newer influences on lier of,
and lier anxieties about, tlie andhoritic tradition and community.66 Tlie subsequent Long
Text revisions toward universalism would reflect, in lier mature years of enclosure as an
anchoress, lier daily exposure and accessibility to tlie laity seeking lier for counsel at lier
andliorliold window.67 Watson’ s own view of Julian’ s learning nins a middle way
between Colledge and Walsli and Glasscoe, accounting for both Julian’s early lack of
leaming and lier later learning of orthodox doctrine however this was acquired.68
With the current rise in recognition of the genre of “vemacular theology” as a
distinct tradition within the late middle ages, along with scliolastic and monastic traditions
of theological literature,69 Julian specialists are paying more nuanced attention to the Idnds
of literature and prayer whidli would be customary for laywomen as well as nuns and
anchoresses in the late l4tli century. Thus, as noted above, Glasscoe presents a strong
case for tlie laity as receiving religious instruction in the vemacular and using primers to
pray, as tlie ancliorites did, the episodes of the Passion on tlie canonical hours.7° On tlie
65 WATSON, Nicholas, “The composition of Julian of Norwich’s Revetation of love”, Speculum 68, 3,
1993, p. 673.
66 WATSON, 1993, pp. 673 - 674, fn. 86. More recently Watson lias changed lis view, and now sees the
Julian of the Short Text as having been a nun, and only in the longer version as an anchorite, in WATSON
and JENKINS, 2006, p. 10.
67 By contrast, COLLEDGE and WALSH, 1978a, p. 215, argue that the ancestor of ail three of the Long
Text manuscripts lias been editted for a more secular readership.
WATSON, 1993, p. 676, fn. 87 gives textuai evidence for Juiian’s lack of early education both in lier
“reliance on pnestly storyteliing” for the formative expenence which led Juiian to seek the three wounds,
and in the poor Latin preserved in lier response to the first visionary experience (in P but corrected in Si),
“Benedicite Dominus”, in LT 4. On the other hand, lie says, unlike other works by continental visionaries
dependent on cierical amanuenses who tend to make their presence feit, Juiian’s texts do flot have this
quality.
69 See McGINN, Bernard, “Meister Eckhart and the Beguines in the context of vernacular theology”, in
Meister Eckhart and the Beguine mystics, ed. McGINN, Bernard, NY, Continuum, 1994, pp. 4 - 14; also
WATSON, Nicholas, “Censorship and cultural change in iate-medievai vernacular theoiogy, the Oxford
translation debate, and Arundei’s constitutions of 1409”, Speculum 70, 4, 1995, pp. 823 - 824, and by the
same author, “Visions of inclusion: Universal salvation and vernacular tlieology in pre-reformation
Engiand”, Journal of medievat and earty modem studies 27, 2, 1997, pp. 145 - 146.
° See GLASSCOE, 1993, p. 30 and by the same author, “Time of Passion: Latent relationships between
iiturgy and meditation in two middle Engiish mystics”, in Langland, the mystics and the medievat English
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other hand Denise Baker argues, on the basis of a comparison of Julian’s text with Aefred
of Rielvaulx’ s De institutione inclusarum a 1 2th century text of guidance for
anchoresses, that Julian’ s third request for the grace of three wounds reflects exactly the
three stage tradition of spiritual development, a progression from the affective (contrition),
to the moral (compassion), to the contemplative (longing with the will for God).7’ Since
these practices as applied to the laity in England by the late l4th century would only have
included the first two stages, Julian’s third wound of longing for God, a prayer for
mystical union, would not be customarily practised by the laity.72 This Ieads Baker to think
that Julian was in some kind of vowed life, whether as nun or anchoress, prior to lier
visions.73
religous tradtion, essays in honour ofS S. Hussey, ed. PHILIPS, Helen, Cambridge, D. S. Brewer, 1990,
pp. 141 - 160.
71 BAKER, 1993, pp. 153 - 154, 158.
72 BAKER, 1993, pp. 154 - 155, 158. Here, Baker draws on the work of Elizabeth Salter’s survey of Latin
and vernacular devotional texts, from the 1 lth through the l5th centuries, showing that “systematic
meditation originally followed this three-stage progression from the affective, to the moral, to the
contemplative” as practised by religious and anchontes, but as meditation became more popular with the
laity, “the final goal of contemplation was omitted”. See SALTER, Elizabeth, “Nicholas Love’s Myrrour
ofthe btessed lyfofJesu Christ”, ed. HOGG, lames, Institut fur englische Sprache und Literatur, Salzburg,
Universitât Salzburg, 1974, pp. 134, 172 - 178. Analecta cartusiana 10.
Elizabeth Salter’s study of Nicholas Love’s vemacular translation of pseudo-Bonaventuran meditations on
the sacred humanity of Christ, shows how he repeatedty omitted sections of the Meditationes dealing with
the contemplative life to focus on its affective and moral uses. Interestingly, however, Salter wntes that
Love “showed that he was fully conscious of the third ‘fruit’ of meditation; in a passage, as far as can be
known original to him, he described accurately the spiritual joy which succeeds deep meditation on the
Passion”. (SALTER, 1974, p. 177.) Nicholas Love ïs quoted:
Sothely this sit ofoure Lorde Jesu hangynge so on the crosse / by deuoute ymaginacioun ofthe
soule is su deuoute to some creamres that after longe exercise ofsorweftill compassioun they felen
some tyme 50 grete likynge / nout only in soule but also in the body / that they kan flot telle /
and that no man may knowe but onely he that by experience feleth it...
LOVE, Nicholas, Myrrour of the btessed lyfofJesu Christ, eds. HOGG, lames and Lawrence POWELL,
Institut fur Anglistik und Amerikanistik, Universitat Salzburg, 1989, p. 244, Analecta Carthusiana 91.
Truly this sight, on the part of the soul’s devout imagination, of our Lord Jesus hanging thus on
the cross is so devout to some creatures that after long exercise of sorrowful compassion they feel
such great delight at times that they cannot describe and that no one can know except the one who
by expenence feels it... (My translation)
Could Julian be behind this “original” comment in Love’s translation, pubiished as it was in 1410?
‘ BAKER, 1993, p. 158. Baker’s conclusion is cautious, that “prior to lier visionary expenence of 1373,
she was familiar with tenets of medieval spintuality identified with vowed religious, including anchontes”.
Note also that in Baker’s 1994 book Jutian ofNorwich ‘s Showings: From vision to book, Baker
observes from sources contemporary with lulian such as Richard Roue and Nicholas Love how the ternis
“simple” and “unlettered” were undergoing transitions in meaning to indicate affective rather than
intellective texts and could refer to literate audiences. On p. 11 Baker concludes:
Phrases similar to Julian’s ‘symple creature unlettyrde’ thus seem to be conventional signais of
devotional discourse rather than descriptions of the educational achievements of their readers. Even
though this evidence does not resolve the question of whether she could read Latin or only English,
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Despite the refinement of historical analysis, then, the verdict is stili out on Julian’ s
state of life and education pnor to her visionary experience. On the whole, however, in the
last few years the tide in Julian scholarship lias shifted increasingly toward accepting the
view that Julian knew only the English vemacular, and that she was a devout laywoman by
background, prior to entering the anchorliold, whether lier change in state of life was
before or after she had the visions.74
4.0 The composition and dating of the texts
A subcategory of conflicting views lias developed conceming when and how the
Short and Long Texts were composed. It is almost universally held that the Short Text is
an earlier version of the Long Text and flot a subsequent abndgement of it. The reason for
this view lias to do with what Julian herseif says about receiving a deeper understanding of
the original vision in the Long Text. The Short Text does flot contain the exemptum of the
lord and servant or the theological reflection on the Trinïty and the motherhood of Christ,
which amount to a substantial amplification of Julian’ s final three revelations.75
In the first chapter of the Long Text, a summary of the contents of the rest of the
chapters, the absence of reference to the exemptum of the lord and the servant and to the
theological material on the motherhood of Jesus has led Colledge and Walsh to posit a
theory that the Long Text was composed in two stages, with an intermediate ediflon of the
Long Text which did not yet include this material from the fourteenth revelation, and the
“final” edition sometime after she received her insight into the meaning of the exemptum in
1393. The intermediate edition is inferred from an account of a subsequent revelation in the
last chapter of the Long Text, where Julian writes:
From the time that it was revealed, I desired many times to know in what was our
Lord’ s meaning. And fifteen years after and more, I was answered in spiritual
understanding, and it was said: What, do you wish to know your Lord’s meaning
it does undennine the view that Julian of Norwich was unable to read or write in any language.
Her silence about an amanuensis... gives further warrant to the conclusion that Julian not only
composed but also insctibed and revised her own text.
It is Baker’s thesis however, that Julian moves from an affective visionary expenence in the Short Text to a
theologically educated interpretation of it in the Long Text, though how Julian would have got that
education is unknown. BAKER, 1994, pp. 12 - 14.
Thus even BAUERSCHMIDT, 1999, P. 207, who clearly respects Colledge and Walsh, argues fora
“least common denominator” procedure, in trying to locate Julian within the medieval theological tradition:
“In other words, there is no reason to posit ber having read Augustine’s De Trinitate when we can find the
outiine of an Augustinian understanding of the Trinity in a source such as John Mirk’s festial, a collection
of vernacular sermons”, i.e., the sort of teaching likely to have been heard from English pulpits of the time.
The exception to this view of the sequence of the Short Text preceeding the Long Text in composition is
the argument by Julia Bolton Holloway which was discussed above. She argued the sequence as W, A and
then the long text, first in her article “Chronicles of a mystic”, The tabtet, 11 May 1996, pp. 610 - 611.
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in this thing? Know it well, love was lis meaning. Who reveals it to you? Love.
(What did he reveal to you? Love.) Why does he reveal it to you? For love.
Remain in this, and you will know more of the same. But you will neyer know
different, without end.
So I was taught that love is our Lord’s meaning. (LT 86.)76
The final edition is inferred from what Julian writes in LT 51, the long dhapter in which
Julian narrates and reflects on the showing she received conceming what she cails the
“example” of the servant and the lord:
for twenty years after the time of the revelation except for three months, I received
an inward instruction, and it was this: You ought to take heed to ail the attributes,
divine and human, which were revealed in the example, though this may seem to
you mysterious and ambiguous. (LI 51.)
Based on these texts and their chronological references, Colledge and Walsh argue that the
composition of the Short Text dates from sometime soon after Julian received the showings
in 1373.
Nicholas Watson also holds to a processual view of the composition of the Long
Text, but dates both the Short Text and the Long Text much later in Julian’s life as an
anchoress than do Colledge and Walsh. The prevailing “bias” in favour of an early dating
of the Short Text is not unrelated to Colledge and Walsh’s desire to authenticate Julian’s
visions as divinely inspired, says Watson.78 Watson prefers to want to show that “neither
Julian nor her book were impervious to history”.79 He argues that the English
conservatism with regard to visionary expenences (as compared with the situation on the
continent), combined with her consequent sense of isolation as a wnter of her experience,
would have impeded Julian’s confidence in writing, up to fifteen years after her visionary
experience.8° He cites evidence in the Short Text that would suggest that the time of
recording the event was at some distance from the event of revelation itself.8’ Moreover,
in dhapter one of the Short Text only, Julian seems to be assuring her readers of her
orthodoxy regarding the use of images, which Watson takes to be an attempt to defuse any
potential charge of Lollardy, a movement, following John Wyclif, known for its critique of
the use of images. Extemal historical evidence would suggest that such a statement would
76 The bracketed sentences are collations from Si inserted into Colledge and Walsh’s edition of P.
COLLEDGE and WALSH, 1978a, pp. 19, 25.
76WATSON, 1993, pp. 640 - 641.
WATSON, 1993, p. 683.
80 See Nicholas Watson’s argument, in WATSON, 1993, pp. 657 - 672. By contrast, Colledge and Walsh
argue that Julian wrote the Short Text immediately after the visions in 1373 and thus prior to her becoming
an anchoress.
81 WATSON, 1993, p. 65$. See ST 11, “...this has aiways been a comfort to me, that I chose Jesus as
my heaven in ail time of suffering and of sorrow. And that has taught me that I should aÏways do so...” and
likewise, ST 6, “...in thefirst moment when I saw it...”.
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only make sense after the Blackfnars Council of 1382, when the question of images
became a controversy.82 Thus Watson dates the Short Text at no earlier than 1382, and no
later than 1388, when Julian received that further enlightenment as to the meaning of the
revelation, quoted above from LI 86, but flot in the Short Text.83 Watson holds that the
composition of the Long Text was begun at the earliest in 1393, twenty years after the
visionary experience (LI 51), when Julian’s understanding of the exemptum of the servant
and the lord was deepened, but that this life work could have continued to be written as late
as 1415 in the ripeness of years. The fact that the Short Text was copied as late as 1413
may even indicate that she was stili writing the Long Text. Thus Watson makes mucli of
the chapter heading of the last chapter in the Long Text, that this is a book which is “flot yet
performed”, to argue that the Long Text was a life-long project for Julian.84 One of the
advantages of Watson’s argument for a later date of composition for the Long Text is that k
allows for the greater possibility of influence on Julian by the writings of the European
mystics as these became more available in vemacular translation.85
I believe Watson’s redating of the Short Text would seem to make more sense of
certain larger movements in the historical context in which Julian was wnting. At the same
time, I can sec Lawlor’s explanation that Julian would be obliged to lier superiors to give
an account of this extraordinaiy visionary experience, ail the moreso because of English
conservatism in that regard; an account that would be characterized by “simplicity and
brevity, and where content is concemed, an emphasis on what had been revealed as distinct
from the author’ s meditation upon it. These are the qualities of Amherst”.86 And that die
Short Text would be the version copied as late as 1413 could be due, among other reasons,
to the fact that the control of publication of the Long Text was flot in Julian’s hands.
82 Watson’s argument is extensive, in WATSON, 1993, pp. 659 - 666.
WATSON, 1993, pp. 664, 667.
84 WATSON, 1993, pp. 678, 681 - 682. See LT 86,
However, see Aers and Staley’s response that Julian’s “often radical vernacular theology is most unhikely
to have been possible after Arundel’s Constitutions of 1407/9”, in AERS, David and Lynn STACEY,
Powers ofthe hoty, Pennsylvania Park PN, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996, p. 79, fn. 4. Then
again, as Bauerschmidt contends, this may well account flot for the production of the theology of the Long
Text but rather for its lack of distribution. The paucity of medieval manuscripts of the Long Text
suggests that it was neyer published. BAUERSCHMIDT, 1999, pp. 208 - 209. Lawlor’s article already
in 1951 inakes this distinction, though within the context of a different argument, in LAWLOR, John,
“Notes and observations: a note on the Revelations of Julian of Norwich” Review of Engtish studies, n.s.
2, 7, 1951, p. 256. Watson continues to defend his position in WATSON, Nicholas, “Censorship and
cultural change in late-medieval England: vernacular theology, the Oxford translation debate, and Arundel’s
constitutions of 1409”, Speculum 70, 4, 1995, p. 850, fn. 80.
86 LAWLOR, 1951, p. 257.
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Perhaps, however, Watson’s and Lawlor’s views of A are flot finally mutually exclusive,
as we have no idea how long it took her to compose. As to the composition of the Long
Text, I am inclined to follow Watson’s dating. As Bauerschmidt observes
If the long text was written in 1393, when Julian was only fifty, it leaves us
wondering whether Julian abandoned the minute meditation on lier visions.
However, if she was stiil working on it in lier seventies (as Watson’ s dating would
indicate), then we would read the long text as a life-project, what Lynn Staley lias
descnbed as “a text for a life”.87
5.0 Summary
To summarize wliat has become a complex web of arguments in recent Julian
scliolarship conceming lier education, early state of life, lier and otlier related
liistorigraphical questions, Bauerschmidt is helpful in his succinct description of the
implications of these two disparate unes of reading of Julian’ s early history. He observes
of Edmund Coiledge and lames Walsh (Augustinian and Jesuit, respectively, by
background) tliat “[tlhefr cntical ediflon clearly wislies to vindicate the ortliodoxy of
lulian’s tlieoiogy by placing lier firmly within the Western medievai theological tradition”
and higliuiglits how their procedure, of “literally embedding the text of Julian’ s Revelation
within extensive notes that point to parallels in both Latin and Engiish theological works”,
is an extension of their interpretive lens. By contrast, Bauerschmidt says, “[i]t is perhaps
no accident tliat lier [Glasscoe’sJ edition of tlie long text (in contrast to Colledge and
Walsh’ s edition) is witliout any critical apparatus or references to other texts”, which
accords witli Glasscoe’ s estimation of Julian as less concemed with Christian doctrine than
with lier insiglit into the inner realities of human existence.88
Michael Wright sees tliis “battie of appropriations” as reflecting contemporary
liermeneutical differences.
Wliat is at stake in the question of Julian’s eariy knowledge of Latin is our
understanding of lier both as a figure in lier own time, and as a writer of spiritual
significance to a number of contemporaly readers. Are tlie visionary experience
and, more significantiy, Julian’s understanding of it, tlie product of a lay female
piety, formed to some extent outside formai ecclesiastical institutions thougli of
sucli significance as to provoke a conversion to tlie most individualistic of the
orders; or do we have the record of the experience of one already professed to tlie
contemplative life? The resolution of the question will detenuine the historical
context from which we may consider Julian’s willingness to instrnct, or even to
87 BAUERSCHMIDT, 1999, p. 20$. See JOHNSON, Lynn Staley, “The trope of the scribe and the
question of literary authority in the works of Julian of Norwich and Margery Kempe”, Speculum 66, 1991,
p. 833. Watson’s hypothesis is gaining acceptance in recent Julian scholarship. See for example,
ANDERSON, Derek, Julian ofNorwich’s nonviolent account of salvation, Ph.D. thesis, Loyola
University, Chicago, 2005, pp. 234 - 238.
88 BAUERSCHMIDT, 1999, p. 205.
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write; lier intended audience; and lier theological assumptions, most notably the
question of universalism. For readers to whom Julian is our contemporary, one
would assume that lier status as a theologian of a somewhat unchurchly spirituality
is at issue.89
In effect, Wnglit is arguing that tlie current interest in Julian as a vemacular writer,
represented by Glasscoe and others, reduces to an interest in lay piety whicli exciudes a
serious recognition of lier as a tlieologian, by scliolars sympatlietic to what lie calis an
“uncliurchly spirituality” in tlieir liermeneutical perspective. Not surprisingly tlien,
Wright’s argument that Julian did know Latin leads liim to tlie conclusion tliat Julian’s
reference to lier audience as lier even Cliristians is to other contemplatives; tliat “slie is
writing of and for people like lierseif, embarked on tlie pursuit of perfection and for wliom
salvation sliould not be a daily issue”.9° It seems to me however as will be developed
below, that Julian was preoccupied witli the problem of salvation. Moreover, even
Julian’ s own mature discourse supports a ratlier different view, of lier “having littie interest
in stages of spiritual progress”.9’ While I do recognize tlie differences of readings which
tliese ambiguities in Julian’ s background open up, I do flot liold tliat tlie current
hermeneutical pluralism witli regard to Julian studies need be regarded in sucli oppositional
terms of a “battie of appropriations”.
Eveiyone who reads Julian of Norwicli is stmck by tlie ncli allusions to scripture
throughout tlie texts, though slie rarely quotes scripture directly. Tlie same can be said for
lier drawing on spiritual cÏassics and theologians of the time, particularly in the anchoritic
and vemacular traditions of piety and tlieology. Strains of tlie scliolastic and monastic
tlieological lieritage echo through lier work as well, even if tliese may have been more oral
than literaiy influences. Ilie variety of studies reviewed above shows tliat Julian lias been
deeply inftuenced by the ricli and conflicting religious cunents of lier age. It lielps us to
humanize lier by locating her in lier cultural context. It also begins to help us clarify in
wliat ways slie saw and spoke differently from lier environment. What is incontestable
even in view of ail the possible influences on lier work is tlie tlieological and literary
89 WRIGHT, 1993, pp. 37 - 38.
9° WRIGHT, 1993, p. 44.
91 Ibis view is held by Frederick Bauerschmidt in bis “Seeing Jesus: Julian ofNorwich and the text of
Christ’s body”, Journal of medieval and earty modem studies 27, 2, 1997, p. 204; drawing on
TUGWELL, Simon, Ways of impeifection: An exploration of Christian spirituality, Spnngfield IL,
Templegate, 1985, p. 187.
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originality of these texts92 and their powerful mtegration of theological questions into a
fundamentally prayerful and practical mystical and theological vision.
At the sarne time, the very variety and conflict to be found in the religious-cultural
context of the late l4th century in England is a different, yet similar mirror reflection of the
diversity in histoncal source studies and the pluralïsm of the contemporary scholastic
community generally. k this respect, I have difficulty with Bauerschmidt’s concem to
identify Julian as a vemacular theologian over against lier being a writer of “monastic
theology... scholastic theology, and especialÏy flot ‘devotional’ titerature”.93 Her
authorial mediation in the texts is botli theological and devotional, a reading which is better
preserved by Derek Anderson’s four trajectories for reading Julian, as will become evident
below. Even if one wishes to “appropriate” Julian strictly as a theologian, new questions
arise: To which theology is this author appropriating Julian? How faithfully can this
tlieology respond to tlie practice of living the Christian spiritual life (the mystical tradition)
on its own terms? Any serious historical, theological study must now corne clean as to its
own hermeneutical interests which provide tlie horizon of the world before the text of the
interpreter.
It is clear that Julian lias mastered the practice of effacing details about herseif in the
texts, hence this variety of conclusions to which Julian scholars have corne as to lier
intellectual biograpliy, lier state of life prior to the documentation of lier being an
anclioress, tlie dating of lier entrance into that form of contemplative life and the dating of
the composition of the texts.
Bauersclimidt observes concerning the outline of what we know about Julian of
Norwicli tliat it is more a delineation of options than a description: “Interpretive choices
must be made at almost eveiy point and these clioices have important consequences for
Bhattacharji bas carefuily shown this, using a methodology of “establishing what [lulian] bas in common
whith others, in what she is flot original”, in order to pinpoint where Jutian’s thought is unprecedented in
medieval literature, in BHAYTACHARJI, Santha, “Independence of thought in Julian of Norwich”, Word
and spirit 11, 1989, p. 79.
BAUERSCHMIDT, 1999, P. 211, emphasis added. On the following page he writes,
It is important to identify Julian as a theotogian rather than a devotional writer because one should
approach A revelation of love without either premature reverence, as if it were the direct outgrowth
of a seif-authenticating and unassailabie religous expenence, or premature scorn, as if it were
merety the direct outgrowth of a seif-authenticating and unassailabie reiigious experience. God
seldom speaks in Julian’s book. The revelation makes littie pretense of immediacy ami Julian is
very conscious of ber mediating role as a theologian. (Emphasis in text.)
Bauerscbmidt contrasts the “ambiguity of authorship” present in other medievai women theologians, but
does this ambiguity make them any less theologians? He cites Julian as negotiating three factors: natural
reason, the normal teaching of holy Church and the inward working of the Holy Spirit. (LT 80.) k seems
to me that by that late date in the composition of the Long Text, Julian is flexible about moving among ail
tbree.
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how one reads A revetation of divine love”.94 Thus, in the same way, I tum in the final
paragraphs of this chapter to outiine the most important interpretive choices that underfie
my reading of Julian. My reasons for these choices will become evident in the course of
the thesis.
6.0 Interpretive choices underlying my reading of Julian
At the end of section 4.0 above, I spoke of my position concerning the dating of the
composition of the two texts. Particularly conceming the Long Text, it seems increasingly
evident that Julian neyer stopped meditating and working on this text, so an early date of
completing the composition seems less and less likely.
As for Julian’ s early education, I tend to agree with Watson, Bauerschmidt, Baker
and others that vemacular sources can account for mucli of Julian’ s educational
background, that she was flot educated in Latin, but that her intelligence and the literary
attention expressed in the Showings suggest she could read and write in lier own vemacular
by the time of composing the Short Text, and that she continued to leam throughout her
life. The extreme views of Colledge and Walsh, Wright, Reynolds and Holloway and
others (seeing Julian as formally educated in Latin from an early age) and of Glasscoe,
Pelphrey and others (that she was illiterate) do flot fit the entire picture received in the texts
themselves. I agree with Bauerschmidt and Watson that Julian is to be understood in the
context of English vemacular theology, because of Julian’ s wnting in the vemacular, and
lier intended audience.95
Ward’s view of Julian’s formation as resulting from her participation in a network
of soutanes (particularly in view of the individualism of the English eremitic tradition as
Ward herseif describes it), and Riddy’s argument that what matters more than whether
Julian was lay or religious is lier having participated in a devout women’s orally shared
literary group, in which the literature would have been common to both states of life, are
interesting in this respect, that they attempt to place Julian within a supportive community
of like minded people.
BAUERSCHMIDT, 1999, p. 211. Significantly, Bauerschmidt leaves to the last chapter of his study his
own assessment of Julian’s background.
BAUERSCHMIDT, 1999, p. 211. On the meaning of the term “vernacular theology” see WATSON,
Nicholas, “Visions of inclusion: Universal salvation and vernacular theology in pre-refonnation England”,
Journal of medievat and earty modem studies, 27, 2, 1997, pp. 145 - 146 and also his “Conceptions of
the Word: The mother tongue and the incarnation of God”, in New medieval titeratures, eds. SCASE,
Wendy, Rita COPELAND, David LAWTON, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997, pp. 89 - 90. See also
McGINN, Bernard, “Meister Eckhart and the Beguines in the context of vernacular theology”, in Meister
Eckhart and the Beguine mystics, ed. McGINN, Bernard, NY, Continuum, 1994, pp. 4 - 14 who first
coined the term.
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However, I am suggesting that neither ta&ing or reading about God with others
nor being given advice about God is adequate to explain what I will argue are the signs of
an invisible empathic, encouraging andfonnative relational presence behind Julian’s
visions and, over time, lier creative soteriological appropriation of the mirroring ftinction of
the Jesus of lier showings. Moreover, I do flot find convincing Ward’s speculation tliat
Julian got lier education in effect as a mother and widow, though tlie experience of grief is
certainly present. To tliink that mothering chiidren, and table tafic with an “averagely
devout husband” could provide lier witli the background reflected in tlie Showings, as
Ward would have it, is flot, in my view, compelling.96 Julian’s vocation, lier tlieology,
would have been written sllently into lier children’s flesh, not into a manuscript.97
As for her state of life pnor to the illness and visionary experience of 1373, the
textual evidence of Julian’s third request for the three wounds/graces as having been made
prior to this time and continually desired thereafter, suggests that she was actively using the
resources at hand for a contemplative life of prayer. Tlie practice of imaginative, affective
Franciscan meditation on the Passion of Christ was already a lively element of that prayer
life. Colledge and Walsli’s view that Julian had been saturated from an early age in the
“old-fashioned”, pre-scliolastic monastic tradition of Ïectio divina may well be accurate,98
though given the widespread cultural interest in the spiritual life, this, and other, more
visual, metliods of appropnating the faith wliich wilI be explored fiirther below, may have
been tauglit to lier.
We receive tlie picture of an already very devout woman by the time of lier illness
and visionary experience, wlio is well accustomed to tlie practice of confession and of
receiving spiritual counsel, tliough with tlie gamut of questions wliicli lias been raised
about her early state of life, not enougli attention has been spent on the roTe of lier advisors
and friends in the spiritual life. Would there have been a difference in the nature of the
96 WARD, 1988, pp. 24 - 26.
° I note here the article by LICHTMANN, Maria,’”I desyrede a bodylye syght’: Julian ofNorwich and the
body”, Mystics quarterly 17, 1, 1991, p. 18 who writes: “Unlike Margery Kempe, for whom chastity after
bearing 14 chuidren lias become an obsessional issue, Julian sees birthing as a divine function, in that Jesus
as true Mother carnes us, bears us forth, and nourishes us”. Lichtmann’s comment about Kempe here is
psychologically realistic, but she does flot apply the same psychological realism to Julian. The
psychobiographical question remains whether or in what way Julian’s preoccupation with the adequacy of
the functions of motherhood in the Jesus of ber visions might also have a psychological referent in ber
early childhood experience.
COLLEDGE and WALSH, 1976, pp. 420, 424.
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relationship she would have had with a spiritual counsellor or director, depending on
whether she were a member of a religious order or a devout laywoman or an anchoress?99
This question again puts the focus on what the relationat context of ber formation
in the discipline of prayer was, rather than the content of her reading per se. It seems to
me the nature and influence of this or these unseen relationship(s) with a confessor and
spiritual dïrector have flot been explored adequately. A psycliobiographical study gives us
the opportunity to attempt to explore the traces of this relational context. Too little attention
has been paid to the possibility and nature of a long-term relationship with a confessor
andJor someone who functioned as a spiritual director, and its effect on her, but I sense this
is very significant context for ber leaming of both piety and theology prior to and following
the visionary experience. Evidence both from her book and from what historical
interpreters of the penod offer is scanty, but will be discussed below, as well as what we
know of other women recluses. In the psychobiographical analysis which follows
however, it will be the particular qualities of the intensely personal, intimate reÏationality in
lier medïtational relationship with the Jesus of lier showings which will be explored at
length in this thesis to see what traces they may reveal of formative relationships in Julian’ s
life.
I am impressed by the historical evidence Ward gives against Colledge and Walsh’s
argument that Julian had been a religious. Ward observes that in l4th century England
[tJhe gap between the spïrituality of the cloister and the hermitage was growing.
The desire for intense prayer rarely led people into the cloistered life... But real
spiritual vigour was beginning to be manifested in movements of lay piety rather
See JANTZEN, 1989, pp. 23, 35 who asserts that she must have had a confessor and spiritual director.
Also Roland Maisonneuve writes in this regard, “Julienne eut des confesseurs...” See the introduction to bis
translation into French of the LT, in MAISONNEUVE, Roland, trad., Julienne de Nonvich: ‘Le livre des
révélations’, Paris, Cerf, 1992, p. 10. On the other hand, recali RIDDY, 1993, p. 114 who draws on ST
16 to emphasize more the influence of female spiritual friends:
The rhetoric ofJulian’s own prose must have been influenced by the habits of speech developed in
‘hoty datyawns’ with her spiritual advisers and female friends. The latter presumably included the
‘certayne personn’ she loved and about whose spiritual progress she wanted assurance, and whom
the Short Text reveals to have been a woman.
Then again there is Gilmore’s take on the clerical confessional context of the production ofJulian’s texts,
in GILMORE, Leigh, Autobiographics: A feminist theory of women ‘s sef-representation, Ithaca, Comeil
University Press, 194, p. 117:
Julian interprets and represents The Revelations within the context of the confession she would
later maRe. Her representation of the experience documents this regulatory presence and the extent
to which she bas intemalized the demands of such policing. This internalization is demonstrated
throughout The Revelations as she forms a judgment about her experience.
Abbott acknowledges Gilmore’s position, though flot its radical political implications, and does flot
distinguish further between the roles of confessor and spiritual father than to be that of giver of absolution
and dispenser of advice respectively, in ABBOTT, 1999, p. 62 fn. 36.
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than in the religious orders: the Imitation of Christ after ail, came from Thomas à
Kempis and belonged more to the devotio moderna than to the religious orders.’°°
Thus Ward asserts, “[ijt was flot monks but laymen following the solitary life who were
the recipients of advice about prayer”; the “stars” of the English mystics, Richard Roue,
Walter Hilton and the author of the Ctoud of unknowing were ail addressing their works to
anchoresses. “It was flot to the cloister but to the hermitage that their counsel was
offered”.’°’ Similarly, Ann Warren has observed that while male anchorites tended to be
clerics, female anchorites usually had flot been nuns before their enclosure.’°2 Glasscoe’ s
study of the literary evidence for lay education by that time lends further weight to the view
that Julian had been a laywoman in ber early years.’°3 To be sure, Bemard McGinn argues
for a “conversation” between the older monastic and scholastic theologies, on the one hand,
and the new, vemacular mysticism, on the other.’°4 Ail to say, that as a laywoman or
anchoress in lier earlier state of life before the time of the visions, Julian might have had
considerable exposure to spiritual guide(s) who were monastic, clerical and anchoritic,
open to the creativity and innovation of visionary experience.
Thus, I hold that Julian had flot been a nun in ber early years. Moreover, to date, I
am inclined to find Jantzen’ s hypothesis can best fit the evidence, that is, that Julian had
been a laywoman who early on in lier life feit called to enter the anchoritic life, prior to lier
visionary experience in y373105 At least, I propose she was practising some fomi of
reclusion, even if flot yet enclosed in the ancliorhold. The evidence I find most convincing
to upliold this position is from Baker’s analysis of tlie influence of ancliontic literature in
Julian’ s texts themselves. As noted above, Baker observes that the presence in Julian’ s
prayer of the request for the third wound of longing with lier will for God is indicative that
Julian was familiar with the devotional practices of ancliontic spirituality pnor to lier
ii06 Beliind the presence of Julian’ s familiarity with anchontic literature pnor to the
visions tlien, the kind of counsel Julian might have received could very well reflect and
100 WARD, 1988, P. 16.
lOi WARD, 1988, pp. 16 - 17.
102 WARREN, 1985, p. 22.
103 GLASSCOE, 1993, p. 26.
104 McGINN, Bernard, Theflowering of mysticism: Men and women in the new mysticism 1200 - 1350, NY,
Crossroad, 1998, p. 23, The presence of God: A history of western Chnstian mysticism 3. This would
certainly seem to be borne out by the various states of life of the “stars” of English l4th century mysticism
themselves who were dispensing spiritual advice to anchoresses: Walter Hilton was a hermit, but later
became an Augustinian canon. The debate is stiil out on the author of the Cloud of Unknowing as to
whether he was a secular priest or a contemplative monk. Richard Roue broke off theological studies to
become a hermit at the age of 18, and later died and was buried in a Cistercian convent.
105 JANTZEN, 1989, pp. 24 - 25.
106 BAKER, 1993, pp. 153 - 154, 158.
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encourage not only the emphasis on contrition and compassion, which slie has 50
obviously interiorized, but also one of contemplation, the tone of moderation and “relaxed
common sense, flot scrupulous anxiety” recommended in the mies for the anchoritic life.107
Thus, I hold that Julian entered the anchorhold, or at least some initial practice of reclusion,
earlier in her life, perhaps having afready experienced a “spiritual crisis”, as Lawior puts it,
which drew her to this vocation, well before the time of her mortal illness.’°8 But it seems
to me that the crisis was flot resolved, simply by being enclosed.
I believe this view makes better sense of the disparate bits of historical detail we
glean from lier text. Jantzen observes that the presence of others in an anchoress’ celi, in
times of extremity, would flot be implausible. There would in any event be the servant(s)
attending the anchoress. The cali for the curate, the priest of the parish church to which
Julian’s ceil was attached, would be a “local cali” in sucli an emergency. It wouid make
sense that the man of religion who cornes later, and listens seriously to ber description of
her visionaly experience, could well have been lier confessor/spirimal director.’°9
I suggest then that it is in the anchorhold, or at least in a life of reclusion, perhaps
within her family home, that Julian became mortally iii, and received the visionaiy
experience, whule meditating imaginatively on the crucifix placed before ber, a practice with
which she was already well familiar. Wliether living in some form of informai reclusion or
in tlie anchorhold, she lias had the experience of the safe space of solitude, in which to
develop ber life of meditation on Christ’s humanity, under the guidance of a spiritual
director andlor confessor, who provided a compassionate, relational context.
But is this ail we can say about Julian of Norwich’s biography?
Everyone in l4th England was touched by the plague and the social and religious
upheavals at that time. But it is Julian who was given to see and speak to the depthless
pastoral need for God’s maternai comfort and compassion among lier even Christians when
Mother Church was not doing it, and to devote lier later life to giving ber showings a
soteriological and trinitarian defense. Someone wlio lias liad “good enough mothering”
would not be thus motivated to the same degree to address the soteriological crisis of
credibility in the Church.
107 BHATfACHARJI, 1989, P. 80.
108 In 1951, John Lawior speculated that Julian was undergoing a “spiritual crisis” at the time she asked for
the three graces and was either testing a vocation to the anchoritic life, or already an anchoress at the time of
her visionary experience, in LAWLOR, 1951, p. 257.
109 Colledge and Walsh hold that this religious person “knew her well and was prcpared to give credence to
what she might say”, in COLLEDGE and WALSH, 1978a, p. 168, though they argue that she was a nun
prior to the visions. See RIDDY, 1993, pp. 114 - 115 for a rather more critical take on the assumptions
that this person might make toward a woman having a visionary experience.
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What would have rnotivated Julian to corne up with the showings she had, and to
devote the rest of lier life to praying a form of lectio divina on them, and to writing and
reflecting on their theological import? This is the question which seems to have been
missing frorn the current retrieval of Julian of Norwich’s original sotenology for theology
today. This is the question to which, I believe, a psychobiographïcal study using relational
psychoanalysis could be a very fmitful tool to develop a response.
7.0 The potential contribution of a relational psychoanalytic
psychobiographical method
The issue of tlie battie of appropriations, as Wright cails it, could be said to be itself
a reflection of the central problern of this thesis: that is, the problem of the credibility in our
own day of the medieval sotenological tradition of Anseim and successors, such that Julian
of Norwich’ s soteriology is being retrieved both for a more comprehensive, theologïcal
appreciation of it, and for its usefulness as a resource for contemporary soteriology. If
tliere is an “unchurchly” crowd appropnating Julian of Norwich it is perhaps because at
sorne level she ïs spealdng to people’s needs, regardless of their churcffly background.
Ratlier than a situation requiring a response of “battie”, it seems clearly to demand a
response winch can engage a correlative dialogue.
Julian lias left us two texts, separated in time by at least twenty years, in winch she
writes uncommonly openly about lier visionary expenence and subsequent practice of
meditating on those showings. By some instoriographical criteria that is not mucli
evidence for a biography. But by other criteria, namely psychobiographical criteria, what
Julian lias left us is a gold mine. The showings and Julian’s subsequent meditations and
theological reflections on them, viewed witli a Winnicottian sensibility, constitute the
witness of a long and evolving transitional space activity. As such, they are full of data and
omissions wliich could be examined for traces of psychobiographical evidence.
In effect, to glean more knowledge of tins person wlio wrote the Showings, and
look back to speculate on Julian’s history prior to their reception, tins rnetliodology enables
us to see that tliere is mucli in what she does telis us about lierself, but also much winch
can be discemed through lier visionary expenence. And we can look to lier description of
lier visions of Christ to provide evidence of the psycliodynamic function tins plays in lier
conversion process.
Julian’s showings, wliile they are very mucli divine gifts of grace, do flot corne out
of nowhere instorically, but are also intimately reflective of a personal and social liistorical
context, whicli we can attempt to study. In imaginative rneditation based on the sacred
liumanity of Christ, Julian’s visionary relationship witli tlie Jesus of ber sliowings, as
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C Meissner suggests of prayer activity generally, takes on the pattem and quality of supplying
what she lacks, or needs, reflecting very intimately and humanly critical elements of her
personal, social and psychological history.
This approach takes seriously the method of psychobiography which is sensitive to
the historical context of the subject. So, as well as being sensitive to women’s and
vernacular forms of spirituality in the fourteenth century, it wiII be aided, for example, by
socio-historical researcli which lias begun to investigate what the mothering practices of the
late l4th England were and how they differed among the classes. What the evidence
reveals is far from being a complete picture, but what it does reveal is flot pretty. It may,
however, provide new sources of psychohistorical evidence as to wliat Julian’s earliest
mothenng experiences might have been, as well as from what class she may have corne.
This psychobiographical approach will use object relations theory to draw out the
significance of early maternai mirroring for the earliest foundation of the nascent sense of
self and trust in tlie other -- and the effects of its absence. This approach, I argue, can give
us insights into what lier psychological preoccupations were in the years preceding the
visions and provide a necessary psychobiographical, relational foundation for the activation
of her theologically mirroring imagination during and after tlie visions.
At the sanie tîme, this approach to Julian also takes seriously the potential adequacy
of the theology of revelatïon developed in the Franciscan and later Ignatian spiritual
tradition which encourage imaginative affective meditation on the life, Passion and
Resurrection of Christ. This theology of revelation recognizes both human agency and
grace, and acknowledges that grace, in prayer activity, mirrors the subjectivity of the
meditator and reveals lier developmental and spiritual needs in that condition.
Precisely because of tlie distance in time between the Short Text and tlie Long Text,
we are also given the data for a developmental approacli to Julian’ s profile. For this
reason, Kohut’s three phases of therapeutic mirroring transference will be enlisted to help
trace tlie transformative and developmental dimension of Julian’ s transitional relationship
with tlie Jesus of lier showings.
Moreover, the following study will use this methodology flot simply to advance a
psychobiographical profile, but to engage this, together with a sociohistorical sensibility, in
furthering our understanding of the liberative conversion process in Julian’ s attitudes
toward salvation, before, durïng and years after the occurrence of the showings. A
psychobiographical method as applied to her writings can help us to see just how mucli she
reveals about lier early psychological disposition and preoccupations and their resolution in
specific ways, as these are reftected in her lifelong thematic concem with sin, suffering,
salvation and its appropriation, human self-knowledge and union with God in Christ. It is
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these psychological dispositions and preoccupations and the pattems of resolution she
adopts which might also have something to contribute to a fiuller picture ofboth Julian’s
early life and lier theological originality. The kind of correlation I am proposing takes
seriously the signs of maturation both in Julian’ s psychodynamic need for mirroring, and
in lier creative stmggle to appropnate a credible soteriology.
CHAPTER 5
JULIAN’S PRE-VISIONARY LIFE: ASPIRATIONS AND ANXIETY
1.0 Introduction
This cliapter traces a relational psychoanalytic psycliobiographical profile of the pre
visionary life of Julian of Norwich, drawing on evidence which she gives in lier two texts.
To begin, however, the reader is oriented to some of the working hypotheses whicli
support this and subsequent chapters. Both theological and psychodynamic assumptions
are bnefly identified.
Julian begins her Short and Long Text by describing tbree graces she had asked for
in lier youth. Since this is the most Julian ever teils us about lier past history, lier
description of these graces, and tlie differences in lier description between the two texts, are
explored for wliat they might also teil us about lier psychobiographical history. Beyond
this, I look to lier accounts of her service in lier youth, lier relationships with identified
others, and her particular expression of the cultural trope of modesty, for furtlier dues as to
lier early narcisstic need for mirroring.
Many previous studies have interpreted tlie illness which Julian was suffering when
she received her visionary experience. Tliese are reviewed; tlien the approach of the
present study is described. The mortal illness is understood as a limit situation which, with
the presence of tlie crucifix, opened up a transitional space between inner and social worlds
in whicli Julian expresses a psycliodynamic pattent The evidence of Julian’s experiencing
a recapitulation of her early lack of mirroring along with a loss of mearnng suggests that the
illness might have been prompted by a sotenological crisis which intensified the symptoms.
Finaily, I draw a brief portrait of what Julian’ s early soteriological beliefs might
have been.
2.0 Working assumptions and hypotheses
This section orients to the major interdisciplinary assumptions which, taken
together, ground the methodology of the present and subsequent chapters of analysis.
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2.1 Theological assumptions and objectives
With Bemard Lonergan and Sebastian Moore I hold the assumption that conversion
is the essential meaning-giver for the theologian.’ This assumption orients us to look for
signs of conversion from some prior, ambivalent belief(s) consciously or more likely
unconsciously expressed, to other, more life-giving beliefs, more or less consciously
expressed as the meaning of the conversion, or transformative experience.2 The present
chapter applies this orientation to Julian of Norwich and lias as its objective the elucidation
of what those early theological, and more specifically soteriological beliefs might have been
in her case, prior to her reception of the visions.
The hypothesis I hold is that an inauthentic soteriology will have the effect of
keeping the believer in a condition of social oppression and psychological isolation, of
unconscious despair at bis or her powerlessness to be situated anywhere else than among
the damned, despite what the religious discourse and/or imagery may say. By contrast, the
discourse and imagery of an authentic soteriology will engage and reflect on deep pattems
engraved by one’s social and psychological location and forge a liberafing sense of
personhood and destiny in relationship to a loving Other.
2.2 Psychodynamic assumptions
One basic psychodynamic assumption I hold with Freud and many otliers, is that
the “stmctures, in ternis of which personality organization and functiomng can be analyzed,
have a genetic history”. More particularly, as Meissner puts it, “the sliape of the faitli
experience as it evolves developmentally is contingent on and reflects, as well as
conditions, the developmental viscissitudes of botli narcissism and object relations”.3 This
assumption grounds the psychohistorical method of looking for signs of Julian’ s early
See MOORE, Sebastian, “Some principles for an adequate theisrn”, Downside review, 95, 1977, p. 211.
2 Although this thesis wïll flot be using the discourse of Lonergan directly, his discussion of conversion
undergirds the work of Moore and Crysdale who do figure in the chapters to corne. Mis understanding of
intellectual conversion bears affinity to what Jones cails Winnicott’s “epistemology”. See LONERGAN,
Bernard, Method in theotogy, NY, Seabury, 1979, pp. 237 - 244, The Seabury library of conternporary
theology; and JONES, lames, “Knowledge in transition: Towards a Winnicottian epistemology”,
Psychoanatytic review 79, 1992, pp. 223 - 237. The work of Robert Doran extends Lonergan’s
understanding of conversion to include a fourth type, which he cails “psychic conversion” with regard to the
distorted cycles of one’s affectivity, is also important for the present study as it cornes doser to Sebastian
Moore’s understanding of the liberation ofdesire. See DORAN, Robert, “Psychic conversion”, The thomist
41, 1977, pp. 200 - 236; and CRYSDALE, Cynthia, Embracing travail: Retrieving the cross today, NY,
Continuum, 2001, pp. 141 - 144.
MEISSNER, W. W., Psychoanalysis and religious experience, New Haven, Yale University Press,
1984, pp. x - xi.
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soteriological assumptions in the traces of lier early psychodynamic attitudes and behaviour
pattems discernable in the two texts.
Another assumpfion is that both compensation and correspondence hypotheses are
operative in the shape of Julian’ s genetic history and faith expenence. These terms describe
two psychological approaches to contemporary religïous experience, based on attachment
theoiy (an outgrowth of object relations theoiy developed by John Bowlby). The
compensation hypothesis assumes that significant religious experiences may be a resuit of
children failing to develop secure attachments with their parents, i.e. suffering “avoidant
maternai attachments”, and seeking such attachments elsewhere, such as in special
teachers, mentors, priests, etc., and presumably in their relationship to God.4 The
correspondence hypothesis, on the other hand, argues that “the security - insecurity of a
person’ s attachment relationships with parents should predict one’ s religious inclinations
directly rather than inversely” such that God images tend to correlate posifively with images
of preferred parents and self - concepts, and, conversely, that a loss of faith is associated
with poor parental relationships.5 He continues, that this latter hypothesis would account
more for people who have not undergone “radical transformations of mental models of
attachment from insecure to secure”. Kirkpatrick’ s studies however have included
examples of people who have undergone such radical transformations, which is the general
scenario I am proposing as the backdrop for what we see in Julian’ s religious
transformation in the Showings. He writes:
Some hints regarding how these vanous relationships may fit together were
suggested by the additional finding that security of attacbment to God showed a
direct correspondence to security of aduit love relationships, but oniy for
participants who had reported insecure maternai attachments during childhood. It
was suggested that, when peopie undergo radical transformations of mental models
of attachment from insecure to secure, ail attachment relationships -- including a
relaitonship with God -- are similarly affected. These findings underscore the
importance of examining an individual’s entire hierarchy of attachment figures and
other personal relations in order to understand lis or her reiigious and human -
reiationship experience.6
2.3 The pre- and post-visionary Julian
Julian’s reception of the visions changed lier life. This is not news, although many
Julian commentators give the impression that lier life prior to the visions, psychologically
spealdng, was essentially of a piece with the Julian which tbey see represented in her texts.
In fact it surprises me that so few commentators have taken an approacli whidli
KIRKPATRICK, Lee A., “An attachment theory approach to the psychology of religion”, The
international journal for the psychology of religion 2, 1, 1992, pp. 16 - 17.
KIRKPATRICK, 1992, p 18.
6 KIRKPATRICK, 1992, pp. 1$ - 19.
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incorporates, as will this project, both compensation and correspondence hypotheses in the
shape of Julian’ s genetic history and faith experience.
The dramatic character of this radical transformation in Julian of Norwich I propose
to cail conversion tbrough, in this case, lier visionary experience. I assume this conversion
had consequences for lier future life, bringing new areas of lier life experience and
personality organization as well as the revelations themselves, over time, under the light of
the meaning which was given by means of the visionary experience. The theological fruit
of Julian’ s years of contemplation of her showings, that “Love was his meaning”, implies
that Julian underwent a profound conversion in lier understanding of her relationsliip with
God.
My first assumption then is that in some sense the pre-visionary Julian had
unconsciously believed that something else -- but not Love -- was the Lord’s meaning, or
at least tliat tliis meaning was in some sense compromised by other “meanings” based on
fear, doubt, shame, despair, etc., as she variously describes lier psychospiritual condition.
In otlier words, in order better to understand where Julian of Norwich ended up in her
appropriation of lier relationship to tlie Jesus of her showings in bis saving work (with ail
its implications for her even Christians and the Trinity), I propose in this chapter to attempt
to understand where she started from.
The littie that Julian offers us in terms of traces of lier early life before the visions
(along with a familiarity with studies of the religious climate, social bistoiy and chiidrearing
practices in late medieval England) can help us understand a bit better what lier early
assumptions about lier relationship with God might have been like. One objective of the
present cliapter to arrive at a sketch of Julian’ s early soteriological assumptions, by means
of reading traces of the shape of the developmental viscissitudes of Julian’ s early life with
the help of object relations theory.7
It wil be essential to include in this study of Julian the profound effect of the then
widespread cultural and religious tradition of affective meditation. This tradition, absent in
contemporary secular psychological culture, contributed elements which facilitated the
appropriation of a transformational relational encounter with the religious transitional
object.
The second assumption this chapter makes is that Julian’s visionary expenence can
fruitfully be understood as an example of transitional activity, as Winnicott understood it.
The usefulness of this psychoanalytic school of thought for understanding the origins of human religious
sensibility in the infant-mother relationship, and in a way that does justice to religious maturation as weIl
as pathology has been explored in chapters above.
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This visionary experience took place in the context of the limit experience of near mortal
illness, and can be conceived as transitional phenomena arising in transitional space, that
third reaim between subjectivity and objectivity, which came to life as Julian beheld the
crucifix set before her dying eyes. The crucifix, symbol par excellence of Christ’ s saving
action, fiinctions as the transitional object and is the focus throughout Julian’ s
transfonnative, visionary experience, the transitional space or realm of symbol formation.
This chapter lays the groundwork for the subsequent analysis of the visions
themselves, and makes the assumption that this transitional activity can be said to take on
the pattem and quality of supplying, psychologically speaking, what she most lacks or
needs, and that it reflects, very intimately and humanly, cntical elements and pattems in lier
social and psycliological history.
I hold that traces of real human relational failures and healing substitutes can be read
both through what she discloses of her pre-visionary self, and tlirough a pattem discemed
at the outset of lier visions. My hypothesis in this chapter is that this approach can supply
new sources of potential evidence of the genetic history of viscissitudes in Julian’ s early
object relations and narcissism which condition the pattem of lier psychospiritual
maturation of mirroring and lier appropriation of a credible soteriology to be explored in
subsequent cliapters.
At the same lime, I stress again that the psychohistorical method I will employ to
explore this hypothesis will be sensitive to historical research available to us conceming the
cultural and religious influences which bore on Julian’s experience. My hope is to develop
a psycliobiographical interpretation whicli is rooted in wliat we know of the sociocultural,
theological and ecclesiastical influences on Julian, and attentive to lier conventional and
original borrowings ftom tliat historical context.8
3.0 Ihe three graces
We know from the littie Julian telis us before launching into tlie sliowings
themselves that at some earlier time in her life tlian when she had the sliowings, she had
asked for three graces: a bodily siglit of the Passion, a bodily sickness, and tlie tliree
wounds of contrition, compassion and longing with lier will for God. How mucli earlier in
time this was we do flot know but it is likely to liave been years before. Her prayer request
reflects an early desire to immerse herseif in tlie tradition of affective piety of the day.
8 See JONTE-PACE, Diane, Augustine on the couch: Psychohistorical (mis)readings of the Cotfessions’,
Religion 23, 1993, pp. 71 - 83.
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This section will look at each grace separately. I will review the research which
gives dues to the bistorical background behind her description of each request. Then I will
offer what might be discerned from this, with the help of the psychobiographical lens,
about the viscissitudes of Julian’ s early life and lier pre-visionary vïews and assumptions
about salvation.
3. 1 The first grace: “I desired a recollection of the Passion”
About the first grace Julian wntes in the Short Text 1:
As to the first, it came into my mmd witli devotion; it seemed to me that I had
great feeling for the passion of Christ, but stiil I desired to have more by the
grace of God. I thought that I wished that I liad been at that time with Mary
Magdalen and with the others who were Christ’ s loyers, so that I might have seen
with my own eyes our Lord’ s Passion which lie suffered for me, so that I might
have suffered with him as others did who loved him, even though I believed firmly
in ail Christ’s pains, as Holy Church shows and teaches, and as paintings of the
Crucifixion represent, which are made by God’s grace, according toHoly Church’s
teaching, to resemble Clirist’s Passion, so far as human understanding can attain.
But despite ail my mie faith I desired a bodily siglit, through which I might have
more knowledge of our Lord and saviour’ s bodily pains, and of the compassion of
our Lady and of ail bis mie loyers who were living at that time and saw bis pains,
for I would have been one of them and have suffered with them. I neyer desired
any other sight of God or revelation, until my soul would be separated from the
body, for I trusted tmly that I would be saved. (ST 1 •)9
There is in the first grace she requested at once a quality of desire to know more of
the Lord’s pains and of Mary Magdalene’s compassion, two prominent devotional aspects
of affective meditation on the crucifixion of Jesus, and a quality of restraint around
desiring any visionary experience as adding anything to what can be known “by human
understanding” of the “truc faith” through the texts and images which Holy Church
prescribes.
Her early desire for deeper knowledge of, and feeling for, the Passion, by means of
visionary siglit and feeling, reflects an exposure to the affective, meditation tradition which
LT 2 omits the unes beginning with “even though I beiieved firmly in ail Christ’s pains, as Hoiy Church
shows and teaches, and as paintings of the Crucifixion represent... so far as human understanding can
attain”. See WATSON, Nichoias and Jacqueiine JENKINS, eds., The writings ofJulian ofNorwich:’ A
vision showed to a devout woman’ and ‘A revelation of love’, University Park PA, Pennsylvania State
University, 2006, p. 62: “Decorated crucifixes, ubiquitous in late medieval English churches and public
spaces, were under attack from reformers in the 1380s who objected to their lavishness and the practice of
venerating them”. This supports Watson’s view that the composition of the Short Text was not completed
before the mid to late 1380s and that the Long text was fifteen to twenty years after that in being composed.
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would promote lier to be disposed toward having what Barbara Newman cails “scripted
visions” and a desire for “relational encounter” by means of meditation.’°
Julian’s request for a bodily sight would suggest strongly that, like other women in
that period, religious and lay pious women alike, she was already in the franciscan practice
of meditating on the pseudo-Bonaventurian Meditations vitae Christi. This practice was
particularly encouraged by Aelred of Rielvaulx in lis De institutione Inctusarum a 1 2
century manual for anchoresses which encouraged affective participation in the life and
Passion and death of Jesus through texts and images as a means of deepening the
subjective appropriation of the Passion in the life of the meditator.1’
Barbara Newman’ s recent study argues that these “scripted visions”, written by
clerics largely for women, contained a conventional plan as to how the meditator would
develop lier spiritual life and appropriate tlie salvific work of Jesus in tlie events of the
Passion. Tliey were, slie says, the first experiments in the “genre of guided meditafions”
which were intended “flot as an exercise in historical reconstruction, but as a script to
awaken the reader’ s visionary imagination”, such that the reader might “make herseif
present” within the dramatic scenarios “as a participant”. They conceived tlie vision,
among other things, “as a relational encounter”)2
‘$eeing’ in short means visualizing, witli a certain measure of imaginative
freedom.... In this form of meditation the boundary between ‘I visualized’ and ‘I
saw’ is porous indeed.... Anyone who performed such meditations as directed and
failed to have visions would have been seriously lacking in imagination.13
° NEWMAN, Barbara, “What did it mean to say ‘I saw’?: The clash between theory and practice in
medieval vïsionary culture”, Speculum 80, 2005, pp. 26 - 28.
See BAUERSCHMIDT, Frederick, Jutian of Norwich and the mysticat body politic of Christ, Notre
Dame, Indiana, Notre Dame Universïty Press, 1999, p. 34 and ABBOTr, Christopher, Jutian ofNonvich:
Autobiography and theology, Cambridge, D.S. Brewer, 1999, p. 53 on these practices. See also
GILLESPIE, Vincent, “Strange images of death: The Passion in later medieval English devotional and
mystical writing”, In Zeit, Tod und Ewigkeit in der Renaissance Literatur 3, cd. HOGG, lames, Salzburg,
1987, pp. 111 - 159. Analecta Cartusiana 117, on the shift from lectio divina to tectio Domini , a practice
of visual meditation on images of the crucifix by thc late l4th century.
12 NEWMAN, 2005, pp. 26 - 28. Her contemporary anthropological comparison is with neo-pagan (here
Wiccan) visionary scripts, but she also refers indirectly to similar contemporary movements within
Christian spirituality, namely, the democratization of the Ignatian practice of meditation and contemplation,
in NEWMAN, 2005, p. 3. Newman distinguishes the genre of scripted visions from unscripted visions,
which presuppose a pnor reading and memory of a wide variety of scriptural, liturgical and classical texts
and images, and lcd to new literary creafion. Scripted visionary guides such as Aelred’s, on the other hand,
“require the reader to consult only one book, and their vemacular offspring do not even presume direct
knowledge of the Gospels. Many such works are dedicated to women, whose devotional reading was
expected to result in the experience of new visions but not necessarily in the creation of new texts”.
NEWMAN, 2005, p. 27.
13 NEWMAN, 2005, pp. 28 - 29.
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Elsewhere, Bauerschmidt observes that “the eye is... an avenue of communication
and communion with Jesus’ pain”:
To gaze with the same intensity of love as Mary upon Christ crucified was to be
with him on the cross, to the point where perception lapses over into imitation. In
the same way Julian seemed to desire flot simply a vivid imagination of Christ’ s
crucifixion but something akin to actually being present at the historical event, just
as Mary was, so as to identify with Christ’s sufferings.’4
In support of the view that Julian was familiar with this meditation practice, there is
Julian’s description of herseif as wanting to expenence what Mary, Mary Magdalene and
the other first disciples did, and calling them “Christ’s loyers” arid “true loyers”.15
At the same time, Julian reflects a quality of restraint around having desired any
visionary phenomena in her youth.16 As she says, “I neyer desired any other sight of God
or revelation”. Newman and others have noted here in ST 1 an echo of the negative attitude
in (nominalist) English scholasticism toward visionary experience, such that the
imagination was judged to be an avenue to deception in fallen humanity. This was quite
different from the situation on the Continent where the influence of devotia modema was
much stronger, and in which visual meditations among the laity were endorsed.’7
Stili, we see that she is ambivalent about this restraint as she says, “But despite ail
my true faith I desired a bodiiy sight, through which I might have more knowledge of
14 BAUERSCHMIDT, 1999, p. 39.
15 WATSON and JENKINS, 2006, p. 12. In an attempt to place Julian within a supportive community of
like minded people Watson and Jenkins wonder whether Julian’s use of this phrase refers indirectly to her
identification with such a community. Specifically, they wonder whether Margery Kempe might have
distributed Julian’s work to a circle of
members of an informal group of priests, monks, anchorites, and laypeople whom [Margery’s]
Book cails “our Lord’s loyers” or “Ood’s servants”. These individuals have no more in cormnon
than that they share an outlook sympathetic to devotional and visionary experience, as well as a
discernible dislike of ecclesiastical formalism.... Indeed, Julian may have self-consciously written
as a member of the “loyers of God”, a phrase she uses, in various forms, of the devout, of potential
readers, and of herseif.
16 Compare Nicholas Watson, that Julian’s “youthful request for more ‘feleing in the passion ofChriste’...
surely implies that her imagination was flot of the kind that found easy the sympathetic absorption in the
events ofChrist’s death that Passion meditation demands. WATSON, Nicholas, “The trinitarian
hermeneutic in Julian of Norwich’ s Revelation of love”, The medieval mysticat tradition in England, cd.
GLASSCOF, Marion, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 85. Exeter symposium V.
17 NEWMAN, 2005, p. 35. Nicholas Watson draws on Julian’s expressions ofrestraint already present in
the Short Text in his argument for the later dating of the composition of both her texts, as the theological
climate in England became increasingly suspicious of visionary experience. See WATSON, Nicholas,
“The composition ofJulian ofNorwich’s Revelation of Love”, Speculum 68, 3, 1993, pp. 637- 683; and
“Censorship and cultural change in late-medieval vernacular theology, the Oxford translation debate, and
Arundel’s constitutions of 1409”, Speculum 70, 4, 1995, pp. 822 - 864.
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our Lord and saviour’ s bodily pains....” (SI 1.) The reason Julian herseif gives for her
restraint is that “I trusted tmly that I would be saved.”
Given this expression of ambivalence in ST 1, the “trust” which Julian says she lias
here is, I suggest, a conventional trust in salvation, to be correlated with her early
acceptance of the “true faith” which Holy Church dispenses by means of its teachings, i.e.,
an intellectual assent rather than a feit knowledge. Since “trust” is a word which recurs a
great number of times in the showings and represents a major relational preoccupation in
her psychological and soteriological dynamics, I suggest tliat her use of this phrase liere,
where she is clearly defensive of her motives being misunderstood, reflects a relatively
conventional ecclesiastical understanding of the concept. Perhaps she is also restrained
because of an ambivalent attitude toward what a relational encounter with Christ and lis
loyers through imaginative, visionary prayer might reveal. Her trust in being saved seems
then, in lier early years, to have been based on her adherence to the sacramental
requirements of the churcli, and lier good works of devotion from an early age. About tlie
latter, see below, the section on lier “service” to God in lier youtli. It does not seem to me
that lier description of this early stage in lier life reflects as yet a conscious examination of
her personal doubts about lier trust eitlier in tlie teachings of Holy Church or in lier future
salvation -- except in this expression of ambivalence around accepting tlie true faitli as
adequate to lier needs.’8
Her ambivalence, it seems to me, could be said to reveal a woman who at a young
age lias developed an intense devotional life and religious aspirations to salvation, tliougli
as yet understood in fairly conventional tenus. Abbott observes tliat “[a]t the start of tlie
text Julian portrays herseif rapt in an intense personal devotion to Christ, concemed
primarily for lier own salvation and desiring an intensification of lier religious
experience.”9 Wliat I am adding to this is the observation that there is a quality of anxiety
in Julian’ s ambivalence around pursuing this first grace: it’ s as if she is saying tliat the true
faith ouglit to be enougli for her to trust in salvation... but is it?
3.2 The second grace: “I desired a bodily sickness”
In tliis respect, the second grace slie liad asked for in her earlier life is also very
interestîng: $he writes:
Contrast this with, for example, what she says in SI 19 “Often our trust is flot complete, for we are flot
certain that almighty God hears us, because of our unworthiness, it seems to us, and because we are feeling
nothing at ail; for often we are as barren and dry after our prayers as we were before
‘ ABBOTT, Christopher, Julian of Norwich: Autobiography and theotogy, NY, D. S. Brewer, 1999, p.
47. Studïes in medieval mysticism 2.
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As to the second grace, there came into my mmd with contrition -- a free gift from
God which I did flot seek — a desire of my will to have by God’s gift a bodily
sickness, and I wished it to be so severe that it might seem mortal, so that I should
in that sickness receive ail the rites which Holy Church had to give me, whist I
myseif should believe that I was dying, and everyone who saw me would think the
same, for I wanted no confort from any human, eartffly life. In this sickness I
wanted to have every kind of pain, bodily and spiritual, which I should have if I
were dying, every fear and assault from devils, and every other kind of pain except
the departure of the spirit, for I hoped that this would be profitable to me when I
should die because I desired soon to be with my God. (ST 1.)
What might be lier reasons, at this earlier period in her life, for wanting a bodily sickness
which would take her to the brink of death — but not over it to actual death, particularly, if,
as she says she desired soon enough to die and “be with my God”? What would she have
been feeling contrition about that it would bring lier to desire to make this request?
She herself acknowledges that this second grace as well as the first were not “an
ordinary petition” (ST 1), i.e., “not the ordinary practice of prayer”( LT 2), witli respect to
what the Church required or necessarily encouraged in its sacramental and ecclesiastically
sanctioned avenues to salvation. But they would not have been uncommon requests in her
social context, for women particularly seeking a more intense religious experience,
particularly if she had had some exposure to movements happening on the Continent. In
Julian’ s case, what she says seems to reflect an early interest in spiritual disciplines for the
sake of having the intensity of the experience itself, and flot necessarily for any expectation
of transformative effect it might have on her sense of being saved, in her relations with
others or even in her relationship with Jesus. Indeed, if she were feeling contrition for
some apparently sinful desire, thought or act on ber part, could lier desire for such an
illness be in effect a desire to languish in the pain and suffering it brouglit lier, perhaps as
some kind of self-imposed penance? In any event, she believed that the experience would
be profitable to lier when she dïed.
Abbott sees in this an “idiosyncratic” and “peculiarly strong seif-dramatizing
instinct”, a sort of desire for “self-separation” from tliose wliose prayer is in tlie common
way, and the pre-visionary “conviction that hers is a speciai case”.2° Abbott summarizes
lis reflections on tlie “psycliologicai and moral dynamic informing” lier early explicit
religions aspiration:
This is a stage of great feeling, of self consciousness and also seif-dramatization, of
struggle and strain. [It] produces a particular focus on hersdjÇ keeping Julian as
agent at tlie centre of the picture. By contrast, tlie showings which follow are
ascribed to the direction [sic] action of God bimself.2’
20 ABBOTT, 1999, pp. 57 - 60.
21 ABBOTf, 1999, p. 60 emphasis added.
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In sum, says Abbott in the same place, the Julian of this picture of her earlier spiritual
aspirations (in ST 1-2 and LI 2-3), is that of a “religious narcissist”. Bauerschmidt makes
a similar thought less explicit observation when he writes that “it is only when Julian
actuaïlybecornes sick that she seems explicitly to connect lier second request to the first,
so that the pain of her bodily sickness becomes part of lier identification with Christ.22
Indeed, if she was lioping actually to die sliortly thereafter, Julian’ s early desire for
a near death experience would explicffly exciude any furtlier motivation for deepened
growth and maturation in lier psycho-spiritual self-understanding or relation to God in
Jesus, in lier service of God, or lier interpersonal relations with others in this world.
Rather, the sickness she had originally desired she teils us, would have availed lier of “ail
the rites which Holy Cliurch liad to give me”. The language she uses liere suggests that
these rites would somehow make lier special, position lier, and increase lier salvation
“insurance” in tlie short term so to speak.
At this point in Julian’ s second request for tlie grace of a bodily illness slie says: “In
this sickness I wanted to have every kind of pain, bodily and spiritual, whicli I should have
if I were dying, every fear and assault from devils, and every otlier kind of pain, except the
departure of the spirit”. (ST 1.) Her intention liere lias again the tone or quality of desiring
an extremely painful challenge not unlilce “extreme sport” afficionados of our own day. f
indeed the athietic analogy can be applied here, it could be suggested that, at a
psychodynamic level, a certain fatalism underlies this kind of life-defying ascetic discipline,
a pessimism about the future condition of, or even about the lilceliliood of continuity or
quality of life in this world. Iliere are, at least, in Julian’ s explicit request to suifer every
kind of pain and fear, certain elements sliared by the contemporaiy youtli’s attraction to
extreme sports: a certain tacit awareness tliat deatli may corne any time soon and a ldnd of
lieroic albeit martyrisli seeking of attention. A more feminine, contemporary example
miglit 5e the kind of woman wlio wants to be first to enter into a field of work which lias
been heretofore dominated by men. It is a challenge which can invite a person to tlie
extremes of feeling overwhelmed and easily brouglit to discouragernent, as well as to
feelings of exhilaration. Julian in lier youth would appear to be driven by desire for
special spiritual knowtedge -- through extreme suffering, tliougli prior to the visions
liere, lier image of wliat she will know by rneans of the challenge is notably quite
controlled, even planned.
Julian continues in tlie Short Text saying tliat in lier request for ail this pain, assault
and fear in lier illness “I lioped this would be profitable to me wlien I should die, because I
22 BAUERSCHMIDT, 1999, p. 39, emphasis added.
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desired soon to be with my God”. Whatever the cause of lier contrition which prompted
lier to ask for this second grace, the text gives the impression of severe discontent with
herseif and lier life on eartli.
At one level, if we consider that there was at that time a general societal fear of
etemal damnation in dying without receiving the sacrament of extreme unction, Julian’ s
already being prepared for deatli well in advance, receiving the last rites pnor to actually
dying and indeed planning the occasion for receiving the last rites before she is even sick,
takes on a rather perfectionistic quality, of wanting to be as prepared for, or as able to
control the (desired) outcomes of the death process as is humanly possible in this life.
At another level, as Bauerschmidt points out, in medieval understanding tlie
reception of extreme unction, understood in that society as tlie anointing of the dying
exclusively, set a person apart from the rest of that society.23 Eamon Duffy writes in this
regard:
It was widely and enoneously believed that the solemn anointing of ail the senses
involved in tlie reception of extreme unction was a sort of ordination or
consecration, cutting the recipient off from the mortal activities of life, even should
they recover. They would have to live thereafter as a sort of animated corpse, as it
was widely thought that “stinking Lazarus” had done after Jesus raised him. Despite
ail the authonties could do to reassure them many lay people believed that an
anointed4person could neyer again eat meat or have sexual relations with bis or lier
spouse.2
Bauerschmidt describes the effect of this anointing as making the person as a “liminal
figure who dwelt on the boundary between this world and the next” and observes tliat this
was a symbolic marginality sliared by anchorites.25 In the Long Text 2 at this point Julian
writes in a somewhat different tone tliat “I wanted to be purged by God’s mercy and
afterward to live more to the worship of God because of that sickness because I lioped that
this would be to my reward wlien I should die because I desired soon to be with my God.”
On the basis of this, Bauerschmidt argues that Julian saw lier reception of the last rites as a
kind of consecration, a symbolic deatli in lier own and lier fellow Christians’ eyes,
preparing her for the anclioritic life. He says
It is impossible to know with our current information when Julïan became an
anchoress, so it is difficuit to know how, if at ail, living such a life of symbolic
death would have affected lier writings. Yet we might say that even if Julian became
an anchoress only relatively late in life, this was in substantial continuity with lier
early desire for bodily sickness to the point of death, and in particular lier desire to
23 BAUERSCHMIDT, 1999, p. 7$.
24DUFFy Eamon, The stripping of the altars: Traditional religion in England c. ]400 — 1580, New
Haven, Yale University Press, 1992, p. 313, emphasis added.
25 BAUERSCHMIDT, 1999, p. 78.
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receive the last rites, which can be read as a desire for the same symbolic liminality
as the anchorite.26
This is an extremely interesting argument. However it is also interesting that B auerschmidt
is flot concemed to compare the Short Text version with the Long Text at this point. In
ST 1 Julian writes simply that when she requested the bodily illness “I hoped that this
would 5e profitable to me when I should die, because I desired soon to 5e with my God”.
There is here no reflection on the gïft of “purgation by God’s mercy” it might bring about,
or the hope that she would “afterward live more to the worship of God because of that
sickness” as in LT 2.
Rather, in SI 1, she seems to be more preoccupied with using the rites of Holy
Church as a means of securing her own personal salvation when she died. An actual death
soon afier, and thus prepared for, would ensure that lier desfre “soon to be with my God”
would be fulfihled. It is tme that in ST 2 slie gives a rather more ambivalent reason for
wanting to go on living after the illness, in order to obtain “more” grace. This will be
discussed further, in tlie section on her service in lier youth.
As Julian describes this second request for the grace of a bodily sickness in lier
early text, she does not seem to have reflected on what lier life afterward in this world
would be like. She seems rather to have had littie intention of being long aflerward in this
world.
I have no doubt tliat the subsequent occurrence of the illness and the reception of
extreme unction at the age of 30 had the effect, as Bauerschmidt suggests, of marking lier
for her vocation, or transforming her understanding of life as an anchoress. But I am not
convinced tliat we can trace in lier outlook on the future in those early years of her pre
visionary spiritual life wlien slie liad made these requests, as Bauerschmidt puts it, a
“continuity with lier early desire for bodily sickness to the point of death... and a desire for
the same symbolic liminality as the anchorite”. That, it seems to me, is wliat her experience
of the visions and lier reflections on them bring about, in a way she could flot liave
anticipated. The differences between ST 1 and LI 2 would argue rather for a lengthy
penod of reflection on and reinterpretation of her early desires, as a resuit of her life
experience and spiritual development subsequent to the writing of the Short Text.
3.2.1 Ihe echo of early childhood viscissitudes?
I propose that less noble, more human traces of lier early viscissitudes in life may
also 5e discemed in what she says about her desire for the bodily illness. I suggest tliat
26 BAUERSCHMIDT, 1999, p. 78.
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what we see here are traces of Julian’s personal and family dynamics at work within the
fourteenth century cultural attitudes toward suffering, extreme unction and death which
Bauerschmidt indicates are part of the backdrop or heritage of her spiritual development.
What miglit we make of lier statement concerrnng lier desire to receive ah the rites
whicli Holy Cliurcli liad to give lier whïle slie thought slie was dyïng, that “everyone who
saw me would think tlie same; for I wanted no comfort from any human, earthly life in that
sickness”? (ST1, LT2.) Slie is concemed liere about what otliers would tliink; that otliers
would think she was dying and therefore flot give lier any comfort. In effect, it could be
suggested tliat she is requesting tlie illness, in part at least, so tliat she wïll experience a
kind of extreme emotional isolation from and abandonment by family and friends, at the
same time as slie would be in a condition of extreme need for comfort and reassurance at
tlie brink of deatli, a situation of isolation which would bring on assault by devils, ah on
top of being in pliysical pain. In Julian’s script of tliis moment “those wlio saw me” would
simply remain emotionally distant.
It is true we know nothing of lier family background. But in psycliodynamic terms,
tliis could possibly be regarded as a kind of impulse to recreate or recapitulate an early
childhood traumatic experience in a critical moment or situation in later life tliat would leave
her isolated, distanced from those around lier. It provokes tlie question: Is there any
evidence in lier texts whicli could support tlie notion tliat Juhian suffered a traumatic
experience of isolation, loss, neglect, or even abandonment at an extremely young age,
when her need for comfort, reassurance, affirmation and compassion would be most
heiglitened? I will explore in a section below wliat Juhian’ s texts say about lier mother,
who was present at the time of Juhian’s illness.
However, at this point I offer some thoughts, inspired by Meissner and otliers, on
wliat psychoanalytic studies sliow of chuldren’s behaviours in response to the death, loss
andJor neglect of a parent. Tlie following is admittedly speculation but based, I liope, on
evidence discerned in Juhian’ s own description of lier pre-visionary self.
Meissner reviews tlie literature and notes Miller’ s research that indicates that a
hus capacity to moum a parental death follows a different path tlian tliat in adults, and
has as its goal “to avoid the acceptance of the reality and emotional meaning of tlie deatli
and to maintain in some internai form the relationship that lias been ended in external
reality”.27 This denial of the finahity of the loss leads to hopeful fantasies of reunion and
idealization of tlie lost parent. Long term sequelae include “acting out symbolic repetitions
27 MILLER, J. B. M., “Children’s reactions to the death ofa parent: A review ofthe literature”, Journal of
the Arnerican psychoanalytic association 19, 1971, pp. 697 - 719.
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of the loss of the parent -- as in attachment to idealized substitute figures or devoflon to
idealized causes -- in an unsuccessflfl attempt to master the trauma of loss.” The child may
develop an identification with the lost parent, and “with the state of death itself, reflecting
an unconscious wish to achieve reunion with the lost parent”.28
Recail that when Julian would have been about five in 1348, the first wave of the
Black Plague wiped out as much as haif of the population in Norwich.29 Since she does
flot speak of her father being present by her deathbed, we may wonder if he had died by the
time she was thirty in 1373. By that time ail three waves of the plague had passed through
Norwich, the third being four years before. If her father had died in her early youth, Julian
may well have been sent away from the family home, to be looked after by a guardian, a
relative or placed in a nunnery. And if Julian’ s family did not have servants, her mother
would have been alone to work and care for her family.3°
Meissner’s description of how chiidren respond to a parent’s death could be said to
bear some resemblance to Julian’s description of her early life of utter and singular
devotion to Christ, such that she desired a bodily siglit of him, and was preoccupied with a
desire for a near mortal illness. Although the present study will flot be exploring
idealization as a psychodynamic process in Julian, the exploration of these resemblances
along those unes does suggest itself as matter for further study. However, if this
speculation as to the possibility that lier father died when she was very young can be
followed, it could well lead to her feeling responsible or guilty for this death, particularly if
she feit close to him. Such is what Martellock argues for example in the case of Cathenne
of Sïena:
Catherine feels guilty and responsible for lier sister’ s death. She reasons that she
loved ber sister more than she loved god and allowed her sister to draw her toward
a worldly life. In Catherine’s mmd, god killed Buonaventura because Cathenne was
sinful. It is flot hard to imagine that other unprocessed losses in lier life -- like that
of lier twin sister -- are also revived and given meaning in this context. “I think that
heli itself was flot enough to punish me.”3’
28 MEISSNER, W. W., Ignatius ofLoyola: The psychology of o saint, New Haven, Yale University Press,
1992, p. 10.
29 This is a statistic recorded in many places. I am drawing on a generai chronology found in DINSHAW,
Carolyn and David WALLACE eds., The Canzbridge companion to medievat wornen ‘s writing, Cambndge,
Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. xv. See aiso the graph in Appendix 1 of this thesis.
° ORME, Nicholas, Medieval chitdren, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2001, pp. 53 - 56.
31 MARTELLOCK, Amy King, She who is flot: A psychobiography of Catherine of Siena using the
theories of D. W. Winnicott, Ps.D. dissertation, Massachusetts school of professional psychology, 2003,
p. 127, citing RAYMOND of CAPUA, The lfe of Catherine of Siena, transi. KEARNS, Conleth,
Wilmington DE, Glazier Press, p. 42.
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Apart from the possibility that her father was lost to her, did Julian suffer a very
early loss of her mother, in some sense, and that this would return as “unprocessed loss”
under any other circumstance of loss or abandonment? Clearly Julian indicates that her
mother was alive when Julian was preparing to die. But consider Jacques Maître’s study,
Mystique etfémininité, which links the devotion to Jesus as mother to the loss of the
mother. Maître observes that
[lia perte de la mère semble avoir joué un rôle chez bien des mystiques. Plusieurs
se sont retrouvés orphelins très précocement (Catherine Labouré, Jean de Dieu [+
1550), Marguerite du Saint-Sacrement, Thérèse d’Avila), d’autres un peu plus tard
(Bernard de Clairvaux, Jean de la Croix). Dans certains cas, une séparation
familiale ou un rejet massif est intervenu durant l’enfance du mystique (Jeanne
Guyon, Marguerite-Marie Alacoque, Marie des Vallées). Je n’ai pas réuni les
données qui permettraient de systématiser davantage ce recensement. Mais on
toucherait vite une limite en se bornant à la matérialité des événements: la façon dont
a été subjectivement vécue la position de l’enfant dans sa constellation d’origine est
le point essentiel.32
In particular, Maître draws on a study by André Green that describes tins subjective
experience as the “complexe de la mère morte”. As Maître describes it
Le complexe de la “mère morte”... ne s’agit pas d’une relation à la mère décédée,
mais d’une déréliction survenue dans l’enfance du sujet, au moment où la mère se
déprime, absorbée qu’ elle est par un deuil. L’ imago maternelle s’ altère alors
brusquement, de sorte que la vitalité heureuse de l’enfant est désormais bloquée
avec la perte d’une relation jusque-là riche et heureuse. Le désinvestissement de
l’objet maternel laisse place à une identification inconsciente avec la “mère morte”.
Pour l’enfant, la perte de sa mère reste inexplicable et la quête du sens perdu induit
désormais une prolifération des capacités fantasmatiques et intellectuelles du Moi à
la recherche de son unité. En même temps peut se développer une culpabilité,
l’enfant ayant l’impression d’avoir perdu par sa propre faute la chaleur maternelle.
Le “complexe de la mère morte” apparaît chez l’enfant dont la mère est
soudain la proie d’une perte dont elle ne parvient pas à faire le deuil, de sorte que
l’enfant est jeté par l’angoisse dans un état de vide parce qu’ill se trouve
inexplicablement privé de son “objet” maternel. La mère n’est pas physiquement
morte, mais elle n’a plus les ressources affectives nécessaires pour investir son
enfant d’une façon qui donne vie à celui-ci.33
Interestingly, Maître compares the effect of this extreme neglect on the infant to the
“agonies primitives”, the “unthinkable anxieties” of falling apart or into emptiness, which
Wiimicott describes.34 And Maître links tins to the experience of women mystics, marked
32 MAÎTRE, Jacques, Mystique etfémininité: Essai de psychanatyse sociohistorique, Paris, Éditions du
Cerf, 1997, pp. 187 - 188.
MAÎTRE, 1997, pp. 189 - 190. See GREEN, André, “Le ‘complexe de la mère morte”, Narcissisme
de vie, narcissisme de mort, Paris, Éditions de Minuit, 1983, ch. 6.
MAîTRE, 1997, p. 191. See WINNICOTT, D. W., “Ego integration in child development”, in The
maturationat processes and the facilitating environment: Studies in the theory of emotional development,
Madison CN, International Uiversities Press, 1965, pp. 56 - 63.
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by a mystical expenence of a “relation fusionnelle manquante”.35 Maître quotes Miche!
Ledoux on characteristic elements of this “relation d’absence”:
Tout ce qui était exprimé venait s’inscrire dans le registre archaïque de la relation
fiisionnelle dont le prototype est celle qui s’instaure à l’origine entre la mère et
l’enfant. Union, fusion dans l’indéterminé, absence de limites, de frontières
précises entre moi et l’autre, fusion qui peut aller jusqu’ à l’interchangeabilité des
positions “subjectives” entre les deux partenaires de la relation.36
Historically, this psychodynamic complex could be related to the more systemic
question as to how mothers in the late middle ages related to their children.
The infant mortality rate was very high in the Middle ages, such that families,
despite the large number of births, had an average of only two to three children who
survived to adulthood. In the time of the plague, the mortality rate was even higher. There
are differing opinions on the effect of the high rate of infant mortality on medieval attitudes
toward children. Ariès, Shorter and DeMause held a negative and pessimistic view of
childhood in the medieval world, described, in Shorter’s words as “matemal indifference”;
DeMause saw the l4th century as the point at which an “abandoning mode” began to shift
into an “ambivalent mode” of childrearing.37 More recently, these extreme negative views
have been challenged.38 While Nicholas Orme for example wants to argue that medieval
parents regarded their cbildren with more attachment and sympathy than this, lie does not
deny however “that many children died young, ah lived closely together with adu!ts, and
most were sent away from home in youth to school or to service in other people’s
bouses”.39 Moreover, none of these authors distinguishes between how male and female
children might have fared.
Depending on the class into which Julian was bom, lier family might have had
servants, and if so, she would have had a wet nurse in lier infancy.4° So in any event, it is
quite conceivable tliat Julian’ s mother was flot emotionally close to her daughter. It is
conceivable tliat Julian was an only surviving child in lier nuclear family. Although in the
MAÎTRE, 1997, p. 185.
36 LEDOUX, Michel, “La relation d’absence”, Résurgences et dérivés de ta mystique, Nouvelle revue de
psychanalyse 20, 1980, p. 239.
ARIÈS, Philippe, L’enfant et la vie familiale sous l’ancien régime, Paris, Seuil, 1973, 316 p.;
SHORTER, E., The inaking ofthe modernfamily, NY, Basic Books, 1975, 368 p.; DEMAUSE, Lloyd,
“The evolution of childhood”, History of childhood quarterly, 1974, 1, pp. 503 - 606.
GIES, Frances and Joseph GIES, Marnage and thefamily in the middle ages, NY, Harper and Row,
1987, 372 p.
ORME, 2001, p. 4.
4° See the studies of fîfteenth century women’s occupations related 10 female biology: wet nurses and
midwives, in HANAWALT, Barbara, ed., Wonzen and work in preindustrial Europe, Bloomington, Indiana
University Press, 1986, chapters 5 and 6.
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Middle ages, unlike today, she would flot have lived in social isolation, it is conceivable
that her early childhood was experienced in this way.
Meissner also observes the climcal symptoms of those who have been deprived of
maternai care at an early age, or who have suffered the death of a parent. “The most
noteworthy sequela of early parental depnvation is the tendency to depression that can
afflict the individual throughout life.... There may be long-term narcissistic difficulties
involving issues of self-esteem regulation and the prolongation of infantile narcissistic
grandïosity.”4’
Meissner is applying these clinical psychological findings to the boyhood life of
Ignatius of Loyola. How would they apply more specifically to a young girl, lilce Julian?
Recent literature on gender and narcissism has refined the data on differences
between infant male and female chiidren in relation to their mothers. Philipson for example
has noted how boys develop a sense of separateness and an appearance of autonomy from
the mother, which may be a narcissistic defense against vulnerability and dependency and
display the classical narcissistic traits of grandiosity. Girls on the other hand identify with
their mothers, so that ego boundaries are more permeable and defined in terms of
relationality rather than autonomy, and so female narcissism may present itself under the
guise of overinvesting and overidentifying with the mother and then others.42 Likewise,
when the littie girl moves toward separation from the mother, if the mother is unable to
tolerate this, this is likely to increase the female child’s separation anxiety. This is
compounded by cultural expectations that compel yet devalue a submissive relational style
in women.43
Rossiter’ s recent thesis draws this matenal together to paint a portrait of feminine
narcissism, which, because of cultural expectations of women, has been difficult to
separate out from feminine virtues; indeed the subject itself has suffered systemic neglect.
What ïs distinctive in that portrait, however, is the degree of controlling behaviour (a
masked form of grandiosity) exerted in relationships in which the woman feels compelled
to over-rely on others for a sense of self cohesion, often at the expense of her own needs
and desires, to avoid feelings of abandonment (shame).44
And, to ask the more significant feminist question for this study as a whole, to what
extent would these effects on the infant Julian be ampÏfied in a context of systemic societal
41 MEISSNER, W. W., 1992, p. 427.
42 PHILIPSON, Ilene, “Gender and narcïssism”, Psychology of women quarterty 9, 1985, pp. 213 - 228.
‘ BENJAMIN, Jessica, The bonds of love, NY, Pantheon, 1988, ch. 3.
ROSSITER, Stanford Kent, Narcissisrn and codependency, Ph.D. dissertation, The Wright Institute,
2004, pp. 56, 63 - 73.
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neglect of females as chiidren and as aduit women? Renée Neu Watkins speaks of the
“holy seif-hate” which was so prevalent among women religious figures in the late middle
ages, such as Catherine of Siena and Angela of Folïgno, and for which choosing to suffer
was the only means of transformation open to them. Watldns writes: “Angela had wished
to overcome lier former character, which, as she saw it, was that of a vain, gluttonous,
petty, smug, hypocritical ‘good’ woman. And what else made Julian desire an illness tliat
would make lier believe she was dying?”45
Tliese speculations could perliaps account for some of the attitudes and pattems I
liave observed in Julian’ s self-description thus far. It is conceivable that Julian’ s religious
aspirations in her early life were marked by a perfectionistic tendency to want to control tlie
outcome of lier experiences, in the sense of repeatedly acting out an unresolved issue of
loss in lier childliood. If so, I suggest tliat tlie pre-visionary Julian had flot yet become
“acquainted with grief’ in the sense of liavïng come consciously to terms with mourning
tlie uncontrollable personal losses in lier life. But an early scenario of maternai deprivation
in Julian’s life, such as lias been suggested liere, could provide a basis for a preoccupation
witli lierseif, witli an ambivalent desire for deatli and witli being set apart, or isolated, as a
special case.
Her early preoccupation with wanting to serve God scrupulously and obediently, I
suggest, would reveal a person as yet quite uneasy in the liminal space wliicli describes tlie
experience of mouming, and the open-ended loss of meaning it entails, when it is allowed
to be fully embraced. In my reading of the launching of tlie visions, it is tlieir very
uncontrollability which signais an unprecedented shift in Julian’s religious experience.
3.3 The third grace: “I desired three wounds”
Julian’ s tliird request for grace in this snapshot of lier earlier life whicli she offers
lier reader, was to receive three wounds “tlie wound of contrition, tlie wound of
‘ WATKINS, Renée Neu, “Two women visïonaries and death: Catherine of Siena and Julian of Norwich”,
Numen: International review for the history of religions 30, 1983, P. 185. For object relations
psychologicai studies of women from a more recent era in Chnstian history see for example GIUGLIANO,
Robert, “Separation, loss and longing in the infancy and early childhood of St. Thérèse of the child Jesus
and the holy face”, Studies in spirituality 14, 2004, pp. 225 - 253. Emily Dickinson has also been the
focus of studies from an object relations perspective, which take up questions of maternai deprivation at an
eariy age to account in some measure for her tendency to isolate in reciusion and to find greater meaning in
the Lord and the world of poetry than in people. See for exampies, ROGERS, Robert, “The sequestered self
of Emily Dickinson”, in Sefand other: Object relations in psychoanalysis and literature, NY, New York
University Press, 1991, pp. 136 - 158; and ALEXANDERSON, Gun, “You cannot solder an Abyss with
air: Traces of early relationship to mother in the life and poetry of Emily Dickinson”, The Scandinavian
psychoanalytic review 26, 2003, pp. 151 - 162.
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compassion and the wound of longing with my will for God”. (ST1, LT2.)
Recali that Denise Baker argues, on the basis of a comparison of Julian’ s text with
Aefred of Rielvaulx’ s De institutione inclusarum, that Julian’ s third request for the grace
of tbree wounds reflects exactly tlie three stage tradition of spiritual development, a
progression from the affective (contrition), to the moral (compassion), to the contemplative
(longing with the will for God) 46 Since these practices as applied to the laity in England
by the late l4th century would only have included the first two stages, Julian’s third wound
of longing for God, a prayer for mystical union, would flot be customarily practised by the
laity.47 This leads Baker to think that Julian was in some kind of vowed life, whether as
nun or anchoress, prior to her visions.48 At least it suggests she was aspiring in some
sense to such heights.49
The impetus for this request for the three wounds came to her, she says in ST 1,
after hearing “a man of Holy Churcli teil the story of St. Cecilia and from his explanation I
understood that slie received three wounds in the neck from a sword, tlirough which she
suffered death”.
Julian’ s request here in $T 1 is framed in the context of a desire to take on the
qualities of a martyr, like St Cecilia, perhaps so that lier own deatli (physical andJor
spiritual) miglit corne tlirougli these tliree spiritual wounds, as did St. Cecilia’s through her
actual neck wounds.
Here in the Short text version, is it possible to see this request in more
psychodynamic terms as allied with the otlier two graces wliich she asked for, in rendering
lier “perfectly” prepared for death, and thus further insuring lier salvation by the
ecclesiastical means available to lier? So far from “trusting in salvation” as slie later came
to leam what this rneant by lier experience of its absence in despair, lier early motivation
may have liad tlie as yet unpurged undertone of wanting to insure lier salvation in the next
world by controlling every means available to lier in tliis world in lier service of God.
46 BAKER, Denise N., “Julian of Norwich and anchoritic literature”, Mystics quarterty 19, 4, 1993, pp.
153 - 154, 158.
BAKER, 1993, pp. 154-155, 158. Here, Baker draws on the work of Elizabeth Salter’s survey of Latin
and vernacular devotional texts, from the 1 lth through the lSth centuries, showing that “systematic
meditation originally followed this three-stage progression from the affective, to the moral, to the
contemplative” as practised by religious and anchorites, but as meditation became more popular with the
laity, “the final goal of contemplation was omitted”. See SALTER, Elizabeth, “Nicholas Love’s Myrrour
of the blessed lyfofJesu Christ”, cd. HOGG, James, Institut f(ir englische Sprache und Literatur, Salzburg,
Universitiit Salzburg 1974, pp. 134, 172 - 178, Analecta cartusiana 10.
48 BAKER, 1993, p. 158. Baker’s conclusion is cautious, that “prior to ber visionary experience of 1373,
she was familiar with tenets of medieval spirituality identified with vowed religious, including anchorites”.
See Julian’s own identification with those who would live contemplatively in ST 4 and 13.
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The LT 2 description of her intention in requesting the grace of these three wounds,
on the other hand, is more general, omitting the oblique reference to the preacher from
whom she received the teaching. “As to the third, by the grace of God and the teaching of
Holy Churcli I conceived a great desire to receive three wounds in my life, that is the
wound of true contrition, the wound of loving compassion and the wound of longing with
my will for God”. It strikes me that the suppression here in the Long Text of lier
enthusiasm for the stoiy of St. Cecilia’ s martyrdom and its clerical source, and the
attribution of this desire first to the grace of God and then to the general teaching of Holy
Church, reflects the intervening years of having lived a ldnd of green martyrdom in the
anchorhold, a mellowing of her experiential familiarity both with the anchoritic life and
with the process of dying to the false self in the spiritual life. Perhaps it could be said to
reflect a growth in Julian’ s capacity to relinquish her self-preoccupation with needing to
control the outcome of lier efforts to insure personal salvation.
In Ellen Ross’ study of the function of suffering in Julian of Norwich and Margeiy
Kempe, she draws on these three graces of response to suffering that is, contrition,
compassion and longing, to argue that “suffering functions... as a part of the process by
which the human person leams to perceive God as love. The experience of pain ftnctions
as a way to God...[Tlhe believer’s Jesus-identified ernotional and physical suffering is flot
an end in itself’.5° She argues on p. 51 that Julian and Margery
do flot linger over cataloguing the varieties of sufferings that plague humans
because they are flot interested in the pain that accompanies discipleship for its own
sake.... The physical suffering that may corne readily to a contemporary person’ s
nilnd was often far from what the most important suffering was about.... The
suffering that most concems these figures is the physical and emotional (including
mmd and affections) anguisli that ernerges in their relationship to God”.
Suffering in each of these three “progressive stages correlates with the process of
coming to understand that the Christ who suffered is God”, as in LT 20 where Julian says
“the most important point to apprehend in his Passion is to meditate and corne to see that lie
who suffered is God...” though this is not in the Short Text.
Ross describes the kind of suffering associated with each of these stages.
Contrition or compunction, associated with confession, had a long and varied
history in the medieval tradition. Compunction, as Gregory the Great had described it, had
° ROSS, Ellen, “She wept and cried right loud for sorrow and for pain’: Suffenng, the spiritual journey,
and women’s experience in late medieval mysticism”, in Maps offtesh and light: The religious experience
ofmedievat wornen rnystics, ed. WIETHAU$, Ulrike, Syracuse NY, $yracuse University Press, 1993, pp.
49 - 50. See also BURROWS, Mark, “Yett he sufferyth with us’: Divine asceticism in Julian of
Norwich’s Revelation of love”, Studies in spirituality, 7, 1997, p. 111.
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two forms: the compunction of fear was feit first and later on, compunction of love.51 But
by the fourteenth century, with the rise of a more personal, affective devotion to the
suffering and humanity of Christ, the prior preoccupation with the eschatological aspects of
compunction were obscured.52 As was observed earlier, the Meditationes vitae Christi
and other aids encouraged enthusiastic devotion by means of imaginative meditations on the
Passion, with the individual as engaged participant. The bodily sufferings and agonies of
Christ were understood to be caused by the sinner, and these meditations served to focus
the individual on his own sinfulness and unworthiness.
Julian reftects the widespread notion of umversal guilt for the sufferings of Christ
and the mouming it should cause: “We have now matter for mouming, for our sin is the
cause of Christ’s pains”. (LT 52.)
Ross acknowledges the close association of contrition with confession and penance
since the fourth Lateran Council of 1215 and acknowledges the stmggle with scmples this
tended to produce in religious persons. Also, anchontic spirituality did not place
importance on extemal penance, but rather interiorized contrition and compunction.53
Presumably this could compound a sense of scrupulosity. Ross holds that Julian did not
51 Gregory writes:
When [the penitentJ considers his sins he is overcome with weeping because he fears eternal
punishment. Then when his fear subsides through prolonged sorrow and penance, a feeling of
secunty emerges from an assurance of forgiveness, and the soul begins to bum with a love for
heaveniy joys. Now the same person who wept out of fear of punishment, sheds abundant tears
because his entrance into the kingdom of heaven is being delayed. Once we envision the choirs of
angels, and fix our gaze on the company of the saints and the majesty of an endless vision of God,
the thought of having no part in these joys makes us weep more bitterly than the fear of heil and
the prospect of eternal misery did before. Thus, the compunction of fear, when perfect, leads the
sou! to the compunction of love.
GREGORY THE GREAT, St. Dialogues, transi. ZIMMERMAN, Odo John, Washington DC, Catholic
University of America Press, 1959, pp. 173 - 174. fathers of the church 39.
52 As McEntire observes of the doctrine of compunction:
A consideration of mourning, weeping and personal sinfiilness seems a morbid preoccupation for
the modem. But from the earliest days of Christianity, weeping and mouming were central to the
daily spirituality of the saints, East and West. The Desert Fathers and the great fathers of the
Church focused their attention on the importance of salvation and eternal life. This concem with
salvation gave nse to the essential teachings about compunction or gratia tachrymarum. Initiaiiy
found and nurtured within a monastic context, compunctio cordis came to the attention of the
public at large through sermons and devotional texts in the vernacular languages. In England, in
particular, the documents attest to the evolution of the doctrine from its traditiona! patristic
foundations to a more enthusiastic, personalised spirituality in the thirteenth and fourteenth
centuries.
McENTIRE, Sandra, “The doctrine of compunction from Bede to Margery Kempe”, in The medieval
mysticat tradition in England, ed. GLASSCOE, Marion, Cambridge, D. S. Brewer, 1987, pp. 77; 84.
Exeter symposium IV.
See GEORGIANNA, Linda, The solitary sef Individuality in the ‘Ancrene wisse’, Cambridge MA,
Harvard University Press, 1981, chapter 3.
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seem to have suffered the affliction of scruples.54 The assumption here, as with many
interpreters of Julian, is that she was too spiritually mature and balanced for this affliction.
Stiil, the effect of scmples is to lead to despair. Could it be that Julian’ s relative silence
(compared to Margery Kernpe’s loud and demonstrative displays of contrition) has as much
to do with a narcissist’ s hypersensitivity to criticism and desire to avoïd feeling shame and
despair, as it does to a spiritual restraint and matunty hard won? As we’ll see below,
shame and despair are pervasive conditions of her soul with which Julian must corne to
terrns. Indeed, they are her core states which are in need of redemption. But she does not
corne easily to recognize them.
Ross allows that since contrition was explicitly associated with sin and its healing,
both the recognition of the sin (sonow and sharne) and the penance for it (physical illness,
sonow, or the world’s contempt) could be painful. “Suffering functions both as a signal
and as a response to the presence of sin”.55
Compassion as a kind of suffering cornes into play, says Ross, when a person
experiences the depth of their love for Christ, identifying with, and thus suffering with
Christ’s pains as a participation in Christ’s salvific work. Christ suffered on account of
human sin, as so much of late medieval devotional matenal emphasized. But Ross also
acknowledges that in Julian, Christ also suffered in compassion for human sorrow and
anguish at his suffering.56 The effect of this compassion, or suffering with, Christ’s
compassionate suffering is to increase love for Christ and enlarge the believer’ s capacity to
have compassion on others. (ST 13, LT 28.)
Longing has its own form of suffering, as a response to Christ’s longing tbirst for
hurnanïty to be reunited with God. “The longing for the joy made possible by Christ’s
suffering creates its own pain of desire which cari be satisfied only after this life”.57
For the present, I propose in the latter part of the following section simply to pose
certain questions from a self psychological perspective to Julian’ s texts concerning the first
ROSS, 1993, p. 53.
ROSS 1993, p. 54, emphasis added.
56 ROSS, 1993, p. 56. This text, found in LT 20, however, is a passage flot present in the Short Text. As
Burrows’ article argues “how Julian retated human and divine suffering [isj through a Chnstotogical mode!
that is apparent!y without precedent in the medieva! schoo!s... one that locates suffering as a continuing
dimension of askesis in Jesus, and thus in God”. Burrows also shows that this development is much more
present in the Long Text and hinges on the centra! point that “Jesus’s suffering did flot end with bis
crucificxion but continued beyond his death” in Jesus’ thirst. BURROWS, 1997. p. 104.ROSS, 1993, p. 58. This corresponds to the eschatological “compunction of love” identified by Gregory
the Great in McEntire’s article cited above.
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of these forms of suffering primarily, that is the two-edged sword of suffering associated
with contrition, which functions both as a signal and as a response to the presence of sin.
3.3.1 More echoes of the psychoanalytic profile of the
pre-visionary Julian?
To retum to the pre-visionary Julian: what might this une of interpretation of lier
two accounts of these early requests for grace further suggest about the antecedent pattems
of lier psychological makeup whicli contributed to Julian’s ardent spiritual search? Are any
early childhoood dynamics discernable in the marks of lier personality left behind in these
particularly personal historical references? Are there any signs of other influences of a
remedial or compensatory nature?
At what early age did she have the desire to ask for these three graces, which by ail
accounts are signs of a precociously intense intenority and spiritual search and draw on
some familiarity with the affective contemplative resources of her day? She says in both
texts that “I desired soon to be with my God”, by which it seems she means to die. But
she also says that “When I was young I desired to have that sickness wlien I was thirty
years old”. (I am flot aware of any cultural significance this age might have liad.) $o there
is an ambivalence here: a desire to die and “be with my God” on the one hand, and on the
other, to have a special spiritual expenence predicated on nearly dying (but flot quite) when
she reached the age of thirty. Can we ask whether there is evidence to suggest that Julian’ s
request for these graces took place much earlier in lier youth than just before she turned
thirty? Certainly the way she says it, it sounds like “when I was young” was many years
before she turned thirty. Is she picturing, at that early age, two contradictory futures in
effect: one in which a life of suffering in this world would corne to a speedy resolution
through death and anticipated union with God; the other in which some as yet hypothetical
spiritual experience through heiglitened suffering was desired? What was lier early
personal experience of suffering which caused her ambivalently to want to die, and yet also
to desire its resolution through a spirituality predicated on suffering? I suggest that,
whatever was the trauma of parental loss and neglect Julian suffered in her early years, it is
possible to trace in this cultural preoccupation with suffenng an ambivalent personal thread
of unresolved identification with the parental loss, and “with the state of deatli itself
reflecting an unconscious wish to achieve reunion with the lost parent”.58
MEISSNER, w. w., 1992, p. 10.
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What we have observed so far of lier youthful, pre-visionary personality is lier
desire to be, as Abbott puts it, a “special case”, preoccupied with personal expectations of
attaining heiglits of perfection and personal salvation, an extreme sport atifiete in the ascetic
life. Kohut would see the narcissistic need to feel “special” as an incidence of grandiosity.
The unconscious psychological suffering associated with the other spiit off pole of
narcissism is a profound sense of isolation, despair and shame. In this coincidence of
ambivalent desires around death, the pre-visonary Julian, I suggest, is crying out of a
primary sense of isolation; living out at once a tendency to desire to avoid (disdain?) the
society of others, and a sense of helplessness as to how to address or resolve the
loneliness, distress and isolation which this tendency produces. Ibis trace of a
psychological pattem, wbicli I am proposing we see in the early Julian tbrough these texts,
is toward non-relationality, a seeking to be self-sufficient at the expense of neyer knowing
loving acceptance or comfort in human relationships. I suggest this “trace” represents a
psychological coping mechanism from a very early age, an age when lier need for matemal
affirmation and mirroring was strong, but chronically unfulfilled. It may also represent a
denial of grief around this unmet need. I propose tliat this was the psycliological pattem
which contributed to lier early attraction to the contemplative life and prayer disciplines, and
at the same time, to her experiencing anxiety with regard to this same vocation. Recall
Jantzen’ s observation that tlie vocation to the ancliontic life was seen as the higliest and
most individualistic of vocations (certainly among tlie options open to women). Thus
perfectionism, isolating egocentricity and ambivalence around mouming early losses, could
be seen as possible tendencies in Julian’s early personal bistory.
Given, as we saw above, tliat suffering and sorrowing are omnipresent in late
medieval spirituality and particularly in the experience of contrition and prenance for sin,
wliat personal psycliodynamics brought on suffering in Julian for whicli slie would seek
understanding in the spiritual tradition available to lier? How did tlie pre-visionary Julian
understand sin? As will become evident in this study, sin is the problem for Julian.59 In
ST 13 Julian expresses a prior wisli that God miglit have prevented sin altogetlier. Is it
possible tliat Julian resisted feeling contrition for pain whicli liad no apparent sinflfl cause?
Did she feel ambivalent around what constituted sin for winch contrition would be
appropriate? Recall the narcissist’ s apparent disregard for moralism (pre-oedipal): the
narcissist’s issues are flot around guilt but around shame.6° Ross observes on p. 53 that
59JANTZEN, Grace, Julian ofNonvich: Mystic and theologian, London: SPCK, 1987, p. 167.
60 See KOHUT, Heinz, The restoration ofthe setj Madison CN, International Universities Press, 1977,
pp. 132 - 133; also CAPPS, Donald, The depleted self $in in a narcissistic age, Minneapolis MN,
Fortress, 1993, pp. 67 - 68 and 98 - 99.
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“meditation on sinftlness alone can lead to despair”. We may ask whether the shame and
sorrow which the believer was supposed to feel in contrition and in repentance, became,
for Julian, a form of suffering marked by unrelenting despair. If so, would it be so
surprising that the Christ of Julian’ s visions suffers compassion for suffering humanfty,
which is so in need of what Kohut lias called empathy, if, somehow she received that
empatliy from some source?
I want to propose in the following section that Julian does show signs of having
received some compensatory relational experience for this emotional absence of mirroring
in lier early life, through the formai means of spiritual counsel or direction as distinct from
sacramental confession.
3.3.2 Evidence of spiritual counsel
Julian teils in both texts tliat while she asked for the first two graces conditionally,
she asked for the third grace without any condition. Because the first two were not
ordinary petitions, she had said
Lord, you know what I want. If it be your will that I have it, grant it to me, and if it
be flot your will, good Lord, do not be displeased, for I want nothing which you do
flot want.... The first two desires which I mentioned passed from my mmd, and
the third remained there continually. (ST 1.)
We have already observed that England was theologically much more cautious than
the Continent with regard to encouraging visionary experience by the late l4th century.
And as is well attested historically, women were regarded as especially vuinerable by
nature to deception if special requests for personal spiritual experiences were pursued;
hence the writing and practice of “scripted visions” to ensure the orthodoxy of their
products. Oversight, instruction, guidance in these matters were ail essential prerequisites
for women. The text here is unchanged in the Short Text and the Long Text, putting the
emphasis on obedience to the Lord’ s will. Julian strikes me as a deeply teachable spirit,
craving instruction and guidance in the spiritual life, in an attempt perliaps to fil the
ernotional void of self within, and perliaps also as a means of seeking to corne out of
isolation. Again, this study will flot pursue the need for idealization in Julian’s personal
history, but her obedience to the counsel of confessors and religious suggests that tliey may
well have functioned as objects of idealization. The potential, remedial mirroring function
of such religious figures in lier life, however, is what I am seeking to address here.
This text conceming the request for the three graces lias been used as evidence to
suggest that Julian was well versed in the affective devotion and contemplative traditions of
the vemacular theology of the late middle ages. Stiil, what are we to make of lier saying
that the first two desires, flot being ordinary petitions, “passed from her mmd”? We may
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well imagine that in sharing these prayer requests with her spiritual counsel, she was likely
discouraged from pursuing desires which would encourage her in seeking “extraordinary”
visionary or bodily experiences for their own sake. Perhaps that counsellor saw that lier
tendencies needed to 5e balanced by a greater attention to the “ordinary” teaching and
society of tlie Church. Even so, I suggest ït is unlikely tliat these two desires passed from
lier mmd very quickly. Ratlier, it would seem to me that if tliese requests were in some
sense Julian’ s spiritualized attempt to respond to early infant experiences of loss or neglect,
then some lengthy period of time elapsed dunng which she revised and accepted the
reduced goals to be set for lier spiritual quest. This would favour the view tliat lier request
for tlie three graces took place in lier youtli, many years before slie tumed tliirty.
It is clear from ail this tliat slie received spiritual counsel. Her text attests to her
being in a pattem of seeking sacramental absolution regularly. (LT 66.) Recent feminist
scliolarship lias tended to put emphasis on the “policing” nature of tliese formai
relationships, and I am not denying tliis as a determining feature of lier social location.6’
Wliat has not to my knowledge been proposed is that tlie relationship witli a spiritual
advisor miglit liave liad a profound psycliological compensatory effect, whicli will be
explored further below.
4.0 Her service and labour in lier youth
At ST$ / LT14 Julian teils us that the Jesus of lier visions says to lier “I tliank you
for your service and your labour, and especially in your youth”. Tliis is the first word that
the Jesus of lier visions addresses to lier directly. It is significant here in tliat it speaks of
the most significant service and labour slie feit slie carned out in lier early life, since it is
that which this dialoguing Jesus identifies as worthy of thanks.
What was this service and labour? This direct speecli follows on wliat she sees at
tliat point to be the labour of Jesus Christ, lis Passion and death, by which the fiend (tlie
devil) is overcome. She says tliat this deed was accomplished by our Lord “in great earnest
and witli lieavy labour”. (ST 8, LT 13.) There is reason, then, to suppose tliat there might
be some parallel in wliat Julian means by lier service and labour as liaving entailed great
suffering, and Jesus’ own labour, sucli that tlie Lord speaks to lier to thank her for it.
Slie goes on to describe the reward for this service in more detail in tlie “tliree
degrees of bliss” wliicli God sliowed lier. (ST 9, LT 14.) The first is to receive tlianks
61 See RIDDY, felicity, “‘Women taiking about the things of God’: a late medieval sub-culture”, in
Wornen and literature in Britain, 1150 - 1500, eU. MEALE, Carol, Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 1993, pp. 104 - 127; and GILMORE, Leigh, Autobiographics: A feminist theory of women’s self
representation, London, Corneil University Press, 1994, pp. 106 - 120.
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from the Lord for voluntarily serving God, when one is delivered from pain, “for it
seemed to me that ail the pain and labour which ail living men might endure could flot eam
the thanks that one man will have who has voluntarily served God”. The second degree of
bliss makes known a soul’s service to ah who are in lieaven. Could this suggest that
perhaps that she felt the service she speaks of was flot recognized or affinned? In that
showing she then saw that every person “will be rewarded for his voluntary service and for
the time that he lias served, and especially tlie age of those who voluntarily and freely offer
their youtli to God is fittingly rewarded and wonderfully tlianked”. (ST9, LT 14) The third
degree of bliss is the security that it will last without end.
As Watson and Jenldns see it, the “three degrees” probably refer to “three states of
life” or “spiritual estates” of spouse, widow and virgin, eacli of wliom was thouglit to
bring forth “bliss’ that corresponds to the yield of the fruitful seed in the parable of the
sower (Matt. 13:3 - 8)”. In that logic, Julian’s receiving ail three degrees of bliss would
argue for lier pnor state of life to have been as a virgin, whether religious or enclosed
laywoman. They hold that the young Julian was a nun and that tlie service of lier youtli is
“a commendation either of Juhian’ s life of devotion before tlie revelation, or perhaps of the
three youthful requests to God described in Cliapter 2”, i.e., ST 1, LI 2.62
We can fairly assume that in the third person, she is writing of lier own commitment
from an early age to “offering lier youth to God” and serving tlie Lord in a life of prayer
and devotion. Tndeed, this revelation reaffinns a belief slie seems already to have liad early
on, that God takes note of the age of the person who thus voluntarily offers youth and
service to God. This would count as fairly strong evidence for tlie view that, regardless of
tlie particulars of lier early state of life (wliether as religious or pious lay woman), Julian
from a very early age was drawn to a life of prayer and devotion and possible virginity, and
that there was a sense that this would be especially wehl regarded and rewarded by God,
sucli tliat she could “trust” in salvation, by lier good works in this service.63 Watson and
Jenkins also observe tlie traces of a medieval behief tliat reward in lieaven for service to
God accumulated with long life:
The logic here, which tlie Middle English poem Peart goes to lengtlis to deny, is
that long life gives more opportunities for good works, which lead to greater
heavenly reward. Rev 14.23 - 30 [LI 14] also seems to assume this cumulative
idea of reward, again associated with Juhian’s early hife.64
62 WATSON and JENKINS, 2006, pp. 78 and 172.
63 This would argue against Benedicta Ward’s hypothesis that Julian’s service was as a wife and mother.
WARD, Benedicta, “Julian the solitary”, in Jutian reconsidered, eds. LEECH, Kenneth and Benedicta
WARD, Oxford, Fairacres, 1988, pp. li - 31.
M WATSON and JENKJNS, 2006, p. 130, commenting on ST2 and LT3.
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Perhaps this belief, that lier service and the graces it would procure were quantitatively
related, contributed to her anxiety around wanting botli to die and yet only to corne to tlie
brink of death, so as to liave received more grace in this life before entering heaven.
The evidence thus interpreted seems to me to coalesce in the picture of Julian as a
young person of perfectionistic religious aspirations whicli she and others saw as service to
God. The suffering associated with lier high expectations of herseif in this service would
in tliat case be intensified by her personal ambivalence around whether to live or die.
Moreover, if there was indeed a culturally imposed sense of uncertainty, particularly as a
woman, as to whetlier or to wliat degree tliis service would be rewarded by God, it would
generate considerable unconscïous anxiety: Despite ail lier service, could slie trust in
salvation?
In LT 14 only, Julian expands lier account of tlie bliss to be had from being tlianked
for one’s service to God with tlie inclusion of an “example” of tlie Lord God as lord in bis
own house, calling lis friends to a feast “gladdening and consoling lis dear friends with
liimself, very familiarly and courteously....” And again, tliat “If a king thank bis subjects,
it is a great honour for them; and if lie make this known to ail the kingdom, then their
lionour is mudli increased”. Her service, would seem to be associated with an experience of
“bliss” (personified perhaps in a relationship of accountability to a religious authority or
counsellor which lias deepened over the intervening years?) in whidh she anticipated only
to have “courteous” relations, but was treated witli unexpected (non-abusive) “familiarity”
and consolation. I am wondering wliether this could reflect an underlying psychodynamic
factor wliich found expression in the striking and unprecedented visionaiy juxtaposition of
“homeliness” witli “courtesy” in lier visions of Christ.65 Specifically, could tliis suggest
tliat what whiff of affirmation slie so longed for through lier rigourous service came, flot
from her nuclear familial circle, perliaps not even from a circle of peers,66 but frorn a far
more unlikely source: clerical andlor monastic person(s) who, as spiritual father(s)
encouraged and directed lier in lier religious aspirations? Tliis is putting a new, more
psychobiographical twist on Colledge and Walsli’s argument tliat Julian “must, early in
life, liave attracted the benevolent attention of some scholar or sdholars who perceived her
spiritual and intellectual gifts, and passed on to her the learning of the sdliools”.67 In lier
early years, I propose, tliis hunger for affirmation and mirroring drew Julian to seek from
See Anna Maria REYNOLDS, “Courtesy’ and ‘homeliness’ in the Revelations of Julian of Norwich”,
Thefourteenth century English mystics newstetter 2, 1979, pp. 12 - 20.
66 Recent feminist theorists have argued for this idea ofa late medieval women’s reading circle to account
for their knowledge of spiritual writings. See RIDDY, 1993, pp. 104 - 127.
67 COLLEDGE Edmund and lames WALSH, eds., A book of showings to the anchoress Julian ofNorwich,
Toronto, Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1978a, p. 45.
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such a source a kind of “bliss” which miglit be understood as the subjective feeling tone of
an as yet immature mirroring need expressed in terms of narcissistic grandiosity.
5.0 Significant identified relationshïps
5.1 Julian’s mother
In the Short Text, at the point when Julian says she wanted those who were with
lier to think she was dying so that they would flot offer any consolation, Julian includes
observations of her mother’ s presence and actions at Julian’ s deathbed. This reference is
suppressed in the LT, and in neither text is there any identification of the “others” at lier
side as being members of lier family. In ST 10 Julian lias begun to have the visions of the
liead of Christ on the crucifix bleeding. But she makes this reference to wliat was going on
in tlie room around her at this same time:
My mother, who was standing there with the others, held up lier hand in front of
my face to close my eyes, for she thought tliat I was already dead or had that
moment died; and this greatly increased my sonow for despite ail my pains, I did
not want to be hindered from seeing, because of my love for [ChristJ. (ST 10.)
Elisabeth Koemg disagreed with previous (and some subsequent) commentators
who had supposed that Julian’s relationship with her birth motlier must have been a rich
and fulfihling one, such that Julian was able to describe God as mother witli sucli depth and
beauty.68 Rather, using object relations theory, Koenig builds a strong psycliohistorical
case from Julian’ s texts that lier relationship with her birth mother was flot satisfying;
indeed that it could be said to have left Julian in a condition of narcissistic rage. I quote
here only her conclusion regarding this one reference to Julian’s motlier in ST1O:
Julian’s mother, in the only glimpse we have of lier, is non-empathic to the degree
that she thinks lier daughter is dead when, in tmtli, Julian is feeling great pain and
great desire to continue looking at tlie face of tlie crucifix, and lier mother’ s action
causes lier sorrow. Julian does not include this passage in the Long Text. Could
this mean that tlirougli lier twenty years’ reflection on tlie parable slie lias learned to
love and tlierefore lias forgiven lier motlier?69
What at least is evident is tliat what Julian thought would be the case -- i.e., that
others would think slie was dying and tlierefore offer no comfort -- seems to liold tme witli
68 See for examples, KNOWLES, David, The Engtish mysticat tradition, NY, Harper and Brothers, 1961,
p. 128; and ALLCHIN, A.M., “Julian and the continuity of tradition”, in Jutian woman of our day, eU.
LLEWELYN, Robert, Mystic CN, Twenty-third Publications, 1988, P. 39.
69 KOENJG, Elisabeth, The ‘Book of Showings’ ofJulian of Norwich: A Testcase for Pau1Ricoeur
theory of metaphor and the imagination. Ph.D. dissertation, NY, Columbia University, 1984, pp. 214 -
215.
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regard to what she says about her mother’s actions at this cntical moment in Julian’s
illness. lier mother is flot indicated as offering her any comfort or reassurance.
As Julian lies dying, her gaze is directed toward the face of Jesus on the crucifix.
This latter was a customary practice of the devout at their last hour, and it is for this
purpose that the curate is called to attend to Julian, setting the cross before her face. Stili, it
is striking that this same Julian, if she had had an exceptionally nch relationship with ber
birthmother, does flot gaze at ah at ber own mother’s face, or speak fondly of ber.7°
Bemadette Lorenzo argues in an unabashedly ahistorical Freudian theoretical
framework, that Julian’ s “psychic structure bears distinct marks of the oral phase”, that is,
Freud’ s first infantile stage of psychosexual development.7’ She notes that in this phase,
feeding and hunger provide elective significations through which is expressed and
organized the relationship with the object. She observes that Julian hungers to see and
excels at describing faces, Christ’s or the devil’s. But she does flot do so with Mary, or,
we may add, wïth her mother.
Julian refers to Mary three times in the Short Text. (ST 4, 10, 13.) The second
reference to Mary, follows immediately on the reference to lier mother, where she sees
something of Mary’s compassion for Christ in lis suffering and sees Mary’s union with
her son in love as the cause of the greatness of her pain wbich surpassed that of the other
disciples. Perhaps a contrast may be observed here between the apparent lack of
compassion of Julian’s mother toward the pain her daugliter is suffering. Julian takes the
vision of Mary’s singleheartedness into herself as she then resolves to keep lier eyes fixed
on the cross “for I knew well tliat whist I looked at the cross I was secure and safe... for
apart from the cross there was no safety, but only the horror of devils”. (ST 10.)
In the first and third of these references to Christ’s mother, Maiy is beleld as one
wlio beliolds lier God in contemplation, first as at the conception and then in tlie third, the
vision of Mary glorified. Julian observes: “And after this our Lord showed himself to
me... and in this I was taught that every contemplative soul to whom it ïs given to look and
to seek will see Mary and pass on to God through contemplation”. (ST 13.)
70Bemard de Clairvaux and francis of Assisi’s accounts of the affirming and ambitious attitudes of their
actual birth mothers toward their Sons provides a dramatic contrast, even if we allow for self-effacement in
Julian’s writing. See CHARRON, Jean-Marc, De Narcisse à Jésus: La quête d’identité chez François
d’Assise, Montréal, Éditions Paulines, 1992, pp. 98 - 104; and CHARRON, Jean-Marc, “Le rapport au
féminin chez Bernard de Clairvaux: Lecture psychanalytique de la Vita prima”, Retigiotogiques 7, 1993, pp.
111-122.
LORENZO, Bernadette, “The mystical experience oflulian ofNorwich, with reference to the epistie to
the Hebrews (ch. IX), semiotic and psychoanalytic analysis”, in The medievat mystical tradition in
Engtand, ed. GLASSCOE, Marion, Exeter, University ofExeter Press, 1982, p. 162 - 163.
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As we saw above, Kohut and Winnicott both identify the liunger to see oneseif in
the face of the other as the primary symptom of the child’ s earliest mli-roring need flot being
adequately fulfihied by the maternai selfobject.
If the chuld does flot acquire the needed internai structure bis pysche remains fixated
on an archaic selfobject and the personality will throughout life be dependent on
certain objects in what seems to be an intense form of object hunger. Tlie intensity
of the searcli for and dependence on these objects is due to the fact that tliey are
striven for as a substitute for the missing segments of tlie psychic structure.72
The question whether Julian suffered a traumatïc eariy infant experience of
abandonment cannot be answered on the basis of tlie reference to lier mother in this text.
But we can at least ask whetlier tbis bnef report of her non-empatliic “encounter” with lier
own mother (and the brevity with which she contemplates Mary), might reflect in Julian’s
early chuldhood a maternai relationship toward lier charactenzed by a lack of empathy, and
a relational distancing and unavailability on lier motlier’ s part? if this were so, we may
read an oblique and somewliat angry reference to lier motlier among “tlie people wlio were
with me” wlien slie says slie said to them:
Today is my Doomsday. And I said this because I expected to die; because on tlie
day that a man or a woman dies, lie is judged as lie will be forever. I said this
because I wislied them to love God more and to set less store by worldly vanity,
and to make them mindful tliat this life is short, as they could see by my example,
for in ail tliis time I was expecting to die. (ST 7.)
This liypotliesis miglit to some degree offer a psycliodynamic account for Juiian’s
isolation, ambivalence around death and lier desire for an illness wliicli would effectively
cut lier off and permanentiy isolate Julian from human, comforting contact. If something
lilce this were the case, it would certainly set tlie stage, psycliodynamically speaking, for
Julian’ s rigid refusai in that moment “to be hindered from seeing, because of my love for
[Christ]”. (ST 10.) It would suggest that the figure of Christ had become tlie substitute for
that intense object liunger.
5.2 The religious person
if it is tlie case that there was a chronic absence of mirroring in Julian’ s early
relationship witli lier mother, it might account to some degree for the extreme object hunger
we see, even here, in Julian’ s desire for spiritual sight of Christ’ s face in tlie context of
extreme iilness. Yet, if Julian suffered from a sense of isolation, liow are we to account for
the emergence, in Julian’ s visions, of tlie particular qualities of the intensely personal
encounter, and tlie intimate and creative relationality wbich emerge in lier engagement with
72 KOHUT, Heinz, The analysis of the sef Madison CN, International Universities Press, 1971, p. 45.
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the Jesus of lier showings? Could the practice of affective piety and scripted visions aTone
account for this? Wbile this practice is an essential element, my view would be that the
spontaneous, “transitional” quality of lier visionary imagination also suggests tlie influence
of a compensatory human relationship of an affirming, empathic mirroring nature.
Winnicott observed very astutely that activity in transitional space is only possible in
a state of relaxation which, lie liolds, requires the context of a tmsting, reliable matemal or
tlierapeutic minoring presence. Any anxiety in that regard inhibits tlie possibility of relaxed
“play” and tlie “creative reacliing out” whicli it promotes.73 For tliis kind of experience to
be possible, it requfres a summation or reverberation by the mirroring object:
It is only liere, in this unintegrated state of the personality, tliat that wbicli we
describe as creative can appear. Tliis, if reflected back, but onty if reflected back,
becomes part of the organized individual personality, and eventually this in
summation makes the individual to be, to be found; and eventually enables bimself
or herseif to postulate the existence of tlie self.74
Winnicott liolds that this is seen in the evotution of transitional space witnessed in
persons in creative lives of art, religion, etc. Altliougli anticipating myseif somewhat, I
suggest tliat in Julian’s launcli into her visionary experience we see tlie beginning of such
an evolution, and tliat this signais tliat there was just such a therapeutic mirroring
relationship which provided lier with some prior experience of that affirming
“reverberation”. What traces might be revealed of sucli formative, mirroring relationships
in Julian’s life?
Notably, there is the specific reference Julian makes to the “religious person” who
visited lier during the day following lier reception of the first 15 revelations. She is
astounded, and ashamed, as lier recounting to him of lier “ravings”( as she prejudges tliem)
is met with lis entirely unjudging, respectful response. That lie is not a pnest himself is
suggested by tlie fact tliat slie says slie then wanted to make a confession for having
doubted tliat tlie visions were from God, “[b]ut I could not teil it to any priest, for I
tliought: How could a priest believe me?” (SI 21.) StilI, she is able to receive bis positive
valuation of them. This encounter conditions and sliapes her subsequent discernment of
tlie source of these 15 visions as slie undergoes demonic assaults, and of the final,
confirming vision tlie next day.
In lier way of effacing detail, Julian may be describing here an episode in an
unusually trusting, longstanding relationship with a monastic spiritual guide. Such a
context bears littie superficial resemblance to the “policing” context of confession which
WINNICOYI’, D. W., “Playing: Creative activity and the search for self’, in Playing and reality, NY,
Routiedge, 1989, p. 55.
WINNICOTT, D. W., 1989, p. 64, emphasis in text.
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Riddy finds so determinative of Julian’s place as a woman in medïeval visionary culture.
Rather, witliout denying tlie cultural context of of the omnipresence of the confessional
box, I would hold that Julian’s description of this encounter has the earmarks an affinning
relationship of spiritual counsel.75
It could quite conceivably be this man, who, by lis counsel and affirmation over the
years prior to Julian’s having the visions, had become a substitute for Julian’s object
hunger for a lost matemal mirroring object. But more than this, perhaps through this
mirroring relation, lie helped to shape in lier a capacity for relafing to Christ in prayer which
came to life in lier sliowings. And perhaps lie continued to help lier shape lier theological
reflections on tlie revelations in lier later years as well. Tlie presence of counsel whicli she
was able to receive is inferred, for example, wliere she tells us tliat with regard to the first
two of the three graces she liad asked for when she was young, tliat is, a to have a bodily
siglit of Christ’ s Passion and a bodily sickness, she set the condition that she receive them
only if it be tlie Lord’ s will, because “it seemed to me tliat neither was an ordinary petition”
(ST 1). Because of that, slie tells us, these requests passed from lier mmd. Aithougli we
have no direct evidence for proposing this as one potentially long term relationship of
spiritual counsel in Julian’s life, if tlie religious had known of her request for tliese graces
earlier in lier life and counselled her as to how to proceed, it certainly would underlïne the
“seriousness and surprise” with which she telis us lie then took lier description of tlie
visions she was receiving.
5.3 The creatures who occupy themselves so much in the
Lord’s privy counsel
In ST 14 do we glimpse a hint of anger at the arrogance of theologians or clergy of
lier day whose intellectual speculations seem far from liaving any relevance to lier need,
and the need of tlie people, to trust in salvation? The Lord sliows lier two portions. Ilie
first is the saviour and our salvation wliich is open and clear, etc. The second is ail wliich
is additional or irrelevant to our salvatïon, that is the Lord’ s privy counsel. She observes
witli unusually explicit exasperation that “some creatures occupy tliemselves so mucli in
Others have argued that the universal medieval discipline of confession led to greater introspection, self
anatysis and the autobiographical impulse. See AER$, David,”A whisper in the ear of early modernists; or,
reflections on literary critics writing the ‘history of the subject”, in Culture and history 1350 - 1600:
Essays on Engtish communities, identities and writing, Detroit, Wayne State University Press, 1992, pp.
177 - 202; and ZIMMERMANN, T. C. Price, “Confession and autobiography in the early renaissance”,
Renaissance studies in honor of Hans Baron, eds. MOLHO, Anthony and John A. TEDESCHI, Florence,
G. C. Sansoni Press, 1971, pp. 121 - 140. Biblioteca storica sansoni, nuova serie.
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this”: wanting to know the Lord’s privy counsel which “is closed to us and hidden”.
Rather she cornes to understand that we should be occupied in accepting that
this is our Lord’s privy counsel, and it is fitting to God’s royal dominion to keep
bis privy counsel in peace, and it is fitting to bis subjects out of obedience and
respect flot to wish to know lis counsel.... Our Lord has pity and compassion on
us because some creatures occupy themselves so much in this; and I am certain that
if we knew how mucli we should please him and solace ourselves by leaving it
alone, we should do so. (ST 14.)
Tins suggests that she did not have compassion on those creatures, and that she was angry
that they did not leave it alone. In LT 30 tins text is unchanged.
Julian’s request, as she beholds the cross in lier dying state, is for tlie second
wound of compassion. This is of course compassion for the suffenng Christ winch, in the
stages of spiritual ascent she was pursuing before lier visionary experience, was the grace
of the second, moral stage. But could this request also have an anthropological
significance? Could it be related to lier anger, tins lack of compassion toward arrogant
members of the clergy? Could it be a hint as to lier pre-visionary attitude toward otliers as
well, indeed toward God? Could she be in a condition of profound anger at the seeming
dissonance between wliat so rnany theologians (and therefore God?) seemed to be about,
and the life and death crises she, and others, were suffering? Could lier rage liere be at a
lieavy sense of sinfulness for which there seemed no way out? Could this be a pattem
winch miglit be repeating itseif since lier early experience of lier motlier?
In ST 13 Julian secs that it is lier sin winch keeps lier from the purity she desires
and so from receiving the third wound of longing for God, the higliest of tlie three
contemplative stages in spiritual ascent. She teils us here of a tendency in lier early life to
anger and impatience and especially to blame God for the imperfect state of the world:
“[B]efore this time I often wondered wliy, through the great and prescient wisdom of God,
5m was flot prevented; for it seemed to me that then ail would liave been well”. It is only
later, in the writing of lier showings, that she secs that “it would be most unldnd of me to
btame God or marvel at him on account ofmy sins”. (ST 13.)
Tliese suggestions wouid point to a critical side to Julian, critical of the failure of the
Church to respond to tlie situation of its people (and hers in particular) with a vision of
saivation whicli could offer comfort and trust. The cnticisrn extends to an assumption tliat
tlie situation should flot exist, and that somehow God is responsibie for its existence (and
flot tlie solution to it). What is also significant is that tlie pre-visionary Julian seems bent
on criticizing lierseif for being thus critical.
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6.0 Julfan’s seif-abasement and effacement
There are other relationships mentioned in the course of her Short Text, the
description of which undergoes reduction in detail or omission in the Long Text. There is,
for example the reference to the woman, “a certain person whom I loved”, whose future
she daringly asks Christ about in ST 16 but is told to be content with the confidence that ail
will be well. In LT 35 (with considerable future now past) the reference to this significant
personal relationship is rendered asexual as “a certain creature whom I loved, if it would
continue in the good living which I hoped had been begun by the grace of God”. Even
more anonymous is the reference to the child accompanying her curate in ST 2, which is
omitted in LT 3.
Our total lack of biographical knowledge of Julian, and lier tendency between the
writing of the ST and the LT to remove even more of the presence of particulars in her own
biography, as well as the particulars of those around her, lias led to considerable variations
of interpretation.
6.1 SeIf-abasement
It has been frequently observed by feminists and otliers that in the Short Text Julian
emphasizes certain qualities in herseif which were typically, and negatively, associated with
lier gender. In the Short text she is a “devout woman”, “uneducated (tewed), feeble and
frail”, who insists that because of lier sex she cannot be a teacher. By tlie writing of tlie
LT, much of this self-abasement has been toned down and ail explicit reference to lier
gender lias been removed, though she stiil describes herself as a “simple, unlettered
creature”. (LT2.)76
As we saw in the introductory cliapter, some interpreters see Julian as following a
cultural norm for women, a trope of modesty or liumility, which allowed Christ to be the
76 BAKER, Denise N., Jutian ofNorwich’s Showings: From vision to book, Princeton NI, Princeton
University Press, 1994, p. 11. Baker observes from sources contemporary with Julian such as Richard
Roue and Nicholas Love how the tenns “simple” and “unlettered” were undergoing transitions in meamng
to indicate affective rather than intellective texts and could refer to literate audiences. On p. 11 Baker
concludes:
Phrases similar to Julian’s ‘sympte creature vnlettyrde’ thus seem to be conventional signals of
devotional discourse rather than descriptions of the educational achievements of their readers. Even
though this evidence does flot resolve the question of whether she could read Latin or only English,
it does undermine the view that Julian of Norwich was unable to read or wnte in any language.
Her silence about an amanuensis... gives further warrant to the conclusion that Julian not only
composed but also inscnbed and revised ber own text.
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author of the woman visionary’s voice, in a Church in which she could flot have any voice
of authority of her own. Watson and Jenkins observe that these self-characterizations are
more than gestures of modesty, and argue for a sbift in the literary persona Julian is taking
on in each of the two versions of her showings, from participant to interpreter. They hold
that in the Short Text Julian characterizes herseif as the participant or “creature”, the one
who desires, in this visionary genre.
[Ijt is such individuals, helpless in their untutored createdness, flot the educated,
who experience visions: chosen individuals, to be sure, but more importantly
representatives of everyone.... In Christian thought Christ, who emptied himself to
become human, ‘taking the form of a servant,’ has a mystenous affinity with the
humble (Plu. 2:7)....
[TJhis creature... must be presumptuously tmsting and receptive, asking ‘tewed’
questions out of personal need.77
They go on to argue that the literary persona of the Long Text is the “interpreter”, the one
who understands, must be represented as educated by means of these same showings, in
order to justify it and reveal that the creature’ s singular expenence is exemplary of a wider
human need and a larger divine tmth. And to do this, Julian the interpreter assumes the
authontative role which many women’s visionary wntings give to clerics (amanuenses).78
Experience and interpretation are flot mutually exclusive in Julian’s writings, because of her
way of both descnbing and interpreting ber experience as “I saw”.79 They conclude that
this doesn’t help us know Julian’s biography, but that it does give us two images ofJulian
neither of which can be wholly a construct.... We will neyer know. Wntten under
a name and profession that symbolized separation from the world, the works have
been carefu1l’ put together so as to conceal the worldly history of thefr
composition. °
6.2 Effacement of details of others
This shift would partly account for ber effacement of other particular individuals
from the Long Text. Abbott’s argument, that tbis reduction in the Long Text of extraneous
detail about others (ber mother and the cbild accompanying the curate at her deatbbed, and
WATSON and JENK1NS, 2006, pp. 7 - 8.
78 Their example here is from LT 4, where the “trinitarian hermeneutic” is ïntroduced, that “Where Jesus
appears the blessed Trinity is understood, as I sec it”. See WATSON, 1992, pp. 79 - 100. Exeter
symposium V. Compare Denise Baker’s thesis which is that Julian moves from an affective visionary
expenence in the Short Text to a theologically educated interpretation of it in the Long Text, though how
Julian would have got that education is unknown. BAKER, 1994, pp. 12-14.
Surprisingly, Watson and Jenkins do flot refer to Kenie Hide’s “henneneutic of beholding” to underline
this continuity. Sec HIDE, Kerrie, Gtfted origins to gracedfulfihlment: The soteriotogy of Julian of
Norwich, Collegeville MN, Liturgical Press, 2001, p. 19.
80 WATSON and JEN1UNS, 2006, p. 10. Watson now holds that perhaps Julian the “creature” was a nun,
and Julian the “interpreter” an anchoress.
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even the certain female creature whom she loved) is to higbuïght in a literary way the
intensity of the drama of Julian’ s self-absorbed encounter with “her personal fantasy
Christ”, would put the emphasis on a literary Julian creating a persona of ber early life, in
effect decades later.8’ This interpretation would seem to be unnecessarily contrived. I
prefer the interpretation of Watson and Jenkins of the mature Julian the anchoress, as
addressing her readers of the Long Text with just the necessary essentials as viewed, so to
speak, from beyond the grave.
6.3 Self-effacement
However, in looking ahead to the mature Julian who composed the Long Text, the
contrast with the young Julian as portrayed above is marked. The qualities of lier
unconscious pre-visionaiy self-perception as a “special case”, a “spiritual narcissist”, traces
of which Abbott lias found and which I have developed above, could tend without direction
and the cntical intervention of the visions themselves, in the opposite direction of adding
detail reflective of her seif-preoccupation, such as lias been observed in Margery Kempe’ s
Book.82 What could have evolved from her self-description in ST 6 as the “wretched
worm, sinful creature” to whom the revelation was shown,83 in a social context winch
would systematically have lier believe tins, had there flot been some direction against
pursuing a tendency to disparaging self-preoccupation?
It would seem plausible to me that Julian’ s capacity for self-effacement was in fact
flot great in lier early life; that while it might have been an ideal in women’s visionary
culture, she was debilitated by lier extreme hunger to be seen and affirmed, paradoxically
evident among other places, in tins early tendency to seif-abasement. It would seem that
Julian at that early age would flot have been able to take on the invisibility required of an
anchoress for the right reasons.
Abbott describes Julian’ s pre-visionary stage as one of
81 ABBOTf, 1999, p. 59. In SI 16, for exampte, Julian asks about how a certain creature is doing:
I wjshed to know, conceming a certain person whom I Ioved, what her future would be; and by
wishing this I impeded myseif, for I was flot then told this. And then I was answered in my
reason, as il were by a friendly man: Accept it generally, and contemplate the courtesy of your Lord
God as he reveals it to you, for it is more honour to God to contemplate him in aÏI things than in
any one special thing.
In the Long Text the gender of this creature is removed.
See for example,WATSON and JENKINS, 2006, p. 6.
Ibis is how COLLEDGE and WALSH, 1978a p. 219, interpret the ambiguous word at the bottom of the
page, but which bas been variously rendered as “the wretched, worldly sinful creature” by REYNOLDS and
HOLLOWAY, 2001, pp. 722 - 725, and “wretched, sinful creature” by WATSON and JENKNS, 2006, p.
73.
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great feeling, of self-consciousness and also seif-dramatization, of struggie and
strain. Julian wants to see Christ; she wants to be wounded; she yeams to taste
death (but only taste).... to create an authentic religious expenence but aching for
something beyond its unaided capacities....
Julian’s concem in [LTJ 2 and 3 with presenting a picture of emotionally-charged
religious exertion inevitably produces a particular focus on herseif, keeping Julian
as agent at the centre of the picture. By contrast, the showings which follow are
ascribed to the direction [sic] action of God himself.84
The development of her capacity for self-effacement to such a dramatic extent in the
evolution of her two texts could then be seen as a function of the effect of the visions and
lier subsequent life of meditation on them, which allowed for a maturation in her need for
mirroring. Her genre of writing the $howings, which brims with lier pervasive personal
presence as the one who sees and is beheld, is the evidence for this une of argument.
Perliaps the reverential autliority in which she was held by others in her later life in lier
pastoral role as spiritual counsellor could be part of the backdrop? Mthougli “unseen”
within the ancliorhold, and so, effectively “self-effaced”, she would nonetheless be
esteemed and affirmed for lier contribution to the spiritual health of lier even Christians.85
As will be explored furtlier along in this thesis, the capacity for self-effacement most
certainly had to do witli lier growtli in perception of herseif as convinced of lier
acceptability as a human being assumed into Christ, allowing lier, as Watson and Jenldns
put it, to speak as a “representative of evelyone”.86
7.0 The illness
7.1 What Julian says
Tlie context in which tlie visionary events occurred, she telis us, was a period of 24
hours at a point of illness nearing death. A number of people have speculated about what
kind of illness this was, and about the visionary experience happening in that state. That it
was a bodily sickness she indicates lierself, in lier description of the symptoms.
What does she say about the illness she receives in ST2 and LT3? She says it lasted
three days and niglits at which point she received extreme unction, as she was expected flot
84 ABBOTT, 1999, pp. 59 - 60.
Compare the description of this paradox in WARREN, Ann, Anchorites and their patrons in medievat
Engtand, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1985, p. 7:
Encouraged, applauded, and supported by society and church, [anchorites] undertook their solitary
life by encamping in the heail of the community. Enclosed and yet exposed, hidden and yet
visible, shadows behind the curtains of their access windows, medieval English anchorites were
daily reminders of the proper focus of Christian existence.
86 WATSON and JENKINS, 2006, p. 7.
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to live tiil day. However she lingered on for two more days and nights. On the third night
(although she was in some inner conflict about wanting to live longer so as to have more
opportunities for good works in this life and so increase her heaveniy reward), she
assented to die. She teils us that her body feit dead from the waist down. She was
propped up as she had trouble holding her head up, and her eyes were rigidly fixed
upward. Once she tums her eyes to gaze upon the crucifix that her curate sets before lier,
lier sight begins to fail, except for a light in the image of tlie cross,87 and everything
around the cross in the darkness, slie says, was ugly to her and occupied by a great crowd
of demons. The upper part of lier body began to die sucli tliat she liad no sensation left
In the Short Text but flot the Long Text she says lier hands feu down on either side and that
she was so weak lier head iolled to one side. Her greatest pain was sliortness of breath and
tlie ebbing of her life and slie feit slie was truly at the point of deatli. At this point, slie
experiences a vanishing of the symptoms of pain, particulariy in lier upper body. At later
points in the texts slie recounts the retum of tlie symptoms, but it is not known or identified
that after this episode slie suffered from the bodily sickness, and she is thouglit to have
lived for over forty years after this experience.
She also tells us liowever, that in her early request for an iiiness, she had wished to
receive flot only physical pain, but “every kind of pain, bodily and spiritual, which I would
have if I died, every fear and assault from demons and every other kind of pain except the
departure of tlie spirit”. (ST 1.)
Julian teils us she recognized this illness she was now suffering as an opportunity
to ask for the second wound of compassion, “that the Lord wouid fui my body full witli
recollection of feeling of lis hiessed Passion, as I had prayed before, for I wislied that lis
pains might be my pains, witli compassion which wouid lead to longing for God”. (ST 3;
and LT 3.) Her request seems to mingle with the request for compassion and lier early
desire for the first grace of a bodiiy sight of the Passion (despite lier comment that she
neyer wanted any bodily vision) in lier present situation of bodiiy iliness. 51e also teils us
in both texts “Wlien I was young I desired to have that sickness when I was thirty years
oid”. Tlie coïncidence of the sickness and tlie visions now at tlie age of 30 constitutes, for
Juiian, a response by God to her youthful first two requests for a “bodily siglit” or
recollection of our Lord in bis Passion, and for a “bodily iliness”.
87 WATSON and JENKINS, 2006, p. 132 cal! this “tunnel vision”.
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7.2 Psychobiological interpretations of this illness
Colledge and Walsh consulted heart specialists who considered that Julian suffered
from “severe heart failure”.88
Brant Pelphrey believes she actually died of a severe chest infection, that the
showings were “an experience which today we might cali ‘life after life”, and that after 11
hours she “awoke ‘with a loud sound and a bang”, alive but in pain; the visions resumed
when she later feu asleep again.89
lames Mcllwain explores four different physical diseases which could account for
the symptoms which Julian describes in a way that is “relatively ample by medieval
standards”. He concludes from lier central complaint of ascending paralysïs and from the
fact of lier eventual recoveiy, that Julian suffered from a case of botulism.9°
More recently, Richard Lawes lias argued tliat an organic illness, involving a very
severe debilitating febnle illness such as pneumonia, would be more likely. He argues
(against Barratt) tliat since medieval psycliology itself sought biological bases for
diagnoses, an organic medical approach can correlate well witli tlie “conventions of
affective piety informing sucli pliysical descriptions of the passion”, and so “far from
creating reductionist explanations, allow resonances whicli enrich meaning”. His argument
liypothesizes that sucli illness, witli its strange psycliobiological disturbances was a
stimulus for the emergence of the autobiographical impulse. This impulse is “related to the
intensity and strangeness of the experÏence itself and tlie strength of its challenge to tlie
coherence of tlie individual’s inner world”.9’
What is evident is that Julian’ s description of her pain is global and diffuse,
encompassing physical, emotional and spiritual dimensions in her awareness ofbeing on
the border between life and deatli. This diffuse, global quality is taken up into lier visions
COLLEDGE and WALSH, 1978a, p. 69.
9° PELPHREY, Brant, Christ our mother: Julian ofNorwich, Wilmington Delaware, Michael Glazier,
1989, p. 17 and p. 259 fn. 1, See also his “Afterword”, in Vox mystica: Essays on medievat mysticism, ed.
BARTLETT, Anne Clarke et al., Cambridge, Brewer, 1995, P. 234. I do flot accept Pelphrey’s speculation
that Julian did in fact die, and returned to life, though flot on the basis that it is an academically
unacceptable hypothesis, but rather that it does flot fit Julian’s psycho-spiritual condition as reflected in the
texts themselves.
9° McILWAIN, lames T., “The ‘bodelye syeknes’ of Julian of Norwich”, Journal of medieval history 10,
1984, pp. 167 - 180.
91 LAWES, Richard, “Psychological disorder and the autobiographical impulse in Julian ofNorwich,
Margery Kempe and Thomas Hoccleve”, in Writing retigious women: Femate spiritual and textuat
practices in tate medievat England, eds. RENEVEY, Denis and Christiania WHITEHEAD, Toronto,
University of Toronto Press, 2000, p. 238. $ee also BARRAIT, Alexandra, “In the lowest part of our
need’: Julian and medieval gynaecological writing”, in Julian of Norwich: A book of essays, ed.
McENTIRE, Sandra, London, Garland Publishing, 1998, p. 255.
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and lier eventual understanding of the pain of the liuman condition and the point of entry
into union with the humanity of Jesus.92
7.3 Psychological examinations of the illness
Psychological interpretatïons of Julian’ s illness, its relation to the visions and to lier
recoveiy have tlieir own history, related, like the psychobiological ones, as mucli to the
context and attitude of the researcher as to their subject matter.
Roman Catholics earlier in the 2Oth centuiy tended to analyze the material on the
basis of criteria for canonization. Molïnan seeks to distinguish a “divine origin” of lier
sickness (and so, her visions) from a “neurotic” or psychosomatic origin, and argues that it
was divine.93
The coincidence of the sickness and the visions causes several to explore wliether
the illness along with the visions were of a psychological or psychopathological nature.
Early in the century, Renaudin saw the visions as having been prepared by a long penod of
desire and expectancy, sucli that the correspondence between Julian’ s desires and their
realization suggests the possibility of auto-suggestion, the desire causing the “ecstasy”. He
concludes however, tliat this was not the case; that Julian liad a sound attitude of
prudence.94
Others were more critical, concluding that Julian was in a “state of hypnotism” or
that she was in a “trance state” experiencing “physical illusion”.95 Thouless, although lie
wants to understand lier mysticism, gives a Freudian explanation of certain episodes in the
showings, arguing that in the (unidentified) sickness “lier normal mental life was
weakened, and tlie scenes of the Passion with which meditation had stored lier mmd welled
up to the surface of consciousness and presented tliemselves with hallucinatory
vividness”.96 Conrad Pepler concludes that Julian’s condition was an “extreme
pathological state. .. [of] acute neurosis induced perhaps by an over-enthusiastic life of
92 See GALEA, Kate, ‘I desyred to haue alt maner ofpaynes’: A study ofthefunction of pain in ‘The
Showings’ of Julian of Norwich, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of St. Michael’s College, Toronto, 1997,
271 p.
MOLINARI, Paul, Jutian ofNorwich: The teaching of û I4th century Engtish mystic, London,
Longmans, Green and Co., 1958, pp. 22 - 30.
RENAUDIN, Paul, Quatre mystiques anglais, Paris, Le Cerf, 1945, p. 60. See also TYRRELL,
George, Thefaith ofthe millions, London, Longmans, Green and Co., 1901, pp. 12 ff, KNOWLES, David,
The Engtish mystics, London, Burns,Oates and Washbourne 1927, pp. 150 ff; COLEMAN, T.W., English
mystics ofthefourteeth century, Westport CN, Greenwood Press, [1938] 1971, pp. 13$ ff.
for the former see INGE, W. R., Studies of English mystics, London, John Murray, 1906, p. 58, and for
the latter, WARRACK, Grace, ed. and transl., Revelations of divine love, recorded by Julian, anchoress
at Norwich, anno Domini 1373, London, Methuen, [19011 1952, pp. xxxvii - xxxviii.
96 THOULESS, Robert, The lady Julian of Norwich: A psychological study, London, SPCK, 1924, p. 25.
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penance and solitude. But she appears to have retained consciousness throughout, except
in the final dream”.97
More recent psychologïcal studies reflect their theoretical preferences for Freud,
Jung, Lacan, frigaray, and Winnicott. Some focus less on the illness itself (and sometimes
neglect the context of her meditation history), though frequently assume that the context of
the illness for the visionary expenence implies a weakened state vulnerable to regression.98
PEPLER, Conrad, Life in the spirit 3, 1949, p. 486.
98 have referred afready to the Freudian study by LORENZO, Bemadette, “The mystical experience of
Julian of Norwich, with reference to the epistie to the Hebrews (ch. IX), semiotic and psychoanalytic
analysis”, in The medievat mystical tradition in England, eU. GLASSCOE, Marion, Exeter, University of
Exeter Press, 1982, pp. 161 - 176. Two articles published from theses approach the $howings from a
Jungian and a Lacanian perspective respectively: BUSSHART, Helen, “Christ as feminine in Julian of
Norwich in the light of the psychology of C.G. Jung”, Mystics quarterty 11, 1985, pp. 63 - 84;
PETERSEN, Zina, “Every manner of thing shah be well’: Mirroring serenity in the $hewings of Juhian of
Norwich”, Mystics quarterly 22, 1996, pp. 91 - 101. The best Lacanian analysis of Julian’s Showings
would be that by COINER, Nancy, “The ‘homely’ and the ‘heimtich’: The hidden, doubled self in Julian of
Norwich’s Showings”, Exemplaria: A journal of theory in medieval and renaissance studies 5, 2, 1993,
pp. 305 - 323. For a feminist, Irigarayan study, see ROBERTSON, Elizabeth, “Medieval medical views of
women and female spirituality in the Ancrene wisse and Julian of Norwich’ s $howings “, in Feminist
approaches to the body in medieval literature, eUs. LOMPERIS, Linda and Sarah STANBURY,
Pbiladelphia PN, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993, pp. 142 - 167, New cultural studies. Elisabeth
Koenig devotes a chapter of ber Ph.D. thesis to a depth psychological approach using Winnicott and Mice
Miller to Julian’s image of the face of the lord in the parable of the servant and the lord in KOENIG, 1984,
pp. 184 - 220. The insights of Koenig’ s chapter have been critical for the development of the focus for the
present study. A masters thesis I wrote under Dr Koenig’s direction began the psychoanalytic study of
mirroring in the Showings. See RATCLIFFE, Holly, Mourning and kenosis: Mirroring of God and self in
transformation, S.T.M. thesis, General Theological Seminary, NY, 1997, 245 p. Other articles address
aspects of the current study. See for examples Sprung’s literary study wbich incorporates Winnicott, in
SPRUNG, Andrew, “The inverted metaphor: Earthly mothering as figura of divine love in Juhian of
Norwich’s Book of Showings”, in Medieval Mothering, eds. PARSONS, John and Bonnie WHEELER,
NY, Garland, 1996, pp. 183 - 199. Other studies include McCONNELL, Helen, “From shame tojoy:
Julian of Norwich, companion on the journey to spiritual wetlness”, Studies in fonnative spiritualiry 14,
1993, pp. 395 - 405; also, RUDD, Jay, “Images of self and self-image in Julian of Norwich”, Studia
Mystica 16, 1995, pp. 82 - 105; LUKAS, Elona, “Psychological and spiritual growth in Hadewijch and
Juhian of Norwich”, Studia mystica 9, 3, 1986, pp. 3 - 20; ROGERS, Daniel, J., “Psychotechnological
approaches to the teaching of the Cloud-author and to the Showings of Julian of Norwich”, in The
medieval mystical tradition in England, ed. Marion GLASSCOE, Exeter, University of Exeter Press, 1982,
pp. 143 - 160, whose interesting section on guided imagery takes no account of the histoncal practices of
which Barbara Newman speaks. Morea includes Julian of Norwich in his study which uses what he calls a
“Christian psychology”, in MOREA, Peter, Towards a liberat catholicism: Psychology andfour women,
London, 5CM, 2000, 184 p.
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7.4 The hermeneutical significance of the illness together with
the crucifix as context of visfonary experience
7.4.1 The visions as found and created
It would seem then, that contemporary interpretations of symptoms of her illness
may be to some degree related to how flexibly or inflexibly the author perceives the
relationship between divine and human agency in the visions which Julian experienced in
that context. An inflexible, “ail or none” interpretation, as Barbara Newman has described
one theology of revelation in her study of late medieval women’s visionary culture, would
require that the visions (and therefore the illness) be either just a psychologicallpathological
phenomenon, or an intervention of divine agency (either way disparaging the human
agency of the woman). But, as Newman is at pains to show, even in the Middle ages,
discernment of human and divine agency in visionary experience could be more adequate
and subtie than this, even producing a visionary culture, although it did flot remain that
way. She identifies four components which appear in most medieval vision texts: the
paranormal (spontaneous), the meditational (cultivated), the aesthetic, and the
supernatural.99 Near-death experience or mental illness could be a context for spontaneous
visions, “uncanny, defying the norms of ordinary perception”, and Julian of Norwich is
cited as a “celebrated example” of the former.’°° Newman observes that visions could also,
and at the same time be the fruits of a complex spiritual discipline, and as will be seen
below, Julian’s texts bear witness to lier having, in lier early years, begun to cultivate
meditational disciplines which could facilitate visionary activity. Pnor to the lSth century,
in which tlie suspicion of visions, and the of use of the imagination to induce them, became
an ecclesiastical and jundical imperative, another tlieology of revelation held sway, with its
roots in monastic tradition but expanded into the vemacular tradition by the l4th century.
In that theology of revelation, the imagination could be put to the service of the devotional
life. !n effect, it “envisaged an implicit synergy between grace and human effort”.’°’
The advantage of using an object relations theoretical basis for this psychohistorical
study can be seen here, in that it also is (potentially) open to holding a more flexible
“bothland” (rather than “either/or”) view of the relation between “human and divine
agency” in the visionary experience of our subject. Winnicott describes the experience of
transitional phenomena in play, religious experience, art, etc., as having the quality of
NEWMAN, 2005, p. 3.
ZALESKI, Carol, Othenvortdly journeys: Accounts of near-death experience in medieval and modem
times, NY, Oxford University Press, 1987, 275 p.
loi NEWvIAN, 2005, p. 6.
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being “both found and created”; as both a product of the imagination bearing the imprint of
the psychodynamic history of the individuaL and in some sense “received”, shaped by
cultural symbols, traditions, external circumstances, etc. In so doing lie is opening
psychological discourse to a potentially more nuanced hermeneutical framework for
understanding, in this instance, Julian’s near-death experience as the context of her visions.
As lie says, originality and the acceptance of tradition as the basis for inventiveness are
anotlier, largeiy unexplored, locus for the psychological dynamic of separateness and union
in cultural life.’°2
7.4. 2 Illness as limit situation
It is one thing to practise such meditation techniques which encourage the use of the
imagination in the course of one’ s life. It is another to do so at the point of dying.
The context of the physical near death experience as the locus for lier receiving the
revelations could be seen as significant in that it would represent a physical crisis or “limit
situation”. Sucli an extreme limit (life ending and entering death) experience may well have
been for Julian an occasion of recapitulating previous expenences of unresolved grief at tlie
(historically quite probable) deaths of significant others and, prior to that, perhaps of an
early maternai envïronment of traumatic separation, loss or neglect. We will neyer know.
Here it is significant to step back and recali that whatever Julian expenenced in
1373, winch prompted tins cntical illness, may also be a sign to us of the effect of large
scaie social or collective trauma reverberating through her text. If we look again at the
graph of the drastic change in population at that tïme in Englisli history winch was to
continue for over one hundred years (see Appendix 1), Loewenberg’s comments on
massive psychic trauma take on new significance:
Its halimark is a fixation on the trauma but with new variations and with an altered
conception of the self and the world. The symptoms are lifelong. No one is
immune. Adaptive and coping capacities are enfeebled. Massive trauma is a crucial
bridge to history.... The psychoanalytical perception of anxiety as a signal of the
danger of helplessness and liopelessness is a political and social category of
understanding whose full implications have yet to be explored....’°3
Jean-Marc Charron observes, from a rather more Freudian perspective, that
“{ a]u plan
psycho-dynamique, l’enthousiasme autant que l’insécurité se comprennent par l’effritement
du Surmoi individuel et collectif qui accompagne de telles périodes de changement”.’04
l02 WJNNICOTT, D. W., “The location of cultural experience”, International journal of psycho-analysis
48, 3, 1967, part 3, repnnt in Ptaying and reatisy, NY, Routledge, 1989, p. 99.
103 LOEWENBERG, Peter, Decoding the past: The psychohistorical approach, NY, Knopf Press, 1983,
pp. 41 - 42.
‘°4CHARRON, 1992, p. 127.
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lEs suggestion about the emergence of narcissism at just such points in history makes
sense:
La thèse de Lasch repose sur une conception du narcissisme contemporain comme
aboutissement logique du culte de l’individu inhérent à l’idéologie libérale qui
domine le développement du capitalisme depuis le XD(e siècle. Nous suggérons de
comprendre aussi l’émergence du narcissisme comme un phénomène lié à la crise
culturelle que traverse l’Occident; dans notre perspective, le narcissisme
accompagnerait les périodes de mutations civilisationnelles et ne saurait être réduit à
un trait de psychologie collective unique à notre génération post-industrielle.105
What Julian says at this point is very significant, then. From having been “very
sorrowfiul and reluctant to die”, she undergoes what I liold is a significant shift to assent:
“So I thought: Good Lord, is it no longer to your glory that I am alive? And my reason
and my sufferings told me that I should die; and with alt the wilt ofmy heart I assented
whotty to be as was God’s witt”. (ST 2, LT 3.) Given her prior condition of ambivalence
around living or dying, this assent to die (if it be God’ s will), signais a real, interior shift
from a condition of resistance to one of consent -- corne what may. In effect, I suggest that
this shift opens ber to become aware of or receptive to repressed feelings, thoughts and
fantasies which are beyond her control. Engaged as her religious visual imagination is in
beholding the crucifix, the shift to an interior condition of assent opens her to an experience
of psychospiritual death, even as it represents a consent actually to die. Vincent Gillespie
and Maggie Ross have observed the radicality of this shift wlien they speak of “the loss of
control that is a form of death” as the paradigm which the reader of Julian must also enter,
along with Julian herself, in order to put on the kenotic “mmd of Christ”.’06
Julian then says that she feit dead from lier waist down. Since Julian is so attentive
to lier feelings, lier description of “feeling dead” is stnkingly similar to Winnicott’ s clinical
descriptions of tlie contrast between feeling dead and feeling alive. Could this condition of
feeling disconnected from lier body -- at the very point at which she is about to die and, in
terms of the faith tradition slie wants to believe, be united witli God -- be a description of a
recapitulation to a condition caused by the repression of painful memories of separation?
Can we at least take from this description tliat lier feeling dead may reflect not only a
pliysical condition, but also be replicating the particular shape of a dissociated experience of
overwhelmingly painful viscissitudes of early narcissism and object i°7
105 CHARRON, 1992, p. 127. He is referring to the study by LASCH, Christopher, The culture of
narcissism, NY, Norton, 1978, 268 p.
106 GILLESPIE, Vincent and Maggie ROSS, “The apophatic image: The poetics of effacement in Julian of
Norwich”, in The medieval mystical tradition in England, ed. GLASSCOE, Marion, Cambridge, D. S.
Brewer, 1992, p. 60. Exeter symposium V.
107 Sec MEISSNER, 1984, p, x - xi.
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But the near death condition as limit situation, between life and death, would in any
event be an occasion in which, from an object relations theoretical perspective, entry into
transitional space activily assumes some pnor capacity for trust. As Winnicott is at pains to
show, activity in the transitional realm is only possible in an environment in which some
maternai mirroring presence is felt by the chuldlperson to exist, allowing the movement into
absorbed, desultory “play” activity. I take it from this that the limit situation ofthe
itÏness woutd not in itseif be the sufficient cause for movement into the transitionat
reatm to occur. Julian’ s assent to die, whule beholding the crucifix, is a consent to trust
both her lielplessness and lier religious imagination to the unseen Other, allowing the
movement into the transitional realm of the sliowings.
Julian’s profound surprise and disorientation at the initial shift into the visionary
world which opened before lier, suggests that on the one hand she was familiar with the
practice of meditating on the Passion narratives and images of the crucifix. The appearance
of the visions at that point of near death can be appropnately grasped and histoncally more
contextually understood if Julian were afready many years in the religious cultural practice
of tectio divina meditating on the texts and images of the life and Passion and death of
Christ, even if she were no longer actively seeking to have visions. Indeed, this practice
could even be seen to be a significant cultural element which helped to compensate for an
otherwise early lack of mirroring, trnstworthy environment which would encourage lier to
engage in transitional space.
On tlie other hand, the sudden explosion into the reaim of a visionaiy world that
was taking on a life of its own before lier suggests that she was flot one whose pnor
experience of prayer liad made lier at ease in this realm of free-flowing, uncontrolled,
visionaiy fantasy or illusion, as we saw in Julian’s restraint concerning the first two of the
tliree graces slie had requested of God in lier youtli. Her ambivalence to dying reveals a
similar resistance pattem. Again in this regard, it is significant tliat in ST 21 Julian is
lierself tlie first person to reduce the visionary material to tlie result of a condition of
“raving”, perhaps precisely because of tlieir spontaneous, uncontrolled appearance.
7.4.3 Interpretation of Julian’s eruption into transitional
space
Ail this gives the impression tliat witli the emption into the transitional space of the
visions, Julian’s tight control and self-judgment of lier feelings and desires in prayer and in
lier psycliological life is lost, as is the basis for lier trust in salvation, as slie liad previously
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understood ït in terms of intellectual assent to the teachings of Holy Church, and flot based
on feit knowledge.
With the illness as cntical context for lier reception of the visions, I suggest that we
might begin to look for this pattem of shifi from conflicted resistance to assent to loss of
control at significant intervals throughout the visions themselves, which begins to be
recognizable here in her dying state, as she is suspended in suffering between life and
death. What I am finding distinctive about this surprised shift into transitional space is that
it introduces a pattern of transformation from suffering, pain, and despair to a condition of
consolation, whicli in the course of the showings is continually related to the movement of
the eyes to gaze upon “the face of the crucifix” ($t 2) in lier dying moments, though
manifesting itself in different appearances. It is the shift from being at the brink of dying
(pliysically and in terrns of the ghostly or spiritual pains Julian associated with death), in a
mysterious moment of fusion witli the crucifix in the bodily condition of dying (and later of
reciprocated eye contact witli the face of the crucifix), to being transformed into a condition
of heaith, both physïcal and spiritual.
The pattern seems to include an extended penod of intense suffering (including
physical symptoms of pain and paralysis, but also emotional and spiritual ambivalence,
resistance and distress, with a seeking after discernment as to how to understand the
suffering). This is followed by a moment of eye contact with tlie face of the crucifix
(combined with an interior disposition of desire for compassion), at which there is a shift
into a state of restoration to emotional cairn (if flot “bliss”) and spiritual consolation. At this
point, it can only be observed in rndimentary outiine. I will retum to this however, again
and again as it develops and is reformed in the visions tliemselves.
What might this entry into the transitional space of her sliowings suggest about
Julian’s need for mirroring and its maturational development? What personal dynamics
miglit have brouglit Julian to begin that visual meditative practice which so favoured the
emergence of a visual, and relational encounter? I have argued above that there are signs
that she continued lier prayer life faithfully, but that she encountered difficulties, botli in the
form of conservative caution expressed by lier spiritual counsel and by the culturai context,
and in the form of internai psychological blocks to aliowing scripted meditations on the
Passion to take a spontaneous course. As she describes in SI 19, she often “feit nothing at
ail, .. . as barren and dry after [lier] prayers as before”. I have suggested here that the
mortal ilhiess functioned as a limit situation which, with tlie help of lier prior experience of
the religious tradition of meditation on the Passion, facilitated Julian’s shift into the
transitionai reaim of lier showings. Now I ask, what psycliodynamic elements of lier life
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context miglit we see fiinctioning in the breakthrough into the visionary transitional space at
that moment?
Specifically for this study, wliat pattems in the makeup of her psychodynamic
histoiy might have resonated with lier personal and cultural experience at that moment,
which then shaped the transformative visionary experience which was to emerge?
• Could a chronic lack of minoring others in lier early life have led lier to hunger for
mirroring and visual affirmation, have brouglit lier to an intense devoflonal practice
witli perfectiomstic religious aspirations? Could Julian’s seeking nourishment both in
practising tliese affective meditation disciplines and in receiving spiritual counsel in
tandem with this have provided a means to begin to address that mu-roring need in lier,
in ways she could not have foreseen?
• Could the illness itself have been as much precipitated by, as it was a stimulus for, a
traumatic experience in her life at that moment? And could that moment of assenting to
die have opened up a sense of mouming a “loss of meaning”? This loss of meaning, as
Homans says, would be at once personal (a lost chuldhood) and social (lier experience
of the Church’ s teaching on salvation and theological neglect of its people in critical
need of consolation).
• Could this moment have brouglit to light a profound dissonance in her experience
between wliat she had been tauglit to think about the Church’s teaching on sin,
damnation and salvation, and what she had been taught tofeel about it?
• Could tins dissonance be a recapitulation of an experience (or repeated experiences) of
pain and suffering due to loss, neglect and isolation in lier life in infancy and again later
in lier life, which slie unconsciously associated with the Cliurch’ s descriptions of tlie
pain of sin and exclusion from salvation?
• Could tliese be significant psychohistorical elements winch together predisposed lier --
in lier moments suspended between life and deatli when she was presented witli the
crucifix to behold, that symbol so rich yet ambiguous witli meaning -- to move
dramatïcally into the transitional space of lier visionary experience? Again, “the
response to loss [of meaning of religious symbolsi opens up the transitional space,
whicli is both social and historical, and in this space persons construct a bridge of
symbols between inner and social worlds through fantasy and its implicitly narrative
cliaracter”.’°8
108 HOMANS, Peter, The abitity to mourn: Disillusionment and the social origins of psychoanatysis,
Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1989, p. 333.
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Looked at in this way, I suggest that these elements could together make for a very
powerful cocktail to account for Julian’s spontaneous and dramatic entry into visionaiy
experience, and for the singularity of lier desire to see Jesus and appropnate bis saving
work in a way which more adequately resonated with lier situation and lier need.
Through this interpretive lens, the illness as context for tlie visionary experience
need flot be seen as merely a psychobiological trauma, nor does it need to imply a
psychopathological condition. I suggest that the context of that limit experience may be
said to have produced a recapitulation of an early chuldhood psychodynamic crisis (with
physical and a variety of other symptoms of suffering), now with an added crisis in
sotenological meaning, a condition of profound pre-oedipal and soteriological dissonance
evoking a fundamental, unconscious terror of deatli as exclusion and abandonment. I
propose that it was this that slie liad previously resisted, repressed and souglit to control by
every possible means. By assenting to die, she was admitting her powerlessness over it
and entering unknown territory.
$ . O A portrait of Julian’s early, pre-visionary soteriological assumptions
On tlie basis of the foregoing review of literature and speculation as to some of the
early patterns in Julian’ s psychodynamic histoiy, is there evidence of the shape of Julian’ s
soteriological beliefs early on in lier life, pnor to the visions? Are there, reflected in her
pre-visionaiy aspirations and anxiety, signs of incoherence between her intellectual assent
to the teacliing of Holy Church and lier emotional beliefs about where slie stands as she
prepares to face lier own “doomsday”?
First, the idea she held that service to God in lier youth, and cumulatively with age,
would contribute toward her salvation seems to have led lier to be ambivalent about
whether to live or die. Her salvation would seem to be based on wliat she does, flot wlio
she is, and this idea of service could have the effect of implying that no good work is good
enough. Presumably what she does, then, can neyer be enougli. I observe this religious
scrupulosity in ST 13 and LT 27 where she wondered, in a condition of longing (whicli
she sees in the visions is to be shunned, because it leads lier to mourning and sorrowing
unreasonably, lacking discretion) wliy the beginmng of sin was flot prevented, “for if there
had been no sin, we should ail have been pure....” I propose to see this as a due to her
suffering an ubiquitous, lieavy sense of sinfulness... as thougli lier sou! “had been in pain
or prison”. ($T 19.) Indeed, though she is in a state of contrition, she expresses fear of
God being angry at lier because of the same sin for whicli she has contrition, and makes
confession and does other good deeds in order to appease God’s anger. (ST 19.) Looked
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at in this light, there is a sense in the pre-visionary Julian, despïte ail lier service to God and
lier good works, of lier feeling doomed to fail.
Related to this is lier recognition which also cornes to her only after the visions, of a
pnor belief that God is somehow seen as responsible for sin. This belief resuits in an
oppressiveiy heavy sense that sin is ubiquitous, that “nothing” in effect “will be well”. We
are far from the chirpy descriptions of Julian as “optimist”, here. Compare Bauerschmidt
here who says:
The key theological problematic with whicli [JulianJ wrestles -- how it could be
truc that ‘aile shalle be wete’if some are damned, excluded from enclosure in
God’s goodness -- is a question of how the boundaries of salvation are
delimited.109
In light of the present smdy, this statement would include the pre-visionary Julian, more
explicitiy than does Bauerschmidt’s wording, in that condition of helpless exclusion
outside the boundaries of salvation.
Second, I have charactenzed the youthful, pre-visionary Julian as one who is a
religious perfectionist, seeking to lie as Abbott cails lier a “speciai case”, in effect a
“religious narcissist” whose desire for speciai spiritual expenence is focused on herseif as
agent, and her own personal salvatîon. I have noted what I perceive to be lier tendency to
isolation and seif-sufficiency, which would, under the circumstances of lier extreme need,
be extremely painful. And as Abbott lias shown, the pre-visionary Julian was driven by a
sense of her personal pain seeking personal salvationlunion with Christ. Perhaps a painful
sense of isolation, and a privatized understanding of salvation may not be unrelated: There
is a sense of isolation or distance between lierseif and others -- including God. Julian of
Norwich before the visions is flot explicitly aware of or pnmarily concemed about
corporate pain, the pain of others. Nor can the pre-visionary Julian “feel” the pain of the
cmcified Lord. Her request, on entering the transitional space, is for the second wound of
compassion. She intends this to be a desire to have compassion with Christ’s loyers, the
first disciples, for Jesus’ suffering. Could this request however open up a tacit request of
God to have compassion on lier?
finally, the overwhelming pain of coming into an experience of moumîng over
which she had no control, is the situation for whicli slie needed a soteriological answer or
response. This pain of feeling powerless in the face of ioss of meaning had many levels,
physical, psychological, relational and spiritual. But somehow the pain of that very
powerlessness was tied up with the pain she associated with sin and ultîmate exclusion
from God’s love. This was the dissonance which drove lier, as we will sec, to seek greater
BAUERSCHMIDT, 1999, p. 79.
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understanding of the peculiar pain of sin and to discover that seeing it in Jesus’s sight was
essential to knowing how she should behold herseif in the sight of God.
One side of the hypothesis of this chapter is that Julian’s early experience of object
relations and narcissistic need for mirroring can to some extent be traced in her text. The
other side of the hypothesis would be that lier sotenological assumptions and appropriation
of them would reflect aspects of lier early experience of object relations and mirroring need
as well.
Wliat then might be the “situation” of her early experience of object relations and
mirroring we see reflected in lier appropriation of these soteriological beliefs?
The situation of the earlïest stages of infancy is charactenzed by vulnerability,
lielplessness and utter dependence on the maternai presence, in order to form a sense of
trust in the reliability of the maternai environment and then of other environments, and to
begin to negotiate a sense of nascent self in relation to other.
Julian’ s early soteriological beliefs as presented here would suggest that it is this
earliest situation which bas flot been adequately grounded in Julian’s history. To be
vuinerable, helpless, utterly dependent on the other is, in the terms of the soteriological
assumptions Julian seems to have appropriated early on, flot a safe condition to be in.
Hence evolves the shame response to this condition, and its masking in pattems of control,
perfectionism, etc. In other words, pattems reflective of a false self organization based on
shame produce both a false self-understanding (as seif-sufficient, yet submissive, etc.) and
a false godobject (the god whose expectations must, yet cannot, be met, and thus whose
anger needs to, yet cannot, be appeased).
A process of mourning of the false self and its organization, and an increasing
acceptance into consciousness of the “situation” of the (female) infant’ s narcissist and
object relational needs for mirroring in a condition of dependence, vulnerability and
helplessness, is in therapeutic terms, the saving work.
Ruether briefly traces the outiine of feminist theological studies of Julïan’s
understanding of sin and redemption.11° She, too, articulates Julian’s understanding of her
concept of sin, reflective of ber situation as a woman, as recognized in “pain”, and then
shows how Julian’s visions led her into an understanding of God’s redemption of
humankind which responds to the needs of one in that situation. Ruether writes:
‘° RUETHER, Rosematy Radford, Women and redemption: A theotogicat histo,y, Minneapolis MN,
fortress Press, 1998, pp. 104- 111, drawing on BAKER, 1994, pp. 63- 106; JANTZEN, 1987, pp. 190-
196;Joan NUTH, Wisdom’s daughter: The theotogy offutian ofNorwich, NY, Crossroad, 1991, pp. 43-72.
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In sharp contrast to the Augustinïan view of sin as overweening pnde and
concupiscence, Julian views our bondage to sin primarily as our entrapment in an
overwhelming sense of fear and worthlessness and as manifest in pain, not
pleasure. But once we glimpse God’s continuing love and our own worth in God’s
eyes, we can become secure in our trust in God. Our wounds can become our
medïcines for growth in contrition, compassion for our fellow Christians, and
reunion with God and with our own true selves.11’
The question which the present study addresses is: How does Jesus save? in Julian
of Norwich’s $howings. This chapter bas attempted to amplify our understanding of the
situation Julian was in, both psychodynamically and soteriologically, prior to the time of
ber visions and ber subsequent years of reflection on them. The following diptychs will
attempt to put flesh on how Julian might be said to have corne to “glimpse God’s
continuing love and [ber] own worth in God’s eyes” and how that describes Jesus’ saving
work and ber appropriation of it in the Showings.
9.0 Conclusion
Evidence from comparing differences between the Short Text and the Long Text
descriptions of ber pre-visionary life and situation suggests the profile of the pre-visionary
Julian as baving had an early history of lack of adequate mirroring. This is reflected in
signs of perfectionistic aspiration, anxiety and ambivalence, and object bunger. Some
indication of a compensatory mirroring relationship is suggested, perhaps with the religious
person she mentions in both texts as coming to see her during her illness, and as a resuit of
medieval devotional meditation practices. This profile is further correlated with a perceived
pattem of distorted, ambivalent affectivity conceming her beliefs about the possibility of
salvation.
RUETHER, 1998, p. 111, emphasis added.
CHAPTER 6
INTRODUCTION TO THE DIPTYCHS
1.0 Orientation to the diptycli format
Until now, this smdy has focused primarily on examining possible traces of an
early psychobiographical portrait of Julian of Norwich. The following chapters however,
will be engaging this background material in two distinct, yet interrelated ways. Each of
these can be considered as an application of the method of mutually cnflcal correlation.
First, Heinz Kohut’ s psychoanalytic discourse of three phases in the therapeutic
mirroring transference is used as a hermeneutical tool to examine the motivation for, and
the process of, Julian’s maturation in lier pre-oedipal need for mirroring. In a second
move, the material will then be looked at through the liberation hermeneutical lens of
Elizabeth Johnson’ s three phase structure of conversion to explore the function of
mirroring in the soteriology of Julian’ s $howings. In the final chapter the resuits of this
double examinaflon will be further correlated with themes in contemporaiy soteriologicai
thought and suggest how they might respond to the some of the important exigencies of the
situation in sotenology today.
In the first instance I will be continuing the psychobiographical application of the
relational psychoanalytic discourse on mirroring to the writings of Julian of Norwich begun
in the previous chapter on the pre-visionaiy Julian. But in the second instance, the resuits
of the psychobiographical study will be extended, as it were, back onto Julian’s $howings
to explore the contours and evolution of the function of mirroring in Julian’s soteriology.
Because of the double nature of this correlation and because of the relatively
undeveloped condition of the dialogue between relational psychoanalysis and soteriology, I
have chosen to develop these themes in the form of three diptychs. Each application of
Kohut’ s three phases of the therapeutic mirroring transference to Julian’ s showings will be
coupled with each of Johnson’s three movements in lier feminist liberaflonist dynamic of
appropriation as conversion experience. In this way the first haif of each diptych will lead
into the second half.
The material in the Showings which is examined in relation to cadi of these three
diptychs corresponds to what we know of the chronology of Julian’s writing of the two
texts. In the first diptych, it is primarily the early cliapters of Julian’s Short Text (and their
differences from those in the Long Text version) which is the focus. The second diptych
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explores similarities and differences in material whicli is common to both the Short Text
and the Long Text, and therefore exciudes from any sustained focus the account of the
exemptum in LT 51 and the subsequent theological reflections. The third diptycli focuses
on die Long Text material which is flot in the Short Text. The primary focus liere is the
exemptum, as this is where the mirroring action is most dynamically developed, but it also
ificorporates the Christ our Mother and trinitanan theological reflections.
I am convinced that Julian herseif would approve of this methodology, insofar as
she regarded the showings as given flot just to lier, but tlirough her to lier even (fellow)
Chrisflans. This is her way of saying that she desired that Christians in every generaflon
appropriate the mysteries of the meaning of the showings that were revealed to lier “for the
profit of many others” (ST 6) so that we also might know that “it is [God’ s] will that we
know tliem”. (LT 34.)
I will now outiine eacli of the two correlational approaches more explicitly as they
will be developed across tlie tliree diptyclis.
1. 1 The relational psychoanalytic psychobiographical correlation
Tlie first of tliese approaches consists in exarnining Julian’s Showings from a
Koliutian self psychological perspective, to explore how Julian engages in and works
through a mirroring transference witli tlie Jesus of lier showings. Tlie first cliapter of each
of the three diptychs, (i.e., chapters 7, 9 and 11) will be structured around Kohut’s
understanding of the three phases in the therapeutic development of a mirroring
transference (that is, resistance to entering into a mirroring transference, working through
narcissistic rage and disillusionment, and lastly relinquïshing tlie mirroring transference),
as a means of conceptualizing the process of radical transformation which I hold is taking
place in Julian’ s self- and God understanding. While I will continue here and in the
following chapters as in the previous chapter to recognize the histoncal embeddedness of
lier texts in the religious conventions of the time, I will seek to tease out, from tlie elements
she borrows from that background and lier unique use of tliem, what they might also have
to teil us about Julian’s psychobiographical condition. This may provide confirmation for
tlie psychobiographical liypothesis that Julian suffered profound maternai neglect in lier
earliest stages of life.
This study proposes tliat the sliowings reveal evidence of the healing and indeed
maturation of her mirroring need. What the study will be looking for are signs that what
begins as a mirroring transference witli more archaic features undergoes transformation into
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one with greater flexibility and differentiation in relationsfflp, characterized by features of
mature narcissism ami object relations.’
1 .2 The liberation hermeneutic soteriological correlation
Secondly, just as the psychoanalytic correlation of mirroring in Julian’ s $howings
will be found in the first chapter of each of the three diptychs, 80 also the soteriological
correlation will be developed in the the second chapter of each diptych In particular,
Elizabeth Johnsons’ s understanding of the three phases of a liberation theological
hermeneutic of appropriation of salvation, which she describes as a conversion process,
will provide a backbone for the soteriological correlation, in chapters 8, 10 and 12.
In the chapter 8, I draw on Sebastian Moore’ s soteriological study, informed as it is
by object relations theory, of what is at work in desire, resistance, healing and
transformation in the spiritual and psychological life, as a starting point for bnnging
contemporary theological discourse into dialogue with Julian’s description of her entry into
the visionary experience. Particularly, Moore will help with the identification of the contrast
experience in Julian’ s soteriological crisis. In chapter 10, Cynthia Crysdale’ s sensitive
feminist rereading of Moore will provide a contemporary discourse for helping to identify a
credible feminine expression of the dynamic of dying to ego in Julian’s conversion,
1 Meissner and Wolski Conn have observed that this type of psychoanalytic correlation leaves open the
relation between psychological maturity and holiness. As Wolski Conn puts it in her study of structural
developmental stages of maturation in Thérèse de Lisieux,
to be hoiy is to love God and neighbor with one’s whole heart, with the fullness of whatever
developmental stage one bas reached. Thus, one can be holy in a more or less mature way.
Nevertheiess, the great spiritual teachers promote cooperation with grace by choices for greater
self-knowledge and sunendering love, ail of which also characterize this model of psychological
matunty and reinforce the mysterious working of grace with nature.
WOLSKI CONN, Joann, “Thérèse de Lisieux: Far ftom spiritual childhood”, Spiritus 6, 2006, p. 70; and
MEISSNER, William, Ignatius Loyota: Psychotogy ofa saint. NH, Yale University Press, 1991, 480 p.
In language which sounds very much like Sebastian Moore she continues:
Each phase of development is a process of maldng the meaning of self and others through
balancing the two basic human longings for independence and attachment. It is flot a matter of
either autonomy or attachment but of how the balance of both will tilt through our choices in each
of these different “stages” or ways of viewing reality.
WOLSM CONN, 2006. p. 70, emphasis in text. Wolski Conn draws on a theoretical framework for
discerning structurai psychological development proposed by Elizabeth Liebert and based on psychologists
Robert Kegan, Jane Loevinger and others, wbich is different from the one used here. See LffiBERT,
Elizabeth, “The thinking heart: Developmental dynamics in Etty Hillesum’ s Diaries”, Pastorat psychotogy
43, 1995, pp. 393 - 409; and by the same author, Changing ltfe patterns: Adutt development in spirituat
direction’ St. Louis MI, Chalice Press, 2000, 225 p. In a sense, in using Kohut and Winnicott to
examine issues of mirroring, I am drawing more on Meissner’s object relations psychoanalytic
methodology than on a psychological mode! of normal maturation, even though both involve structural
developmental patterns.
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specïfically in Julian’s revision of her understanding of what sin is and how saivatïon
effectively responds to sin in the human condition. After looking at Julian tbrough the eyes
of Crysdale, this second part of the sotenological conelation begins to look for retrievals. I
look for sources in the traditions from which Julian herseif may have retrieved.
Specifically in this context, I will look at symbolism from the anchontic tradition and the
metaphor of the mirror in English medieval mystical tradition, as well as how Julian
reverses the Anselmian logic of satisfaction. In the final chapter 12, I will develop the
soteriological ramifications of Elisabeth Koenig’ s study of the mirroring function of the
face of the lord in the exemplum for articulating in Julian terms what is traditionally called
the objective salvific work of Christ and the subjective appropriation of that work. It is in
this last chapter that the thesis cornes together. I hold that in its maturest expression in the
exemptum the function of minoring in Christ govems both the development of lier
subjective appropriation of salvation and the dynamism of Christ’s objective saving work
in the Showings.
1.3 Toward retrieving Julian’s soteriology for today
finally, the material generated in this double study of the maturation of mirroring in
Julian will be correlated with themes in the contemporary problem of soteriological
credibility with the hope of rendering Julian’s soteriology more recognizable and available
as a contemporary response. Julian’s soteriology is only beginning to be recognized and
affirmed for the capacity of its narrative and theological reflection to engage us, the
postmodern seeker, in imagination, prayer, and significant theological dialogue about the
hurnan predicament(s) we expenence and about what would constitute one or more credible
Christian soteriological response(s) to that predicament.2
2 ANDERSON, Derek, “Julian of Norwich’s nonviolent account of salvation”, Ph.D. dissertation, Loyola
University, Chicago IL, 2005, 269 p.; BAKER, Denise N., Julian ofNorwich’s $howings: From vision to
book, Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 1994, 215 p.; BAUERSCHMIDT, Fredenck, Jutian of
Norwich and the mystical body politic of Christ, Notre Dame, Indiana, Notre Dame University Press,
1999, 290 p.; BOZAK-DELEO, Lillian, “The sotenology ofJulian of Norwich”, in Theology and the
univers ity, APCZYNSKI, John ed., Lanham, MD, University press of America, 1990, pp. 37 - 44;
BRÀDLEY, Ritamary, “Julian of Norwich, everyone’s mystic”, in Mysticism and spirituality in ,nedievat
England, POLLARD, William and Robert BOENIG, eds., Cambridge, D. S. Brewer, 1997, pp. 139 - 158;
RIDE, Kerrie, Gtfted origins to gracedfulflhlment: The soteriotogy ofJutian ofNorwich, Collegeville MN,
Liturgical Press, 2001, 233 p.; and RIDE, Kerrie, “The parable ofthe lord and the servant: A soteriology
for our times”, Pacifica Australian theologicat studies 10, 1997, pp. 53 - 69; JANTZEN, Grace, Jutian of
Norwich, mystic and theotogian, London, SPCK, 1987, 229 p.; NUTH, Joan, Wisdom’s daughter: The
theology of Jutian of Norwich, NY, Crossroad, 1991, 217 p.; and also by NUTH, “Two medieval
soteriologies: Anseim of Canterbury and Julian of Norwich”, Theotogicat studies, 53, 1992, pp. 611 -
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Since this correlation is addressed only in the final chapter of this thesis, this can
only be a beginning of such a correlation. Julian’s Showings touch on virtually every
theme in contemporary soteriology. Four of these are named but only two of these are
being addressed wïth any depth in the present study: 1) the problem of the meaning of the
cross and Christ’s Passion and death as saving work, and 2) the theme of salvation as
revelation, and the exigency that salvation be real and able to be expenenced in this life,
which raises the question of the relation between objective and subjective soteriology.
2.0 Ihe human predicament
Julian says, once, late in her Long Text, that she
understood no greater stature in this life than childhood.... For the chuld does flot
naturally despair of the mother’ s love, the child does flot naturally rely upon itself,
naturally the child loves the mother and either of them the other. (LT 63.)
How did she get here, both psychobiographically and soteriologically? Is this pathology or
maturity? What is the human predicament for Julian which needed salvation? What is the
salvific work of God in Christ in Julian’s visionary soteriology, and how did she
appropriate it, such that she was enabled to corne (as this thesis argues) to prophetic human
maturity in childiike dependence? And how can this speak to us now?
The human predicament identified in Julian’s $howings is one ofrelational
dependency combined with vulnerability to profound violation of trust, as is the case of
infants, chiidren and aduits in systemic psychological and societal situations of neglect and
abuse. I suggest that Julian’s texts reveal her to have experienced this human predicament
largely as normal until she was ushered into the visionary world of the showings, at which
point she experienced what I am calling a pre-oedipal soteriological crisis in that it
manifests issues of shame and self worthlessness rather than oedipal issues of guilt.
This crisis, I suggest, was brought to consciousness, or at least became
recognizable, in the confusion around suffering, sin and whether saïvation was possible,
which the showings elicited in lier. Julian’ s is not initially a problem of coming to terms
with guilt for past actions, as it was for example with Augustine. Julian’ s is a much more
subtie problem. What 5 5m when, fully expecting to be overwhelmed and condemned by
its presence in the showings, she can’t see it? Arid what, then, is the purpose of suffering
contrition, penance and physical pain for what she tliought was sin? Julian’s attentiveness
to the showings leads her into uncharted waters. Secret sins, which are of a much more
645; PALLISER, Margaret Ann, Christ our inother of mercy: Divine rnercy and compassion in the
theotogy ofthe Shewings ofJutian ofNorwich, NY, Walter de Gruyter, 1992, 262 p.
190
pre-oedipal character, are revealed as her more chronic challenge. These bring her to a new
awareness of who Christ is, who she is and greater compassion for the lot of the rest of
humankind in this condition. Her crisis is resolved in a life transformed over the years by
lier relationship with God in the Christ of her showings. The crisis, brouglit to
consciousness in the first showings of Christ’ s Passion, as well as its resolution reflected
in the meanings of the exemptum of the lord and the servant, are expressed in terms of
profound interiority and yet also having liberative social consequences yet to be fully
plumbed. This study will explore one particular thread running through the reformation of
soteriological symbolism in her showings and years of meditative reflection on them, that
is, the mirroring dynamic of the face of God in Christ.3
Perhaps the linldng thread among aIl three discourses (relational psychoanalysis,
feminism and the tradition of soteriology) could be said to be the search for a soteriology
which responds both healingly and liberatively to the situation of child abuse as
characteristic of the human predicament for which Christ’ s saving work must offer a
credible answer.4 This understanding of the human situation must engage earliest infancy
in which the effects of chronic neglect and abandonment are subtle, yet traumatic and
systemic. 0f course it also engages the situation of violent physical and sexual abuse, and
how this can become even more clearly social, systemic sin when linked with issues of
poverty, racism, etc.
It responds to the human situation of utter vulnerability, fragility and dependence,
the need for empathic, trnstworthy parental care, the suffering which is associated with the
neglect, abandonment and violation of trust in the child’s condition of dependency, and the
debilitating consequences of such trauma for the possibility of healing and growth into
mature dependency in psychological and spiritual development. It asks the question what
sin looks tike in the effects (as distinct from the causes) of innocent suffering.
It is flot difficuit to see that the human predicament of fragiity and utter dependence
is the primary human condition of infants, male and female, rich and poor alike, coming
into the world. But if the needs for the spiritual correlative of a reliable holding
environment and an empathic mirroring maternai relation are flot only flot met but
About the social liberative consequences, two recent works stand out: BAUERSCHMIDT, 1999, 290 p.,
on Julian’s imagining the polïtical; and ANDERSON, 2005, 268 p.
Compare this with Elizabeth Johnson’s statement: “For me, the goal of feminist religious discourse
pivots in its fullness around the flourishing of poor women of color in violent situations”. JOHNSON,
Elizabeth, She who is: The rnystery of God infeminist theotogical discourse, NY, Crossroad, 1992, p. 11.
On the one hand, her articulation is historically and socially grounded in the experience of those on the
underside of history, but on the other, it does flot explicitly address the situation of “cosmic child abuse” in
the tradition ofjuridical soteriologies.
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systematically witheld, this can be seen to instail a false sense of self and with it a profound
confusion as what suffering is supposed to mean.5 Sebastian Moore’ s soteriological
response to this confusion around suffenng as a function of “muddled religious thinking”
will be explored more fully below in his psychoanalytic soteriology. Male and female
differences in the presentation of this false self must be distinguished, hence the need to
attend to the neglected feminine face of narcissism, as well as the effects on women of
systemic neglect in Christian patriarchy.
But this predicament also responds to the situation within the tradition of
soteriology itself, which has led to an effective history of teaching that God is angry and in
effect flot tmstworthy, and therefore that there is no salvific meaning possible in being
dependent on God, particularly for those who have suffered at the hands of those who have
been authorized to teach and transmit this tradition, but also for their oppressors.6 This
coming together of discourses seeks to respond to this double-sided situation by looking at
Julian’s $howings to explore how Christ’s saving work works for her, how she
appropriated it, and how it might speak coherently and credibly to those who can recognize
themselves in this condition in our own day.
Historically, Anselmian soteriological theory was a significant development ftom
the ransom theory to which Anseim was responding, which had made saivation a kind of
deal between God and satan and lefi humanitind a sort of pawn in the drama. Anseim
responded to a need in that context for greater focus on the responsibility of the Christian
person for sin, and to that extent bis satisfaction theoiy took human anthropology more
seriously. This is perhaps more obvious in the affective prayer tradition which Anseim
initiated, focusing on the humanity of Christ.
It would be a signifieant study to explore why Anseim’ s prayer life and bis
theology came to speak such different languages, and more significantly, what
consequences that has had for soteriology. For Anseim belief was necessary for
experience and for theology to arise out of experience. And yet as William Loewe writes
“the quest for that experience moves many of Anselm’s prayers in a direction opposite that
of the Proslogion”.7
On the systemic nature of this violence from a relational psychoanalytic perspective see for example Alice
MILLER, Thou shatt flot be aware: Society’s betrayal ofthe chitd, NY, Meridian, 1990, 329 p.
6 See Elizabeth Johnson on “scotosis”. JOHNSON, 1992, pp. 13 - 14.
LOEWE, William, “By way of introduction: Sebastian Moore, Anseim and friends”, in Jesus cructfied
and risen: Essays in spirituatity and theology in honor of Dom Sebastian Moore, eds. LOEWE William
and Vernon GREGSON, 1998, pp. vi - vii.
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On the one hand, Anseim seeks in solitary meditation the grace to feel what by faith
lie knows to be true. Anseim wrote “Lord, let me taste by love what I taste by
knowledge”.8 Loewe says of this Anseim, that “[wJhen that grace is granted, prayers of
this type open a space in which faith’s affirmations penetrate the imagination and shape
one’ s affective life”.
On the other hand however,
the opening chapters of the Prostogion... begin with Anselm’ s fervent quest for the
experience of union with God. Soon, however, they register a shift. First
gradually, and then torrentially, prayerful recollection cedes to a different dynamic
that moves Anseim out of prayer and into a quite distinct pattem of consciousness.
Instead of abiding quietly in God, Anseim gives himself up to bis intellect’s restless
desire to understand how it is that what he believes about the God whose face he
seeks is true.9
In the feudal society everyone knew their place and their responsibility to their
supenor. So to speak of human responsibility for sin was a meaningful response in that
social situation of order. But by the fourteenth centuiy, the feudal system was falling apart
and the centre could no longer hoÏd. To hold to the same view that humanldnd shouÏd
know its responsibility in tins radically liminal, overwhelmingly chaotic time, was to
inspire collective confusion as to the mearnng of suffering and one’s responsibility for sin.
The problem for women was compounded however, in that within the tradition women had
been marginalized, neglected and blamed as responsible for sin. So in a systemic sense, I
suggest, their situation consciously or otherwise was ail the more more comparable to that
of child abandonment and abuse. The suffering of tins nature is the effect of innocent
suffering, well-described by Wendy Farley as radical suffering:
Radical suffering is present when the negatÎvity of a situation is expenenced as an
assault on one’ s personhood as such.... this assault reduces the capacity of the
sufferer to exercise freedom, to feel affection, to hope, to love God.... In radical
suffering the soul itself has been so crippled that it cari no longer defy evil. The
destruction of the human being is so complete that even the shred of dignity that
might demand vindication is extinguished.’°
Beverly Lanzetta describes tins suffering, as experienced systemically by women, as a
form of spiritual violence inflïcting a soul wound:
Elusive and difficult to grasp, spiritual violence invades the integrity of a woman’s
psyche and soul at sucli a pnmary level that most women cannot recognize or name
what lias harmed them. Unable to identify the source of their pain, women ofien
blame themselves and develop strategies to protect their oppressors. Tins quality of
8 ST. ANSELM, “Meditation on human redemption”, in The prayers and meditations of Saint Anseim,
transi., WARD, Benedicta, NY, Penguin, 1973, p. 237.
LOEWE, 1998, p. vi.
‘° FARLEY, Wendy, Tragic vision and divine compassion: A contemporary theodicy, Louisville KY,
Westminster John Knox Press, 1990, pp. 53 - 55. Quoted in JOHNSON, 1992, p. 249.
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soul suffering, which survives at the cost of women’ s spiritual dimimshment,
inflicts on women an unequal burden of sin and blame. Thus, witliout
understanding the subtie ways in wliich lier soul is violated and the fierceness that
marks the site of lier affliction, a woman cannot resolve lier inner conflict. Often
unspoken, denied, and ridiculed, or dismissed as unimportant and emotional,
women’ s soul wounds must be brought to consciousness to avoid tlie trivialization
of tlieir experience and for healing to occur. It is in tlieir anguish and despair,
sorrow and betrayal, rage and tears tliat women [moveJ beyond fragmentation and
false passivity to wholeness and empowerment.
We know now tliat the child in lis or her earliest condition of powerlessness and
dependence, desires to trust the parent wliether or flot the parent is tmstworthy. Where tlie
parent ïs unable to respond adequately to the dhuld’ s needs, a cliild will take on a sense of
responsibility for the parent and intemalize an overdeveloped sense of responsibility. Thus
satisfaction theory, as it lias been put to use in tlie tradition, has had the effect of
reinforcîng botli the confusion and suffering of women (and men) living out of a false
sense of self. Wliat relational psydlioanalysis is lielping us to understand is that there can
be no appropriation of the true self, or tlie development of a capacity for taldng appropriate
responsibility for one’ s actions, before tliese pre-oedipal needs are given a way to be
recognized and healed. Wlien salvation is looked at from the perspective of tlie vulnerabiity
of the abused, it is this healing, involving its own brand of redemptive suffering
(Winnicott’s and Koliut’s notion of disillusionment, Homans’ understanding of mouming,
and Moore’s notion of “ego-deatli”, as tliese are expressed in women’s experience) in an
empathic mirroring relation which becomes tlie means for potential conversion.
Theologically, feminists are clear that the soteriological tradition associated with tlie
language of atonement (expiation, satisfaction), wliïch was intended to help women and
men appropriate salvation in Christ, lias effectively served to produce profound confusion
around what is redemptive about suffering, thus perpetuating false self structures and
legitimizing abusive suffering of women.
This is tlie situation which renders incredible in our day so much of Anselmian
atonement tlieory and the judicial imagery of it and subsequent Reformation formulations.
Not only does it flot describe adequately tlie human situation of vuinerable dependence and
tlie systemic violation of trust, it also renders the salvific work of Christ incredible. Rita
Nakasliima Brock argues tliat “[s]uch doctrines of salvation reflect by analogy, I believe,
LANZE’ITA, Beverly, Radical wisdorn: A feminist mysticat theotogy, Minneapolis MN, Fortress, 2005,
p. 72.
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images of the neglect of chuidren or, even worse, chuld abuse, maldng it acceptable as
divine behavior -- cosmic chitd abuse, as it were”.’2
Hence this predicament requires that the saving work of Christ be coherent and
credible to those for whom trust (necessaiy for growth in self worth) lias been violated and
rendered incredible. My hypothesis is that in this close reading of Julian’ s
psychobiography and its correlation with a liberation hermeneutical reading of lier
appropriation of the saving work of Christ, by means of lier mirroring relationship with tlie
Jesus of lier sliowings, lies a key to understanding botli tlie evolution of lier understanding
of the saving work of Christ and its coherence with how tliat saving work is appropriated,
in a way wliich is unique in the liistory of Christian soteriology, and, can speak to our
present postmodem situation, particularly to those on the underside of liistory.
6.0 Introduction to cadi diptycli
6.1 The first diptych
I will begin cliapter 7 of tlie first diptycli with a summary of the first of tlie three
phases through whicli we can see the therapeutic process of maturation of mirroring needs
in Kohutian self psychology. Tliis first stage requires an overcoming of resistance to enter
into a mirroring transference with a trusted, empathic Otlier, and is a prerequisite for there
to be an experience of disillusionment and mouming, experienced as a kind of exposure to
tlie archaic prestructures, or false self. I reiterate as well tlie four movement responses
which Homans appropriates from Schaclitel to describe the dynamics which signal the
presence of mouming, not only the loss of sense of self but also tlie loss of meaning of the
cultural symbol of the crucifix as expressing the relation between sin and suffenng. This
chapter then goes on to examine the first therapeutic phase of maturation in mirroring needs
as this developmental procedure highlights a pattem in Julian of resistance shifiing to assent
to entering into the most archaic mirroring transference, that is, fusion, witli the suffering
Christ of the showings in the Short Text.
I explore two moments of Julian’ s first entiy into tlie transitional realm. First I
examine her initial shifts in bodily feelings from resistance into assent, which lead into her
showings. The bodily feelings evoke pre-oedipal associations with Winnicott’s concept of
tlie holding environment. Then I explore lier bodily sight of the Passion which becomes
alive as she enters the transitional realm of beholding the crucifix. Her bodily siglit of the
12 BROCK, Rita Nakashima, Journeys by heart: A christology of erotic power, NY, Crossroad, 1988, p.
56, emphasis added.
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crucifix is characterized as merged or fusional, and the anchorhold is identified as a
possible holding environment enabling this experience. It is Julian’ s request for the wound
of compassion (rather than contrition) which is responded to in the empathic bodily sight of
the kenotic, suffering Jesus of her showings. The disorientation of feeling both mouming
and comfort gives rise in Julian to confusion.
With this in hand, I will tum in the second chapter in this dyptich, chapter 8, to
explore how her condition on entering the showings contributes to what I will describe as
her experience of soteriological contrast. Thus, the second part of this dyptich will engage
an exploration of Julian’ s expenence of contrast, that is, what I propose to call lier pre
oedipal soteriological crisis of meamng with regard to what she had previously
appropriated from the tradition conceming sin and her destiny, now in light of the
showings. It is at this point that I will begin to draw for help explicitly on the soteriology of
Sebastian Moore for this correlation. His identification of a fundamental confusion in the
Christian tradition around the meaning of suffering and his distinction between dying to sin
and Jesus’ death to ego correspond well I suggest with what seems to be at work in
Julian’ s confusion.
6.2 The second diptych
The first chapter in the second diptych, that is chapter 9, will explore with Kohut
how Julian’s two texts, the Short Text and the Long Text, give signs of lier shift into the
second therapeutic phase in the maturation of mirroring needs, that is, of the “worldng
through” the disillusionment of the archaic narcissistic prestructures of both grandiosity
and shame/despair througli an empathic confrontation with reality by the mirroring other.
This exposure makes possible the appropriation of a truer sense of self distinct from her
experience of fragmented feelings, and the identification of two secret sins. I hold that
Julian experiences this true self first of ail as empty and depnved but constituted
relationally, botli exposed and affirrned in the sight of the compassionate mirroring Other.
Julian’s images of mutual beholding develop the theme of the compassionate suffering of
the kenotic Christ and bis transformation into joy as ftinctioning to minor Julian’s own
healing and transformation. Finally, I propose that lier images of mutual bodily enclosure
with Christ signal lier working through the fusion toward a more flexible mirroring
transference with the Jesus of lier sliowings.
In chaper 10, the second chapter of the second diptych, I draw on Cynthia
Crysdale’ s feminist appropriation of Moore’ s work to flesli out wliat sin and salvation look
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like from the side of the dispossessed. In particular, I correlate Julian’ s astounding
revision of the Church’s teaching on sin with Crysdale’s “double-sided approach to
redemption” of “accepting both the pain and the responsibility for new life”.’3 In the case of
women, sin, for Crysdaie, needs to be understood flot as pride, but rather, grief. Julian’s
retrieval of Anseim’ s soterioiogy within the $howings undergoes a reversai
transformation, and the spiritual traditions avaiiabie to lier for intelligibiity find polyvalent
resonance in the medieval mystical metaphor of the mirror as well as the symbol and
practices of anclioritic enclosure.
6.3 The third diptych
The first chapter in this third diptycli, chapter li, will explore the third phase of
Kohut’ s therapeutic process of maturation of mirroring need as applied to the Long Text.
In some sense there is in Julian’s Showings no ultimate relinquishing of a mirror
transference with God, but rather a maturation from merged subjectivism into a more
flexible expenence of self and other which I cali relational realism. The chapter develops
the idea that Julian’ s self-identification witli the kenotic Christ unfolds as a mature working
through to relinquishing archaic forms of minoring transference in her soteriological vision
of the exemptum of the servant and the lord, particularly by means of the object constancy
which beholding the exemplum enabled lier to intemalize over time. As Julian’s self
understanding as constituted in the sight of God in Christ strengtliens, self and other are
more clearly differentiated yet umted in substance and sensuality, Julian’s unique
understanding of human antliropology. The exemptum functions to promote, and lier
recognition of the gamut of the work of Christ as “mirroring” mother reflects, a growtli
toward greater object constancy witli regard to Julian’s beholding of God. Knowing
herseif to have her tme being only in-tlie-sight-of-God is the basis for lier understanding of
the unbreakability of human union with God in substance and this is necessarily inclusive
of lierself and alt lier even Christians. Union with God in sensuality, is in tlie human day
to day condition of human fragility experienced as a movement from the distress of
narcissistic resistance to the assent to behold Christ’s empathic responsiveness to her
situation. (healing of pain and malting sense of suffering-witli Christ; responsibility-
passing quickly over unnecessary suffering of seif-pre-occupation). It too invites inclusion
of ail lier even Cliristians in tlieir various conditions, and reflects lier own mature capacity
to function as the mirror of Christ’s compassion or empathy for otliers.
13 CRYSDALE, Cynthia, Embracing travail: Retrieving the cross today, NY, Continuum, 2001, pp. 25 -
26.
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The second chapter in this final dyptich, chapter 12, draws again on Sebastian
Moore’s understanding of desire for God as growth in trust. As lie understands
maturation in the spiritual life, our dependence on God, experienced as balance between
oneness and separation is “mutually advancing and mutually enhancing” with each ego
death and transformation.14 Julian’ s distinctive constellation of dynamic imagery in the
exemplum is the summation of her vision of differentiated union with God in Christ.
Drawing on bnuliant, and largely unrecognized work done by Elisabeth Koenig, I argue
that the implied dynamism of mutual beholding, that transformative movement to eye
contact in the imagery of the servant-lord relation, captures Julian’ s understanding of how
she is appropriating salvation in her life by means of a compensatory mirronng function.
But it also provides a key to noticing how her adaptations of Christ’s objective salvific
action in the past and future move in the direction of expressing the mirroring function as a
christological trinitarian activity. Ml the other maternai fiinctions of Christ and the Trinity
which Julian subsequently develops in the Long Text are seen to draw their coherence from
this primary mirroring dynamic. The earlier condition of mirroring in Christ’ s suffering is
neyer abandoned in the later mirroring image in the exemplum. This is the gemus of
Julian’s soteriology that, in one dynamic vibrant image of the mirroring Christ, it gïves at
once a single coherent vision of redemption and sanctification, and a credible account of
both objective and subjective soteriology. Julian’s soteriology of mirroring assists her and
humanity to appropriate and participate more and more profoundly in the salvific work lier
Showings imaginatively enact.
‘ MOORE, Sebastian, Jesus, tiberator of desire, NT, Crossroad, 1989, pp. 15 - 16.
DPTYCH 1
CHAPTER 7
DIPTYCH 1.1 FROM RESISTANCE TO ASSENT:
ENTERING THE TRANSITIONAL SPACE 0F THE BODILY SIGHT
1.0 Introduction
The study thus far has examined possible psychobiographical traces of Julian
having suffered in her infancy from a neglect of maternai mirroring with resulting
narcissism and object relations issues. I have observed that there are many other sources of
this systemic neglect in her social location and religious context which would compound
this primary absence of mirroring. I have proposed that a pre-oedipal separation trauma of
this nature can help to account for the intensity of lier experience at the tïme of lier illness
and presumed to be imminent death in 1373.
I propose to cail this experience her pre-oedipat soteriotogicat crisis; pre-oedipal
because it is genetically pnor to oedipal issues of guilt tradiflonally associated witli sin;
soteriological because the intensity of its effect of inculcating a tenor of
abandonment/exclusionldamnation resonated flot simply at an individual,
psychobiographical level, but also at the level of lier social location. In a pre-oedipal
soteriological crisis, I suggest, the issues have to do with fundamental sliame and self
wortlilessness. Julian, I liold, experienced, at the point of inmiinent death, a condition of
intense confusion around suffering, sin and hints of an underlying sense of despair of
salvation. In other words, I am suggesting that Julian approached death unconsciously or
ambivalently fearing deatli and damnation wliile trying to “trust in salvation” and that this
reverberated at a pre-oedipal level witli lier expenence of neglect and traumatic separation
as an infant. The intensity of tlie crisis was, I suggest, compounded by tlie access to this
lost, neglected self whicli opened up as Julian was at tlie point of dying. This would help
to account for wliat I will cail lier resistance to entering into tlie mirroring transference witli
tlie Jesus of the showings. I propose more generally that this lielps to account for lier
singular lifelong preoccupation with issues, at once psychodynamic and spiritual,
intrapsychic and interpsychic, of beholding and being belield by God in Christ. It may be
said to be reflected in the nature of the bodily siglit she received and the intensity of lier
desire botli tofeet witli Christ in his suffering (“to have mynd and feeling of Christ” as she
puts it, after 1 Cor. 2:16 and Philippians 2: 5) and to see the face of the Jesus of lier
showings, good descriptors for object hunger, as well as goals of meditative
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contemplatio. It is reflected in lier intensity to share lier visionary experience with others
50 that they too might experïence what she was being shown.
I suggest that the three wounds she prayed for, that is, contrition, compassion and
longing for God both prepared lier and in some sense hindered lier for this crisis. They
prepared her insofar as the affective meditative tradition encouraged the affective
appropriation of Christ’s saving work on the cross. I propose that they hindered her
insofar as in frequently practÏsing tliese prayer requests and the religious means available to
lier (sucli as meditation on tlie crucifix) she tacitly assumed to know their outcomes before
she received tliem in her visionary experience, and that there was a crisis of mearnng for
her to go through as to the coherence between what she thought would be salvific for lier,
and wliat would become for lier a bodily and visual experience of salvation, to wliicli she
could assent to trust.
The first cliapter in this diptycli will engage wliat I am calling lier pre-oedipal
sotenological crisis from tlie pre-oedipal side, so to speak. Drawing primarily on Kohut’ s
description of tlie first pliase of entry into the mirror transference, I will explore tliose first
moments of Julian’s entry into the visionary experience as she belield tlie crucifix in lier
dying state. (Tlie second cliapter of tlie diptycli will tum tliese reflections in the other
direction, exploring how Julian’ s shifts from resistance to assent to enter into tlie mirroring
transference became the means for her to begin to see what Elizabeth Johnson cails a
contrast experience in tlie process of appropriafing Christ’ s saving work.)
2.0 A brief review of the first of the three phases of mirroring
transference in Kohut
Recafi tliat Kohut describes tlie process of maturation in the therapeutic context as
having three distinct pliases. In the first phase, whicli I explore in this chapter, there is
resistance on the part of tlie client to forming a mirroring transference witli the empathic
analyst. As we saw above, tlie absence of nuclear autlientic self structure at this stage is
identifiable in the two fragments of archaic prestmcture which present themselves
altematingly and unconnectedly as narcissistic omnipotence or grandiosity, and, searing
shame. We have been sensitized to the possibiity that symptoms of the feminine
expression of narcissism are located in the quality of relationships, rather than in the desire
for autonomy, and that shame may predominate over grandiosity. Koliut’s first phase ends
at the point at which the individual’ s trust of the empathic analyst is sufficiently secure to
accept to establish a mirror transference. This establishment of trust allows a transitional
space to become possible in which the client may tolerate some degree of chaos in play,
dream, imagination, etc. in relation to the analyst.
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2.1 Homans on mourning and the psychology of fantasy and
movement
This chapter will draw on Kohut, Winnicott and other object relations
psychoanalytic theorists to flesh out the present study. But the second chapter of this
diptycli also proposes to discem in Julian’s Showings a concem that the credible
appropriation of Jesus’ salvific work was flot a private, intrapsychic revelation for herseif
alone. It involved symbolic imagery and narrative which could be shared socially with
others. The correlation between these two chapters bears at once on both Julian’s own
experience of need (her vision of the human predicament and Christ’s salvific response)
and that of lier even Christians. Therefore it is important to show that what Julïan’ s
$howings reveal is flot merely intrapsychic but lias social meaning, and ïnvolves a
transformation of the conventional meaning of the concept of sin and of the religious,
cultural symbol of Christ’ s suffering in the Passion. For this reason I will continue to
draw from time to time on Romans’ work (inspired by Kohut) on disillusionment,
mouming and the creation of new meamng out of lost cultural symbols, as that was
described in earlier chapters.
Recail that Romans sees this work of mouming in terms of movement responses,
fantasy activity and the narrative impulse. Homans writes:
[T]he path of mouming and individuation leads into fresh territory, the expenence
of creating meamng.... I think that people neither simply repudiate nor simply
reappropnate meanings but instead create meanings in an arena of social space
which lies midway between the past and the future...
The key to this process of reappropriation lies in the psychology of fantasy
activity and in understanding that activity in terms of the construction and
perception of movement, which is in turn related to the human propensity to
narrate.1
Linldng the intrapsychic witli the interpsychic, by means of Kohut’s self psychology, recall
that Romans liolds that the loss of meaning of cultural symbols leads to mouming which
leads to fantasy activity, the narrative impulse and the movement responses in mouming:
deep bodily feelings; a readiness to engage in fantasy activity (transitional reaim) and its
narrative quality; narcissism and object relations issues; and finally a capacity for empathy.2
Observing the presence of these movement responses in Julian’ s Showings will be a fiirther
support for the correlation between the intrapsychic and the social dimensions of the
1 ROMANS, Peter, The abitity to inourn: Disiltusionment and the social origins ofpsychoanatysis,
Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1989, pp. 326 - 327.
2 ROMANS, 1989, p. 333.
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meaning embedded in her mirroring transference with the Christ of her showings.
Homans’ work thus helps build a correlative bridge between the diptychs, 50 to speak.
3.0 From resistance to assent to enter into a mirroring transference in
Julian’s Short Text
3.1 The flrst movement responses
In Julian’s initial description of her dying condition and lier responses to her
visions, I perceive what I would cali a phase of resistance which corresponds to Kohut’s
first phase of the narcissist’ s resistance to entering into a therapeutic mirroring transference.
I described at the end of the last chapter how this resistance was focused in lier
ambivalence around dying: wanting at some level to be dead and out of tliis world of 5m
and suffering, but that as she approached death in lier illness, slie becarne reluctant,
thinking consciously of this as a shortening of lier life and as a kind of abortion of the
graces yet to be obtained for the next world by living longer in this one. I suggested that
tliis signals an unconscious pre-oedipal ambivalence and fearful doubt as to lier status
among the saved on lier Doornsday, bringing lier in effect, in Winnicott’s phrase, to “the
bnnk of unthinkable anxiety” of abandonrnent and fragmentation.3 Ml of this in effect
provokes a paralyzing resistance in her to either living or dying, and cornpounds lier
suffering condition. And, I suggest, it intimates an unrecognized kind of suffering too, the
grief of tlie abandoned self within.
Tlie first movement responses, from resistance to assent, occurs as Julian lingers
on in a condition somewliere between life and deatli. Slie cornes to tlie point wliere she
teils us slie tliought “Good Lord, is it no longer to your glory that I am alive? And rny
reason and my sufferings told me that I should die; and witli ail the will of my lieart I
assented wliolly to be as was God’s wiil”. (SI 2.)
This is tlie first textual description of a movement response of this nature, and in
eacli case to be described below tliere is a shift in bodily feelings and eventually in wliat she
sees, whicli follows from eacli act of assent. In this case, slie telis us, she tlien feit dead
from the middle of lier body down. She also telis us she was moved to ask to be propped
up, so tliat lier “lieart miglit be more free to be at God’s will and to think of him” in lier last
moments of lïfe. It is at this point that tlie curate is called for.
WINNICOTr, D. W., “Ego integration in child development”, in The maturationat processes and the
facilitating environment: Studies in the theory of emotional devetoprnent, Madison CN, International
Uiversities Press, [1962] 1965, p. 57.
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The second movement response from resistance to assent cornes when the pnest
placed the crucifix before her eyes. Julian telis us “my eyes were set upwards toward
heaven, where I trusted I was going; but nevertheless I assented to fix rny eyes on the face
of the crucifix if I could...” ($T 2.) There is a sort of rigidity implied in her description of
lier eyes as “set upwards toward heaven”, whicli could be understood as a frozen resistance
to... what? Speculation lias suggested that Julian had been influenced by tlie apopliatic
tradition of Hilton’s Scale ofperfection and the anonymous Cloud of unknowing wliich
moved away from meditation on Christ’ s liumanity toward some “higlier” form of
imageless contemplation.4 Could it also be a description of a frozen ambivalence toward
tlie moment of Julian’s death andjudgment? In assenting to “fix” lier eyes on tlie crucifix,
it would seem tliat, before the fact, she didn’t expect this frozenness to thaw. However,
slie telis us, tlien lier sight begins to fail, and then she feit as if the upper part of lier body
were beginning to die. It would seern tliat lier “assent to be as was God’s will” is
hastening lier end: “Tlien truly I believed that I was at the point of deatli”. But there is a
further movement response: “And suddenly in that moment ail my pain left me, and I was
as sound, particularly in tlie upper part of rny body, as ever I was before or have been
since”. (ST 2.)
These first movernent responses are experienced as deep bodity feelings, leading
lier first to assent to feel more keenly tlie symptoms of death, and then, surpnsingly and
mysteriously, to feel physically eased. There is stili resistance, however, as she telis us “I
liad no more confidence tliat I should live, nor was the ease complete, for I thouglit that I
would rather have been delivered of this world, because that was what my heart longed
for”. (ST 2.)
Stephen Johnson, following Kohut’s description of “optimum frustration”,
describes what it takes to break through a narcissist resistance to entering into a mirroring
transference. Tlie recovery of the true self requires “a massive, cumulative failure coupled
with supportive therapeutic intervention” to bnng tlie narcissist to tlie realization that he or
See TUGWELL, Simon, o.p., Ways of imperfection: An exploration of Christian spirituality,
Springfield, IL, Templegate, 1985, pp. 187 - 188. Bauerschmidt agrees with this view, as over against
Abbott, who argues that Julian was in the affective tradition at the time of the showings. ABBOTT,
Christopher, Jutian of Nonvich: Autobiography and theology, Cambndge, D. S. Brewer, 1999, pp. 48 -
57. Bauerschmidt reads Julian as rejecting both affective and contemplative pieties, in their respective
capacities to keep the believer preoccupied with the act of prayer rather than with the attnbutes of God. I
agree as long as it is clear that it is her experience of the showings and years of reflection on them which
brought this home to her. It isn’t apparent here in ber report. See BAUERSCHMIDT, Frederick, Julian of
Norwich and the mystical body potitic of Christ, Notre Dame, Indiana, Notre Dame University Press,
1999, p. 52, fn. 55.
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she has constructed a false self that is no longer tenable.5 The failure in Julian’s case may
be at many levels. It is essential to remember that in spealdng of narcissism here, I am
referring to a feminine expression of narcissism, as has been articulated by Rossiter.6 But
I suggest it is thefailure ofthe setf she has known to be able to know or control the
outcome of this experience of really dying wliich is what Julian is assenting to feel in lier
body. Perhaps lier assent, and the pain wliich that initially brings on, could be described as
lier entIy into an awareness of an (heretofore resisted) “identification witli the state of
death”. In psychoanalytic terms this could be described as an awareness of a self she lias
flot known before, a self whicli had been abandoned, a gneving for whicli had itself been
buried.7 Tlie initial descent into feeling even more keenly tlie symptoms of her own deatli
reflects, I suggest, lier assent or sunender to recognizing lier powerlessness to know or
affect the outcome of this awareness. Following this line of thinking, the fact that this
assent to surrender to a condition of powerlessness is occurring at tlie point of deatli is
significant. It suggests that despite ail the suffering Julian has experienced prior to this,
nothing provided the trigger for tlie traumatic frustration (cumulative massive failure) which
brouglit about this new condition of assent. It could be suggested tliat this is diagnostic of
tlie degree to which Julian had defended lierself against experiencing such a condition
“nakedly” (as she would later put it), tliat it would take an actual experience of imminent
deatli to bring it about. In view of that, it is all the more an act of courageous assent or
surrender to “talting in” tlie wished-for yet dreaded expenence of actual death.
I must pause to say tliat I realize tliat tlie language of “assent” and “surrender” are
cliarged witli difficulty in feminist discourse whicli frequently lias identified sucli
movements witli “submission”. It is true that they have a long and continuous history in
the thouglit and language of tlie Christian spiritual life (and now more recently in tlie advent
of the Twelve step movement, an ostensibly secular spiritual programme of recovery but
with Christian roots). But perhaps tliere are different kinds of assent according to spiritual
and psychological mamrity as well as social location. In this instance, of Julian’ s first
experience of it, tliere is something quite parallel going on in Micliel Hulin’s description of
“le paradoxe mystique”, which lie observes cinically and in women mystics:
JOHNSON, Stephen, Humanizing the narcissistic style, NY, W. W. Norton, 1987, pp. 57 - 58.
6 ROSSITER, Stanford Kent, Narcissism and codependency, Ph.D. thesis, The Wright Institute, 2004,
pp. 63 - 73.
Compare the kind of deep bodily feelings Julian assents to feel with, for example, the anonymous account
of a sexually abused woman which introduces the chapter on grieving and mourning, in BA$S, Ellen, and
Laura DAVIS, The courage to heal: A guide for wornen survivors of child sexual abuse, NY, Harper and
Row, 1988, p. 118. “Sometimes I thïnk I’m going to die from the sadness. Not that anyone ever dieU from
crying for two hours, but it sure feels like it”.
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C’est en s’effaçant complètement... elle bascule, parfois d’une seconde à l’autre, de
l’état de torture dans l’état de consolation. Elle plonge dans la béatitude à l’instant
même où elle consent à sa propre abjection.8
The “consolation” received in total self-effacement has been interpreted as perpemating the
mold of subjection of women in female mysticism.9
Emmanuel Ghent’s object relations study of masochism and submission as
“lookalikes” for surrender may help to clarify why it is important to identify this shift in
Julian from frozen resistance to assent or surrender, and why so many feminists have
dïsmissed this seemingly passive dimension of Julian’s spirituality.1° In using the phrase
“taking in”, Ghent is describing the wish to sunender in tins way: to “take in’ the inner
truth, to perceive self and other as they really are, that is, without regard to the false selves
erected out of compliance to early authorities”.11 He draws on Menaker who observes that
“the patient is faced with the single ultimate choice: will he [or sheJ choose growtli or
refuse it -- can lie [or sheJ take in wliat is, permit the resultant disorganization of the status
quo of the self.. .?“l 2 Echoing tins, but from the discipline of the history of spirituality,
Vincent Gillespie and Maggie Ross describe Julian’s moves toward relinquishing control of
her visionary experience as a form of death, as testified in lier use of language. I have
spoken above of Julian being in a condition of frozenness prior to lier experience of the
showings. Likewise they observe incidents of Julian expenencing “impasse” at tliose
moments wliere she is unwilling to relinquisli control of the signification of lier vision.13
The status quo of the self would be to remain attached to the illusion of control in relating to
tlie other, winch describes the feminine form of grandiosity and shame winch can be
detected in that expression of narcissism. To choose growth is to face and feel bodily the
disillusionment and fragmentation of that self. For Julian I suggest tins is afirst response
HULIN, Michel, La mystique sauvage: Aux antipodes de l’esprit, Paris, PUF, 1993, pp. 179 - 180.
See for example the writing of BECKWITH, Sarah, “A very material mysticism: The medieval
mysticism of Margery Kempe”, in Medievat literature: Criticism, ideology and history, ed. AERS,
David, NY, St. Martins Press, 1986, P. 55 fn. 4.
10 GHENT, Emmanuel, “Masochism, submission and surrender: Masochism as a perversion of surrender”,
in Retational Psychoanalysis: The emergence ofa tradition, eds. MITCHELL, Stephen, and Lewis
ARON, Hillsdale NJ, Analytic Press, 1999, pp. 211 - 242.
11 GHENT, 1999, p. 231.
12 MENAKER, Esther, “WiIl and the problem of masochism”, in Masochism and the emergent ego:
Selected papers of Esther Menaker, ed. LERNER, Leila, NY, Human Sciences Press, 1979, pp. 84 - 98.
13 GILLESPIE, Vincent, and Maggie ROSS, “The apophatic image: The poetics of effacement in Julian of
Norwich”, in The medieval mysticat tradition in England, ed. GLASSCOE, Marion, Cambridge, D. S.
Brewer, 1992, pp. 56, 60, 69. Exeter symposium V.
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of choosing to grow, flot the last, and that perhaps it could onty have begun in this way, if
indeed she suffered very early from a maternai deficit.
The loss of this sense of the self she has known, I suggest, sets up a response of
mourrnng a false self and assent to what is the case. These are of a piece. The whole
process of illusion becoming disillusionment in transitional phenomena, as Winnicott
describes it, is the process whereby inner and outer worlds can become related more
effectively. As a new sense of selfhood emerges, Julian’ s image of God or “godobject”
changes too. The spiritual tradition might liken this process to the way of purgation in
knowledge of God and self. Homans says of mourning that the “[t]he response to loss
opens up the transitional space which is both social and historical, and in this space persons
construct a bridge of symbols between inner and social worlds through fantasy activity and
its implicitly narrative character”.14 I suggest that this is what is needed for Julian
eventually to see herseif in relation to God from a new perspective, and that the meanings
(and practices?) she has associated witli sin and salvation have been off the mark.
The “supportive therapeutic intervention” in Julian’s traumatic experience
-- of
failure / powerlessness / mourning / disillusionment I identification with the state of death I
or “unthinkable anxiety” -- is symbolized in the crucifix the priest sets before her eyes.
Whatever this symbol has meant to her until now, and it lias no doubt meant submission,
obedience to the authority and the teachings of Holy Church as Abbott holds,15 the crucifix
must also, from what we know of late medieval women’s piety, have had maternai
associations for Julian of passio, of suffering as giving birth, of lactation, and of the
generative body of Christ as itself ekktesia.16 Carolyn Walker Bynum clarifies that in
Julian and others in the fourteenth cenmry, the emphasis on Christ’s suffenng in the
Passion, “is flot primarily a stress on the sacrifice needed to bridge the gap between us in
our sin and God in lis glory; it is rather an identijication with the fact that Christ is
what we are.’17 This was the fruit of the historical shift to devotion to the humanity of
Christ. Until the high middle ages, the Christological focus had been on the glorified Christ
which heightened the sense of the distance between God and the creature.
14 HOMANS, 1989, p. 333.
15 ABBOTT, 1999, pp. 61 - 63.
16 BYNUM, Caroline Walker, Fragmentation and redemption: Essays on gender and the human body in
medievat religion, NY, Zone Books, 1992, ch. 3.
1 7BYNUM, Carolyn Walker, Jesus as Mother: Studies in the spirituality of the high middte ages,
Berkeley CA, University of California Press, 1982, P. 130, emphasis added.
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Julian looks at the crucifix and lier feelings of physical pain and spiritual suffering
are taken away. Coupled with the experience of being on the brink of unthinkable anxiety,
Julian looking into the face of the crucifix, sees lier own helpless suffenng condition
mirrored there. Her bodily feelings shift as she sees this.
Winnicott descnbes tliat the good-enough mother “puts lierseif in the baby’s
place... to know wliat the baby needs” in the infant’s vuinerable physiological condition of
being on the brink of unthinkable anxiety.’8 It is this which, according to Winrncott and
Kohut, the therapeutic intervention must match in order to respond to the missed early
parental function. I suggest that Julian is experiencing the two together, a situation of
traurnatic frustration (as Kohut calis it) which brings lier to tlie brink of unthinkable anxiety
in lier vulnerability and the “supportive therapeutic intervention” (or optimum frustration as
Kohut would put it) that meets lier need for an empathic presence in that moment: “...and
suddenly in that moment ail my pain left me”. To the extent that this fits the evidence, I
suggest that this could be diagnostic of an early experience of the missed maternai function
of an empathic holding environment, the precursor of the mother’ s face.
I suggest slie is now experiencing a “match” between lier need and the appearance
at the right time of the face of the mirroring crucifix in an empathic response to her
condition. A transitional space is opening, in which lier deep bodily feelings are becoming
an organ of surprising knowledge. A new respect for assenting to a self / an Other she lias
flot known before cornes into being, as she finds lier body restored.
I suggest that what Julian found herself feeling was both more and less than she
bargained for. The increase in conventional sonowing she perhaps expected to feel on
beholding the crucifix in contrition for sins was flot there: ail ber pain was taken away.’9
Rather, it would seem that what Julian is describing to us in her first encounter with the
deep, disorienting and liberating bodily experience of suffenng is a kind of self-kenosis,
fused with Christ’ s kenosis in bis Passion. In this chapter, it is the quality of fusion or
merging with the crucifix which is significant, as I propose it signais lier engagement in a
mirroring transference with the Christ of lier showings.
18 WINNICOYT, [1962] 1965, p. 57.
19 The focus on contrition and confession leU in the fourteenth century frequently to preoccupation with
scruples, that is “the ever-present danger of a failure to balance acute awareness of sin with acceptance of
forgiveness”. See ROSS, Ellen, “She wept and cned right loud for sorrow and for pain’: Suffering, the
spiritual journey, and women’s experience in late medieval mysticism”, in Maps offlesh and light: The
religious experience ofrnedieval wonzen mystics, ed. WIETHAUS, Ulrike, Syracuse NY, Syracuse
University Press, 1993, p. 52.
208
I am suggesting that, out of an unconscious identification with the state of death,
frozen in its resistance to living or dying, Julian assents to enter into an active mouming
process mirrored in the suffenng she sees in the face of the crucifix. I propose that this
mourning for a lost self will be mirrored in what she sees and feels, fused in this mirroring
transference.
Alice Miller has identified that once a person enters into a therapeutic mirroring
relation (formulated here in Sebastian Moore’s words), “what the client sees in the
anaÏyst is not the parent but the chitd he or she has had to repress”.20 Looking at
Julian’ s recounted experience in this way, it will be possible to see the lost, abandoned
child of Julian’ s true self in the gamut of bodily feelings she experiences as she identifies
with Christ’ s pains, and in what she sees in the face of the suffering Christ. It will also
become for Julian a doorway to discovering the degree to whicli as yet unnamed sins had
secretly determined that false sense of a self-sufficient, isolated self, practising acts of
suffering associated with contrition, penance and compassion in a scrupulous, self
preoccupied way. The mouming that she is now experiencing would then become the
means toward maldng more real for lier what lier sins really were -- in God’s sight -- for
which contrition and forgiveness would be essential and effective means of healing and
grace. It would also make compassion an experience of communion with Christ and lier
even Christen, rather than simply a conventional act of prayer on her art1 These fruits
of the mourning process will be discussed further throughout these chapters. Most of ail, it
would open the door to a new appropriation of herself in relation to the Christ of lier
showings.
3.2 Julian’s bodily sight
Yet another movement response to assent to enter into the transitional realm occurs
when, with the ease which came in the mysterious removal of her symptoms of suffering,
Julian remembers to ask for the grace of tlie second wound (of compassion, though it
includes elements of her other requests as well):
that our Lord... would fiIl my body full with recollection [myndJ and feeling of bis
blessed Passion, as I had prayed before, for I wished that bis pains might be my
pains, with compassion which would lead to longing for God.... I desïred to
suffer with him, living in my mortal body, as God would give me grace. (SI 3.)
20 MOORE, Sebastian, Jesus, liberator ofdesire, NY, Crossroad, 1989, p. 26.
21 BRADLEY, Ritamary, Jutian’s way: A practicat commentary on Jutian of Norwich, London, Harper
Collins, 1992, p. 171.
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It is at this point that she in effect assents to enter the transitional reaim of
spontaneousty recottecting the Passion for which she has long been praying, and to
experience it in the form of a bodily sight which she had ceased actively to request.
Her initial entry mto the visionary experience as Julian recounts it is in an image of
blood flowing from under the crown of thorns placed on Christ’s head. It is a conventional
enough image, in the context of fourteenth centmy affective devotion focused on the
crucifix. She says,
I desired to suffer with him, living in my mortal body, as God wouid give me
grace. And, at this, suddenly I saw the red blood trickling down from under the
crown, ail hot, flowing freely and copiously, a living stream, just as it seemed to
me that it was at the time when the crown of thorns was thrust down upon his
blessed head.... I was greatly astonished by this wonder and marvel, that he
would be so homely with a sinful creature living in this wretched flesh. I accepted
it that at that time our Lord Jesus wanted, out of bis courteous love, to show me
comfort before my temptations began.... (ST 3.)
Even here there is doubt and fear of the temptation of devils awaiting her at her
death (also a common teaching of that era). But she observes that with “this sight of bis
biessed Passion and with bis divinity, of which I speak as I understand, I saw that this was
strength enough for me, yes, and for ail living creatures who will be protected from ail the
devils of heu and from ail their spiritual enemies”. (SI 3.) I propose that this is a signal
that her archaic narcissistic false self (as seif-sufficient, isolated etc.) is giving way to a
conscious, astonished awareness of some new sense of self, in the paradoxical condition of
fundamental fragility and safety as she enters into a merged mirroring transference with the
Jesus of her showings, here in his homely (i.e., intimate, familiar) companionship.
3.2.1 The transitional function of the bodily sight
Julian gives a kind of categorization of the types of visions she received: bodily
sight, words formed in my understanding, and spiritual sight (ST 7), which, according to
earlier Juiïan commentators, were derived from Augustine’ s categories for classifying
prophetic visions.22 However, those who have attempted to foliow such categonzations
when applied to Julian’s showings are, as Bauerschmidt observes, “inevitably frustrated”,
22 See, for examples, MOLINARI, Paul, Julian of Norwich: The teaching ofa l4th century English
mystic, London, Longmans, Green and Co., 1958, pp. 60 - 72; PELPHREY, Brant, Christ our mother:
Jutian of Nonvich, Wilmington Delaware, Glazier, 1989, pp. 80 - 91. The way of the Christian mystics
series 7. Sec AUGUSTINE, St, De genesi ad litteram, book 12, chapter 7, translated as The literai
meaning of genesis, transi. TAYLOR, John Hammon, NY, Newman Press, 1982, p. 186, on the
categories of corporeal, spiritual and intellectual visions.
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as they do flot seem to work.23 Bauerschmidt, on the other hand, makes a significant
observation about how Julian’s use of the phrase “bodily sight” actually functions in the
visions. Bodily sight in Julian of Norwich, according to Bauerschmidt,
indicates both a mode of seeing -- something involving physicat sensation, though
in a way that to her is clearly different from the usual perception of a material object
-- and an object of vision -- Christ’s body, specifïcally the body on the crucifix that
the priest has placed before her. Julian speaks of “bodily sight”, without further
qualification, onty in reference to this specific representation of Jesus’ body and the
various permutations that she sees it undergo.24
Bauerschmidt is at pains here to distinguish this view of Julian’s use of the notion of
bodily sight as an object of vision from that of many Julian commentators, such as
Pelphrey. Bauerschmidt says that Pelphrey, for example, regards it as “primarily a mode
of subjective apprehension -- a mode that engages, or seems to engage, the senses -- which
leads them to try to categorize any ‘vision’ Julian has as a bodily sight”. Rather,
Bauerschmidt draws on observations made by Nuth, Baker and others to emphasize that
Julian’ s use of the concept of bodily sight is reserved exclusively for the “rather obscure
transformations associated with the crucifix upon which she was gazing.... [TJhe bodily
sights are distinguished from the other sights because they are of Christ cmcified and are
closely related to the material object of the crucifix”.25 Thus he stresses that Julian does
not have bodily sights of anyone else. As Denise Baker lias observed, Julian’s
visions include none of the personages who play sucli a large role either as torturers
or as compassionate witnesses in the serial Passion narratives and much of the
devotïonal art of the late medieval period. Only Jesus appears in bodily likeness;
even lier visions of Maiy at the time of the Incarnation and the Crucifixion are flot
corporeal.26
About the function of bodily sight as a mode of seeing, Bauerschmidt describes it
as “something distinctive about the manner in which Christ’ s body is perceived. It is as if
there were a resonance between Julian’s body and the body of Christ on the cross,
comrnunicated through the medium of sight”. Bauerschmidt sees this mode of seeing as
involving “the physical dispiacement of Julian’s pain by Christ’s”, though he allows that in
the first showing she says her pain had been taken from lier and that the dynamic of Julian
actually describing herseif as participating in Christ’s pains only begins in her recounting of
23 BAUERSCHMIDT, 1999, p. 42.
24 BAUERSCHMIDT, 1999, p. 42, emphasis in text.
25 BAUERSCHMIDT, 1999, pp. 43 - 44, and lis fn. 34 on p. 230.
26 BAKER, Denise N., Jutian ofNonvich’s Showings: From vision to book, Princeton NJ, Princeton
University Press, 1994, p. 48.
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the eightli showing. What is significant at this point is Bauerschmidt’ s observation that
“she does flot ‘see’ sirnply with her eyes, but with her entire body”.27 Carolyn Walker
Bynum was the first to highlight that for medieval religious women the body was a vehicle
of knowing and the source --through suffering
-- for an experienced union with Christ.28
Bauerschnildt draws a connection here with the participative model of perception
which was basic to medieval epistemology (even though in Julian’s day this was being
challenged by nominalism’s approach to perception as efficient causality). Thus Thomas
Aquinas spoke of how “the received is in the receiver according to the mode of the
receiver”.29 Julian’ s bodily seeing, as a participative mode of perception,
is the adequation of lier disease-wracked body to the object of lier perception:
Christ’ s suffering, generative, crucified body.... She cannot maintain the distance
that the eyes allow, but sees Christ’ s suffenng by participating in it. At the same
time, while the othemess of the cmcified cornes to inhabit her in compassionate
intimacy, lie stiil maintains lis otherness.30
Bauerschmidt lias given an excellent close reading of tlie nature of Julian’ s bodily
sight of tlie crucifix. But I have to say bis preference for the “objective” quality of the
crucifix and its meaning, over the “subjective” quality of Julian’ s experience of beliolding
it, may be problematic, as I see it. Wliat Abbott calls the “animated” quality of the
crucifix, tlie “external correlative of her inner experience” seems to leave us even moreso
with two unrelated realms, the objective or the subjective.31
I propose tliat Julian is entering and seems in ber text to be inviting the reader into a
tliird realm. I am suggesting that wliat Julian is descnbing can perhaps be understood in
terms of an epistemology which embraces the work of creative symbolic formation in the
third reaim of transitional space tliat is at once personal, subjective and social, objective.32
As sucli, I suggest that we see Julian’s bodily sight of the crucifix, insofar as it is
as Bauerschmidt says an “object of vision”, as a transitional object, or a self/not self
27 BAUERSCHMIDT, 1999, p. 44. emphasis added.
28 BYNUM, 1992, chs 3 and 6 (reprinted in this book from earlier publications as articles); see also
LICHTMANN, Maria, “I desyrede a bodylye syght’: Julian of Norwich and the body”, Mystics quarterty
17, 1991, p. 17.
29 AQUINAS, St Thomas, $untrna theologiae, transi. ERNST, Comelius o.p., Oxford, Biackfriars, 1972,
1.84.1.
30 BAUERSCHMIDT, 1999, p. 46.
31 ABBOTT, 1999, p. 64.
32 JONES, James, “Knowiedge in transition: Towards a Winnicottian epistemology” Psychoanalytic
review 79, pp. 223 - 237, and, by the same author, Retigion andpsychology: Psychoanalysis, feminism
and theology in transition, New Haven, Yaie University Press, 1996, chs. 4 and 5.
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object. The mother’s breast, the edge of the blanket, the teddy bear, if we may say so, are
lilcewise the “object of vision” in the child’s emerging transitional world of symbol
formation. But what constitutes the othemess of the transitional object is itsef in a
process of dynamic transformation, and revelatory of Julian’s transforming sense of self as
well as of Christ’s homeliness. The religious transitional object (the godobject) of
someone who lias developed a mature capacity for play and integration will retain its
profound sense of connectedness with self and other, but may flot look like its early
predecessors.
Likewise, insofar as the bodily sight of the crucifix is a “mode of seeing” I suggest
we understand that to mean that it is significant as the feeling tone of Julian’s assent to enter
into transitionaÏ space, that is, the presentation of the crucifix at that moment is related to
the development of a sense of trust in a condition of rest made possible only by being alone
in the presence of an empathic other. It is a mode of seeing and knowïng with the body
which resonates with the pre-oedipal issue of relational trust. I suggest that it might be
viewed as a mode of seeing which is engaged in a mirroring transference. Just as the
“adequation” of the intenor condition or feeling life of the child to engaging in transitional
space (play) is effected through trust in the presence of an accepting other, so also I suggest
does Julian’s bodily sight function to engage lier in a visionary experience which
presupposes the presence of an empathic other, in this case, tlie suffenng Christ of the
crucifix (witli whatever the empathic relational resonance was which she might have
associated witli that). The results of this, which in the child promotes the development
both of a sense of the reality of the nascent self and of object relations, negotiating inner
subjective and outer social worlds, could tlien be looked for in the development of Julian’s
showings.
b repeat, on the one hand, Julian’s bodily sight of the crucifix as an object of
vision functions as a transitional object. It represents at some level thefound quality of
everything Julian lias received from her tradition as to the significance of the crucifix, and
in this sense is objective, in the way in which Bauerschmidt is using that tenn. But as a
transitional object the crucifix is also at some level being created by Julîan, registering her
profound need to be mirrored in the meaning whicli lier bodily sight of the crucifix comes
to have for lier. As Bauersclimidt concludes, Julian’s bodily sight of tlie crucifix is the
inauguration of a process of formation of a new identity shaped by “mynd of the
passion”.33
BAUERSCHMIDT, 1999, p. 62.
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At the same time, ber bodily sight of the crucifix, as a mode of seeing, functions as
enabling ber simultaneously to enter into transitional space. It provides that trusting
resonance between Julian’s intenor state and the empathic mirroring Other wbose presence
makes possible Julian’s assent to enter into a mode of knowing througb deep bodily
feelings and a readiness to engage in visual fantasy activity and narrative. It is this mode of
knowing and leaming which Homans describes as important for engaging movernent
responses in transitional phenomena for tbe work of mouming both a false self and lost
meanings of cultural symbols. Ail tbe bodily senses are engaged in what Julian will corne
to cail the prayer of beholding.34
In Julian’ s bodily sight of the crucifix she seems botb to find and create tbere a
transitional object, and as she enters the transitional space of beholding the face of the
crucifix, she experiences bodily and visually what she most needs to see, feel and know in
her vuinerable condition. I suggest that tbis will enable ber development both of a new
core sense of self and of the reality of the other. And this, I suggest, will be reflected in
signs of growth in maturity in Julian’s need for mirroring.
Moreover, this transitional reaim becomes tbe site for her creative work of
formation and transformation of symbols within her religious tradition, in particular with
regard to 5m and salvation in Christ, whicb she believes, God desires to make available as
well to lier even Christians in sucb need of comfort as to berseif. (ST 6.) What is
significant is that there will be evolution in the meanings which Julian draws from her
transitional bodily sigbt and perhaps transformations in ber relationship with this
transitional object. Wbat remains constant throughout is that meaning cornes througb
Julian’ s beholding Christ’ s face beholding ber. As will become clearer later on, Julian’ s
shifis from resistance to assent will become increasingly expressions of desire as to what
she will see of herseif and of Christ in that mutual beholding, and over the years, as to
what ftrther meaning these sbowings will corne to bave for ber.
3.2.2 Assent to kenosis: “I feit no pains except Christ’s
pains”
The next movement response from resistance to assent seems to be at the point at
which ber mother provides the “resistance”, such tbat it prompts Julian to assent to see and
feel within lier tlie suffering of Christ’s own pains.
See LT 43; also HIDE, Kerrie, Gfted origins to gracedfulfitlment: The soteriology ofJutian of
Norwich, Collegeville MN, Liturgical Press, 2001, p. 25.
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In ST 10, Julian is focused on Christ’s face as the locus for ail his pain and
suffering, and then on bis body as if it had been dead for a week, which was drying and
biowing in the wind. In one of Juiian’ s very few explicit references to scripture she
quotes here in ST 10 the great kenotic hymn in Philippians 2:5, “But each soul should do
as St. Paul says, and feel in himself what is in Christ Jesus. This revelation of Christ’ s
pains filled me full of pains.. ..“35
While her mother is attempting to close Julian’ s eyes believing lier to be dead,
Julian is intensely engaged witli the physical suffering of Christ. Her mother’ s action
greatly increased my sorrow, for despite ail my pains, I did not want to be hindered
from seeing, because of my live for him. And with regard to either, in ail this time
that Christ was present to me, I feit no pain except for Christ’ s pains; and then it
came to me that I had littie known what pain it was that I had asked for, for it
seemed to me that my pains exceeded anymortal death. I thouglit: is there any pain
in heu lilce this? And in my reason I was answered that despair is greater, for that is
a spinmai pain. But there is no greater physical pain than this; how could I suffer
greater pain than to see him who is ail my life, ail my bliss and ail my joy suifer?
Here I felt tmly that I loved Christ so much more than myself that I thought it
would have been a great comfort to me if my body had died. (ST 10.)
What I observe is that Julian responds by resisting lier mother’ s intervention, and
assenting, with greater determination, marked by lier reference to Philippians 2, to engage
in a mirroring transference witli Christ in suffering which, in lier description liere, involves
a desire both to see and feel tlie pains of bis kenosis as lier own interior condition.
Altliough slie retains a sense of Christ’ s otherness, I suggest lier description of lier visual
engagement witli and feeling of Christ’s pains could be described as one of visceral fusion.
The description by Ledoux of the fusional relation of the female mystic characterized by the
“relation d’absence” comes to mmd:
Tout ce qui était exprimé venait s’ inscrire dans le registre archaïque de la relation
fusionnelle dont le prototype est celle qui s’instaure à l’origine entre la mère et
l’enfant. Union, fusion dans l’indéterminé, absence de limites, de frontières
précises entre moi et l’autre, fusion qui peut aller jusqu’ à l’interchangeabilité des
positions “subjectives” entre les deux partenaires de la relation.36
Some see the very few scriptural quotations in Julian’s $howings as due to the rising ecclesiastical
concem at the Lollards’ vemacular translations of scripture at the time, as well as to her use of the late
medieval visual meditative practice, focused on the crucifix, of tectio Domini. On the other hand, it has
also been observed that Julian’s writing is infused with scriptural allusions. While the present study is flot
engaging an analysis of lier use of language per se, it is striking that there should be a sense of fusion
between Julian and sacred scripture, such that the latter is everywhere present but rarely, apart from this
instance, even indirectly identified. Whether lier “texts” for meditation were written or visual, (or both, in
the case of her $howings), Julian knew how to do tectio divina.
36 LEDOUX, Michel, “La relation d’absence”, in “Résurgences et dérivés de la mystique”, Nouvelle revue
de psychanalyse 20, 1980, p. 239.
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What is also sigmficant is a shift here from confusing lier previous condition of
spiritual pain (such as despair) with physical pain. Until now, Julian’s description of her
desire for the pains of illness and the pains of contrition do flot seem to be distinguishable.
For the first time, Julian is describing a distinction that is significant. $lie does flot see or
feel Christ in despair, only in incredible physical pain. To put a sharper point on it, rather
than envisioning Christ as being superhumanly powerful, Julian sees Christ as being
superhumanly powerless in lis Passion, containîng ail the suffering of humankind. It is as
if she is seeing lier own life of immense suffering for tlie first time as mirrored in the
crucifix. Whereas earlier, Julian’s solitary suffering and pain was confused and
ambivalent, I propose that we see in Julian a shift within lierseif, such that in this
transitional reaim of Julian beholding the crucifix, lier body is teaching lier to make a
distinction in her own feelings between the kenotic state of intense bodily suffering of a
powerless condition shared in Christ, and the spiritual pain of isolation, ambivalence and
despair which also lias its own, resistive, bodily feelings. And, it would seem, this
movement response is made possible by lier entry into a fused minoring transference with
tlie innocent suffering Christ of her sliowings. It is the fusion or merging of bodily feeling
with the suffering Christ whicli dominates Julian’s initial entrée into the showmgs.
3.2.3 The a]ternations between visions of the flowing
blood and the dying body of Christ
Following on the initial showing of the bleeding crucifix (SI 3), tlie next two
visions are again of the bleeding crucifix, with images first of the blood diying and caldng
(SI 7), tlien of tlie blood flowing again, at which she repeats lier description ofhow
copiously and freely it was flowing. This time slie adds: “...and I saw this blood run so
plentifully tliat it seemed to me tliat if it had in fact been happening there, tlie bed and
everything around it would liave been soaked in blood”. (SI 8.) As well as tlie flowing
blood of the suffering, healing, nurturing cmcified One being an allusion to the eucharistic
wine, several feminist scholars have drawn connections here to medieval images of
menstruai blood, lactating breasts and tlie motlier’s suffering liemorrliage in birthing a
chuld.37 With knowledge of the context in whidh it arose in women’s medieval devotion,
the symbol stiil fiinctions polysemously to inspire different contemporaiy interpretive
explorations. Could it also be an image of the overwhelming flood of thoughts and
feelings she lias heretofore resisted experiencing in consciousness, lier confusion of fears
See for examples BYNUM, 1982, pp. 132 - 133; and LICHTMANN, 1991, p. 15.
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of being judged, lier tenor of (and potential rage at?) her condition of powerlessness which
up to now has been equatable with damnation
-- the ultimate abandonment by God?
Then again in the eighth showing (ST 10) the vision of Christ is as he is dying,
Julian describes the dryness, bloodlessness of his face and body. Abbott treats at length
the Long Text version of these first showings, where the drying out of the flesh of the
Christ-figure is much more expanded and intensified with imagery of cloth flapping in the
wind, etc. This too, was a conventional image at the time. Kuryluk observes that the
“vision of Christ’s dried-up skin reflects the nature of mystical experience which,
oscillating between the extremes of flulness and nothingness, ecstasy and mortification,
empties out and annihilates the object of its desire”.38 But what Abbott associates most
flully with these images in the Long Text could be said to be present in some degree afready
in the Short Text. Abbott holds that these images
dovetail with the theological theme of Christ’s self-emptying, lis kenosis. The
crucifixion is thus evoked as a depersonalizing process in which the supremely
living person, whose blood Julian saw flowing ‘hote andfreisly and ryth
plenteously’... descends to the status of a dead object, a thing to be dharactenzed
in terms of other things.”39
The descriptions of these visions of Christ altemately bleeding and drying may be
“iconic”, as Abbott has described it, referring to its static, non-reciprocal, non-narratorial
quality, “recreating the intense focus of Julian as viewing subject” in which Christ “is
appropnated as an object of lier exclusive attention”.40 From tliat perspective they could
also be said to be fragmentary images which describe what Julian’s mouming is feeling
like. I would bld, in keeping witli recent theory about mouming, that while the loss of
tlie object of desire may be real, the intensity of the mouming is related to the sense of s4f
tliat is lost in relation to the otlier. Perhaps wliat we see in Julian’s altemating visions of
endless blood and endless drying in Clirist’s Passion could be seen as altemating images of
the confusion Julian is feeling interiorly. Thus, on the one hand, Christ’s tearsflifeblood
which will neyer stop flowing, could be seen as an image of the flood of confusion and
grief raised by her powerlessness to control these events, yet eased by some hint of life she
does flot yet know -- here amplified by the medieval eudliaristic allusion. On the otlier, the
dry deadness of Christ’s body could be seen as an image of the fear that life as she lias
known it is gone forever, the life of lier suffering self as she lias known it up tili now; the
emptiness and depnvation of an as yet unknown sense of herself. These images could
38 KURYLUK, Ewa, Veronica and her ctoth, Cambridge, Basil Blackwell, 1991, p. 209.
ABBOTT, 1999, pp. 69 - 70.
40 ABBOTT, 1999, pp. 67, 73.
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suggest an intenor chaos erupting in her sense of selffiood. Because this occurs very early
on in her showings, perhaps these oscillations could also be seen as a precursor to the
fragmented images of the alternating feelings of spiritual bliss (through suffering) and
abandonment Julian experienced in the third showing. (ST 9.)
Such are some of the significant movement responses in Julian’ s entiy into her
visionary experience in these bodily sights of the Passion, as seen through the lens of
Kohut, Winnicott, Miller and Homans. What I want to suggest is that there is embedded in
ail this imagery, projected onto the screen of the bleeding crucifix, also a reflection of a
process of profound mouming, depersonalization, self-emprying going on in Julian’s own
personal bistory. Abbott’s insistence on the distant, objective or iconic quality of the
animated images related to the suffering, dying Christ on the cross, it seems to me,would
reinforce my interpretation of its projected (as yet relatively spiit or umntegrated)
transferential quality, alongside its religious conventionality. But I would hold that Julian’s
bodily sight of feeling Christ’ s pains represents a shift into entering a merged or fused
mirronng transference, and flot a distant kind of seeing.
I have stressed that these movement responses are at the level of deep bodily
feelings of resistance sififfing into assent. The surprising effect of these movement
responses, as that registers in her feelings, is one of comfort, that the Lord
would be so familiar with a sinful creature living in this wretched flesh... And at
the same time as I saw this corporeal sight, our Lord showed me a spiritual sight of
bis familiar love. I saw that he is to us everything which is good and comforting
for our help.... (ST 3 - 4.)
Julian’ s practice of desiring the wound of contrition may well have contnbuted to
lier receptivity to feeling comfort in such extreme cfrcumstances, but not simply for the
conventional devotional purpose of increasing lier personal sorrow for sins (and
masochistic comfort in succeeding). However it is perhaps significant that it is Julian’ s
request for the wound of compassion (rather than contrition) which is responded to in the
empathic bodily sight of and lier merged feelings witli the kenotic suffering Jesus of her
showings wbich elicited this strange new sense of comfort.
This response of comfort speaks to me of Julian undergoing this process of
mouming with some bodily perceived sense of lier deepest needs being mirrored and
affirmed in the transitional realm of beholding the crucifix. To use Homans’ phrase, she
shows afready some preparation for engaging in this growth in her “ability to moum”. This
emphasis on comîort in Julian’s response would confirm Abbott’s distinction between the
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youthful, self-preoccupied and seif-isolating, religious narcissist Julian, and the self from
which Julian speaks as she records lier showings later.41
Another confirmation would corne from Nancy Coiner’s fascinating smdy “The
‘homety’ and the heimiiche: The hïdden, doubled self in Julian of Norwich’s Showings”.
Coiner has developed Freud’s argument that the “unheimtich” or uncanny, “the affect
caused by the return of the repressed”, is a species of the “Heimiiche (liome-lilce or
familiar) to account for Julian’ s astonishment at seeing the face of the crucifix begin to
bleed, and at its homely meaning of comfort. Coiner believes that “what is most ‘homely’
or heimlich (and therefore also most unheimlich, or uncanny) tums out to be the hidden
nature of the self, and argues that Julian experiences -- and confronts -- a “crisis in
subjectivity”. For both Julian and Freud, the self is disconcertingly split between two
parts, each of which is hidden from the other’s view. Furthermore, for both Freud and
Julian, that split self is constituted by a deep connection to the maternai body... as a site
where ah categories (of life and death, of separation and unity) blur.42 This raises the
question of what might have helped constitute that deep connection to the maternai body?
Like Coiner, I am drawn to tum to a medieval symbol, the anchorhold.
4.0 The anchorhold as holding environment
In the study of the history of Christian doctrine among other fields, the context of
doing theology is becoming recogmzed increasingly as having a determinative effect on the
practice of theology. In the case of our present subject Julian of Norwich this is no less
significant particularly given the originalïty of lier work. Hence, I have been paying
attention to the debates about what state of life Julian was in prior to and following the
showings and the writing of the two texts.
But this question of context is also significant from an object relations theoretical
perspective, which identifies the maternai holding environment and mirroring function as a
significant element in any context which affirms and enables human maturation and
creativity. In a culture dominated by male writers and theologians, this “context” may be
taken for granted by its privileged members; it was simply the air which men breathed.
However, for a brilliant, psychologically oversensitive, devoted medieval woman who
41 ABBOTT, 1999, cli. 2.
42 COINER, Nancy, “The ‘hornely’ and the ‘heimtiche’: The hidden, doubled self in Julian of Norwich’s
Showings”, Exemptaria: Ajournai of theory in medievai and renaissance studies, 5, 1993, p. 307. See
FREUD, Sigmund, “The uncanny”, in Sigmund Freud: Collected papers, transi. RIVIERE, Joan, NY,
Basic, 1959, 4, pp. 368 - 407.
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dares to wnte lier theology in the vernacular, we can assume that a mirroring, affirming
context would be systemically witheld from her, yet ail the more necessary for such
creative work.
In the chapter on the pre-visionary Julian I argued, among other things, for an
interpersonal presence of a mirroring other in the person of a spiritual counsellor or director
in Julian’s youth which may well have continued on into her maturity as an anchoress, and
which prepared Julian for this therapeutic process of redressing the debilitating effects of
original trauma of maternai neglect and loss and their ongoing effects on lier aduit life, on
her capacity for self-acceptance (narcissism) and object relations. It would seem that
positing sucli a relationship might also help account for lier overcoming lier resistance to
entering into a therapeutic mirroring transference relationship and self-identification witli
the kenotic Christ.
I aiso underlined the significance in Julian’s early history of the tradition of
affective meditation on the Passion as an imaginative devotional means of encouraging a
relational encounter and participation in the scenes of the Passion. I argued that this too
could have had a significant, culturally accepted mirroring function of encouraging healing
and integrative work in prayer, particularly if she had been reticent to enter into mirroring
relationships. I suggested we might see this form of devotion as promoting a creative
meditation activity characterized by Winnicott as a transitional reaim, insofar as it
presupposes the trnstwortliy presence of an other wlio reflects back affirmingly the
emergence of the nascent self.
At this point I wisli to introduce another source in the medieval religious tradition
for what I will cail an imaginative holding environment, a social or interpersonal
environment of nurture and therapeutic mirroring, which, I believe, functioned powerfully
as a container and mirror for the work of self-transformation in relation to Christ: the
tradition surrounding the anchorhold. I suggest that themes associated with the anchorhold
and tlie ancliontic vocation can be detected here in the fusional or merged character of lier
transformative visionary experience of the bodily sight of the suffering Christ.
I propose that by the time of the sliowings Julian had been influenced by the
imaginative symbolic power of the tradition of anchoritic literature and bodily enclosure. I
am aware that to argue that Julian was afready enclosed before lier near death expenence
goes against tlie currently held view of Julian’ s state of life at the time of the showings
(apart from Jantzen and Baker). Perliaps the psychohistorical evidence for such a proposai
could be a case in point of how a psychohistorical study can contribute new sources of
evidence for the practice of the new history. There is the possibility that she lived in
seclusion in her own home before actually becoming formally enclosed. Contemporary
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women’ s experience as well as women mystics in the Christian tradition corroborate this
proposai. While acknowledging the ambivalence of the tradition of enclosure for women,
Janet Ruffing lias shown liow significant “enclosure” can be as a spiritual sanctuary, “safe
places set apart and protected in some way...” for women to have “respect, solitary time.
space to grieve”.43
Such places provide a safe environment that encourages women to sink to other
levels of awareness. Enclosures allow women to sofien the defenses they maintain
to protect themselve and to stop the constant ‘radar’ and early warning systems they
maintain to alert them to apporeaching danger.44
Ruffing also notes: “Carolyn Bynum discovered that the earlier a woman entered
the monastery, the stronger her sense of self and the more original lier metaphonc language
was”.45 In the history of women mystics, periods of informai enclosure are a repeated
phenomenon. For example, Catherine of Siena spent three years in seclusion in her parental
home after the death of lier sister.46 Marie de l’Incarnation also enclosed lierself informally
after the deatli of her husband. Even more significantly than these active mystics for the
purpose of this study of Julian is the case of the Montreal recluse Jeanne Leber, who lived
for fifteen years in reclusion in lier own home prior to her formai enclosure.47 Would this
have been a possibility in Julian’ s case?
I propose that while the tradition and bodily practices of the anchoritic vocation may
have functioned for Julian initially as a symbol of her ambivalent, resistive identification
with the state of death, in the Short Text account of the first showings, enclosure in
solitude, whether formally in the anchorhold or informalÏy, is hinted already as becoming a
kind of therapeutic holding environment.
Tlie earliest condition of the infant, prior to any separation of the infant’ s self from
the mother, is one of absolute fragility and dependence on maternai care. Winmcott denies
‘ RUFFING, Janet, “Spiritual direction with women: Reclaiming and reinterpreting key themes from the
spiritual tradition”, Presence, an international journal of spiritual direction 12, 3, 2006, p. 40.
‘ RUFFING, 2006, p. 40.
‘ RUFFING, 2006, p. 40. See BYNUM, 1982, 279 p.
46 MARTELLOCK, Amy King, “She who is flot: A psychobiography of Catherine of Siena using the
theories of D. W. Winnicott”, Ps.D. dissertation, Massachusetts school of professional psychology, 2003,
p. 130, argues that long after she came out of seclusion Catherine retained the “secret ceil” of self
knowledge as a way “to feel that the most important part of herseif was aiways in the presence of God and
that this connection and communion was more real than her objective reality.... It is another creative use of
transitional phenomena for defensive purposes”.
“Jeanne est dans sa trente-quatrième année [au moment où elle s’enferme formellement dans son reclusoir
à la CND pour le reste de ses jours]. Depuis quinze ans (1680), elle a vécu recluse sous le toit paternel”.
DEROY-PINEAU, Françoise, Jeanne Leber: La recluse au coeur des combats, Montréal, Bellarmin,
2000, p. 119.
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the concept of an infant in this earliest condition as having a “self’; the infant exists as a
dyadic relationship of mother-baby. What is needed at that time for the baby to develop is a
reliable environment which provides for the baby’s bodily and physiological needs. Recail
Winnicott’s description of the function of the holding environment as allowing a state of
unintegrated relaxation in the baby’s condition of absolute dependence, in which the baby
can move non-defensively toward integration of the environment. Winnicott describes this
from the baby’ s perspective as “I am seen or understood to exist by someone” and “I get
back (as a face seen in a mirror) the evidence I need that I have been recognized as a
being”.48 This, Winnicott calis the “holding environrnent”, which functions clearly as
more than just physical handling and includes the essential component of minoring.49
Both Winnicott and Kohut are agreed that the therapeutic or “analyfic” situation
must replicate these unmet needs for any real development to be possible in the adult who
bas not received this early maternai attention. Winnicott’ s and Kohut’ s
view of the development of the self led Winnicott [and KohutJ to redefine both the
analytic situation and the analytic process. Whereas Freud saw the analytic
situation in terms of abstinence (instinctual wishes emerge and find no
gratification), Winnicott sees the analytic situation in terms of satisfaction, flot of
instinctual impulses per se, but of crucial developmental experiences, missed
parentalfunctions. The couch, the constancy of the sessions, the demeanor of the
analyst -- these become the ‘holding environment’ which was flot provided in
infancy. Freud saw the analytic process in terms of renunciation; by bnnging to
light and renouncing infantile wishes, healthier and more mature forms of libidinal
orgarnzation become possible. Winnicott sees the analytic process in terms of a
kind of revitalization; the frozen, aborted self is able to reawaken and begin to
develop as crucial ego needs are met.50
For both Winnicott and Kohut then, a receptive, empathic acceptance of “narcissistic
illusions” as describing the analytic situation is the medium for the “growing edge of the
self’.5 1
I hold that what is reflected in Julian’s deep body movement responses from frozen
resistance to assent to enter into the transitional realm of the showings, would require a
situation in which she felt safe and accepted, as the medium for the growing edge of the
48 WINNICOTT, W. D., [19621 1965, p. 61; and by the same author, “The theory ofthe parent-infant
relationship”, in The maturationat processes and the facilitating environment: Studies in the theory of
ernotional development, Madison CN, International Uiversities Press, [19601 1965, pp. 37 - 55.
‘ WINNICOTf W. D., [1960) 1965, pp. 48 - 49.
50 MITCHELL, Stephen, “The wings of Icarus: Illusion and the problem of narcissism”, in Retational
psychoanatysis: The emergence ofa tradition, eds., MITCHELL Stephen and Lewis ARON, Hillsdale NJ,
Analytic Press, 1999, p. 162, emphasis added.
51 MITCHELL, 1999, p. 163.
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self. The lived martyrdom of the anchontic vocation, which promoted the generosity,
intimacy and gentleness of Christ’ s relationship with the anchoress could perhaps have
provided significant elements of sucli a “holding environment”. I will explore in more
depth the symbolism Julian retrieved from the anchontïc tradition below, in chapter 10.
As Julian’ s experience of entering the world of the showings begins, it is
remarkable how quickly it is revealed to her that the fragility of ail creation is
simultaneously safely kept and loved, in the “spiritual sight of his homely love” in the
image of the liazelnut. The associations Julian lias of simultaneous fragility and security in
lier vision of the hazelnut are already there in the first showing. (ST 4.)
4.1 The hazeinut and other visions of comfort and enclosure in the
first showing
Julian’s very early vision of the hazelnut in the palm of lier hand echoes the theme
of comfort while describing an image of enclosure:
And in this lie showed me something smail, no bigger than a hazelnut, lying in the
paim of my hand, and I perceived that it was as round as any bail. I looked at it and
thouglit: What can this be? MU I was given this general answer: It is everything
which is made. I was amazed that it could last, for I thought that it was so littie that
it could suddenly fali into nothing. And I was answered in my understanding: It
lasts and always will, because God loves it; and thus everything bas being tlirough
the love of God.
In this littie thing I saw three properties. Tlie first is that God made it, tlie second is
that lie loves it, the third is that God keeps {preservesJ it. (ST 4.)
It is in the very first showing, at the same time that Julian has the first bodily sight of
Christ, that she receives this spiritual sight of Christ’s liomely love as
everything which is good and comforting for our help.... Christ is our clothing,
for he is that love which wraps and enfolds us, embraces us and guides us,
surrounds us for his love, which is so tender that he may neyer desert us. And so
in this siglit I saw truly that he is everything which is good, as I understand. (ST
4)52
52 In LT 6 Julian extends this section to include a vision of the human body as a purse, which is opened
and shut in the time of its necessity, and observing that it is God that does this. There continues to be a
controversy as to whether the middle English word soute here refers to “food” -- and its digested form as
“sou”, or as a variant of saute, or “soul”. Personally, I have long held to the former interpretation, and
considered that this is an oblique reference to the condition of constipation which must have been ftequent
among anchorites. For example, the hagiographer of the anchoress Chrïstina Markyate writes: “Tbrough
long fasting, ber bowels became contracted and dried up”; cited in TALBOT, C. H. transi. and ed., The life
of Christina Markyate: A twelfth-century recluse, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1998, p. 104,
Medieval Academy Repnnts for Teaching 39. Julian, in that light, secs even the daily bowel movement as
a gift of God’s goodness, which, I bold, serves as an excellent example of the homely concretization or
intemalization of the symbolism of the enclosure.
Sec also WATSON, Nicholas and Jacqueline JENKINS, eds., The writings ofJulian ofNorwich:’ A vision
showed to a devout woman’ anti ‘A revelation of love’, University Park PN, Pennsylvania State
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The anchontic literature, or possibly the anchorhold itself, then, could have had a
very strong influence on Julian, in that it provided a imaginative symbolic container or
holding environment for lier to embrace the psycho-spiritual dying to self in Christ, the
mouming of a false self in a transforming, life-giving way, characterized by the surprising
visceral quality of fusion, containment, comfort and familiarity (homeliness) that Julian
telis us she experiences, even as she is experiencing deep disorientation and pain unlike
anything she lias previously known. It is lier assent to enter such a painful, disorienting,
yet strangely comforting fused kenotic experience which I propose to explore in the second
chapter of this diptch as that which inaugurates the contrast experience in Julian. Here I
am proposing that Julian’s knowledge of the anchoritic tradition contributed to this
dimension of lier showings and facilitated lier expenence of spiritual comfort in entering
this fused union with Christ in his suffering.
5.0 Julian’s confusion
Thus far, I have emphasized a psychobiographical interpretation of Julian’ s
response in these first showings to the suffering of Christ on the cross. Their meaning to
lier centres around how the suffering humanity of Christ is revealed to be intimately
reflective of lier own human condition in that moment, not as sinful per se, but as simply
suffering incredible pain, weakness, powerlessness and the disorientation of mourrnng.
But this very meaning also causes lier confusion because the common teaching of the
Church taught lier to see herself as essentially sinful and as having caused Christ’s
suffering and God’ s wrath. She expresses lier confusion or disorientation as a
preoccupation with “sin” which doesn’t make sense in light of the deeply felt compassion
she is experiencing with Christ’s own suffering:
And after this I saw God in a point... and by this vision I saw that lie is present in
ail things.... I marvelled at this vision with a gentie fear, and I thought: What is
sin? For I saw tmly that God does everything, however small it may be, and that
nothing is done by chance, but it is of the endless providence of God’s wisdom.
Therefore I was compelled to admit that everything which is done is well done, and
I was certain that God does no si Therefore it seemed to me that sin is nothing,
University, 2006, p. 142, who see it as an anticipation of the portrayal of God as mother in ET 55 - 62.
Julian is shown that God says that he
cornes down to us in our humblest needs. For he does flot despise what he has made, nor does he
disdain to serve us in the simplest natural functions of our body for love of the soul which he
created in his own likeness. For as the body is clad in the cloth, and the flesh in the skin, and the
bones in the flesh, and the heart in the tmnk, so are we, soul and body, clad and enclosed in the
goodness of God. (LT 6.)
In ail of this, it is “God who has enclosed us ah in himself’. (ET 6.) Kerrie Hide bas recently argued that
in this early image of the hazelnut is contained Julian’s soteriology. See RIDE, Kerrie, “Only in God do I
have ahi”, Downside review, 122, 2004, pp. 43 - 60.
224
for in ail this sin was flot shown to me. And I did flot wish to go on feeling
surprise at this, but I contemplated our Lord and waited for what he would show
me. (ST 8.)
In the enclosing imagery of God in ail things, the pre-oedipal themes of mouming,
vulnerability and comfort in knowing her condition to be mirrored, or more specifically
merged in the other, are ail present. But it is in this latter aspect of her experience, of
wondering what sin is that it has no place in this experience, that lier confusion in her
suffering lies. This experience, at once personal, pre-oedipal and yet reverberative of the
liuman predicament of lier even Christians -- particularly women
-- brings to light wliat I
propose is an underlying situation of sotenological contrast. Tlie study tums to this in the
next chapter.
CHAPTER $
DIPTYCH 1.2 SUFFERING AND CONTRAST EXPERIENCE
1.0 Introduction
The present chapter begins with Elizabeth Johnson’ s description of the contrast
experience, the first stage of the conversion process in the liberationist appropriation of
sotenology. It then looks at tliese same first showings of the Short Text as in the last
chapter to explore how they might reflect the contours of Julian’ s soteriological crisis in
Johnson’s terms. I will argue that this contrast experience was brought to consciousness
by lier showings and resulted in confusion between what lier showings would teach lier
and wliat the Churcli’s common teaching held. I explore Sebastian Moore’s psychoanalytic
sotenology as a way of articulating Julian’s confusion around suffering more explicitly
along these unes.
2.0 Naming Julian’s experience as an experience of contrast:
The Iink with Johnson’s first movement in the liberation dynamic
of conversion
Johnson describes the three phases of the conversion process understood as the
feminist expression of the liberation dynamic of appropriation: the identification of an
experience of contrast, the confirmation of the dignity of the subject as she cornes into
speech (which involves a positive retrievat of more mearnngful and coherent sources from
the tradition), and the appropriation of an understanding of salvation which is responsive
to the deepest needs of women (and men) and so, liberative and transformative.1
Drawing on Schillebeeckx, Elizabeth Johnson describes the contrast experience in
the following way:
It is the kind of frnitful experience that transpires when persons bump up against
the stubbom resistance of historical reality to what they sense to be tme, good, and
beautiful. When reality is thus ‘dis-illusioning’, the contrast challenges people to a
1 See JOHNSON, Elizabeth, She who is: The mystery of God in feminist theologicat discourse, NY,
Crossroad, 1992, chapter 4, and ber “Jesus and salvation”, Proceedings of the Catholic theological society
ofArnerica 49, 1994, pp. 1 - 18.
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decîsion: either close their minUs and deny what they have experienced, or use it as
a springboard to address and struggie with the causes of the suffering.2
How, then, could Julian’s experience be akin to this?
Julian’ s experience of contrast is perhaps the reverse of contempormy feminists’
expenence. As the contemporay liberation dynamic is articulated, a situation of
unrntelligible social evil demands intelligibility, and renders naïve belief in the status quo
incredible. What is “incredible” for Julian, however, is flot her early life of devotion to
chosen and unchosen suffering. It is rather the familiarity, the intimate and comforting
liomeliness of God revealed to her from the first of lier showings of the Cmcified which is
incredible, in the sense of its being “too good to be true”. Julian was living in an age which
had no concept of freedom and equality between the sexes or classes of people. I believe
we can safely say of sexism, whether projected back into the medieval penod or since, that
as it is “written deeply into a traditional culture, it often goes unnoticed, for it has roots in a
longstanding memory.... [TJhe biases lie so deeply ingrained that they are experienced as
precisely what should be, even according to the wil of God”.3 This situation of practising
pious acts of suffering, as a way perhaps of unconsciously dealing with massive
unintelligible societal suffering, was perhaps as it should be, for Julian. It is only in light of
the showings that she assents to an awareness of lier radical powerlessness and unchosen
vulnerability in the face of suffenng at death, the outcome of which she could not control.
As I see it, it is oniy in light of the showings which set up the contrast that her fear of death
as the recapitulation of traumatic separation and abandonment is brouglit to the fore. It
seems to be only in light of the showings that she becomes confused and she doesn’t know
what sin is anyrnore. It is only in light of the showings that the situation of the contrast
experience arises to consciousness, and focuses the question for Julian around what to
believe -- the Church’s teachings or her showings?4
As Julian puts it more eloquently in the Long Text:
How can this be? For I know by the ordinary teaching of Holy Church and by my
own feeling that the blame of our sins continually hangs upon us, from the first
man until the time that we corne up into heaven. Ibis, then, was my astonishment,
that I saw our Lord God showing no more blame to us than if we were as pure and
as holy as the angels are in heaven. And between these two oppositions my reason
was greatly afflicted by my blindness.... (LT 50.)
2 JOHNSON, 1992, P. 63.
HAIGHT, Roger, Jesus, symbot of God, NY, Orbis, 1999, p. 372.
Marguerite del Mastro gives an extended description of what she calis the “contradiction between the
doctrine of the Church as she had learned it, and what she was now being shown”, indicating five popular
teachings of the time and Julian’s paradoxical visionary responses, in DEL MASTRO, Marguerite, “Juliana
of Norwich: Parable of the lord and servant -- radical orthodoxy”, Mystics quarterty 14, 1988, pp. 84 - 86.
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I suggest ffiat what Julian, recollecting her experience, names as blindness is, in
this case, confusion in the meaning of lier suffering and its relation to sin, as the
underlying experience of sotenological contrast.
As she watches Christ’s blood flow and the body die before her she feels she is
dying a new death. No longer are these the pains of ambivalence she was suffering on the
verge of dying -- she is quite clear: they are flot her pains; they are Christ’s. This is not
suffering that is conventïonal or compulsive, driven by the desire to control the outcome, or
at least by the presumption to know what that outcome will be, and to avoid facing some
more fundamental pain within of being totally powerless in tlie face of death and in some
sense fearing the worst. Now she is feeling Christ’s overwhelming pains in lier own
body. But given ail she lias intenonzed about suffering, she might well be unclear. Despite
ail this agitation, fear and doubt she is in a condition of knowing lier utter powerlessness:
she lias assented to the reality tliat slie is physically dying. Nonetheless, at tlie same tirne
she is experiencing a union with Christ as he approaches deatli, sucli tliat slie sees God
“present in ail things” -- and by implication, in herself.
The contrast experience which cornes into her awareness through the showings is
between Julian’s visceral sense of comfort and of being toved and safe in her condition
offragitity, united witli Christ in lis suffering, and yet confusion in lier “reason” as to
liow lier suffering can be anything but a sign of lier sinfulness, tlie blarne for wliich hangs
continually about lier and which is what separates her from Christ, as she bas been taught
by Holy Cliurch.
Tlie real work of contrition here it would seem is a work not of self-judgment, but
as Watkins lias described it, of self-surrender.5 It is a relinquisliing of the “strong sense
of self-will” which liad led lier to tlie perfectionist “belief tliat she knew what she needed
for lier own spiritual progress”.6 In other words, we miglit say that it is a surrender of
who slie tliouglit she was, to enter into a relationship of shared suffering witli an as yet
unknown, uncontrollable yet homely, mirroring Christ.
5 WATMNS, Renée Neu, “Two women visionaries and death: Catherine of Siena and Julian of Norwich”,
Numen: International review for the history of religions 30, 1983. p. 197, fn. 11.
6 PANICHELLI, Debra Scott, “Finding GoU in the memory: Julian and the loss of the visions”, The
Downside review 104, 1986, p. 307; as weIl as ABBOTI’, Christopher, Jutian of Norwich: Autobiography
and theology, Cambridge, D. S. Brewer, 1999, p. 60.
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3.0 Sebastian Moore’s psychoanalytic soteriology
I propose that as Julian assents to enter into the visionary experience she undergoes
confusion in her suffering and its relation to sin, as the underlying experience of
soteriological contrast. This is aldn to the confusion around indiscnminate suffering which
Sebastian Moore describes as having rendered the suffenng of Christ on the cross
meaningiess in our day. In one place he cails this the “cuit of suffering”.7 In the foilowing
paragraphs I will describe Moore’s psychoanalytic soteriology, which, aithough a
contemporary sotenological attempt to speak to the problem of the incredibility of the cross,
is initially difficuit to grasp perhaps because of how it differs from the ways in which the
sotenologicai tradition has effectively taught generations of Christians to think of God, sin
and salvation.
It is to this Christian heritage of misconceived suffering associated with the cross to
which Sebastian Moore wants to apply bis psychoanalytic soteriology. Moore
understands that recovering the salvific significance of the story of Jesus must intersect
with the pre-religious story of human consciousness. He locates this consciousness flot in
some transcendentai reflection lilce Rahner, but in the contemporary postmodern
psychoanalytic account of narcissism. For Moore, the one universai pre-religious human
desire is for sefworth, a desire, as McDargh puts it “to know ourselves as loved, valued
and the source of delight to a beloved other”.8 McDargh goes on to describe Moore’s
insight:
Moore proposes... that ail human beings have a “pre-religious love affair with
God” insofar as the question of the heart “do you love me?” is ultimateiy asked flotjust to the significant others that are the human chiÏd’s first interpersonal universe,
but to the horizon of ail meanings and existence -- the origin and end of human
becoming, in short, to God. With the postmodern psychoanalytic thinkers, Moore
sees these questions not as infantile yeamings better outgrown, but as the persistent
cries de coeur of every human being which are deait with throughout life in the
matnx of real reiationships in the world as well as in the expenentially real inner
representationai world in which we represent to ourselves in story and symbol the
ultimate answers we live by. The encounter in prayer, sacrament and community
with the living Christ is thereby given a psychological location and a reality that is
flot reductive, even though it is psychologically located.9
To the contemporary question “If Christ saves but we are stiil in our psychological
distress, so what?” Moore would pose bis own: “The central question for an understanding
MOORE, Sebastian, The crucfied Jesus is no stranger, NY, Paulist, 1977, p. 23.
8 MCDARGH, John, “Theological uses ofpsychology: Retrospective and prospective”, Horizons 12,
1985, p. 262; MOORE, Sebastian, Thefire and the rose are one, London, Darton, Longman and Todd
Press, 1980, 158 p.
McDARGH, pp. 262 - 263.
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of our salvation in Jesus Christ is: What is the death of ego out of which we are brought
into divine union?10 Moore’s project is an attempt to describe what he means by ego
death, and why it is important for the appropriation of a credible soteriology.
Moore sees his as an “inverse soteriology”, begbining witli humanldnd (in
particular Jesus’ grieving disciples, after his death) and how we appropnate salvation, and
then from there, moving to what it is that Jesus does which is salvific. He seeks to offer
this in terms of a psychology that “grasps what bereavement does to the ego”.1’
Ibis methodology, has been criticized for potenflally confusing Christian spiritual
growth with any psychological experience of grief. Moore’s response is simply that
without the experience of grief as an ego death, suffering remains confused. Moore’s
inverse soteriology lias also been criticized for its assumptÏon to know what was going on
in the hearts and minds of the disciples, and for reducing the Resurrection to a subjective
expenence. Moore’s methodology is clearly drawn from his own life of affective
meditation on the gospels, and the mearnngful prayer encounter which lie lias experienced
through this practice.’2 It is interesting in the context of the present study to observe
Moore’ s continuity witli Julian in the practice of tectio divina. She too desired to
experience, by means of imaginative meditation, what Jesus’ closest disciples feit at bis
Passion. Julian writes:
I wislied tliat I had been at tliat time witli Mary Magdalen and witli tlie otliers who
were Christ’s loyers, so tliat I miglit have seen with my own eyes our Lord’s
Passion which he suffered for me, so that I might have suffered with him as others
did who loved him....” (SI 1.)
In this respect lier metliodology was not unlike Moore’s (altliough she got more than slie
bargained for). As for the critique that it renders the Resurrection a subjective expenence,
the stress Winmcott and Homans lay on the third, transitional reaim, between subjective
and objective, as the locus for the creation of meaning of symbols, could be invoked to
respond to this cnticism. Intenority does flot necessarily equate to private subjectivity.
Moore draws on Alice Miller’ s object relations theory as a basis for bis “adequate
intentionality-shaped psychology”.’3 With relational psychoanalysis lie holds that we are
10 MOORE, Sebastian, Jesus, liberator of desire, NY, Crossroad, 1989, pp. ix - x.
11 MOORE, Sebastian, “The forming and transforming of ego: An explanatory psychology of
soteriology”, Lonergan workshop vol. 8, 1990, pp. 180 - 182, emphasis in text.
12 For the criticism sec, for one example, DUFFY, Stephen, “Ego transcendence and transformation: The
soteriology of Sebastian Moore”, in Jesus crucfied and risen: Essays in spirituality and theology in honor
of Dom Sebastian Moore, eds. LOEWE, William and Vemon GREGSON, Collegeville MN, Michael
Glazier, 1998, p. 45.
13 MOORE, 1990, p. 180.
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bom into dependence and that life is lived in dependence on others and ultimately on the
mystery which is God. The idea that the self is an isolated monad is an illusion, he says.14
However, oneness and separation are the two pulls that shape human infancy and they
remain in tension until death)5
Moore understands desire as set into this relational context of trust. “Desire is
solicitation by the mystery we are in”.16 By this he means that desire does flot begin with
us but with God. “Desire is flot an emptiness needing to be fihled but a fulness needing to
be in relation”.17 To grow in desire is to grow in trustful relationship in the total mystery
which is God. This vital desire only increases with satisfaction: “One cari aiways be more
trustfut, more connected, which means, more desirous”.18
The way we experience desire, however, changes. He seeks an adequate
psychology to account for how we experience changes in the way we feel situated in the
“total mystery”, i.e., in our relation with God.
In fact he says, the important changes in our experience of desire corne through
growth crises.
The growth crises of our life will bring about changes in our desire. Between the
desire of the infant for the glory of the maternai embrace and the desire of a Gandhi
to restore the self love of a people, and at the limit, the desire of Jesus for a baptism
that will send fire through the earth, there lie many growth crises. The process is...
the liberation of desire.19
He goes on to say that the crises of life, such as falling in love, undergoing conversion,
suffering bereavement, etc., “ail present the painful and bewildering demand that the
person die to the existing ego-form and into a new interaction of the two great constitutive
forces, of oneness and separateness”.2° Tensions at eveiy point of life crisis are resolved
through a death to the current ego-consciousness and birth of a new, “mutually enhanced,
mutually advanced” balance between oneness and separation.2’ This process of
transformation of ego through life crises is what Moore calis the process of the liberation of
desire.
14 MOORE, 1989, p. 9
15 MOORE, 1989, p. 15.
16 MOORE, 1989, p. 10.
17 MOORE, 1990, p. 167.
18 MOORE, 1989, p. 11, emphasis added.
19 MOORE, 1989, pp. 12 - 13.
20 MOORE, 1989, p. 15.
21 MOORE, 1989, pp. 15 - 16.
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Before proceeding, it is essential to be clear about what I understand Moore’ s
concept of dying to ego to mean and flot to mean. Johnson says that in die classical
theological understanding of dying to self developed by men, this was understood as a
decentring of the prideful self who asserted itself over others.
But the situation is quite different when this language is applied to persons akeady
relegated to the margins of significance and excluded from the exercise of self
definition. for such persons, language of conversion as loss of self tuming from
amor sui, functions in an ideological way to rob them of power, maintaining them
in a subordinate position to the benefit of those who mie.
[Wjornen’s primordial temptation is flot to pnde and self-assertion but radier to the
lack of it, to diffuseness of personal center, overdependence on others for self
identity, drifting and fear of recognizing one’s own competence.... In this situation
grace cornes... not as the cail to loss of self but as empowerment toward discoveiy
of self and affinnation of one’s strength, giftedness and responsibility.22
I believe Sebastian Moore would agree wholeheartedly with this description of the situation
of women. What does need to be retained, however, is what Johnson later refers to as
“loss of self-identity [whichJ is also a loss of the experience of God”.23 She uses this
negative way to describe what is going on when women begin the conversion experience of
discovenng and affirming a truer centre of seifhood, which simultaneously transforms the
experience of who God is too. It is this loss of seif-identity (as it lias been known) as loss
of the experience of God (as that bas been known) wbich I mean to correlate with Moore’s
notion of ego death, as “a death to the current ego-consciousness and birth of a new,
‘mutually enhanced, mutually advanced’ balance between oneness and separation”.
3.1 Sin as resistance to ego death
What is sin for Moore? Moore focuses on the resistance we have to this lifelong
process of dying to ego-consciousness. “We fear becoming someone we do flot as yet
know”.24 We fear the emption of the “oceanic” in cadi life crisis of desire as a challenge
to the ego-consciousness to which we have become accustomed and in which we have
expenenced the trust relationship. (Perhaps for women or others who have suffered
neglect, it couid better be said that we fear the spectre of fragmentation posed by the
renegotiation of “separation” in each life crisis as well?) It is precisely at such times that die
“mysteiy appears thoroughly untmstworthy, capricious, and cruel”.25 It is only when we
22 JOHNSON, 1992, p. 64.
23 JOHNSON, 1992, P. 65, drawing on Karl Rahner.
24 MOORE, 1989, p. 19.
25 MOORE, 1989, p. 20.
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somehow recognize that the existing trust relationship doesn’t work anymore that we are
changed:
The growth crisis is flot undergone unless we seem to be swallowed up by the
oceanic. How this is flot our destruction but on the contrary the threshold of our
destined life, is the most mysterious thing in the finite’ s dialogue with the infimte.
It is the expenence of rebirth out of death.26
(Again, for women could that experience seem initially more like being fragmented by
overwhelming separation?) Such deaths of ego become the condition of our
development.27
Before proceeding to describe firnher why it is that humankind resists undergoing
such ego deaths, I would make an observation. Moore’ s understanding of humanldnd as
essentially relational, dependent on and drawn by desire into a trusting relatïonship with the
mystery that is God, stands against the effective history of the satisfaction theory of
salvation, which as Johnson has observed, “has fostered the idea of an angry God who
needs to be recompensed by the bloody death of his son”.28
That Julian had absorbed this effective history is clear in lier pre-visionary,
perfectionist tendency to blame God that sin had flot been prevented from ever coming into
the world. (ST 13.) It is also implicit as a fear of God’s wrath as she describes this later in
her marvelling at its absence in lier showings. (LI 48, 49.)
3.2 Moore’s psychoanalytic parable of original sin
For Moore as we saw, the one universal pre-religious human desire is for self
worth. Moore likewise reconceives what sin looks like: “sin is self-hatred”.29 Sin is
understood as resistance to undergoing the ego deaths which life presents us. Why is it
that some people do flot grow, do flot face the fear of ego deaths? Reasons such as
personal negligence or perversity are flot adequate lie says. Moore writes that “Christian
tradition lias a name for the spiritual inertia that is woven into the human condition over and
above personal sin: original sin”.3° He tums again to psychoanalytic theory for a
description of original sin as the “systemic societal repression in people of the ‘true self’:
26 MOORE, 1989, p. 20.
27 MOORE, 1989, p. 21.
28 JOHNSON, 1994, p. 5.
29 MOORE, 1977, p. 37.
30 MOORE, 1989, p. 25.
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the true self that does trust life, that does want to grow, that does ‘desire to desire
more“31
Moore draws on Alice Miller’s work for a relational psychoanalytic theory of
mirroring very aldn to that of Winnicott, to give a theological account for original sin. He
describes the effects of what can go wrong in the infant’s early experience of mirroring.
Whereas the child seeks to see and enjoy hersef in the mother-minor, under those
circumstances of chronically inadequate mirroring the child rather is made to feel shame,
and so to abandon the important maturation in narcissism and object relations of negotiating
that tme sense of self.32
Interestingly Moore describes what might more typically be a littie boy’ s response
to the mother, insofar as typically the boy tends to identify himself as autonomous, separate
from the mother:33
The infant is drawn into oneness with the mother tlirough seeing itsef in the
mother, and tliis fascination is held in balance by the growing sense of its separate
existence.... The sense of separateness allows the infant to enjoy himself in the
mother-mirror without getting lost in it -- to enjoy himsefthere. Now if the
mother won’t let liim be separate but holds him to her as a mirror to hersdf then
he is flot free to enjoy himself in lier. Thus lie leams to crush the self in wliich he
should delight, to cmsh it flot only in himself but in the people lie meets in later
life.34
If the feminine side of narcissistic dysfunction is attended to, the picture perhaps
looks different, but arrives at the same seif-sabotaging end. Insofar as the little girl (whose
need for relationality makes lier separation from the mother more attenuated) needs to see
herseif in the mother-mirror, but is neglected and cannot see or enjoy lierseif there, the
dynamic moves in a different direction, tliat of getting lost in the unthinkable anxiety of
experiencing fragmenting separateness too soon, before ever having enjoyed the oneness.
So she crushes the self in which slie should deliglit, and crushes it in others, in lier very
liunger for the relational oneness slie neyer enjoyed.
The effect is tliat the child neyer enters fully into the mirror pliase, and so cannot get
beyond it. Moore sees this permanence of wliat lie calis “early ego” (aldn to Koliut’s
archaic prestructures) as tlie social norm in our culture. Thus the arrest at the early ego
phase makes the long journey of death and transformation of ego seem quite unreal. Moore
MOORE, 1989, p. 25.
32 MOORE, 1989, p. 27.
See CHODOROW, Nancy, The reproduction ofmothering: Psychoanalysis and the sociology of
gender, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1978, 263 p.
MOORE, 1989, p. 27.
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sees that this “system of deprivation” is a societal systemic, flot merely an individual
problem and describes the consequences of this resistance as original sin.35
Moore turns to Jesus and the effects of his death on the entry of his disciples into
bereavement as reversing the “millenially inhented resistance to this transformation”.36
Moore sees that what the Christian fact (Jesus’gift of bis true self for the life of the world
through a lifelong practice of death to ego) does to the familial and social repression of the
true self is
(a) to reveal the end and meaning of human transformation by effecting it in Jesus
for bis disciples, (b) thus to restore the transformative dimension to its normative
status after it has been virtually eclipsed by sin, and (c) swallow up sin in
transformation.37
Moore’s project is to sort ont confusion in Cbristianity’s customary indiscriminacy
conceming suffering, and to put meaning back into Jesus’ life, death on a cross and
Resurrection. In this project he distinguishes between dying to ego and dying to sin.
Significantly Moore argues that only Jesus died to ego only, and that bis whole life is an
example of transformation, the example for Christians of liberated desire trusting in the
mystery of God. Dying to sin is what Moore catis the heating of this resistance to ego
death, the heating of the early ego. “The difference between sin and the reluctance we
expenence in face of a challenge to grow is that sin systematically prevents the challenge
from presenting itself’.38 In other words, feeling fear or dread of the challenge to mature
in self-love is flot in itself sinful. The repression of feeling the dread, the refusai to
recognize that there is a challenge, is. “Finitude, creaturehood, is not sin”, says Moore,
and I would add: though from the perspective of sin it is finitude and creaturehood
-- i.e.,
dependency
-- which look sinful. It is preciseiy the consciousness of human fear, dread,
etc. which is unthinkable and incapable of being felt from the perspective of sin. Sin is
resisting to feel that fear.
For Moore, affective non-defensiveness is an essential categoiy for doing theology.
Where this is flot the case in theology, Moore argues that there are customary distortions
made in our theologicai concepts of sin and suffering. “The muddle is to associate ail
MOORE, 1989, pp. 28 - 29.
36 MOORE, 1989, p. 29.
MOORE, 1989, p. 30.
38 MOORE, 1989, p. 32.
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suffering, suffering as sucli, with sin, and to hold onto this connection even in the case of
Jesus by the subterfuge of saying that he suffers our sin”.3
Moore describes the difference in kind of suffering which is undergone in dying to
ego, in entering the transformative process into which love invites:
The truth is that suffering inheres in finitude in the presence of the infinite, and that
Jesus undergoes this suffering which we, because of sin, are unabte to undergo
until we see our true self and its proper suffering in him.... Jesus, sufferer of the
infinite, suffers empathically with that in us which, because of sin, is unable to
suffer and it is the awareness of being suffered-with where sin prevents us from
suffering that causes sin to fali away.40
Moore is insistent that Jesus’ life was one that was in a continuai process of dying to ego
into fuller life, and that our appropriation of Jesus’ creative, transformative suffenng is the
way to become “progressively more in solidarity with others and alive to the nerve of pain,
desire, and hope, that runs through us ail”.41 This, in effect, is the fruit of ego death, a
movement out of seif-preoccupation toward a greater sense of solidarity, communion with
humankind in its various conditions.
This kind of suffering is very different from the kind of suffering which is
perpemated by repressing occasions for ego deaths. The latter translates into the
complacency with the ego/society as ït is which leads to depersonalized, systemic
distortions such as racism, sexism, etc.42 From this we can see that confusion in suffering
does not lead to real solidarity, but simply perpetuates a sense of seif-preoccupation with
personal (over)responsibility and a sense of isolation.
The first chapter of the next diptych will explore in kohutian terms Julian’s struggle
to render her confusion around suffenng intelligible in light of the trust which she
experiences wïth the Christ of lier showings and to reform lier understanding about wliat
sin is for lier in a non-defensive way. In the sotenologïcal correlation part of tliat diptych I
will explore witli lielp from Cynthia Crysdale what Julian miglit have to offer to the
question of wliat 5m looks like from tlic underside of history, tliat is, as it is experienced by
those wliose condition of dependency could be said to render them susceptible to violation
of trust. Exploring tlie correlation Crysdale asks wliat personal responsibility would look
like from the perspective of sucli suffering? Having undertaken the joumey of ego deatlis,
MOORE, 1989, p. 35, emphasis in text.
40 MOORE, 1989, pp. 35 - 36, emphasis in text.
41 MOORE, 1989, p. 37.
42 MOORE, 1989, p. 33.
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liow, from that perspective, would this joumey bear fruit in greater solidarity with
humankind?
In the present context, I simply want to draw a correlation between Moore’ s
distinction between these two kinds of suffering, and what I perceive to be at work in
Julian’ s confusion around lier experience of suffering as she assented to enter into the
visionary experience.
4.0 Suffering death of ego in Julian
The muddle in religious thinking about suffering as Moore describes it lias resulted
as we have seen in unredemptive suffering. In the case of women, this has perpetuated
women’ s sense of being responsible for others’ suffering, and supremely, for Jesus’
suffering and God’s wrath, the effect of which is a sense of unmitigated burden of
sinfulness. It is the confusion inherent in tliis vicious circle which Julian, I suggest,
became aware of when, by contrast, lier sliowings reveaied flot a confirmation of what she
liad been taught by Holy Church, but a disconfirmation, in the form of tliat strange,
disorientingly painful yet homety comfort, as she entered into an active encounter witli tlie
Jesus of lier sliowings.
Using the way Moore describes tlie kind of suffering which Jesus undergoes, and
whicli liumankind undergoes wlien we begin to see our true self in Jesus, how might we
see this in Julian’s experience? I repeat Moore: “Jesus, sufferer of the infinite, suffers
empathically with that in us wliich, because of sin, is unable to suffer and it is the
awareness of being suffered-with wliere sin prevents us from suffering tliat causes sin to
fail away”.
Using Moore’s language, wliat was the pre-visionary Julian unable, because of sin,
to suffer? It seems that prior to her assent to enter into the mirroring transference with the
Jesus of lier showings she had been unable to suffer two things: first, she had been unable
to suffer tlie acceptance of lier powerlessness over imminent pliysical death (a refusai to
accept lier creaturely limitedness or feel tlie fear of damnation she had intemalized); second,
slie liad flot been able to suffer the disorienting pain of receiving comfort in union witli
Christ empathically suffering with lier.
First, as we saw in the early shifts from resistance to assent to enter tlie visionary
reaim, Julian seems to be led to feel lier symptoms of death more keenly. There is a
relinquishing of a fundamental ambivalence toward death in tliose first shifts. It is possible
to see in lier self-preoccupied ambivalence what Moore would cail an unliberated desire to
trust, a thwarting of her experience of knowing herself to be “solicited by tlie mystery” slie
is in. Tlie shift to relinquisliing that ambivalence and assenting to die brings on a shift into
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feeling more keenly the deatli she lias resisted. Perhaps Moore would say that in this
instance Jesus suffers empathically wïth that assent to die in Julian, which she has flot
been able to suffer heretofore. But tliis interior assent to die brings on more than she
anticipated, as tlie symptoms of dying then shift off into a condition of comfort. The
resistance is swallowed up.
Second, if we continue to use Moore’s language, Jesus suffers empathically with
that comfort in Julian. Julian becomes aware in ST 10 tliat it is no longer her own pain,
but only Christ’s pain in her tliat she is feeling. $o far in lier ascetical training, she lias
practised acts of compassion in order to liave (manufacture?) mynd and feeling of Christ.
But now, it is Christ who is suffering in lier. It is Christ’ s suffering-with, or compassion,
causing this disorienting painful comfort in lier which she heretofore lias neyer known,
which causes tlie 5m (in Moore’ s understanding of sin as that whicli resists expenencing
ego death) to fail away, witli the resuit that slie begins to feel what she lias been unable to
feel until now. She is confused, but having become conscious of the difference in this
shared suffering with Christ wliich is also a strange comfort, it would seem slie cannot go
back.
I propose that tliis is Julian’ s first assent to undergo an ego death, as Moore bas
described it, a death to tlie false self which had grown up in the absence of a mirroring
(m)Other. If this is so, then what Julian will see mirrored in Christ wil be a first sight of
lier mie self assenting to be solicited by the mystery, assenting to trust in Christ whom she
lias desired, yet neyer before been enabled to enjoy, neyer before seized within. And if this
is the case, the pattem we see here will be repeated, as Julian becomes more and more
acquainted witli tlie interior shifts and assents whicli tlie practice of dying to ego, the
liberation of desire enables. And we will see Julian become more astute in disceming what
constitutes resistance to tliis liberation.
Until this moment of assent or surrender to the visionary realm, Julian, I would
propose, has flot experienced or “seen” the contrast between the suffenng that is a
“consequence of union with God” as distinct from suffering tliat was understood as a
“means to it”.43 This new, disorienting visionary world, which is opening to her as she
assents to surrender lier conventional picture of tlie outcome of religious means of
devotion, brings the contrast into focus.
But having liad tliis awakemng to confusion, this consciousness raising as to lier
blindness or inability to experience homely comfort in relation to Christ, Julian understands
‘ CRYSDALE, Cynthia, Embracing travail: Retrieving the cross today, NY, Continuum, 2001, p. 124.
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that this is a problem flot just of a personal order, but for ail lier even Cliristians. If God
does flot want God’ s people to be bowed down in some compulsion to be working at
suffering endlessly and non-redemptively, then this is something people need to know.
Indeed, she says, God wants us to know it. And from very early on in the Short Text
(although this will become more pervasive in tlie Long Text) she telis the reader she
believes she lias liad this showing for the sake of otliers:
.1 counsel you... that ... you contemplate [behold] God, who out of his courteous
love and lis endless goodness was willing to show this vision generally, to the
comfort of us ail. And you who hear and see this vision and this teaching, whicli is
from Jesus Christ for the edification of your souls, it is God’ s will and my wish
that you accept it with as mucli joy and deliglit as if Jesus had shown it to you as lie
did to me.... But it is tnily love which moves me to teil it to you, for I want God to
be known and my fellow Christians to prosper, as I hope to prosper myself by
hating sin more and loving God more. But because I am a woman, ought I
therefore to believe that I should not teli you of the goodness of God, when I saw at
tliat same time that it is his will that it be known? (ST 6.)
5 . O “Wbat is sin?”
The effect of Julian’ s experience of contrast is confusion in suffenng. I said in tlie
last chapter that while beholding the crucifix Julian’ s bodily sight began to teacli lier to
make a distinction in her own feelings between the kenotic state of intense bodily suffering
of a powerless condition shared in Christ, and the spiritual pain of living in isolation,
ambivalence and despair which for Julian has its own bodily feelings. Thus seeing bodily,
in a condition of fusion with the crucifix, became an organ of knowledge for Julian. But
this seeing witli her body does flot coliere with what she lias been taught.
Julian focuses lier confusion in lier preoccupation witli 5m, in the disorienting fact
that she does flot see sin revealed to lier in the showings. Julian tliouglit slie knew what sin
was. She knew what the Cliurcli taught was 5m arid what to do about it. But underlying
tliat was a tacit understanding that tliere was really nothing that could be done about sin;
tliat God was fundamentally absent from ail things. Then in lier vision of God in a point,
she says tliat
in my understanding and by this vision I saw that lie is present in ail things. I
contemplated it careflully, knowing and perceiving througli it that lie does
everything which is done. I marvelled at this vision with a gentie fear, and I
tliought: What is sin? for I saw tmly that God does everything, however small it
may be, and that nothing is done by chance, but it is of the endless providence of
God’s wisdom. Tlierefore I was compelled to admit that everything which is done
is done well, and I was certain that God does no sin. Therefore it seemed to me
tliat sin is nothing, for in ail this sin was flot shown to me. And I did not wish to
go on feeling surprise at this, but I contemplated ouï Lord and waited for wliat lie
would show me. (ST 8.)
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Perhaps there is a correlation to be made here with Sebasfian Moore’ s negative
understanding of sin as that which prevents us from suffering the challenge of dying to ego
with which life confronts us, prevents us from being empathically suffered-with by Jesus.
For Julian, the question of what is sin becomes the question which now needs
intelligibility. The idea that sin is nothing would have been familiar to her in the
Augustinian tradition. But what the Church had effectively taught her about sin, and what
she had intemalized about sin, suggests she anticipated seeing herseif as blameful, as
having caused Christ’s suffering. (LT 50.) I propose that Julian’s central problem, clearly
articulated already in the Short Text, is her agonized experience of soteriological crisis, that
what she had been taught to believe about 5m and her accessibility to salvation in Christ
was flot believable -- at the point at which she needed most to believe it. Instead, she is
plagued with a sense of ambivalence and isolation. But what brought this to a head was
that it did flot cohere with what the suffering Christ of her showings would teach ber.
Again, the contrast arises in light of what her showings have disconfirmed. What, then, is
sin?
At one level, blindness is Julian’ s acknowledgement of resistance to seeïng and
understanding, with the eye or bodily feelings, what her showings would reveal to ber.
This blindness could be what Moore and the psychoanalytic tradition cali defensiveness. I
am suggesting that Julian’ s word “blindness” describes, at a more fundamental level
however, lier expenence of soteriological contrast, this confusion around the meaning of
her suffering and its relation to sin. The next diptych will tum to Julian’ s search for the
intelligibility of 5m and and human responsibility in view of the meaning which lier
visionary experience brings to light conceming her human condition.
DWTYCH 2
CHAPTER 9
DIPTYCH 2.1 EMPATHY AND EXPOSURE
1.0 Introduction
The first chapter in this second diptych will explore with Kohut how Julian’s texts
give signs of lier shift from the first phase into the second therapeutic phase in the
maturation of minoring needs, that is, of “working through” the disillusionment of the
archaic narcissistic prestmctures. This exploration will draw primarily from lier Short Text
but will also examine the Long Text’ s reworking of material in the Short Text, as lier
appropriation of this shift occurs over time. It will be for the third diptycli to explore the
further maturation of lier mirroring need as that is witnessed in lier exemplum of a lord and
a servant, contained only in tlie Long Text.
In the following pages I will draw out Julian’s working througli of attitudes toward
herseif and lier relationship witli God and humankind as this is revealed and developed in
lier probing of the question of sin and its relation to God and selfhood in the showings.
It is through the evolution of lier showings that the problem of sin is resolved for
Julian. Bradley lias observed, in an article whicli will be examined more closely in the next
chapter of this diptych, that mirroring images in Julian and other fourteenth centmy Englisli
mystics serve the function of articulating “the matunng process within the mystical life.”
Specifically, I propose to show how the maturation of the mirroring function in the Julian’s
showings allows a transformation in lier attitudes toward lierself and God and a
reconceiving of what sin is in light of this. I hold that the locus for this maturation is in the
function which lier mirroring transference with tlie Jesus of lier sliowings plays. This
visionary Christ thus assumes the missed parental function of the mirroring other which
allows for maturation to take place.
1BFDLEY, Ritamary, “The speculum image in medieval mystical writers”, in The medievat mysticat
tradition in England, ed. GLASSCOE, Marion, Cambridge, D. S. Brewer Press, 1984, p. 23. See also
ABRAMS, M. H., The mirror and the lamp, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1953, 406 p., who
distinguishes the medieval symbol for consciousness, that is, the mirror, from the modem symbol, the
lamp; and MEDCALF, Stephen, “Medieval psychology and medieval mystics”, in The medieval mysticat
tradition in Engtand, ed GLASSCOE, Marion, Exeter, University of Exeter Press, 1980, pp. 120 - 155.
242
In this chapter I identify three areas which are indicators of this maturation in
Julian’ s showings. These areas could be described as essentially movement responses:
deep bodily feelings, eye contact and images of bodily enclosure.
The chapter also looks at what Julian cails the “pain of self-knowledge”, and lier
identification of two “secret” sins, and how this gives lier better understanding of herself
and something of an answer to her initial conundrum about sin. Julian’s double
anthropology is studied in these terms.
Since these themes are interrelated I will follow largely the order in which Julian
presents lier visions both in their sequence and in the differences she records between the
Short and the Long Text. In so doing, I hope the organic connections will be more clearly
maintained. The parallels with Kohuts self psychology will be made throughout the text.
2.0 A brief review of the second of the three phases of mirroring
transference in Kohut
Kohut describes the process of maturation in the therapeutic context as having three
distinct phases. Once resistance is overcome and the mirror transference is established, the
second phase involves working through the narcissistic rage and disillusionment which
emerge out of the empathically presented “confrontation with reality”. It is this working
through process which the present chapter will examine. Gradually, through tins
confrontation, the client cornes to recognize the archaic prestructures or the self-fragments
which manifest as grandiose omnipotence and searing shame in the client’s behaviour. Tins
phase is characterized as a working through the narcissistic disillusionment with regard to
what constitutes the true, or authentic sense of self. In this phase, Kohut says that
transmuting internatization of the function of the mirroring mother weakens the clients
propensity to react to frustration altemately with grandiose vanity or searing shame, and
interiorizes the capacity for sootinng, affect regulation and perdunng self acceptance and
self esteem.2 Gradually through transmuted intemalizations of the analyst’ s empatinc
mirroring, the individual can recognize what tins confrontation lias exposed in herself and
begin to lay down new self structures in the reality ego winch are at once more realistic,
cohesive and satisfying. In effect, what is first expenenced as “out there” somes, by
transmuted internalizations, to be experienced as “in here”. Kohut’ s analysis of the
maturation of tins mirroring function lias been refined in more recent theory as the
2K0HUT, Heinz, The anatysis ofthe self Madison CN, International Universities Press, 1971, p. 199;
and The restoration ofthe self Madison CN, International Universities Press, 1977, p. 53.
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individual’ s capacity for mentalized affectivity, that is, for identifying and interpreting
subjective affect states with greater realism and coherence.3
Recali Kohut’s description of the experience of growth in self-understanding in the
client which can occur through the regulated discomfort experienced in the process of
transmuting intemalization:
The patient will gradually realize that the seif-experience in the horizontally spiit
sector of lis personality -- a setf-experience of being empty and deprived
which, although underemphasized, has always been present and conscious-
constitutes his authentic self and that the up to now predominant self-experience
in the non-didhotomized sector--the seif-experience of overt grandiosity and
arrogance--did flot emanate from an mdependent self but from a self that was an
appendage to the self of his mother.4
Grandiosity and sharne are linked together as the two emotional expressions of the
same fragmentation of self. As the client grows in tolerating and reinterpreting the
experience of emptiness, that is of neither grandiosity nor shame, she makes room for the
recognition and acceptance by the reality ego of appropnate mirroring and idealizing needs
within the authentic self.5 The archaic narcissist prestructures of grandiosity and shame
are exposed, in the presence of the empathic other, such that a new, more cohesive sense of
self may corne to be experienced, albeit at first in feelings of deprivation and ernptiness.
As new research in narcissism has shown, narcissisrn in women is made more
complex, and potentially neglected, by the fact of the systemic effects of patriarchy.6 This
study will be alert to recognizing that the archaic prestructural symptorns of “grandiosity”
and “shame” may reveal themselves in different -- and perhaps reverse -- proportions and
colours in women, and in Julian in particular. As Rossiter lias shown, narcissism in
3Mentalized affectivity is defined as
a mature capacity for the regulation of affect and denotes the capacity to discover the subjective
meanings of one’s own affect states. Mentalized affectivity lies, we suggest, at the core ofthe
psychotherapeutic enterpnse. It represents the experiential understanding of one’s feelings in a way
that extends beyond intellectual understanding. It is in this realm that we encounter resistances and
defenses, not just against specific emotional experiences, but against entire modes of psychological
functioning.... Thus we can misunderstand what we feel, thinking that we feel one thing while
truly feeling another emotion. Moreover, it is even possible that we can deprive ourselves of the
entire experiential world of emotional richness.
FONAGY, Peter, Gyôrgy GERGELY, Elliot JURIST and Mary TARGET, Affect regulation,
mentalization and the development of the sef NY, Other Press, 2004, P. 5.
4KOHUT, 1977, pp. 210- 211.
5KOHUT, 1971, p. 186.
6 ROSSITER, Stanford Kent, Narcissisrn and codependency, Ph.D. thesis, The Wright Institute, 2004, p.
71.
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women is more correctly described by the symptoms associated with codependency,
specifically in a denial of womens’s own needs and desire. He writes
Unlike the boy, who develops identity through hïs denial of the other [the mother],
the girl must achieve the capacity for self-abnegation in order to avoid loss of the
paramount connection with the mother. The girl’s tendency to deny her own needs
and desires can be exaggerated by caretaking deficits, and codependency may be a
direct resuit of these deficits. An exaggerated denial of the other is a feature of the
narcissist, whule exaggerated seif-denial is a feature of the codependent.7
3.0 Summary of Julian’s initial transitional process
I argued earlier that we can see in Julian’ s pre-visionary liistoiy a desire mixed with
resistance to participating in uncontrolled, imaginative, affective meditation. This provides
the background for the significance of lier assent to enter into the visionary experience of
the showings. This entiy into the visionary transitional reaim is marked by deep bodily
feelings, whicli merge with lier vision to become for lier a kinaesthetic “organ of
knowledge”. I suggested that Julian’s astonishing increase and then removal of pain, as
the crucifix is placed before ber, is a kind of parallel tlierapeutic situation to that of the
infant’ s needs for bodily care bringing lier to the brink of unthinkable anxiety, coupled with
the intervention of the mother wlio is able to put herself in the baby’ s place to respond to
tlie baby’ s bodily needs at the right time. Her bodily sight of the crucified is characterized
by the pre-oedipal themes of seeing and feeling with tlie body, and also underlines the
presence of movement responses akin to what Homans lias described as deep bodily
feelings and a readiness to engage fantasy activity and narrative in the work of mouming.
Bauerschmidt confirmed (without the help of object relations theory) tliat Julian’s bodily
siglit of the crucifix is botli an object of sight and a mode of seeing with tlie body.
I suggested that Julian’ s entry into the mirroring transference is in merged or fused
images of bodily suffenng with Christ in bis suffering. Tlie vivid images of Christ’ s head
and body alternately flowing witli endless blood and then drying to a point of endlessly
dying may bint at a raw, first expression of altemating flooded feelings of bliss-in
suffenng and empty, deprived feelings of abandonment, which liave yet to be understood
by Julian. These raw, “iconic” images of the Passion, I suggested, are perhaps Julian’s
first visually mirrored expenence of arcliaic false self fragments (sinless and grandiose vs
ail sinful and despairing) wliicli are in tlie process of undergoing grief, or a dying to ego
after Sebastian Moore. The pain she suffers which becomes Christ’ s pains is like no
suffering of contrition for sin which slie lias ever known. It is both more painftil that
ROSSITER, 2004, p. 70.
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anything Julian lias known and yet paradoxically comforting, since she is present to and
sharing in Christ’ s own suffering. It was this that she found so unsettiing and yet
comforting. I propose that this is a further instance of the face of the crucifix supplying
the therapeutic mirroring presence she most needed in that instant.
3.1 $111 and selfhood
As we saw in the last diptych Julian expressed her confusion or disorientation at
this paradox as a preoccupation with “5m” which doesn’t make sense, in light of the deeply
feit compassion she is experiencing with Christ’ s own suffering. Julian asks the Lord early
on in ber third revelation “What is sin?” ($T 8, LT 11.) The context for this question is lier
surprise and perplexity in flot seeing 5m in lier first sbowings. There, where she fully
expected to see something, she sees nothing. Admittedly, she knows that in Augustinian
theology, sin bas no being. So why does this perpiex lier then? In effect, I suggest she
fully expected to see sin as defining her selfhood. But she is shown nothing in this regard.
When she does flot see sin, there is a profound perplexity because in effect she does not see
herseL at least what she bas tacitly understood to be herseif until this point, as I see it. I
suggest that this is one strong indication that Julian experienced ber authentic self first of ail
as empty and deprived in Kohut’s terms, both exposed and affirmed in the sight of the
compassionate other. As well as correlating with Kohut, Julian’ s description of the
nothingness of sin seems to describe well what Sebastian Moore is tafldng about as the
initial experience of dying to sïn, as assenting to experience that which 5m lias prevented us
from experiencing, which inaugurates a healing of the human pattem of resistance to ego
death.
3.2 The exposure of fragmented feelings
It is significant that the riglit understanding of what is (and what is flot) sin is so
important for Julian, for it is a reflection of ber deepest concems and fears conceming
human nature as well as the nature of God’s relationship toward ber, toward humanldnd
and human destiny. It therefore affects bow she is to understand lier identity in these
visions.
Julian had strong cultural warrant for lier early belief in a God who judged and
condemned humanldnd. It was after ail a common late medieval belief that salvandorum
paucitas, damnandorum muÏtitudo, “few are saved, many are damned”.8 But it is a
8 TUCHMAN, Barbara, A distant mirror: The calamitous I4th century, NY, Ballantine, 1978, p. 34.
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common experience for people nowadays, too, to hold an incredible, because abusive,
image of God, even when these same people would daim not to believe in God.9 As
Bradley puts it
Julian understands how difficuit it is to believe that God works by mercy and grace,
without wrath. Often we insist on clinging to a punishing image of God: as if ail
sorrow that enters our life is God’s chastening hand.10
Ibis, it seems, was lier untested assumption when in the seventh showing she encounters
her first experience of the revelation of feelings of spiritual delight -- and then thefr
withdrawal. She was thrilled to hear Christ thank lier for lier service, and was fihled with a
supreme spiritual delight.
In this deliglit I was fihled full of everlasting surety, and I was powerfully secured
witliout any fear. This sensation was so welcome and so dear to me that I was at
peace, at ease and at rest, so that there was nothing upon earth whicli could have
afflicted me.
This lasted only for a time, and then I was changed and abandoned to
myseif, oppressed and weary of myseif and ruing [regretting] my life, so that I
hardly had the patience to go on living. I feit that there was no ease or comfort for
me except faith, hope and love, and truly I felt very little of this. (ST 9; LT 15.)
Julian is struck that “in this time I committed no sin for which I ought to have been left to
myself, [LT for it was so sudden]”. ($T 9; LT 15.) Her initiai understanding of sin, it
appears, is that it is the immediate cause of desolate feelings of abandonment to oneself.11
The revelation continues. God gives lier again the spiritual comfort, rest, delight
and security for lier soul--and then again removes it, leaving lier feeling abandoned once
more.
And then again I feit the pain, and then afterwards the deliglit and the joy, now the
one and now the other, again and again, I suppose about twenty times. And in the
time ofjoy I could have said witli $t Paul: Nothing shall separate me from the love
Sec RIZZUTO, Ana-Maria, The birth of the living God: A psychoanatytic study, Chicago, University of
Chicago Press, 1979, pp. 177 - 211, whose study of aduits’ images of God as “a special transitional objcct”
lias spawned a whole field of research.
10BRADLEY, Ritamary, Jutianr way, London, Harper Collins, 1992, P. 153.
11 larlier I noted that it was n customary belief in the late middle ages that sin and compunction for sin
both caused suffering. Nowadays we tend to go to the other extreme to avoid sin and so tend to be less
familiar with the dynamics of the suffering it produces. Mary Coelho makes a fascinating observation
about how as beginners in the spiritual life we tend to assume unconsciously that we could eam a nght
relationship with God by our activity. She relates this to simple psychological behaviounsm:
Behavioural psychologists have donc experiments with hungry pigeons given com at random
intervals. The pigeon, in order to try to make the corn corne more often, tries to do just what it
was doing before the last corn arrived in case that activity had caused the corn to corne.
COELHO, Mary, “Understanding consolation and desolation,” Review for retigious 44, 1, 1985. p. 63.
Presumably the pigeon also tries to avoid doing what it was doing just before the corn stopped coming?
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of Christ; and in the pain I could have said with St Peter: Lord, save me, I am
perishing. (SI 9; LT 15.)
I suggest it is important to stress the sigmficance of this drastic expenence of
rapidly altemating feelings of consolation and desolation Julian has in this showing. What
Julian feels as consolation is believed initally to be the bliss of union in the presence of
Christ; what she feels as desolation is believed initiafly to be the heu of separation in the
absence of Christ. I am reminded again of Michel Ledoux’ s clinical comparisons of
women mystics and clients who experience archaic merged or fiised mirroring relations
with the mother. $pealdng of a client he says, “[nie pouvant ‘intérioriser’ l’analyste et
emportant en elle une image de lui, elle vivait chaque séparation comme défmitve et
irrémédiable”.12 Absence of the mother is intolerable, yet the relationship is experienced as
a “relation fusionnelle vécue dans le manque et l’absence”. Ledoux continues:
Or, si cette absence est vécue par les mystiques dans le registre fusionnel, on ne
s’étonnera pas d’y trouver l’insupportable souffrance de l’Absence et les moyens de
la pallier dans la négation de l’espace et du temps qui spécifient cette relation:
relation sans intermédiaire. Relation dans l’actuel de la présence. Refus de l’attente
et de la médiation du souvenir.13
These alternating feelings are flot at this point felt sirnultaneously, nor does Julian
speak anywhere prior to this in the showings of any understanding of their havmg a
meaning in relationship to one another, except as mutually exclusive opposites. It suggests
that Julian had known these extremes in her pre-visionary past, certainly the (probably
extended) expenence of absence, and from this perspective it is possible that what I have
called her religious aspirations were fueled by the desire for the thrill of bliss, understood
then by Julian as “longing for God” or contemplative union.
Note also the similarity of this description to that observed by Kohut of narcissistic
personalities as oscittating in presenting feelings between unbridled ambitionlgrandiosity
and searing shame/sense of failure.14 In the fragmented experience of these two extremes,
the narcissistically wounded personality also does not see them as at ail related to one
another, and so cannot grasp that they might have any meaning apart from what they each
feel lilce.
But Julian does corne to recognize that her showings are teaching lier to see herself
in a new way, and here to see these two extrerne feeling states in greater integration. From
12 LEDOUX, Michel, “La relation d’absence”, in “Résurgences et dérivés de la mystique”, Nouvelle revue
de psychanalyse 20, 1980, p. 239.
13 LEDOUX, 1980, p. 243.
14KOHuT, 1971, p. 192
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this experience Julian learns something which she will leam again and again in more areas
of lier spiritual life:
This vision was shown to teach me to understand that some souls profit by
experiencing this, to be comforted at one time, and at another to fail and to be left to
tliemselves. God wishes us to know that lie keeps us safe ail the time, in sorrow
and in joy; and sometimes a man is ieft to himself for the profit of bis soul,
although bis sin is flot aiways the cause.... (ST 9; LT 15.)
The fact that this is such a significant leaming for lier however is, I suggest, strong
evidence that the earlier, fragmented feelings and tlie meanings slie took from them had
dominated lier usual experience. The key element in this learning I suggest is the continued
merged mirroring function of the suffenng Christ of lier showings (keeping lier safe aIl the
time) whule this is happening.
4.0 Eye contact: The change of chere
In the eighth revelation as slie attends to the vision of the crucifix, Julian’s
personai, pliysical pain is replaced with a feeling of Christ’s own sufferings enciosing the
suffering of ail humankind. “In ail this time that Christ was present to me, I feit no pain
except for Christ’s pains....” (ST 10.) This was the fulfilment of her prayer, to have mynd
or recoilection and feeling of Christs own Passion. (ST 1; LT 2.) It is here in the Short
Text only that Julian describes lier mother attempting to close lier eyes, presuming lier
already dead. Julian resists this: “I did not want to be hindered from seeing, because of my
love for Christ”. (ST 10.)
But then she continues: “At this time I wanted to look away from the cross but I did
not dare, for I knew that whilst I contempiated tlie cross I was secure and safe”. (ST 10;
LT 19.) If, as Kohut would lioid, tlie tendency is typically to see the image of God as a
distant paternai image, then an idealizing transference with Christ wouid remam archaic and
shamefiuled. Juiian’s new identification of lier suffenng in Christ’s Passion is, however,
of a different order of expenence. Her bodiiy resonance witli the cmcified Jesus “ail the
time that Christ was present to me” stiil lias a ftsional quality. But here, in lier first
reception of that fiiiing of lier body with Christ’ s own pain, she reacted ambivalently, both
regretting that she’d asked for it -- “I thought: is there any pain in heu like this pain?” --
and at tlie same time in lier understanding, receiving tlie confirmation
-- “Heu is a different
pain, for in it tliere is despair”. (ST 10; LT16.)
Significantiy, Juiian describes that a suggestion came to her “seemingly said in a
friendly manner...’Look up to heaven to lis Father”. (LT19, cf ST1O.) Slie recognizes
tliat she must make a choice. “I saw cleariy by tlie faith whicli I feit that there was notliing
between the cross and heaven which could have grieved me, and that I must eitlier look up
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or else answer”. It is true that this may reflect an influence of apopliatic ascent mysficism
in England, such as is represented by the author of the Ctoud of unknowing, although, as
noted by Watson, this is flot a significant element in anchontic spirituality. Rather, one of
the objectives of anchoritïc spirituality is that it does not involve a mystical ascent because
in the context of the anchorhold the spiritual ascesis of the anchoress is not to escape the
“world” but rather to transfigure lier external reality, that is, the anchorhold)5
I suggest that the presentation of the choice itself is also a manifestation of lier
ambivalence around entering into a mirroring relationship of identification with Christ’s
own suffering. The alternative of a non-specific, distant, impassible heavenlFather could
be seen as a representation of a more archaic internalization of an idealized paternal
selfobject. Recali that initially when the priest came with the crucifix she had feit it would
have been easier to remain with her eyes fixed heavenward. The pain of what is known
would be easier to fit into her pre-visionary interpretive framework than the pain of
something unknown, unpredictable and so, apparently untrustworthy.
She experiences an ambivalence of simultaneous reactions around the choice she
must make. However it is significant that it is only in the Long Text that she can articulate
this: “Reluctance and deliberate choice are in opposition to one another, and I expenenced
them both at the same time.” (LT 19)16
The resolution of the ambivalence cornes to lier as a question of where tofocus her
eyes in contemplation. She chooses against her feelings of reluctance to remain focused
on the cross and makes a deliberate, assenting choice:
No, I cannot [look up to heaven], for you are my heaven... So I was taught to
choose Jesus for my heaven whom I saw only in pain at that time... And that lias
taught me that I should aiways do so, to choose Jesus only to be my heaven, in
well-being andin woe. (ST 10 and il; LI 19.)
We might say Julian is choosing to attend to lier need for a present, accessible,
mirroring godlselfobject, identifying, in the crucifixion of Jesus, a mirror image of heaven
15 WATSON, Nicholas, “The methods and objectives of thirteenth-century anchontic devotion”, in The
medieval mystical tradition in Engtand, ed. GLASSCOE, Marion, Cambridge, D. S. Brewer, 1987, pp.
132 - 153. Exeter symposium W. This article will be mined further in the next chapter.
16 The subtlety of such a statement, found only in the Long Text may be an instance of how a
psychobiographical approach to history can bear fruit: it contributes to the view that the Short Text was
composed prior to the Long Text, and not the reverse as Holloway continues to argue. See HOLLOWAY,
Julia Bolton, “Chronicles of a mystic”, The tablet, Il May 1996, pp. 610 - 611, and REYNOLDS, Sr
Anna Maria and Julian Bolton HOLLOWAY, eds. and transi., Julian ofNonvich: Showing of love, Firenze,
Sismel, Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2001, pp. 5 - 33. Biblioteche e archivi 8, where on p. 5 Holloway makes it
clear that Reynolds does flot hold to the same view.
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in pain, in which she beholds herseif to be included. Note that her choice was flot based on
Julians pnor experience of identification with Christ in lis Passion, although she had
desired the grace to suffer with him. (ST 1.) Indeed, whether or flot the Church proscribes
the seeking of sucli identification, I suggest that the first inclination of the female
narcissistic personality is to feel an unbridgeable distance between herseif and the idealized
patemal god/selfobject, even if it is Christ in his suffenng.’7 Julian acts on faith only, flot
knowing what the outcome will be but trusting ifiat “lie who had bound me so fast would
unbind me when it was his wffl”. ($T19, cf ST1OE) This act is evidence of a development
in lier capacity to trust even thougli the context seems untrustworthy.
We may well imagine however, what emotional turmoil this would cause in lier.
To be in a state of participation (merging) with Christ as lie is dying is both comforting,
knowing she is present to Christ and flot alone in lier suffering, but also presumably
terrifying, since, as he dies so will slie. Thus we are told in tlie eiglitli to nintli18
revelation that Julian watched for tlie moment when Christ would expire.
Just as it seemed Christ was at tlie point of expiring, lis appearance clianged to one
ofjoy. Simultaneously she experiences a dramatic shift within herseif: “And suddenly, as I
looked at the same cross, lie changed to an appearance [chereJ ofjoy.” (ST 12; LT 21.)
Because Julian’s use of this word chere is significant to the present thesis, I will
use lier own middle Englisli word chere instead of otlier modem translations. Tlie range of
meanings of this word chere seems to constellate around the visual display of intenor states
as reflected in the liuman face. For examples, chere is translated in the glossary of the
Colledge and Walsli edition simply as “demeanor”, aithougli in the text they also translate it
variously as “appearance”, “countenance”, “expression”.’9 By contrast, Hoyt Greeson
17A woman I know with wounds of a narcissistic nature has resisted praying herseif in Christ in bis
Passion even though she is in deep distress because, she says, this would be “pndeful”. I sense that she
resists it however because it would also bring to awareness feelings of shame, the other feeling fragment of
archaic grandiosity. Compare Kevin Gillespie who notes that in spiritual direction eye contact with an
image of Christ is a good “litmus test of shame”. See GJLLESPffi, Kevin, “Listening for grace: Self
psychology and spiritual direction”, in Handbook for spirituality for ministers, NY, Paulist Press, 1995, p.
356.
18 In the manuscripts the change of Christ’s chere at this point occurs in the eighth showing. For the
reasons Colledge and Walsh use tojustify changing the reference to the “ninth” showing, see COLLEDGE,
Edmund and James WALSH, eds., A book of showings to the anchoress Julian ofNonvich, Toronto,
Pontifical Institute ofMedieval Studies, 1978a, p. 95. Acknowledging this, and yet aware ofGlasscoe’s
criticism of this editorial change, I will refer henceforth to this moment of the change of Christ’s chere as
the eighth to ninth showing. GLASSCOE, Marion, “Changing chere and changing text in the eighth
revelaflon of Julian ofNorwich”, Medium aevum 66, 1997, pp. 115- 121.
19 COLLEDGE AND WALSH, 1978a, vol 2, p. 750.
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translates chere as “the human face; display of emotion; behaviour; mood; and chongyng of
chere as the changing of one’s mmd or mood”.20
Moreover, the change in Christ’ s chere lias a transforming effect on Julïan. “The
change in lis blessed appearance [chereJ changed mine and I was glad and joyful as I
could possibly be”. (ST 12; LT 21.) It is at this point, where she sees Jesus’ face or chere
transform, that lier bodily fusion, lier attachment to seeing Jesus witli her body only in his
Passion, shifts into a face to face mirrorïng encounter. Significantly this risen, joyfiul Christ
does flot lose lis wounds. Tlie showings from now on have a visually more “reciprocal”
and verbally “dialogical” quality of encounter.21
Recali also what Midliel Ledoux observes about Roman Catholic women mystics
who have suffered a “relation d’absence” in early infancy. Tliere is, lie says, in mystical
experience of women with sud a history, a tendency toward interchangeability of tlie
subjectivities of tlie mystic and the Christ of lier mystical experience.22 The simultaneous
sliift in chere (including the interior state) of tlie Christ of Julian’ s sliowing and Julian
herseif from suffering on the point of death to joy, I suggest, is a case in point.
What might tlie transformation in the eiglitli to mntli showing reveal
psychoanalytically in terms of Julian’s working througli a mirroring transference?
I suggested much earlier that Julian’s early history had brouglit about in lier an
unconscious condition of identification witli the state of death. As well as ail tlie
unresolved grief and abandonment issues which that would create, Julian would be
vuinerable to anger. One expression of anger (for women) is in a grandiose narcissistic
sense of overresponsibility for relationships, which expresses itself in a martyrisli “need”
to suffer. The relational pattem Julian gives us to see in lier is in the relationship slie has
20 GREESON, Hoyt, “Glossary to the BL Sloane 2499 manuscript”, in REYNOLDS and HOLLOWAY,
2001, P. 646.
The word chere, derives from the Greek kara and Latin cara, for face. According to the
Dictionnaire Robert, “la chère” (from the Old French chiere) is used in the expression “faire bonne chère
à quelqu’un”, with two meanings, one 110W archaic: “lui faire bon visage, bon accueil” and the other
modem: “faire un bon repas”.
21 ABBOrr, 1999, P. 70. Abbott secs this as Julian’s own mature commentary on an “egocentric, self
generated religiosity “ which she has “long - outgrown”. Abbott secs Julian no longer as a religious
narcissist, but rather now as a “responding subject”. ABBOTI’, 1999, pp. 65 - 66. However, the present
study secs in her earlier showings of the bleeding and drying crucifix an archaic, fragmented, but fused
minoring transference describing very precisely the movement response of deep bodily feelings Romans
wants to associate with the mourning process, in which she is fused with Christ in the pain she experiences
of him. Unlike the present study, Abbott’s interpretive framework does not trace in detail the development
in maturation in the showings.
22 LEDOUX, 1980, pp. 235 - 246.
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with God in Christ. We can imagine that from within that perspective, Julian beholding the
dying Christ would be in some condition of participating in a relational pattem wliicli she
believed would necessarily conclude by increasing lier sense of responsibility for his
suffering, and whicli would repeat the archaic grandiose pattem of believing unconsciously
that her godobject needed lier to suffer in order for the godobject to survive (i.e., that God
was under lier control), even as it drove lier ever more deeply into the other fragmented
feeling of sliame, associated with sinfulness. In effect, the chronic Jack in her early
childhood separation-individuation process could well have lcd her to set aside lier own
nascent self and her needs and feelings because of lier fear that expressing these would
“destroy” whatever family milieu she had, and therefore ultimately destroy her. This
relational pattem would extend to lier relationship with God: we may imagine she assumed
that any aggressive feelings on lier part would destroy God, and therefore tliat it was
unsafe to trust God with such unwanted sectors of her self. Compare Amy Martellock’ s
psycliobiography of Catlienne of Siena on this point:
if we suppose tliat Catherine experienced infantile trauma, which left the legacy of
an unconscious conviction about the dangerousness of lier instinctual impulses, we
miglit guess tliat her sense of heing sinful and worthy of punishment predates any
lesson leamed from religious doctrine. When she is less that perfectly defended
against them, lier feelings of guilt are themselves psycliotically grandiose. In a
letter to the Pope, for instance, slie implies that it is her sinfulness that lias lcd to a
tragic breakdown in relations between Florence and the Vatican.... Her guilt is flot
linked to a specific act slie can remember or name. It is huge and unforgivable,
perliaps even by God.23
This predicament is to be contrasted witli Mice Miller’ s observation of how the
lieahhy separation-individuation process (i.e., of mirroring and idealization) includes a
sense of the durability of the parental object:
My parents do flot need my comfort or my smile... I can be angry and no one will
die or get a lieadache because of it. I can rage and smash things without losing my
parents. In D. W. Winnicott’s words, ‘I can destroy tlie object and it will stili
survive.24
The situation Julian is encountering as she enters the mirroring transference with the
suffering, dying Christ of lier showings could be described as an occasion which would
provoke in lier the fear of repeated object loss, and the impotence to do otherwise that carry
23 MARTELLOCK, Amy King, She who is flot: A psychobiography of Catherine ofSiena using the
theories of D. W. Winnicott, Ps.D. dissertation, Massachusetts school of professional psychology, 2003,
p. 159. See further Martellock’s section entitled “The failure of god” pp. 163 - 170, for ber interpretaflon
ofCathenne’s resolution ofthe sense of grandiose responsibility for suffering for others for their salvation,
and the guilt (or shame) of flot succeeding, by means of starvation.
24 MuER, Alice, The draina of the gifted child: The search for the true sef NY, Basic, 1981, P. 16.
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it out to its conclusion, this time in the destruction of God. Looked at this way, it is
possible to see that Julian would have difficulty recognizmg and accepting aggressive
feelings in herseif, but that they might be stili present. But what happens in the change of
Christ’s chere astounds her. Although she is merged with Christ in bis pains, she does flot
have the grandiose power to kiil Christ in her own suffering which she might have
imagined she had. In fact, the mutual change of chere which takes place could be said to
be effecting a work of disillusionment in Winnicott’s and Kohut’s understanding of that
therapeutic concept. In the change of the dying Christ’s chere to joy she sees in effect that
she “can destroy the object and it will stiil survive”. This new capacity to “use the object”
of her showings is important because it leads therapeutically to greater reality acceptance, to
the recogrntion of the other (what Kohut called independent centre of initiative25) and its
durability, as well as to greater self acceptance.26
It could be suggested that at this moment Julian realizes that the Christ of her
visions is outside her onmipotent control, such that as Winnicott says “there could be said
to bejoy at the object’s survival”. She cannot make him die, even in lier own physical
death throes and spiritual will to suffer. In that same moment, as we saw, the relationship
changes and she begins to look this Christ in the eye, in order to leam from Christ what she
is to understand. And, in that instant, she, like the chere she is beholding, is transformed
25 MOSS, David, “Narcissism, empathy and the fragmentation of self: An interview with Heinz Kohut”,
Pitgrimage 4, 1, 1976, p. 33.
26 Winnicott dïscusses “object use” in the context of discussing the capacity for reality acceptance. He is
not using the word use in the sense of “exploitation”. The latter would better describe how objects are
expenenced in more archaic forms of mirroring transference, as subjecflvely enmeshed engagement with
reality in terms of “object relating”.
Rather, Winnicott expresses himself on object use in the following way: “The assumption is
always there, in orthodox theory, that aggression is reactive to the encounter with the reality pnnciple,
whereas here it is the destructive drive that creates the quality of externality. This is central in the structure
of my argument WINNICOTT, D. W., “The use of an object and relating through identifications”, in
Ptaying and reatity, NY, Routledge, (1969) 1989, p. 93. Aggression as Winnicott is using this word to
describe the destructive drive is flot about anger, which is rnuch later in infant development. “There is no
anger in the destruction of the object to which I am referring, though there could be said to be joy at the
object’s survival”. The destroying (in fantasy) of the object, but discovering that the object survives
“makes the reality of the surviving object felt as such, strengthens the feeling tone, and contnbutes to
object-constancy. The object can now be used”. WINNICOTT, 1989, p. 93. What object use fosters is
the recognition that an “object is outside the area of the subject’s omnipotent control.... In this way a
world of shared reality is created which the subject cati use and which can feed back other-than-me substance
into the subject”. WINMCOTT, 1989, p. 94.
What both Winnicott’s and Kohut’s descriptions have in common is that the object cornes to be
recognized as having a durable othemess as experienced by the subject, and can feed back othemess into the
subject’s experience. This is considered by both theorists to be a major achievement in terms of the
capacity for mature object love.
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into a condition ofjoy. Early on I made the psychobiographical hypothesis that Julian had
identified witli a state of death, due to early childhood losses and neglect. If this
hypothesis is true, then it could help to account for the power of the transformation in
chere from a dying to ajoyous Christ in Julian’s eighth to ninth showing.
The reverberation of this change of Christ’ s chere changing hers will echo through
lier whole soteriological vision, as we will see. It is, I suggest, a pivotai point along the
way of her assenting more fully to enter into, and remain in, an evolving mirroring
transference with the Christ of lier showings. In it, I suggest, we see the critical
transformative factor, tlie therapeutic mirroring function of empathy mirrored in Jesus’
compassion for lier condition, whicli Julian, now able to “take it in”, sees transformed to
joy. In this instance il was brouglit about by an active choice on lier part to suffer with
Christ in whatever his condition, which resulted in this surprising transformation. In
effect, there is a movement toward greater trust in lier experience of tliis mirroring
transference, as mirrored in Christ’s cliange of chere to one ofjoy. In lier condition of
fusion, lier chere is changed by lis. We are to understand that it is notjust Christ’s face
which transforms but bis whole pliysical and spiritual condition. Likewise, aithougli Julian
says tliat lier chere clianged to joy, we are to understand that it is lier wliole bodily and
interior spiritual condition which is transfomied. This is indicated in wliat the Lord tlien
speaks to lier: “Where is tliere any instant of your pain or of your grief?” (ST 12; LT 21.)
Tlie transformation of tlie condition of lier wliole person is expenenced and known
tlirough the transformation of the chere of Christ in this visual encounter. I see this as a
significant instance of Christ’s face functioning as mirror for Julian, in tlie active way
Winnicott and Koliut have understood. Tlie Christ of this showing is flot simply mirroring
back lier condition of selfhood as it is, but the mirror of Christ’s chere is itself
transformative, showing lier a part of herseif she does not know, the self slie is to become,
and effecting tliat transformation, in tlie transitional space of Julian’ s visionary expenence.
The psychological transformation whicli this showing effects in Julian is underlined
by the fact tliat she is impelled to write about it in such a way as that it miglit be
“performed” or effected in others as well. (LT 86.)27 If movement responses lead to tlie
27 A number of Julian commentators have observed that Julian’s style of writing or rhetoric engages the
reader in the same transformative process. See for examples, KOEMG, Elisabeth, The ‘Book of Showings’
ofJulian of Nonvich: A testcase for Faut Ricoeurs theory of metaphor and the imagination, Ph.D.
dissertation, NY, Columbia University, 1984, ch. 7; Derek ANDERSON, Jutian of Nonvich’s nonviotent
account of satvation, Ph.D. thesis, Loyola University, Chicago, 2005, pp. 95 - 109.
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narrative impulse, Julian seems to have wanted to stay alive to both for many years,
perhaps the rest of her life.
By means of the transformation, the changing of the chere of Christ also teaches
her how she is to understand lier interior states differently from what she has done in the
past. In the past, suffering seems to have meant generalized desolation and abandonment
and bliss lias meant consolation and the immediate gratification of union in heaven. She
realizes for the first time in lier experience that both conditions, suffering and joy, are
conditions in which she lias union with Christ. It is experienced here, I would hold, in stiil
a relatively fused way, registering itself in the movement responses of deep bodily and
facially reflected feelings. Union with Christ, Julian learns, is in effect heaven botli in lis
Passion and in his Resunection whule she is stiil here on earth, and she lias this experience
of heaven in suffenng (woe) and in joy (well-being). (ST 10, 11; LT 19.)
In the Long Text only Julian adds
I understood that in our Lord’s intention we are now on his cross witli him in our
pains, and in our sufferings we are dying, and with lis help and lis grace we
willingly endure on that same cross until the last moment of life. Sudderfly lie wili
change his appearance [chereJ for us, and we shah be with him in heaven.
Between the one and the other ail will be one time; and then ail will be brought into
joy.... And here I saw truly that if he revealed to us now his countenance [chere]
ofjoy, there is no pain on earth or anywhere else wbich could trouble us, but
everything would be joy and bliss for us. But because lie shows us lis suffenng
countenance [chereJ, as he was in this life as lie can-ied his cross, we are therefore
in suffering and labour with him as our nature requires.... And the harder our
pains have been with him on his cross, the greater will our glory be with him in lis
kingdom. (LI 21.)
What this further reflection on ber experience seems to suggest in the psychoanalytic terms
I am using in this study is that Julian cornes to understand that wlien she sees Christ in bis
suffering at point of deatli it is an indication of labour or integrative work which is going on
in lier, in lier interior condition. So, for example, in the Long Text only, Julian observes
that Jesus’ beauty or divinity is concealed in ber showings of the Passion because in effect
lie becomes like us in our dying condition:
Jesus wished, for bis love and for man’s lonour, to make himself as much hike
man in this mortal life, in our foulness and our wretdliedness, as a man couÏd be
without sin; and this is meant wliere it is said before that the revelation symbolized
and resembled our foui, black rnortality, in which our fair, bright, blessed Lord
concealed bis divinity. (LI 10.)28
28 Anderson observes that when Julian uses the word wretched to describe the human condition, it is to be
understood in connection with the dying condition she herseif was in at the time of the showings.
ANDERSON, 2005, p. 196.
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Both the suffering and the Resurrection are registered in Julian’s intenor condition through
the mirrorïng function which Christ’ s chere fulfiuls.
If the change of chere can be seen as a movement response in Julian, li suggests
itseif as an instance of a transforrnative process of grief or mouming going on; a dying to a
false self organization; a grief or mouming of a loss of orientation she associated with lier
former sense of selfhood (as sinful) and with the meaning of the religious symbol of God
(as abandoning her in lier need), which she associated with that sense of selfhood. Her
former orientation no longer holds trne to lier experience of herself united in Christ in
suffering and in joy in the showings.
4. 1 “Are you well satisfied that I suffered for you?”
Christ immediately speaks to her in this new condition asking her:
Are you weli satisfied [paydeJ that I suffered for you? Yes, good Lord, I said; ail
my thanks to you [gramercyJ, good Lord, blessed my you be! If you are satisfied
[payedeJ , our Lord said, I am satisfied [payedeJ. It is ajoy and a bliss and an
endless delight to me that ever I suffered rny Passion for you, for if I could suffer
more, I would”. (ST 12; LT 22.)29
The visual, feit transformation of tlie change of chere is reflected also in this active
dialogue, an instance, I suggest, of Homans’ concept of narrative impulse resulting from a
movement response in the transitional reaim of mourning. This is the first time Julian
replies to the Jesus of lier showings. Her response is astounded. I am flot alone in
suggesting that this was the opposite of what Julian until now might have expected the
Christ of lier visions to say.
For example, Bhattacharji has commented on this shift from suffering to joy, when
Christ asks Julian whether she is well satisfied that lie lias suffered for lier, as reflecting in
Julian a marked independence and originalïty in relation to medieval wornen’s (and men’s)
writing. Drawing on one example from the reiigious lyrics which promoted affective
meditation on the Passion Bhattachaiji writes that they
are ail aimed at stirring up a pity in the reader which is designed to lead to
repentance and to a response of reciprocal love for Christ. They tend to be on the
unes of ‘Look at what Christ lias done for you; can you give nothing back in
return?’... [Christ’sJ worst pain, liowever, cornes from man’s unresponsiveness,
and the thrust of the wliole piece is to produce in the reader shame and guilt at this
lack of response.
29 The word payde, payede, or as in the Paris manuscript of the LT bas it apayde, are ail transiated as
“satisfied” in COLLEDGE and WALSH 1978a, pp. 749, 756. In GREESON’s glossary of Si in
REYNOLDS, Sr Anna Maria and Julian Boiton HOLLOWAY, 2001, p. 666 it is transiated as “pieased”,
“satisfied” from the old french (a)payer.
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In marked contrast stands Christ’s address to Julian: ‘Are you weIl safisfied
that I suffered for you?...’... [W]hen it cornes to the response in the behotder
that the description of Christ’s sufferings is meant to evoke, Jutian parts
cornpany sharpÏy with her contemporaries. Rather than the provocation of shame
stirring one up to greater effort, there is a completely free exchange here: Christ’ s
gift of salvation and Julian’ s gratitude; lis joy and lier joy. What Julian stresses is
that Christ’s love fmds a fulfiilment in being able to give itself in this extreme of
suffering, independently of any subsequent response from the creature. It is flot
so mudli the agony of the Cross as Christ’s delight in seif-giving whidh, almost as a
bonus, provokes a response of seif-giving in the creature.30
Bhattacharji argues that Julian’s stress on Christ’s joy in seif-giving as a motive for
the Crucifixion is unique, and that from this flows “ail that is most dharactenstic and
unusual about her thought”, i.e., the exemptum of tlie lord and the servant, and the
motherhood of Christ reflections in the Long Text.31 For example, Bhattachatji argues that
it is this which leads Julian
to liken Christ’s love to that of motherhood, as against the far more common
presentation of Christ as courtly lover, patiently wooing lis lady, the individual
soul. The whole object of courtship is to extract, so to speak, a response from the
beloved, to draw that person to oneseif. A mother, however, cares for lier child in
order to develop it as a person and to prepare it for life; seeing the child develop is
lier chief reward. For a motlier, then, the greatest threat is not so mudli tlie chuld’ s
unresponsiveness, as misfortune or death to the dhuld.32
Despite her careful attention to how Christ’s dialogue sets up such an extraordinary
response in Julian, Bliattacharji is more interested in Julian’s grasp of a truth about God
than about the developmental process Julian reveals in her affective response to the
showings. In the present psychobiographical study, however, I would have to argue that
tliese are flot unrelated spheres. In the next chapter of this diptydh, I will revisit this text
from a more explicitly soteriological conelative perspective, where “satisfaction” takes on a
blunter contrast in the medieval tlieological context. But in this chapter it seems to me that
the correlation needs to be explored at the level of the dynamism in what Julian sees as
Christ’s human nature -- mirroring lier own into being. In particular, I find it significant
that Bhattacharji highlights the fact that the capacity of the Christ of Julian’s showings to
give according to Julian’ s need, in effect to give lier the satisfying mirroring she needs, is
30 BHATrACHARJI, Santha, “Independence of thought in Julian of Norwich”, Word and spirit 11, 1989,
pp. 84 - 85, emphasis added.
31 BHATTACHARJI, 1989. p. 87.
32 BHATrACHARJI, 1989, p. 87. 1 find Bhattachariji’s characterization of the nature of Christ’s
motivation which Julian then mirrors in ber own writing style to be much more precise than Anderson’s
insistence that Julian seeks to “woo” ber reader (presumably in the same way as she experienced this
wooing by the Christ of the showings). See ANDERSON, 2005, p. 109 and elsewhere.
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flot affected by the response of the beliolder. It compares significantly with Winnicott’ s
description of the good-enough mother who accommodates herseif to the child’ s need for
mirroring, as distinct from needy mothering who cannot function adequately as a “mirror”
in Winnicott’ s terms. It is the needy mother who attempts to draw out the child’ s visual
response to make up for lier own chromc deficit in early childliood mirroring, and so limits
what the chuld can experience as acceptable parts of herseif.
Moreover, Alice Miller’ s brilliant insight into what happens once a person enters
into a therapeutic minoring relation (formulated here in Sebastian Moore’ s words) is that
“wliat the client sees in the analyst is flot the parent but the chitd he or she has had to
repress”.33 Here it is clear that the therapeutic mirror is expenenced by the client as not
needy, but rather able to allow tlie client to be seen, and so see the condition of lier
unknown true self in relation to tlie mirror.
Returning to tlie dialogue above, I suggest that Mïller’ s insiglit can highliglit a new
element in wliat Julian takes from tliis dialogue in tlie context of tlie mirroring transference
witli the Christ of lier showings. Instead of pictunng Jesus as saying tliese words to her,
let us imagine tliïs to be Julian’s own abandoned self speaking to lier. Then she would be
hearing her own autlientic centre of selffiood, lost to lier or abandoned up until now,
speaking to lier saying: “Are you well satisfied that I suffered for you? . . .If you are
satisfied... I am satisfied....” (ST 12; LT 22.) The effect, at least on tlie contemporary
reader, of reading these words as t)’ they were Julian’ s authentic but negtected self
spealdng to lier (i.e., tlie merged experience of lier selfliood-in-the-Clirist of her showings)
is equally astounding. How long lias tliat self been living out of a sense of isolation,
abandonment, non-recognition? And now to liear tlie voice of tliat lost, suffering self now
registered in Julian’s interior state merged in Christ as a chere ofjoy asldng Julian “[aire
you well satisfied that I suffered for you? . . .If you are satisfied... I am satisfied....” I
suggest tliat this would effect or instill in tlie beliolder/listener the satisfaction of a long
unfulfilled longing for identification witli this lost, neglected self and an overflow of
sympatliy for its suffering condition. I suggest that this is partly at least wliat Julian
recounts in lier astounded response of gratitude. ($T 12; LT 22.)
I suspect it had tlie effect of giving Julian a sense of this alienated, lost self, beheld
in the Christ of lier sliowings, as liaving suffered enough. If looked at in tliis way, what
Julian experiences is a kind of homecoming to herself-in-Christ. The abandoned Christ-in
her lias suffered enougli, and lis and lier chere are transformed to joy. It breaks open in
MOORE, Sebastian, Jesus, tiberator of desire, NY, Crossroad, 1989, p. 26, emphasis added.
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Julian a torrent of compassion in union with Christ in bis suffering whom she now knows
is adequate to lier need. It also opens lier to have compassion for tlie rest of liurnanldnd in
its suffering state, in the same way as slie experiences Christ’s compassion in her. Looking
at Julian’ s recounted experience in this way, it is possible to see what I am describing as
the lost, abandoned child of Julian’s true self as being exposed, given back to lier and
affirmed in a new way through the reverberating presence of the empathic chere of Christ
which made the difference. And looking at this interaction in this way, it is possible to see
Julian moving a first step toward intenorizing that empathic chere and responding in
effortless compassion to lier own beleaguered self, whicli has been for so long condemned
to suffering in isolation.
I suggest that this speculation helps us to understand why Julian’s showings were
so significant both for ber affective response as well as for the theological consequences
they had for lier transformed understanding of tlie nature of lier relationsliip witli God in
Christ and lier new sense of solidarity with lier even Christians. Her affective, bodily
response in this transformation of lier interior condition, whicli I am calling her
liomecoming to lier authentic self by means of lier mirroring transference witli Christ’ s
chere, is, I suggest, Julian’s way in to lier theological grasp of tniths about God, liuman
nature and liumankind’s relationship with God.
It also gives significance to tlie understanding Julian cornes to have that tlie
suffering of Christ did not end with bis crucifixion but continued beyond bis deatli, is
ongoing and will continue insofar as tliere is ongoing suffering in humankind.34 I suggest
that Christ’s ongoing suffering is relates for Julian, to her recognition of the ongoing
need for the authentic self in each human sout to assent to the satisfaction of its deep
need to be seen, recognized and accepted in Christ’s cliere.
It is in Julian’ s moment of knowing tliat slie is dying -- at least some experience of
lierseif whicli pnor to her visionary expenence Julian tended to daim as central, and yet
wliich now is seen as false
-- tliat a link can be made witli tlie self-experience described by
Koliut wbich is critical to transformation. As he describes it, feelings of ernptiness and
depnvation accompany tlie experience of the authentic self wbile wliat was tlie main
(conscious) sector of the self, the “early ego” as Moore put it, cornes to be recognized as an
appendage of tlie matemal selfobject which must “die”. Julian, or at least the archaic self
Mark Burrows has observed that Julian’s view ofChrist’s suffering as ongoing shows “how Julian
related human and divine suffering through a Christological model that is apparently without precedent in
the medieval schools”. BURROWS, Mark, “‘Yen he sufferyth with us’: Divine asceticism in Julian of
Norwich’s Revelation of love”, Studies in spirituality 7, 1997, p. 104.
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that defined itself as constitutionally or substantially sinful, is dying, merged in Jesus’
death, and yet discovers a different, long abandoned centre of selffiood as she beholds
(visually and with lier body) lis transformed chere.
Julian understands from the nintli showing that Christ wants lier to know that his
suffering was out of love for lier and in tlie tentli showing lie sliows lier the wound in bis
side in lis humanity. (ST 13.) In the intervening years between tlie Sliort and the Long
Texts, Julian’s meditation deepens. Whereas slie is drawn to look at tlie wound in
Christ’s side in ST 13, in tlie long text slie is drawn to enter it:
Witli lis sweet regard [Christ] drew lis creature’s understanding into his side by
the same wound; and there lie revealed a fair and delectable place, large enough for
alT mankind that will be saved and will rest in peace and love. (LT 24.)
What is clear in tliis sliowing is Clirist’s capaciousness and inclusivity in lis
humanity. We may suspect tliat a bodily knowledge of this capaciousness was previously
unavailable to Julian. Tlie Lord says to lier “See how I loved you”. (ST 13.) This is a
confirmation for Julian of being contained within the Body of Christ, and by implication in
tlie twelfth showing in tlie same chapter contained witliin tlie salvation of Holy Churcli. In
that context Christ reveals himself more glorified saying:
I am lie who is highest. I am he whom you love. I am he in wliom you deliglit. I
am lie whom you serve. I am lie for wliom you long. I am lie whom you desire. I
am lie wliom you intend. I am lie who is ail. I am lie whom Holy Church
preaches and teaches to you. I am lie who showed himself before to you. (ST
13, LT 26.)
Here, in tliis shift from beliolding Clirist in lis suffering liumanity to beliolding him
in bis glorified liumanity, Julian begins to liave an inkling of liow slie is to understand the
relationsbip between lier true self and Christ. Her first experience of tliis new centre of
selfhood is througli sliared bodily suffering witli Christ. Only eventually, as we’ll see
below, is this selfliood claimed as tlie core of lier identity as Christ reigning within lier.35
In this shift Julian could also be seen as being drawn to recognize Jesus as object of both mirror and
idealized transference in bis appearance to her as compassionate, suffenng saviour and glonfied Lord,
respectively. Significantly these images appear to her sequentially, in that order. This paper will flot study
idealization in Julians visions. Her life was full of ecclesiastical paternal selfobjects, and her familiarity
with God as heavenly Father bas already been mentioned. I only draw attention here to the fact that, as
Julian would know, the Jesus of the Gospels is able to accept the idealizing admiration of others, which is
the characteristic of the good idealized selfobject. “Jesus is unembarrassed when a prostitute uses ber fallen
hair to wipe his feet”. See LLEWELYN, Robert, With Puy Not With Blame, London, Darton, Longman
and Todd, 1982, p. 125. This background of idealization heightens, perhaps, the meaning of the visions
she has of Jesus as mirror of her humanity, which is why they have such a transforming effect on her self
understanding.
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4.2 Substance and sensuality
Julian’s showings register both visual and bodily transformations in the dynamic
mirroring relation with this visionary Christ. They teach lier to understand hurnan
anthropology as being of two natures, substantial and sensual, as Christ has these two
natures. The substantial union of our humanity in Christ in our creation tour makyng) is
neyer broken. The sensual in humanldnd can corne to be oned (onyd) or in union with
Christ in bis “flesh taldng” or Incarnation. Sensuality for Julian includes body and soul
(LT 57), the whole of the psychosornatic condition of human beings in the world, which
Julian telis us is changeable.36 Substance in humankind is described variously as the godly
will and as kynd.37 As Julian understands it, substance is “directly united with God at ail
times, whether or not we are aware of it”, though, unlike Meister Eckhart, with whom
there is a parallel notion of an essential self aiways connected with God, Julian’s substance
is neyer defined “in terms of the (male) higher, intellect”.38 The “astonishing turn” Jantzen
observes in Julian’s human anthropology “is the assertion that the essential liuman self is
the substance and the sensuality when they are oned together”.39
Julian begins to speak of substance and of sensuality in liuman anthropology
already in the Short Text, although it took the twenty years of reflecfion on the exemplum
to bnng it to fuller articulation in the Long Text. Nuth observes how for Julian the human
soul is the locus for substance and (potentially) sensuality:
In order to explain the changeable nature of the human being, Julian makes a
distinction between the ‘substance’ of the human soul, which is knit to God
36 GREESON translates sensuality as “capacity for receiving physicai sensations”, “physical appetite”.
in bis glossary for Si in REYNOLDS and HOLLOWAY, 2001, p. 671. COLLEDGE and WALSH 1978a,
p. 757, translate it simply as “physicai nature”. Jantzen’s description is more helpful. Sensuality she says
is that which constitutes our God-given independence.... It does flot mean ‘sensuous’ and does not
refer exciusively to the physical senses, let alone to sexuaiity, though ail of that wouid be
included. It includes, rather, ail of our psychology and physicality as individual human beings; our
capacities for perception in sight, heanng, touch, and so on, our whole sensory consciousness, and
our capacity for action. JANTZEN, Grace, Jutian ofNorwich, Mystic and Theotogian, London,
SPCK, 1987, p. 142.
for an account of the rich meaning of this word kynd, see KRANTZ, M. Diane F., The hfe and text of
Julian ofNotwich: The poetics of enctosure, NY, Peter Lang, 1997, pp. 97 - 99, 100. Studies in the
humanities, Literature--Politics--Society 32. As weil as meaning nature, essence, and kind in the sense of
good-natured, Krantz also draws out many other middle English associations of the word with sexuality,
which would draw the association with Julian’s “sensuality” tighter.
38 JANTZEN, Grace, power gender and Christian mysticism, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
i995, p. 148.
ANDERSON, 2005, p. 159. Emphasis in text.
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[eternally, in the liuman soul of Christ (LT 53, 54)J , and ‘sensuality’, the part of
the soul doser to the body and affected by the vagaries of time and space.4°
Nuth puts this into the context of Julian’ s need to render intelligible the prevalent
belief that God was wratliful, and this will be explored further in the next chapter. The
significant question for the psychoanalytic orientation of the present chapter however is
this: why would the assertion of the unbroken union with Christ in our substance (in our
creation) and the possibility of union witli Christ in our sensuality be so significant for
Julian? Why is changeability in the human condition otherwise 5° fnghtemng to lier? This
leads us to recall that the primary condition of one who lias been neglected and abandoned
in her need for maternai mirroring is that of aiways being on the verge of the unthinkable
anxiety of disintegration and fragmentation. In effect, I suggest Julïan’ s double
anthropology supplies a ground for Julian’ s growth in relationship with a trustworthy other
who mirrors lier in a way that allows lier to gain access to lier authentic (coliesive and
realistic) centre of selfliood.
More particularly, her assertion of the substantial union of Christ’s humanity with
that of liumankind which was neyer broken could be said to function as tlie ground for this
new-found trust tliat lier own cliangeabiiity, lier capacity for anger and blame toward God,
would not overpower God’s constancy toward liumankind. Her visionary experience of
tlie changing chere of Christ brouglit about a new experience of trust in this mirroring
Christ sucli that, in Winnicott’s words, slie could “destroy tlie object and it will stiil
survive”. It seems to me that this is how Christ’s unbroken substantial union with
humanitind functions psychoanaiytical]y in lier antliropology. As a concept intended to
lielp lier articulate the truth of the visionary experience of Christ’ s clianging chere,
“substance” lielps lier to become clearer about God’ s reality as an independent centre of
initiative beyond lier control, thus undercutting tlie grandiose belief in lier
overresponsibility for others’ (Christ’ s) suffering. At tlie same time it confirms God’ s
trustworthiness in a way whicli allows ber greater self and reality acceptance. In rime, as
we’ll see in the next chapter of this diptycli, it helps clarify for lier tliat wratli is only on tlie
liuman side.
I am suggesting tbat for hurnans like Julian to corne to know God as God wants to
be known in God’s sight, Christ’s union witli us in our makyng, (tliat is, our creation, the
godly will, kynd or substance) would indeed need to be kept intact in fallen liumanity, if
40 NUTH, ban, Wisdom’s daughter: The theotogy ofJulian ofNorwich, NY, Crossroad, 1991, P. 62.
Fora longer description ofJulian’s understanding of the double nature ofhumankind, as substance and as
sensuality, see NUTH, 1991, pp. 109 - 113.
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that humanity is identified explicitly as those whose early child neglect or abuse and social
location would otherwise have them introject that tliey are intrinsically sinful,
fundamentally excluded from humankind, less than liuman and so constitutionally
incapable of union with God. I suggest it represents for Julian what the healing, minoring
function of the therapeutic chere of the Christ of her showings engaged in lier.
I propose that tlie extraordinary nature of Julian’s antliropology needs to be seen in
this stark contextual light. This is flot a question of lier being gnostic or lieretical. Rather,
the belief in the substantial union of Christ with humankind in our godly will, which came
to lier througli the revelatory play of beholding the showings, plays a fundamental
compensatory role of liealing and encouraging lier to revise a deeply engrained doubt or
despair of lier self-worth, of lier human acceptability, of lier inclusion among tlie saved,
and to be delivered from tlie unconscious grandiosity of overresponsibility for Christ’s
suffering. Julian’s showings are engaging Christ in a mirronng transference which began
visually, engaging eye contact, and develop viscerally into wliat I describe below as images
of mutual containment. I am proposing that the anthropology whicli Julian draws from
tliese sliowings serves to foster in Julian the transmuting intemalization of the function
of the mirroring mother and to allow lier to interiorize the capacity for soothing, affect
regulation, perduring self and reality acceptance and self esteem.41 In other words, a
liealing and restoration of lier true self is engaged in the face to face encounter witli the
Christ of lier showings.
This antliropology also allows lier self-knowledge to evolve into a more balanced
knowledge of lier various conditions or sensuality, as this then is revealed and exposed to
lier by tlie empathic Christ of lier showings. Sensuality cornes to identify the liurnan
intenor condition wliere integrative work takes place by Christ’ s work of mercy and grace
in this life.
Instead of simply projecting “tlie good” out tliere onto God and being left with tlie
fragments of a constitutionally sinful sense of self, Julïan’s interiority is clianged, in a
process of transmuted intemalization. Winnicott once observed that
[r]eligions have made mucli of original sin, but have not all corne round to tlie idea
of original goodness, that whicli by being gathered togetlier in tlie idea of God is at
tlie same time separated off from the individuals wlio collectively create and re
create this God concept. The saying that man made God in his own image is
usually treated as an amusing example of the perverse, but tlie trutli in this saying
could be made more evident by a restatement, sucli as: man continues to create and
re-create God as a place to put tliat which is good in himself, and whicli lie miglit
41KOHUT, 1971, p. 199; and 1977, p. 53.
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spoil if lie kept it in himself along with ail the hate and destructiveness which is also
to be found there.42
In Julian’s case, her double anthropology expresses a growing flexibility in self
understanding as a more coherent centre of selffiood along with a greater seif-acceptance as
a “both-and” creature. It allows her to retrieve from projection onto God that “place to put
what is good in herself’ (as well as any “hate and destructiveness”) which is essential for
her healing to come into a greater knowledge of lier true self in the mirroring transference
with the Christ of her showings.
But if tins is so, contemplating tins mirroring Christ will also bring her face to face
with a clearer mirror of what is flot good in herself in her sensual condition (as distinct
from her earlier, archaic global self-hatefiulness). As well as revealing her bodily resonance
in Christ, beliolding Christ will bring her to self-knowledge winch contrasts witli the
sensuality of Christ of lier showings. Thus lier double anthropology lias the effect of
insuring Christ’ s transcendence as well as Christ’ s immanence because the showings
continue to function as revelatory of the exposing as well as empathic presence of the
healing otlier. Julian insists that while tlie union of substance is unbreakable, tlie union of
liuman sensuality with Christ is fleeting and aiways only “in part” in tins world.
But our passing life whicli we liave liere does not know in our sensuality what our
self is, but we know in faitli. And when we know and see, tnily and clearly, wliat
our self is, tlien we shail tmly and clearly see and know our Lord God in tlie
fulness ofjoy....
And so in ail tins contemplation it seemed to me tliat it was necessary to see
and to know that we are sinners.... (LT 46.)
5.0 The pain of self-knowledge
It is in the context of beliolding Christ now glonfied that Julian remembers lier
longstanding prayer for tlie wound of longing for God, that is, contemplative union.
Tmmediately she returns to tlie problem of 5m in tlie thirteentli revelation, in winch she
questions why God did not prevent sin, since it is sin whicli hinders lier from experiencing
bliss. (ST 13; LT 27.) It is as if slie is retuming to the pattem of her pre-visionary self
which I suggest was primarily split between archaic fragments whicli could be
characterized as “sinless” (grandiose in a self-righteous way) and “ail sinfiil” (sliamed,
despairing). Her pre-visionary expectation in tins way of thinking, she tells us, was to
42 WINNICOTT, D.W., “Morals and education”, in The maturationaiprocesses and thefacilitating
environrnent: Studies in the theory of emotional development, Madison CN, International Universities
Press, [1963] 1965, p. 94. Anderson’s thesis will be particularly significant, as one of the implications of
his study is that Julian’s showings help her readers to practise ways of encountering and becoming more
like God, i.e., nonviolent. See ANDERSON, 2005, ch. 5.
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wish lierseif to be sinless so that she might avoid pain and enjoy bliss, and because it isn’t
so, to blame God. It is flot difficuit here to see the re-emergence of the grandiose self, here
in a condition of wliat amounts to narcissistic projective rage, in a condition of resistance,
even as it is engaged in this mirroring relation. In fact, in this context Julian recognizes this
as an attitude “greatly to be shunned; and I moumed and sorrowed on tliis account,
unreasonably, lacking discretion, filled with pride”, but with whicli she nonetheless
struggies. (ST 13.) Interestingly she observes that lier interior struggie did flot stop tlie
Jesus of lier showings from revealing to lier what she needed. This Jesus of lier sliowings
(witli wliom slie is oned in substance if not in sensuality) is flot simply a mirror reflection
of lier grandiosity. Neither would a good-enough mother fail to allow lier child lovingly
and at tlie riglit time to be disillusioned of lis or lier grandiosity, even tliougli the child did
not yet understand this.
The mysterious response to lier question which she receives from tlie Lord is that
“Sin is necessary [behouety] but ail will be well and ail will be well and every kind of tliing
will be well”. (LT 27, cf. ST 13.) By sin she understood
ail whicli is flot good: the sliarneful contempt and the complete denial [noghtyngel
of himself whicli lie endured for us in tliis life and in lis death, and ail the pains and
passions, spiritual and bodily, of ail lis creatures. For we are ail in part denied
[noghtedJ [LT trobelyd troubled], and we ought to be denied {noghted] [LT
trobetyd], following our master Jesus until we are fully purged, [ST tliat is to say
until we be fully noghted of] our own mortal flesh and ail our inward affections
which are flot good. (ST 13; LT 27.)
She observes tliat sin lias no kind of substance and cannot be recognized except by
tlie pain caused by it. “And it seems to me that this pain is sometliing for a time, for it
purges and makes us know oursetves”. (ST 13; LT 27.) Thus it cornes to lier that lier
pain is the pain of coming into self-knowledge. This pain could be called the pain of
growtli-producing disillusionment of both grandiose autonomy and despairing isolation,
tlie pain induced by the effective confrontation witli reality by a trusted empathic other.
Julian’ s empathic mirroring Christ gives lier what she most needs to see exposed in herseif
and in a way slie can accept to see, as slie sees “how Christ has compassion on us because
of 5m”. (ST 13; LT 2$.)
The Lord in his mercy reveals our 5m and our feebleness to us by tlie sweet
gracious liglit of lis own self, for our sin is so foui and so liorrible that he in lis
courtesy will not reveai it to us except by the light of his mercy.... For lie in bis
courtesy measures the siglit for us for... we sliould flot endure to see it as it is. (LT
7$.)
The pain of this recognition of lier sinfuiness is met witli the consolation that God
does not see lier sinfulness with tlie wrath and liarsli judgrnent witli whidli she herseif
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would judge it, but rather “very tenderly, showing no kind of blame to me or anyone who
will be saved”. Indeed in tlie Long Text she cornes to see that because Christ is in union
with human beings, when God looks on liumanity God only sees Cbrist’s liumanity. “Our
Father may not, does flot wish to assign more blame to us than to his own beloved Son
Jesus Christ”. (LT 51.)
Here is a real movernent in Julian’s integration of self and godJparent selfobject:
until now we can imagine tliat although she saw God consciously or intellectually as
loving, there was in lier as in most of us, a deep, unconscious fear of the Godlparent
object’ s judgment of her in lier irnperfect or sinful state; lience lier initial desire to know
bliss without pain, i.e., to be sinless. What she leams is that since God does flot blame lier
simply for being sinfiil, she can appropriate this vision of God’s generosity into her own
self perception: she need not blame herseif for lier human state of imperfection and sin.
Ratlier it can become the window througli which to enter tlie Lord’s love in lier more fully,
in otlier words to become more fully accepting of her wliole self, substance and sensuality,
in relation to Christ.43
And so it is tliat Julian sees tlie Lord revealing to lier that slie will sin, tliat slie is flot
(and need not be) exempt from this human condition. (LI 46.) Sin now lias a purpose.
Synne is behouety, fitting, necessary. Its presence in the human person is not an
indictment. It is a part of liuman nature. 5m is necessary because Julian of Norwich needs
to know her whole self, and the particular pain of purgation of sin helps this self
knowledge to corne into consciousness. However, sïn must be seen by tlie liuman person
for what it ïs in Chrïst’s compassionate sight so that the person may see Christ and be
healed and transformed in those wounded places. Redemption is not a personality
transplant. Ratlier, as Julian sees tliat liurnans are restored to our full, essential selves in
Christ, “sin will be no sliarne, but honour to man”. (LI 38.) She is sliown tbrougli the
graces of prayer, that is, contrition, compassion and trust, properly understood in relation
to tlie compassionate andjoyful Christ of ber sliowings, that the wounds of sin and shame
become honours in the siglit of God. (ST 17; LI 39.)
Julian’s sensual self, that is her changeable psychosomatic condition, which does
consent to sin, she sees now as thougli through Christ’s eyes of compassion. Seeing
herseif in bis eyes of compassion becomes tlie means for her to understand lier
connectedness to the rest of liumankind:
43Mountney bas understood Julian’s meaning here. He writes, “1f we can have a deep enough grasp of the
depth of God’s love even in our sinfulness, and feel and sec that he loves us utterly, sin and ail, then it
becomes casier for us to feei the same for ourselves”. MOUNTNEY, John Michael, Sin shah be a glory,
London, Darton, Longman and Todd, 1992, p. 79.
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So I saw how Christ lias compassion on us because of sin; and just as I was before
filled full of pain and compassion on account of Christ’s Passion, so I was now in
a measure filled with compassion for ail my fellow Christians, and then I saw that
every kind of compassion which one bas for one’s even Christians in love is Christ
in us. (ST 13; LT 2$.)
5 1 The two secret sins exposed
This revelation of self-knowledge begins to unveil to lier more clearly the answer to
lier question wliat is sin. Significantly, slie sees tliat more tlian ail others traditionally so
named, there are two ‘secret sins” whicli keep the soul from knowing itself to be umted to
lier Lord. (SI 24; LI 73.) The first is tlie sin of slotli or impatience, of being complacent
witli andlor resentful of God and one’s circumstances wliich is the resistance to knowing
and accepting oneself in one’s fallen condition. Impatience blames God for having created
sin, which she had perceived until now as the stumbling block to lier experiencing the bliss
0f UfliOn with God. Sloth resists interior cliange.
Kohuts comparable description of what Julian cails slotli is the resistance of the
archaic grandiose self to forming the mirror transference through which alone it wil expose
itself to a confrontation with reality. A more colioquial expression would be to cali this tlie
sin of denial. It corresponds directly with Sebastian Moore’ s understanding of resistance
as original sin. In Julian’s case, we can see the sin of impatience and sloth for example in
lier earlier impatience to die. It can also be traced in lier tendency to wisli life were
otherwise or want to control tlie outcomes 0f future events. This is impiied in lier reflection
much later: “Then shah none of us be moved to say in any matter: Lord, if it had been so,
it would have been well. But we shah ail say witli one voice: Lord, blessed may you be,
because it is so, it is well....” (LT $5.) It miglit also have manifested itself in anger.
Recail her coldness toward her mother44 and lier veiled anger against the theological
authorities who would try to know God’s privy counsel (and impose it on others). Recail,
too, the speculation tliat in lier early narcissistic sense of being special perliaps lay an
unconscious disdain for ordinary folk, which I explored in chapter five.
At the same time Julian sees the second 5m of despair for what it is, the motive
behind the first sin of impatience and sloth.45 For Julian despair presents itself in what we
44See KOENIG, 1984, ch. 7.
‘ Compare Joan Nuth on the interrelation between sloth (as impatience) and despair:
Impatience with suffering causes an apathy that leads to “wasting of time”, which Julian considers
“the beginning of sin”. {LT 64.] This leads to despair, since the sinner becomes ashamed and
guilt-ridden, “afraid to appear before our courteous Lord”. [LT 76.] NUTH, 1991, P. 128.
Nuth’s footnote 39 at that point (p. 200) anchors this interrelation historically:
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might eaU an attitude of ontological unworthiness, which leads to defenses against
exposing herseif to God in her need, as she observes of herself:
[O]ften our trust is flot complete, for we are flot certain that almighty God hears us,
because of our unworthiness, it seems to us.... And thus when we feel SO, it is our
folly which is the cause of our weakness, for I have expenenced this in myseif.
(ST 19.)
Despair holds her to be fully and eternally to blame for lier sins.
Julian perceives that despair derives from linking the fear of exposure to the
knowledge of oneseif as fallen with the fear that God wiil judge a person hatefully in this
condition of contrition and naked self-knowledge. This would appear to be the background
for the then common teaching of the Churcli that God was angiy which Julian had also
introjected. Increasingly, Julian sees this despair as the sin besetting souls seeking union
with the Lord:
God’s love does not change, but during the time that a man is in sin lie is 50 weak,
so foolish, so unloving that he can love neither God nor himsef His greatest
harm is his blindness because he cannot see ail this. Then almighty Gods perfect
love... gives him sight of himself... And then it seems to the soul that God has
been moved to look upon it, as though it had been in pain or prison, saying, “1m
glad that you have found rest, for I have aiways loved you.’ (ST 19.)
Despair itself must corne to be recogmzed for the sin it is, and yet at the same lime, seen
through the eyes of the beholding Lord in order to see oneseif both objectively and with
tenderness. Despair is neyer a condition which the creature consciously chooses, and 50 it
is inappropnate that the despairing person think God could be angry. The Long Text
version of this text from ST 19 reflects the direction she is taking, as she becomes more
aware and accepting of her own vuinerable nature:
Man is changeable in this life, and falis into sin through frailty and ignorance. 11e
is weak and foolish in himself, and also his will is overpowered in the time when
lie is assailed and in sorrow and woe. And the cause is blindness, because lie does
flot see God, for if lie saw God continually, lie would have no harmful feelings nor
any kind of prompting, no sorrowing which is conducive to sin [no sorowyng that
servyth to synne]. (LT 47.)
The connection Julian makes between sloth and despair is interesting. By ber day, sloth was
considered one of the seven deadly sins, and it had acquired the meaning it bas today, signifying
Iaziness. But in the cardinal sin tradition, which came to the West through Cassian and Gregory,
this sin was referred to variously as accidia, implying an apathy or listlessness about spiritual
matters, andlor tristitia, undue sadness or melancholy.... In Iinking despair to sloth, Julian
betrays some awareness of this earlier stage of the tradition. In the Ancrene riwie [part 4], despair
is the eighth cub of sloth.
For the history of the tradition Nuth is drawing on see BLOOMHELD, Morton W., The seven deadty
sins: An introduction to the history of a religious concept with special reference to medieval English
titerature, Lansing, Michigan State College Press, 1952, pp. 70, 72, 96, 112 - 113.
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To experience the intenor condition of despair as a condition of frailty, ignorance and
blindness beheld by God in compassion is a risk which can only be taken as an act of trust,
and in Julian’ s case I hold that the therapeutic and salvific practice of intemalizing that trust
came through beholding Christ in the transitional realm of the showings and her subsequent
years of meditation on them.
Over the course of years Julian sees this deeply engrained pattem of despair to be
the besetting cause of her tendency to a kind of fear she calis “doubtful dread”. (ST 21, 24;
LT 66, 73.)46 Whereas the feeling of despair parallels the tendency to fear to make eye
contact with the Lord who beholds the creature (and so to imagine that God has tumed
God’s face away, because the creature has turned away from God), so also then, beholding
oneseif, as beheld by God, replaces despair with joy. Despair, or shame is the sin which
keeps Julian from seeing herseif, in Kohut’ s phrase, as the “gleam in the mothers eye”.
Despair is that which made trusting in salvation effectively impossible and unbelievable
earlier in Julian’s life, I suggest.
It is sigmficant that in both instances of sloth and despair what results is a
blindness, an “ignorance of love”, an incapacity to see how God could be present to these
conditions in any except a judging way:
Md it is about this knowledge that we are most blind, for many men and women
believe that God is almighty and may do everything, and that he is ail wisdom and
can do everything, but that he is ail love and wïshes to do everything, that is where
they fail. And it is this ignorance which most hinders God’s loyers, for when they
begin to hate sin and to amend themselves according to the laws of Holy Church,
stïll there persists a fear which moves them to look at themselves and thefr sins
committed in the past. And they take this fear for humility, but it is a reprehensible
blindness and weakness; and we do flot know how to despise it, as we should at
once despise it, like any other sin which we recognize, if we knew it for what it is,
46 Julian ends the Short Text with a chapter identifying four fears: First there is fear of assauit, by which
Julian means fear of bodily sickness and other pains which are not in themselves sinful and which can heip
purge the person. Second there is fear of pain, by wbich a person is wakened from the sleep of sin and
moved to seek comfort and mercy of God and begins to understand contrition. This would appear to be the
pain of self-knowiedge. Third there is doubtful fear which is a kind of despair. About this she bas the most
aggressive thing to say, which in itself suggests the extent to which it was a chronic issue for Julian: “for
I am certain that God hates ail doubtftfl fear, and he wishes us to drive it out, knowing truiy how we may
live [LT lovel. Lastly there is reverent fear, which she does not descnbe apart from it being sweet and
gentie. This wouid seem to be akin to trust. (SI 25; LT 74.) Abbott bas argued that these four fears
formed the core of ber message. ABBOTT, 1999, ch 5. See also BRADLEY, Ritamary, “Juiian’s
‘doubtfult drede”, The month 21, Feb, 1981, pp. 53 - 54, who argues that the state of “doubt, bordenng
on despair” permeates Julian’s text. Panichelii goes further to argue that Juiian’s ending of the Short Text
on the note of these four fears suggests that Julian’s deniai of the visions afier the flfteenth showing was a
condition of distress which continued to dominate her life. The Long Text she argues was written as Julian
gained greater understanding of the meaning of the showings and of what her sin actuaily was. See
PAMCHELLI, Debra Scott, “finding God in the memory: Julian and the ioss of the visions”, The
Downside review 104, 1986, pp. 299 - 300.
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because it cornes from the enemy.... For of ail the attnbutes of the blessed Trinity,
it is God’s wiil that we have rnost confidence in lis delight and bis iove. (ST 24; cf.
LI 73.)
It is here that Julian tums to integrating these fragmented feelings into a more
consistent attitude in wbich she can accept that she is beloved of God in weil being and in
woe, and discovers that different kind of pain, the pain “which purges and gives us
knowledge of ourselves”. In this way Julian in lier own language lias corne to see each one
of the secret sins as representing a form of resistance to the distinctive pain of
disillusionment and dying to false selves or ego, a resistance to beholding -- to engaging in
a mirroring transference with -- tlie Cbrist of lier showings. She lias corne to the point of
having a capacity for reinterpreting tlie meanings of lier feelings insofar as slie sees them
through Cbrist’s love for her. Her integration of this capacity in the Long Text is more
apparent where she is adarnant about fears which do flot corne from God, saying tliat,
“though tliey appear diguised as lioliness, tliey are flot so true”. (LI 74.)
I observe in passing that Julian’ s insight into these two “secret sins” of impatience
and despair as forms of resïstance to trust in God’ s love is extraordinarily modem (or
perhaps I sliouid say, modem psycliology actualiy has quite an ancient precedent) in this
respect, tliat tlieir “secret” or hidden nature bears ail the marks of what we would cail tlie
“unconscious”. Julian’s insiglit helps to open up the concept of sin to new rneaning in our
contemporary world, and a new vision of what Christ’s saving work is.’
5.2 The human predicament revised
Julian’ s hard-won revision of her understanding of sin is also significant because it
suggests a transposition or shift of awareness in lier understanding of wliat the liuman
predicament is for which saivation is God’s response. Lamm observes that the hurnan
predicament as Julian describes it is one of exposure, vulnerability and abandonment, and
that God’ s response is appropriate to that condition:
In being exposed, and in realizing the degree to which we are exposed, we leam the
extent to which we are aiways aiready enclosed in God’s iove. Seeing our
condition as one of being exposed and vulnerable is absolutely crucial for Julian
because only through the wiliingness to experience our exposures can we recognize
God’s redemption, whicli cornes in the form of ioving protection.48
47For the Twelve Step Programme, denial is that which keeps people from being able to recover from
addictions. Kierkegaard discusses despair as sin in The Sickness Unto Death, Princeton, NJ, Pnnceton
University Press, 1983, 201 p.
48 LAMM, Julia, “Revelation as exposure in Julian of Norwich’s $howings”, Spiritus 5, 2005, p. 65.
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To be more exact, the condition of exposure, frailty and abandonment, experienced
blindly in self-preoccupied despair, is the human predicament to which salvation is a
healing and restorative response, as Julian experiences it. However, this was not how the
Churcli regarded the human predicament. The despair Julian introjected is reinforced from
without as well, by her knowledge of the “ordinary” teaching of Holy Church, “that the
blame of our sins continually hangs upon us”. (LT 50). Julian’s confusion and need for
intelligibility requires, therefore, that we pay attention to the question of her social location
as well as this proposed psychobiographical dimension in her soteriology. This will 5e the
focus of the next chapter.
5.3 The fruit of self-knowledge
In the present context, I observe at least three fruits of her maturation in mirroring
need as they are manifested in Julian’s showings thus far. First, she shows signs of
developing a new capacity to have empathy for herseif. $econdiy, she becomes able to
understand her feelings of desolation from a new perspective, even recogrnzing some
suffering as actually “conducive to sin”, and learning that she is to pass over them lightly.
Thirdly, she understands compassion for lier fellow Christians as Christ’ s action in her.
From a psychoanalytic perspective, ail of these are clear indications of the actïvity of
transmuted intemalization and maturation in her self structure and her capacity for empathy
and object relations as a result of this mirroring transference with the Jesus of lier
showings.
5.3.1 b have empathy for herseif
As an image of how she sees her whole self, sin and ail, mirrored in God’s love, in
the Short Text Julian receives the final vision of her soul in the midst of her heart, where
Jesus sat at rest. We can see Julian’s process of self acceptance, mirrored in God’s sight
deepening here into the beginning of her understanding of the “godly will”, the substance
or imago Dei, which, in human nature remains united with God and which through prayer
and trust becomes united with God in sensual condition also. ($T 19; LT 43.)
Immediately following this vision, the revelations were hidden, and she
experienced a state in which she earlier would have believed herseif to have become
abandoned to herseif:
Ail this, k seemed was to move me to despair; and I kept on trusting in God, and
spoke words aloud to comfort my sout, as I should have done to another person
who was so betaboured. ($T 23, LT 69.)
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This I would understand to be an indicator of transmuting internalization througli her
minoring relationship with Jesus, in that Julian shows herseif to have intemalized the
mature capacity to have empathyfor hersetf in her desolate feelings, as she would for
sorneone else.
5.3.2 “It is not God’s will that when we feel pain we should
pursue it”
McEntire observes ofLT 72 that Julian’s texts reveal a rnaturity in the contemplative
life, as she cornes to a greater awareness of the interior nature of the grace of compunction
and mouming as well as of the eschatological joy in and desire for eternal blessedness.49
Whatever maturation Julian experienced, I propose that it included a maturation in her
capacity to die to sin (as resistance to consciousness of impatience and despair) and leam to
accept the grief (and relief) of narcissistic disillusionment as part of the purgation process in
the lifelong process of dying to ego. This affected her scmpulous practice of focusing on
false sins for which there was neyer sufficient contrition, as she came to understand tins
practice frorn a different perspective now, as an abandonment of her Christic, authentic
self. The mouming or grief which cornes with the apparent absence of God in pain (which
fonnerly she equated with God’ s abandonment, wratli and punishment) is no longer to be
belaboured, but rather passed over as quickly as possible.
God wishes us to know that he keeps us safe alt the time, in sorrow and in joy;
and sometimes a man is left to himself for the profit of his soul, although his sin is
flot aiways the cause... Therefore it is flot God’s will that when we feel pain we
should pursue it in sorrow and mouming for it, but that suddenly we should pass it
over, and preserve ourselves in the endless deliglit which is God. (ST 9, LT 15.)
And therefore if a man be in so rnuch pain, so much woe and so rnuch unrest that it
seems to bim that he can think of nothing at ail but the state he is in or what he is
feeling, let him, as soon as lie rnay, pass it over liglitly and count it as nothing.
Why? Because God wants to be known; and because if we knew hirn and loved
him we should have patience and be in great rest, and ail that he does would be a
delight to us. (ST 20.)
And when we fall back into ourselves, through depression and spiritual blindness
and our experience of spiritual and bodily pains, because of our frailty, it is God’s
will that we know that lie has flot forgotten us....
It is God’ s will that we accept his commands and his consolations as
generously and as fully as we are able; and lie also wants us to accept our tarrying
and our sufferings as lightly as we are able, and to count tliem as nothing. For the
McENTIRE, Sandra, “The doctrine of compunction from Bede to Margery Kempe”, in The medieval
mystical tradition in England, ed. GLASSCOE, Marion, Cambridge, D. S. Brewer, 1987, p. 87. Exeter
symposium IV.
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more lightly that we accept them, the less importance we ascribe to them because of
our love, the less pain shah we experience from them and the more thanks and
reward shah we have for them. (LT 65; see also ST 20.)
From having begun the showings with a global and generahized sense of pain and
suffering, Julian has corne quite a distance in distinguishing between suffenng that teaches
purgation (dying to ego) and is restorative, from a different kind of suffenng which is
based on an obsessive, though unconscious, refusai to assent to God’s consolation. “The
cause is bhindness, because he does flot see God; for if he saw God continually, he would
have no... sorrowing which is conducive to sin”. (LT 47.) In these showings she has
become much clearer as to her authentic centre of selfhood in the sight ofGod. This new
centre of selffiood, discovered in relation to the mirroring Christ, throws into relief and
allows her to name effectively what sin is for her. Her coming to name feelings of
“sonow that are conducive to sin”, which she once took to be holy, is evidence of Juhian
developing a capacity for affective mentalization.
5.3.3 Compassion for one’s even Christians
What Julian sees is the kenosis of Jesus in the Passion transformed into bis
Resurrection joy and capaciousness for enclosing ail humanity. This is paralleled in the
self-emptying wbich she is undergoing as she discovers and detaches from the feelings of
sloth (grandiosity) and despair (shame), associated with the archaic self structures, and
opens herself to the loving, cornpassionate regard in which she sees Jesus behold her. In
bis chere she experiences a different, new centre of selfhood. One way she describes this
is in ber new experience of compassion for ber fellow Christians as Christ in her. Insofar
as the Christ of lier visions shows empathy, she gains a capacity for empathy and shows
signs of having a deeper empathy for others. Recail that the capacity for empathy is one of
the movement responses Homans obseiwed in the mouming process in narcissism.50 This
is a significant sign of maturation in lier capacity to relate internai and extemal worlds with
greater coherence, flexibility and realism, and to relate to others with greater self and object
constancy.
6.0 Mirror reversai images of mutuai enciosure
Following Julian’s fifteenth showing she fahls asleep and is attacked in a dream by a
demomc presence wbicli would bave lier doubt the showings and believe that she had been
50 HOMANS, 1989, p. 330.
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raving. This is a due as to the prevalence of a fundamental attitude of self-doubt and fear
in Julian. The final, sixteentli showing is given, she teils us, as a confirmation of the truth
of the others: “Know it well, ït was no hallucination which you saw today, but accept and
believe it and hold firmly to it, and you will flot be overcome”. (ST 22; LT 68.) I suggest
we flot forget here the echo of the mirroring presence of the religious person who came to
her after her dream and who, when she judged herseif as having been raving, treated her
account of her showings seriously and respectfully. (ST 21; LT 66.) She herseif is thus
enabled to accept this last, sixteenth showing as a confirmation of ah the showings which
preceded it.
In this final showing Juhian receives a vision of her own soul in the centre of her
heart in the middle of which sits the Lord Jesus at rest.
[T]hen our Lord opened my spiritual eyes, and showed me my soul in the midst of
my heart. I saw my soul as wide as if it were a kingdom, and from the state which
I saw in it, il seemed to me as if it were a fine city. In the midst of this city sits our
Lord Jesus, tme God and true man, a handsome person and tali, honourable, the
greatest lord. And I saw him spiendidly clad in honours. He sits erect there in the
soul, in peace and rest, and he mies and he guards heaven and earth and everything
that is....
..This was a delectable and a restftl sight, for it is so in tmth forevermore; and to
contemplate [the behaldynge of] this while we are here is most pleasing [ptesande]
to God, and veiy great profit to us. And the soul who thus contemplates
[behaldys] is made like to him who is contemplated [behaldene], and united to him
in rest and peace And when I liad contempiated this with great attention, our
Lord very humbly revealed words to me, without voice and without opemng of
lips, as lie had done before, and said very seriously: Know it well, it was no
hallucination [rauyngej which you saw today, but accept and beieve it and hold
firmly to it and you will not be overcome. (ST 22; see LT 68.)
I want to suggest that what we see in this showing is a kind of reverse image of the tenth
showing in which Julian was drawn to enter into the wounded side of Christ.
Between the tenth and the sixteenth showings we see a mirror reversai, first of
Juhian being drawn into Jesus through the wound in his side, into a place of rest, and then a
revelation of her own soul’s interior landscape in the midst of which sits Jesus at rest.
Both are images of containment or enclosure. In both instances she sees the enclosure as
spacious like a kingdom, though they are reverse images of who is enclosing whom.
The entry point into the tenth showing of being contained in Christ is through the
wounds of pain and sin which they share in their suffering humanity. Julian recounts in
the Short Text that it was
as if he had saïd: My child, if you cannot look on my divinity, see here how I
suffered my side to be opened and my heart to be spiit in two and to send out biood
and water, ail that was in it; and this is a delight to me, and I wish it to be so for
you.” (ST 13.)
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The sense she gives in the Short Text passage is that Christ’s Passion reveals only his
humanity, flot lis divinity to Julian. Interestingly the Long Text alters the mearnng of
Christ’ s side and heart being rent, suggesting that this is also exposing part of Christ’ s
divinity; that in Christ’s open side is both a vision of the Creator and the saviour:
And with that he brought to mmd the dear and precious blood and water which he
suffered to be shed for love. And in this sweet sight he showed bis blessed heart
split in two, and as he rejoiced lie showed to my understanding a part of lis blessed
divinity, as much as was lis will at that time, strengthening my poor soul to
understand what can be said, that is the endless love which was without beginning
and is and aiways shah be.
And wïth this our good Lord said most joyfully: see how I love you, as if
he had said, my darling, behold and see you Lord, your God, who is you Creator
and your endless joy; see your own brother, your saviour; my child, behold and see
what delight and bliss I have in your salvatïon, and for my love rejoice with me.
(LT 24.)
Thus only much later are the two natures of Christ actually articulated by Julian in lier entry
into his open wound. This image of Julian’ s enclosure in Christ’ s body is an image of her
acceptability, lier recognition, her inclusion in Christ’ s love and in the salvation of the
Church. It must be remembered that the context in which she came to this showing was of
having intemalized the terror of exclusion and unacceptability, as I see it. I argued above
that it could represent the limit of the power of her unacceptable feelings of aggression and
the durability of God to contain and humanize that anger in Christ’ s loving regard. In that
light, perhaps the Long Text could be said to confirm this psychoanalytic argument in that
the same image takes on, over time, a deeper significance as the acceptabiity of lier
creation, as well as lier salvation, made possible by Christ’s union with humamty in
substance and sensuahity in our creation.
With regard to the reverse image, that of Christ at rest in Julian’ s soul, whidh in
some sense is also the soul of ail humankind as she sees it, and which Christ desires that
humankind behold witffln, this immanent Christ is seen in lis double human nature, in
substance and sensuality in both the Short Text and tlie Long Text. The significance of this
showing is that it places Christ’ s two natures witbin the human soul contemplating Christ.
It unites Christ’s substantiat humanity (in our creation) and Christ’s sensual humanity
(in our salvation) with humankind. This showing, intended to be for Julian a confirmation
of ail the showings whidli preceded it, could be said to have the psychoanalytic function of
affirming lier whole self in ail the changeability of lier hurnan sensuality. It is, I suggest, a
confirmation of Julian’s having corne a long way to interionzing the function of the
mirroring (m)otlier, to becoming capable of seeing herself as she is seen by the Christ of
1er showings. In other words, having experienced Christ’s capaciousness to contain her
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humanity -- lis capax humani so to speak, she is given an image of her whole, authentic
self as capax Dei, having a capacity for God.
What Julian takes from this sixteenth showing is that “the soul who thus
contemplates is made like to him who is contempiated, and united to him in rest and peace”.
(ST 22; LT 6$.) This allusion to 2 Cor. 3:18, which reads “And we with our unveiled
faces reflecting like mirrors the brightness of the Lord, ail grow bnghter and brighter as we
are mrned into the image that we reflect: this is the work of the Lord who is Spirit”,
suggests that Julian is learning that the face of Christ gives her mirror knowiedge of herseif
and God. However, it is only in the Long Text that she can say this herseif: “And what
can make us to rejoice more in God than to see in him that in us, of ail lis greatest
works, he hasjoy?” (LT 68.)
Interestingly, too, in the Long Text lier final showing of Christ reigning in lier soul
inciudes this further description that lie is “higliest bishop, most awesome king...” (LT
68). The fact that tlie two natures of Christ, that are eventually seen as united and reigning
within lier, include episcopal dignity in the Long Text suggests that lier anxiety conceming
wliat to beiieve about lier liuman condition before God lias become the iocus of a sense of
intenor autliority; tliat liaving been located “out there” in extemal authority it is now “in
here”, on tlie basis of tlie fruits of her life practice of contemplation. In more
psychoanalytic terms this would reftect a long term process of undergoing dying to
introjected false selves and growing in a cohesive centre of selffiood, as slie sees that
mirrored in Christ in different liuman conditions.
In any event, I am proposing, after Kohut, that between the tenth and tlie sixteentli
showings tlie shift in tliese images reflects some transmuted intemalization of the mirroring
transference whidh deepens in the twenty year period between tlie Short and the Long
Texts. Recail that Kohut identifies the therapeutic import of tlie mirroring transference to
be in the empathic trusting relationship between analyst and client, whicli allows tlie client
to witlistand the exposure of archaic grandiosity and sliame to reality through the
therapeutic use of optimum frustration. Here, Julians trust in the Jesus of lier showings
aflows her to receive these new images of lierseif no longer in an intense merged mirroring
transference of suffering Christ’s pains, but ratlier in images of mutual containment, mutuai
capaciousness and adequacy. first she beholds lierself contained by him in his body, and
then containing him in lier soul. I suggest that tlie power of both of these images had to do
with how they contrasted with what Julian expected prior to the showings: i.e., that she
would be exciuded from Christ’ s salvation and that Christ was flot in her. Her revision in
tlie Long Text of tlie meaning of what she was seeing in entering tlie side of Christ is sucli
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that suffering and joy were now both occasions of union with Christ. This suggests she
was experiencing greater expenential confidence than what she had at the fime of wrifing
the Short Text.
In both of these cases of mutual enclosure the images are of bodily enclosure, and
so, to that extent, bear resemblance to the first experience in the showings of fusion with
Christ in his bodily suffering, and manifest the ongoing preoccupation with pre-oedipal
issues of bodily display, holding and mirroring. It could be argued that these reverse
images of mutual enclosure represent a shift from a merged mirroring transference,
involving a merger or symbiosis of primary identity, toward a less archaic transference.
They reveal some greater flexibility in the mirroring transference than do her first
showings.5’ The thmst of this argument will find further confirmation in the exemptum,
where Julian shows even greater flexibility and subtlety of relations to obtain between the
beholder and the beheld.
7.0 Conclusion
An empathic confrontation with the fragmented reality of her mterior condition, by
the mirroring function of the Jesus of her showings, makes possible Julian’s appropriation
of a new centre of selfbood in relation to the Christ of her showings. Julian shows
movement from fragmented feelings through to the capacity to feel “both at once” (affect
regulation), and contain a greater realism around their interpretation in the presence of
Christ (mentalized affectivity). As for eye contact, Julian’ s images of beholding Christ’ s
chere change in ST 12 and LT 21 show the compassionate suffering of the kenotic Christ
and his transformation intojoy as functioning to enable and reflect back or mirror the
movement response of transformation of Julian’s own bodily and interior healing process.
51 KOHUT, 1971, p. 116. Lamm and Bauerschmidt each describe in their own terms what I suggest is
going on in the mirroring transference. Lamm’s comment (which is intended to interpret Julian’s tenth
showing of her entering the side of Christ) is that for Julian “revelation occurs by dissolving the boundanes
between what is interior and what is exterior”. Sec LAMM, 2005, p. 62. Compare this with
Bauerschmidt’s focus on liminality in his comment that “[t]o be embodied is to have boundaries, but to
have boundaries is also to have thresholds, points of opening into which others may enter and from which
new things may proceed. It is this possibility that Julian highlights”. Sec BAUERSCHMIDT, Fredenck,
Julian ofNorwich and the mysticat body politic of Christ, Notre Dame, Indiana, Notre Dame University
Press, 1999, p. 64. It seems to me that Julian highlights both... and more, insofar as these images are seen
as developments toward greater cohesion, flexibility and adequacy of self and object relations within a
mirroring transference. This will be developed in the next diptych in the discussion of Julian’s exemplum
where her relationship with the mirroring Christ becomes yet more nuanced.
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The double anthropology which Julian draws from these showings serves to foster
in Julian the transmuting intemalization of the minoring function of the Christ of her
sliowings. Her identification of tlie pain of self-knowledge reflects this internalization.
And Julian’ s refinement in tlie identification of two secret sins, and liow slie responds to
their presence in lier life, is also seen to reftect this process of working through toward
greater realism and maturation in lier need for minoring in lier transference relationship
witli the Jesus of lier showings.
Finally, Julian’s images of mutual bodily enclosure minor aspects of the growing
capaciousness of lier relationship with Christ and signal lier working through tlie initial
fusion slie experienced witli tlie bodily siglit of the suffering, dying Christ toward a more
differentiated mirroring transference witli tlie Christ of lier sliowings.
CHAPTER 10
DIPTYCH 2.2 CONFIRMATION AND RETRIEVAL
1.0 Introduction
In the first chapter of this diptych I explored in Koliutian psychoanalytic terms how
Julïan submits to the struggle to render lier confusion around suffering intelligible, to
reform lier understanding about what sin is for lier and about liow slie is to relate to Christ
when tliere is sin in her.
I now turn the psychoanalytic conelation on its liead, to see how this interpretation
of Julian’s work of disillusionment and visionary exploration of a new understanding of
lierseif, and the meaning of sin and suffering in relation to the Christ of lier Showings,
might help elucidate the motivation for tlie liistorical genesis of lier soteriology. A major
assumption in this hypothesis is that correlating the psychobiographicat speculation
concerning her tack of early mirroring with this feminist problematic in the
appropriation of Christian soterioÏogy may offer us dues for grasping the existential
urgency which drives the theotogical originality of Julian ‘s showings and her
meditations.1 In so doing, it may also speak into tlie contemporary searcli for a credible
soteriology.
1 In Derek Anderson’s brilhiant study of Julian’s nonviolent soteriology as being an important resource for
contemporary feminist soteriology, it is this existential or praxeological logic which is missing from lis
“strict” theological analysis. In discussing Julian’s editing (or retrieval) of traditional theological ideas, for
example, Anderson writes that Julian “reveals her concern for the pacific quality of the divine life itself..
The logic ofJulian’s approach seems to turn upon the ideal that God’s own life does flot admit of violence”.
This gives the impression that Julian began “consciously and systematically” to construct a nonviolent
trinitarian theology such that “Julian’s soteriology draws its shape from the peaceful nature... of the
Trinity”. ANDERSON, Derek, Jutian ofNorwich ‘s nonviolent account of satvation, Ph.D. thesis,
Loyola University, Chicago, 2005, pp. 117, 144. Not surpnsingly, he draws exclusively on the Long
Text. My argument moves from the opposite direction to the same end, that her experience of
appropriation of salvation through the showings led her to reshape soteriology and ultimately trinittanan
theology, and is underlined in the historical evolution of thought in the Short Text and Long Text. This is
a question of taking seriously in an historical subject the disclosure of context and social location as
essential to theological methodology. His silence as to bis own social location is another instance of tbis
problem. Despite the differences in methodology however, Anderson’s study is a major contribution to the
feminist constructive project in soteriology, and an articulate response to a major gap in sotenological
studies of Julian of Norwich wbich las failed to treat “Julian’s theology as a resource for addressing
contemporary concerns for the violent implications of Cbristian teaching about salvation”. ANDERSON,
2005, p. 63. I suspect his work will become a standard by which Julian studies in soteriology will be
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Elizabeth Johnson describes the second movement in the lïberation dynamic of the
conversion process as one of confirmation, ïnvolving a retrieval of good news from the
Christian tradition through memory, narrative and solidarity with others who are suffering.
The problem of intelligibility raised by the contrast experience moves toward the
confirmation of a meaningful response experienced in greater flourishing of womanldnd.
With regard to the retrieval moment in this process Johnson writes that “[tJhe ambiguity of
the Christian tradition lies precisely in this fact, that despite its sexism it bas served as a
strong source of life for countless women throughout the centuries and continues to do so
today”.2
I will draw again on Sebastian Moore to assist this correlation, this time in the form
of Cynthia Crysdale’s reading of Moore’s soteriology which is sensitive both to the social
location of women, and the concem to understand personal responsibility for 5m in tandem
with the systemic causes and effects of sifl.3 I will draw on Crysdale in two movements,
each of which will be followed by an exploration of Julian’s Showings in the Short Text
and their equivalent in the Long Text. These two movements follow Crysdale’s description
of lier soteriology as a double-sided approach to redemption.4 In the first movement
Crysdale examines how women and others on the underside of history can find the cross
an authentic symbol of salvation when we corne to situate ourselves primarily as having
been victims of systemic sin, and can identify with the cmcified rather than the cmcifiers, a
difference in situation which lias important consequences for how salvation is experienced
by such persons, at least initially.
However, Crysdale is also concemed, as is Sebastian Moore, that only Christ is
tmly sinless. Victims of social and familial systemic sin participate nonethess in those
systems, but can with healing become more responsible agents. It is this second
movement, which is concemed with articulating an authentic expression of what the
experience of sin and personal responsibility is for women and others who have no voice in
history, which rounds out Crysdale’s soteriology.
measured.
2 JOHNSON, Elizabeth, She who is: The mystery of God in feminist theotogical discourse, NY,
Crossroad, 1998, P. 63.
I am flot the first to apply Crysdale’s work to a study of Julian of Norwich. Pauline Head applies both
Crysdale’s Moore-based soteriology and James Alison’s Girardian soteriology to Julian. See HEAD,
Pauline, ‘J would be one of them and suifer with Him’: Retationship, sin and redemption in Jutian of
Norwich’s theotogy of the trinity, M.A. thesis, Trinity College, University of Toronto, 2004, 75 p.
Unfortunately, this document was flot available through interlibrary ban at this time of writing.
CRYSDALE, Cynthia, Embracing travail: Retrieving the cross today, NY, Continuum, 2001, p. 25.
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Each of these two movements in Ciysdale’s soteriology will be followed by a
conelation of the relational psychoanalytic mirroring dynamic in Julian’s Showings which I
explored in the first chapters of these diptychs, i.e., chapters 7 and 9. This attempt at the
correlation of these discourses will lielp to illuminate for us Julian’ s search for the locus of
her true self and for the intelligibility of sin and and human responsibility she found in
relation to the Christ revealed in her showings. Her visionary experience brings to light
new meaning for her and for us in this cenmry, when it is seen in view of the situation of
her human condition I am proposing. It puts into a very different light, for example, the
critique, even from some sympathetic Julian specialists, that her sotenology is somehow
unorthodox, or even heretical.5
As Johnson describes this second movement in liberation conversion, the retrieval
must take place in what she calis a context of “narrative remembrance”, which “functions to
empower women flot as individual monads but in a solidarity of sisters”.6 What in Julian’s
case might have provided material for retrieval, given that she was, as I am suggesting,
enclosed in the anchorhold (or at least aspiring to it and living some form of seclusion at the
time of the showings)? This chapter closes with three possible (albeit to varying degrees
ambiguous) sources in the medieval soteriological, anchoritic and mystical tradition from
which Julïan seems to have retrieved for lier unique appropriation of Christ’s saving work
in terms of what I am calling mirroring. Although our knowledge of any “solidarity” Julian
might have enjoyed (in some postulated network of anchorites, for example) is
hypothetical, the account of Margeiy Kempe’s visit to Julian and of the good counsel Julian
gave must stand as a witness to the fact that Julian listened to those in need and became
renowned in lier own day, flot for her writing, but for the comfort, compassion and
wisdom she shared with those who came to lier window. In other words, it can be said
with some certainty that she was confirmed by others’ responses that what she herself
needed was what otliers needed too.
See for example, LEWIS, Muriel, “After reflecting on Julian’s revelations of behovabil synne”, Studia
mystica 6, 1983, p. 41, where she writes that Julian makes
statements which advance the most comforting conception of sin to be found in Christian
literature. Ideas puzzling, contradictory, astounding and daring to the point of heresy abound in her
book. Everyone loves Julian; no [one] wants to think ber a heretic. But the writer who wants to
present this amiable anchoress as totally orthodox bas a problem.... [SJome critics and
commentators in their desire to preserve Julian’s orthodoxy, have ignored or tried to explain away
her more startiing statements.
6 JOHNSON, 1992, p. 63.
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2.0 Soteriology from the underside of history
In the first diptych I described Sebastian Moore’s psychoanalytic soteriology and
parable of original sin, and began to apply it to Julian’s experience of suffering. The
engagement of her suffering with the Christ of her showings gave risc to what I called the
contrast experience in her Showings. In this chapter, I continue that application, with help
from Cynthia Crysdale. Crysdale draws on Sebastian Moore to explore what sin, salvation
and conversion look like from the underside of bistory, that is, as it is expenenced by
women and persons in other dispossessed groups who have systemically intenorized self
hate.7 Crysdale’s approach offers an important lens, through which to read Sebastian
Moore’s soteriology, for women and others who have been oppressed by traditional
soteriological interpretations of the cross.
First I will look more closely at what Crysdale has to say about the experience of
sin and how salvation is appropriated by those on the underside of history.
Then, turning to Julian’s showings, I explore how this approach can help us
retrieve what I suggest is happening in Julian as she describes the transformation in the face
of the Christ of her visions, which is that it puts a limit to her suffering and causes her to
have to discern something new which Christ intends for her to understand about herself
and sin, instead of assuming that what she knew before was trne.
2.1 Cynthia Crysdale’s soteriology from the side of the victim:
grief as participation in crucifixion
Crysdale, like Johnson but unlike many white western Christian feminists, seeks to
find new meaning in the cross, and she engages the search for an authentic meaning of the
cross first by reinterpreting suffering, particularly oppressive suffering.
Crysdale’ s project is what I am calling a “pre-oedipal sotenology “in that, ifice
Sebastian Moore, she is focused on the systemic arrest of the development of sefworth in
women. Crysdale recognizes familial or relational dysfunctionality as welt as other forrns
of patriarchal, social sin as systemic to the problem of the incredibility of the cross for
women, “both of which systematicaÏly destroy... self esteem in the name of good
faith”, particularly as Christianity is a prime mover in ail these distortions.8 She describes
‘ CRYSDALE, 2001, p. 159, fn. 9. Crysdale takes the idea of the “underside of history” from
GUTIERREZ, Gustavo, The power of the poor in history, transi. BARR, Robert, Maryknoll NY, Orbis,
1983, pp. 192, 169 - 234. Crysdale expands the concept to “refer to ail who have been ieft out of the
teiling of history, those whose voice bas flot been allowed a public forum”.
$ CRYSDALE, 2001, p. 2, emphasis added.
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this situation first by drawing an example from the nove! The good conscience by Car!os
Fuentes about the fmit!ess self-inflicted suffering of a Mexican boy who wants to imitate
Jesus and whips himself in an attempt to pay for the sins of his family.9 What Crysda!e
takes from this novel is a classic example of what I have described above in the first
diptych as Julian’ s confusion in the meaning of the experience of suffering, which, despite
ai! its good will does flot lead to rea! so!idarity and transformation, but simply perpetuates a
sense of seif-preoccupation with personal (over)responsibi!ity and isolation.
It is important to note, however, Crysdale’s observation that there is “no suffering
that simply exists ‘out there’, whose meaning and va!ue are somehow determined apart
from the person experiencing the suffering. Suffering is aiways an interpreted event”.’0
This is significant, because she does not see events of suffering as redemptive or
unredemptive in themse!ves, but rather in how they are interpreted and evaluated. This
grounds her daim that
no cvii that one can suffer ... is beyond the scope of God’s healing. There is, to be
sure, oppressive suffering, and I am flot claïming in any way that such suffering is
good for people; only that such suffering con be the locus of God’s presence, con
be the medium through which we encounter God.”
She then uses narratives from her own life to describe what kinds of experience of
suffering can be interpreted as redemptive. First she recalis her experience of birthing lier
first chuld, and how that pain was a!so transfonnative, like dying and nsing
simultaneousty.
Then she speaks of lier persona! growtli in recognition of family dysfunctionality
which lcd lier to translate “sin into the modem maladies of addiction and victimization, and
recovering ‘forgiveness of sins’ as ‘recovery from addictive habits”.12 This last point is a
significant confirmation for tlie theoretica! grounds of the present study, when linked to
McDargh’ s intuition tliat tlie extension of object re!ations tlieory to family systems is one
way in which the barrier between intrapsychic and social discourses in psyclioanalytic
theory and theology is being dissolved. As McDargh puts it,
There are intellectual and empfrical pressures within modem psychoanalytic
tlieonzing tliat move it in creative ways to engage politcal and social realities as
essential and flot accidentai components in the formation of the intrapsychic life.
We cou!d cite, for example, tlie increasing!y influential work of German
psychoanaiyst Alice Miiler who lias forced us to look at the reai impact of
CRYSDALE, 2001, p. 2.
10 CRYSDALE, 2001, P. 33, emphasis in text.
11 CRYSDALE, 2001, p. 33, emphasis in text.
12 CRYSDALE, 2001, p. 3.
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psychological and physical abuse in childhood on the psychic development as well
as the long-term consequences for political and cultural life of the pattems of family
life and child-rearing that perpetuate such abuse. Parallel to Miller’ s accounts of the
systematic character of the social pressures that shape and misshape the human
personality are the theoretic and therapeutic efforts to extend psychoanalytic object
relations theory in the direction of family therapy and general systems theory. The
point of these references is that insofar as they represent the opening of modem
depth psychology to the dimension of the political and the social they promise that
any theology that senously dialogues witli such theory and its originating praxis
may avoid the narrowing focus on the individual that lias been one of the hazards of
a psycliological analysis.’3
Crysdale also describes lier growth in awareness of the importance of feminist
issues for her self-understanding.’4 Saiving Goldstein’ s exposure of the difference
between sin as experienced by men and women, Roberta Bondi’s Memories of God and
other feminist influences led Crysdale to affirm with Bondi that, for women and the
dispossessed, the authentic
meaning in the cross [comesj through grief rather than guilt... seeing the issue of...
salvation not as that of forgiveness but as that of healing, healing the false
shame....
Tlie cross and resurrection have tradifionally been interpreted as redeeming
humanldnd from sin as arrogant ambition. The problem that is solved by the cross
is our direct or indirect destruction of those we love -- including God -- and the
solution is God’ s forgiveness, manifested in the resurrection. Redemption involves
a transaction whereby Jesus died for us, standing in our place to pay tlie penalty
that we owe to God for sin. While this approach retains its prominence today,
another side of the story is now being told.
The difficulties with understanding 5m primarily as pride, especially for
women and those on the “underside” of history, have been recognized for several
decades. For those who approach the cross with an atready beteaguered sense
of self what is to be discovered in the cross and resurrection is flot -- initially
-- forgiveness but healing. The wounded victims of the world, in contemplating
Jesus on the cross, discover themselves not primarily as crucifiers of a sinless one
but as victims who have been slain. Jesus the cmcified becomes ally and friend;
God the Father becomes grieving parent and the Risen Lord signifies healing and
empowerment.’5
13 McDARGH, John, “Theological uses of psychology: Retrospective and prospective”, Horizons 12,
1985, pp. 263 - 264.
14 CRYSDALE, 2001, p. 4.
15 CRYSDALE, 2001, pp. 7 - 8, emphasis added. Sec SAW1NG GOLDSTEIN, Valerie, “The human
situation: A feminine view”, Journal of religion 40, 1960, pp. 100 - 112, who was the first to grasp that
for women pride is flot the primary sin but rather seif-deprecation. BONDI, Roberta, Memories ofGod:
Theotogicat reflections on a ltfe, Nashville TN, Abingdon Press, 1995, P. 113. Overviews of feminist
views of sin can be found in ALSFORD, SalIy, “5m and atonement in feminist perspective”, in
Atonernent today, ed. GOLDINGAY, John, London, SPCK, 1995, pp. 148 - 165; CAHOY, William,
“One species or two? Kierkegaard’s anthropology and the feminist critique of the concept of sin”, Modem
theotogy 11, 1995, pp. 429-454.
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Thus Crysdale engages Sebastian Moore’ s psychoanalytic sotenological insights
about sin and salvation but with a particular focus on how this is experienced in human
lives lived on the underside of history. She identifies Moore’s key insight in his book The
cructfled Jesus is no stranger, that Jesus represents for us our own potential Self -- the
deep and hidden person that we are before God -- wbich we crucify rather than allow to
live. “What if Jesus were the representative, the symbol, the embodiment, of this dreaded
yet desired self of each of us, this destiny of being human...? The crucifixion of Jesus
then becomes the central drama of man’s refusai of bis true self’.16
I described in the first diptycli liow Moore’ s inverse soteriology cornes to see
Jesus’ own life as this symbol of dying to false self which culminates in bis crucifixion.
As tbis drama plays itself out in a person, Jesus’ crucifixion confronts him or her with “the
evil in bis life becoming explicit as the wilful destruction of bis true self now concrete for
him in the man on the cross”.17 Moore says in this place that ail symbols transform, that
the crucified as symbol transforms and converts evil into sin and sin into grace. “And
through tifis conversion the believer finds as bis own that identity which first lie rejected
and crucified. He passes -- and we are forever passing, back and forth -- from ‘cmcifying
the Lord of glory’ to being ‘nailed to the cross with Cbrist”.18 Crysdale adds that as
Jesus’ crucifixion was resolved in bis bodily Resurrection, “so, in the life of the believer,
does the making explicit of one’s Self-destruction become the occasion of
transformation”.19
16 MOORE, Sebastian, The crucifled Jesus is no stranger, NY, Paulist, 1977, p. x, in CRYSDALE,
2001, p. 8. Crysdale’s assumption on page two that Moore’s categories are Jungian is inaccurate, if his
later writing is taken into consideration. See the discussion in the previous diptych of bis appropriation of
Alice Miller’s psychoanalysis. The reference to McDargh above makes clear why this clarification is
significant. Crysdale’s own definition of “Self’ is theological -- the imago Dei -- “that finds its full
flounshing only in the embrace of God’s community of love”. See CRYSDALE, 2001, p. 159, fn. 10.
Nonetheless, her capitalizing of the word “Self’ follows Jung -- flot Moore. In the present study I wiIl
capitalize it only when quoting Crysdale.
Moreover, unlike Jungian archetypes, Moore grounds the Christian encounter with the symbol of
Jesus’ crucifixion in the realism of history. In bis experience of encounter in the Chrisian contemplative
experience there is a tension:
Resolve it by dissolving the thought of the Jesus who actually was on that cross, and the
encounter itself, with ail its power to evoke in me the self, falls to pieces.... Make of him simply
the as yet unappropriated self and the tension and realism of the encounter collapses. MOORE,
1977, p. 30, emphasis in text.
Crysdale recognizes this point. CRYSDALE, 2001, p. 30.
17 MOORE, 1977, p. x, emphasis in text.
18 MOORE, 1977, p. xi.
19 CRYSDALE, 2001, p. 8.
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According to Moore and Crysdale, the cross makes explicit what otherwise would
remain an obscure tendency to destroy what we could, and at some level want to, become.
Because there is no evil in Jesus, ail evil ïs revealed on the side of those who will bis death.
Evil is restricted to bis crucifiers, an act arising from the human heart; it is flot in God.20 In
this way for Moore sin is flot disobedience to a divine command but, as Crysdale puts it, an
innate conflict between who we are and who we can become. Unable to believe in
ourselves, there is a “death wish” in our desires and aspirations, an alienation between
liumanldnd’ s conscious ego and this true self.21 The resistance we cari feel to being one’ s
true self leads, in the full extent of evil, to the destruction -- crucifixion -- of any evidence
of being called to full personhood in us, and it is well identified in the kind of envy or
resentment one can have of others who are dying to ego.
Crysdale contributes to Moore’s soteriology a new and sigmficant dimension. She
makes explicït ïts significance for those on the underside of history. She says that the
process of dying to ego,
acknowledging our own Self-destruction, mediated through the crucified Jesus,
leads to insights into how we are flot only crucifiers but also the crncified. The
more we can see the ways in which we sabotage our own flourishing, the more we
are able to see how we ourselves are victims, are objects of crucifixion.22
But unlike Moore’s understanding of sin, which she says is stili linked to pride, such that it
is now translated into the “ego needing to be in control, the ego reflising to yield to the
Self...”, Crysdale observes that for women and other “designated non-persons in this
world -- the path to salvation may begin from the other side”.23 For those whose value
has been interiorized in terrns of their helpffilness to other persons, “the rejection of Self
cornes in a different form, flot as the ego taldng charge but as the ego capitulating to others’
defimtïon of full human flourishing”.24 Ciysdale’s point is cntical.
For those who begin thinking of themselves as non-Selves, salvation has to do
with the discovery of integral dignity and the choosing of this mystery of Self by a
strengthened ego. From this angle one discovers something altogether different in
entering the cross and resurrection story.... [IJn contemplating Jesus on the cross,
one discovers oneseif, not as the crucifier who willed this death, but as the victim
who has been slain....
In this case transformation works in the opposite direction. By
identifying with Jesus the Crucified, one is able to name one’s own victimization,
20 CRYSDALE, 2001. p. 9.
21 CRYSDALE, 2001, p. 9.
22 CRYSDALE, 2001, p. 9.
23 CRYSDALE, 2001, p. 10.
24 CRYSD&LE, 2001, p. 10.
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to face the wounds that have hampered one’s full human flourishing. Detrimentat
assumptions that one is constitutionatly unabte to be in communion with God
are unveiled as fatse presuppositions that destroy one ‘s potential Self25
Thus the point is that those on the underside of history will discover themselves primarily
in the crucified Jesus as the cructfied, flot the crucifier. For such as these, says
Crysdale, the moment of Resurrection transformation conveys flot forgiveness initially, but
rather empowerment.
If, for those who are the powerful voices of history, the redemptive suffering
which leads to forgiveness is the recognition of guilt, what then, for the voiceless, is the
kind of suffering which is authentic and transformative into empowerment, as that is
mediated by Jesus’ crucifixion? Moore’ s insistence on the place of bereavement, as the
different kind of suffering which is undergone in letting go of the resistance to dying to ego
as mediated by Jesus’ crucifixion, is sïgnificant. It connects with Bondi’ s observation that
women corne to redemption through grief rather than guilt. It seems to me that there is no
other response possible than grief when a non-person begins to recognize that non-identity
as such by the maldng explicit of its own symbolic death, as that ïs mediated in an
identification with Jesus’ crucifixion.26
Recail also that grief, or mouming as Homans put it, is a lieu for transitional
activity, engaging narcissism and opening a transitional space where transformation in the
spiritual life and symbol formation may occur. Grief engages a new awareness of the
disfigured ego’s powerlessness to maintain the illusory (shame-based) self and world it had
created in order to deny the awareness of systemic suffering. And in the assent to grieve
the death of this illusory self and its world (including its god), a different kind of pain is
suffered, a pain which can feel like one is dying. And yet through engaging that pain, a
new birth ïs potentially made possible in which a person’s awareness of a new, unknown
yet familiar centre of selffiood emerges, which Crysdale identifies as the self,
constitutionally related to God in Jesus’ crucifixion.
25 CRYSDALE, 2001, p. 10, emphasis added.
26 Other feminist expressions of this grief on the part of victims of sexual abuse describe this grief as a
disillusionment with a false god, expressed as
la souffrance de se sentir abandonnées par Dieu, de devoir faire le deuil du Dieu qui n’a pas sauvé,
le deuil d’une certitude ébranlée par l’experience. Or, des victimes, des survivantes, ont finalement
découvert, avec joie et surprise, non seulement qu’il était possible et correcte de douter dans de
telles circonstances, mais que Dieu leur était présent même dans ces temps de doute et d’errance
spirituelle.
NADEAU, Jean-Guy, Carole GOLDING and Claude ROCHON, “Les victimes d’abus sexuels confrontées à
la souffrance et à la violence de la Passion”, Théologiques 13, 2, 2005, p. 102.
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On this experience of grief, which is so significant both to Julian’s experience and
to Homans’ extension of the concept of transitional space from object relations theory mto
the field of cultural symbol formation, Crysdale does flot dwell very long, however. Yet I
suspect it is pivotai to grasping the motivation for the reverse direction of the appropriation
of soteriology by women. Nor does she go into any detail as to how the identification with
the cmcffied one is experienced in practices that are flot just cognitive and linear in nature,
unlike Moore who brings his contemplative practice into his soteriology.27 However, this
does flot impede the present study from applying Ciysdale’s insïghts to Julian’s Showings.
2.2 Noughting: Julian’s identification with Christ’s Passion and
change of chere
Turning to Julian’ s Showings, I propose to explore briefly how this approach can
give us a language for retrieving what I suggest is happening in Julian as she describes her
visionary identification with Christ in bis Passion and the transformation in the face of the
Christ of her visions. I believe we can see two shift in Julian’ s early visionary experience
which signal a profound reorientation and transformation: first, as we saw above, she
enters into a new kind of suffering of grief and intensified awareness of dying. Second,
she experiences this as an identification with the Crucified. This intimacy with the
suffering Christ causes her to have to challenge the assumption she seems to have
introjected that she is constitutionally unable to experience union with God. It initiates in
Julian a healing experience of self worth and human digmty as a new centre of selfhood
constituted in the sight of the Christ of her Showings.
27 In this regard, I observe that it is one of the satisfying aspects of Anderson’s thesis that he distinguishes
epistemological from ontological and relationai accounts of salvation. Ruether’s balanced condensation of
feminist theological accounts of this-woridly salvation that are responsive to women’s flourishing, he
observes, “depends for its success upon the ability of exciuded people to recognize the value of their own
personhood and to resist the structures that silence and exclude”. ANDERSON, 2005, p. 47. Anderson,
like Grace Jantzen and others, sees this impulse toward liberation in Julian of Norwich. See JANTZEN,
Grace, Jutian ofNorwich: Mystic and theotogian, London, SPCK, 1987, P. 158, for exampie. However,
he says, in feminist discourses, epistemological recognition, or consciousness-raising, tends to be seen as
the solution to the problem of sin. This, he argues is flot adequate to deal wïth the human plight, and even
alludes to its pelagian consequences, such that in some feminist accounts Christ is rendered incidentai to the
epistemologicat account of the solution of sin. ANDERSON, 2005, p. 53. Anderson implicitly adverts to
the ontological and relationai dimensions ofJuiian’s anthropology which “insists that humans can be
restored to just and nurturing reiationships with one another oniy when their humanity is restored to
wholeness in mother Christ”. ANDERSON, 2005, p. 48. Moreover, he addresses the question of how a
salvific mode of discourse might function in human lives in bis account of the “performative” nature of
Julian’s book. The Showings became for Julian and her readers a text to meditate on in order that the book
might be “performed”, i.e., that in the practice, we might become more like the God who was shown to
her. ANDERSON, 2005, chs. 2, 5.
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The fwst tliing Julian discovers is that lier identification with Christ in lis suffering
produces a new kind of suffering we might cali intense grief, which Julian describes as lier
suffering Clirist’ s pains. We may assume that tins pain was flot just “in lier imagination”,
tliough it was in the transitional reaim of the showings, but that slie also actually feit tins
pain bodily -- in a new register. Moreover, tins new experience of pain opens lier to the
immensity of Christ’s universal suffering, the suffering of ail of humankind contained in
Christ’s suffering. In that sense, tins pain gives lier a new experience of meaning: it opens
lier, potentially, to solidarity with tlie suffering of otliers. And I suggest it is precisely tins
new kind of suffering winch also begins to set a tirnit to lier previous interpretation of
suffering as someliow good “in itself’. It constitutes lier inauguration into tlie formation of
lier identity sliaped by “mynd of the Passion”, as a process of what we miglit cail dying to
false (dysfunctional) ego in relation to the Christ of lier sliowings.
The redemptive kind of suffering, tlie lifelong work of dying to false ego associated
witli “mynd of the Passion” is for Julian a process of what slie cails noughting, whidh we
might reinterpret as a detachment from those creaturely things (and relationsinps) in winch
she sought spiritual rest but did not find it. As she writes in the first sliowing about the
little thing no bigger than a hazelnut, winch is ail of creation:
What may tins be? And it was answered generally thus: It is everytinng that is
made. I marveiled how it might last, for it seemed to me it might have suddenly
fallen into nothing [nawghtJ because of its littleness.
Tins little thing winch is created seemed to me as if it could have fallen into
nothing [noughtJ because of its littleness. We need to have knowledge of tins, so
that we may deliglit in despising as notinng everything created, so as to love and
have uncreated God. For tins is tlie reason why our hearts and souls are not in
perfect ease, because here we seek festin tins tinng winch is 50 little, in which there
is no rest, and we do flot know God who is almiglity, ail wise and ail good, for lie
is true rest. God wishes to be known and it pleases him tliat we sliould rest in inm;
for ail things whidh are beneatli him are not sufficient for us. And tins is the reason
why no soul lias rest until it has despised as nothing [titi it is noughted qfl ah
which is created. When the soul lias become nothing [is noughted] for love, so as
to have him who is ail that is good, then is it able to receive spiritual rest. (LI 5; see
SI 4.)
On this point Pelphrey describes two kinds of noughting in Julian. 11e first is the
“no thing” of sin in the Augustinian sense. The second ïs God’s own entering into the
process of noughting in order to redeem creation. “Tlie incarnation, liumilation and
crucifixion of tlie Second Person of the Trinity is precisely God’s own expenence of
noughting.”28 It is this noughting or kenosis which began at Jesus’ conception, and
28 PELPHREY, Brant, “Much ado about noughting”, Juiianpaper9, Waukesha W1, Order oflulian of
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which is represented by Jesus’ experience of absence and loss in physical pain,
thirst, cold and darkness, and by lis falling into despair, death, and heu.... In the
crucifixion... Jesus allows himself to be negated wïthout any response. It is his
failure to react -- bis own deliberate noughting -- which tums evil around.29
Pelphrey describes the two types of noughting in Julian therefore in a way that is
flot unlike Moore. Although Pelphrey does flot describe the latter in terms of gnef per se,
neither does le describe it in terms of guilt and forgiveness. He describes it as amountÏng
to a self-emptiness shared in Jesus, which I liken here to that experience of emptiness and
deprivation which Kohut describes as the first experience of the authentic centre of
selffiood.
For Julian it is possible to experience noughting through evil alone -- in which case
we experience despair and death -- or it is possible to expenence another noughting
through faith in the redemptive power of Jesus’ own self-emptiness, in which case
we experience redemption, compassion and new life.3°
Nawght in the first sense might be akin to Julian’s pains and suffering which have
no intelligibility, experienced as they are out of a sense of isolated abandonment, until they
are expenenced in the second sense, as a mouming of the dying false ego in union with
Christ in whom there is solidarity with other suffering people. Noughting in this second
understanding, as sharing in Jesus’ self-emptying, is that pain Julian descnbes of coming
Norwich, 1994, p. 11. Compare Aers who sees this as an example of Julian’s strategy of “superseding the
conventional image”, here, of creaturely fragiiity, with, in this instance, “theologicai reflections on the
nature of desire”. AERS, David, “The humanity of Christ: Reflections on Julian of Norwich’s Revetation
of love “, in AERS, David and Lynn STALEY, The powers of the hoiy: Religion, politics and gender in the
late medieval English culture, University Park PN, Pennsyivanïa state University Press, 1996, pp. 84 -
85.
See also HIDE, Kerrie, “Oniy in God do I have ail’: The soterioiogy ofJulian ofNorwich”, Downside
review 122. 2004, pp. 50 - 51, where, in her exegetical rigour, she notices a speiiing variant in P
(reproduced in the quote from LT 5 above) between nawght and noughr. According to Hide, “Nawght is an
OId English word that describes that which does flot exist, nothing at ail. The ‘fa!! to nawght’, to be
nothing at aIl, rather than ail in God, graphically confronts the reader. It resonates with Julian’s
interpretation that sin is nought”. (Admittediy the P manuscript changes the speliing in the second
occurrence of this expression.) Then on pp. 52 - 53 she continues:
Julian piays with the paradoxicai meaning of nawght and flought. It is noteworthy that though
these words sound aiike, spelling distinguishes the nuance in meaning. We think we wiil fa!! into
nothing, but paradoxical!y we must become nothing. We are to have “nght nought between God
and [us]...”
(I observe in the OED that contemporary Eng!ish retains something of this distinction in the meanings of
“naughty” and “flot”.)
29 PELPHREY, 1994, p. 11.
30 PELPHREY, 1994, p. 13. The context of Peiphrey’s interest in this paper is the dialogue between
Christians and Buddhists. It is on this last point that Juiian, he says, differs from Buddhism.
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into self-knowledge. Whule the experience of self-emptying is at first painful, Hide
observes that, for Julian, it is what makes possible her prayer for “full worship” of God.
This usage of the word “worship” means more than honour, praise, glory and
thanks. “Full worship” conveys a sense of the total and absolute givïng of one’s
self. We only fully worship if we corne “nakedly, fiully” and “homely”....
Emptying, becoming as nothing, leaves a space for God to fil us so that we may be
true to God’s desire for us to have aiL31
Noughting in union with Jesus’ noughting, or dying to ego is also “cosmic compassion”
and brings forth compassion in the creature. As Pelphrey observes,
[i]n Christ’s pain or negation we find our own pain and negation; but this,
surprisingly, becomes the positive value of compassion. Further, we begin to see
the world around us through the eyes of compassion. Thus in our own pain and in
the pain of the world, we discover the presence of the divine. Concem for
ourselves tums into concern for others, indeed, for the whole world.32
The second point I wish to underline is that ail of this takes place in Julian’s
showings as she enters into a rnerged identification oniy with Christ. Even Mary plays a
relatively insignificant role in Julian’ s visionary world, which is different from the affective
tradition’ s expectations. Although Julian is quick to place herself as among the sinful and
unworthy, the early showings consistently return to the bodily sight of Christ’ s Passion
with which, as T have argued, she enters into an intense fused mirroring transference. If
entering into the experience of salvation engages an identification with the Crucified (as
distinct from the cmcifiers) for those on the underside of history, then Julian’ s experience
and the reversai of anticipated meaning it reveals to her is a classic example of Crysdale’ s
observation (in section 2.1 above).
Thus the grief-pain and suffering in rnerged identification with Christ is the
beginning of lifelong healing and reorientation for Julian. Consider, in the first showing,
the significance of her astonishment and wonder that “lie would be so homety [intimate]
with a sinful creature living in this wretched flesh” (ST 3; LT 4), and again in the next
chapter, the vision of the little, fragile thing winch God enfolds in love. What I suggest is
striking in tins response of astonishment is that it would parallel what Crysdale is saying
about women who have introjected a systemic belief in their self-hatefulness. In particular,
I propose that this vision challenges the root of Julian’s deteterious assumption that she
is constitutionatly unabte to be in communion with God. This very first showing
31 HIDE, 2004, pp. 54 - 55.
32 PELPHREY, 1994, p. 13.
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reveais this flot to be the case, as she finds herseif entenng actively into Christ’ s Passion
and seeing herseif and ail creation enfolded in God’ s love.
Again, the moment of mutual change of chere could be said to signal the point at
which Julian is called out of an unconscious systemic pattern of relating to Christ, (as to
everyone else presumably), out of a seif-hateful drivenness to suffer endlessly. Beholding
his face ofjoy beholding her, she now is being chalienged to take her own existence or
incarnation seriously. This also would seem to be just the opposite of what she might have
expected in such an encounter, that is, that Christ’s suffering condition would be endless.
Or worse, that she would be judged by God as hatefully as by her own intemalized,
merciless judge.
But what she sees mirrored back is flot païnful in those ways. Rather, Christ’s
chere ofjoy encourages her to keep looking “in the mirror” if you will, to see what Christ
will reveal that she has flot known about herseif, especially in terms of her acceptability,
her self worth and her belovedness in the eyes of the Jesus of her visions. I would argue
that this is the moment that Julian has the first taste of her true sefas that is
constitutionaÏty related to, and reÏationaÏly constituted in the sight of the Christ of her
showings. I would even venture to specuiate that Julian’ s astonished experience of this eye
to eye contact and mutual change of chere, is her first experience of the conversion to a
new centre of identity in relation to Christ. This reversai of the anticipated meaning of the
cross in Julian’s showings is also at the heart of salvation for those on the underside of
history. As we’ il see in the next dyptich, this eye contact and its transforming effect
resonates through the mature vision of her soteriology given in the exemptum of the lord
and the servant.
Julian’ s reverse images of enclosure are significant expressions of her exploration
of the implications of this new centre of seifbood in visual and bodily terms. Entering the
wounded side of Christ is an image of her acceptabilïty and inclusion among the saved in
Christ’s Body the Church. Beholding Christ reigning within her soul gives visual image to
the union in substance which was neyer lost in the fali and the union in sensuality which
Christ’s flesh taldng enables in her humanïty.
As for Crysdale’s description of the empowerment which comes when women
undergo this reverse way into the appropriation of salvation in Christ, the final, confirming
vision of Christ reigning in her soul also gîves the reader a sense ofJulian’s new self-
possession and authority. Recall that in the Long Text her final showing of Christ
reigning in her soul includes this further description that lie is “highest bishop, most
awesome king...” (LT 68). A number of feminists as well as other theologians have
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criticized Julian’ s theology as somehow thwarted or flot fiflly exploiting the criticism of the
Church that is in it, due to her limited status, and difficulties in the culture itself, which
could be taken as a criticism of the maturity of lier sense of inner authority.33 However,
what seems to be evident here is nothing short of Julian’ s experiencing a sense of
empowerment, in the sense in which Crysdale is using this word. In this respect Lamm
lias recently observed that Julian
lias redefined what it is to be a bishop and wliat it means to have power and
authority, and she lias redefined such things in terms of a radical love that knows
no anger and assigns no blame.... Julian does not have to summon anger to censure
the bisliops in Avignon, Rome, and Norwich. In simply and faithfully describing
the ideal -- Christ as mother, Christ as friend and as courteous Lord, and Christ as
bishop in her soul -- she has already exposed the distance between the bishops and
Christ.34
I believe we can see in the character of Julian’ s peculiar movement into
appropriating her salvation that this expenence of transformation is, as Crysdale predicted,
working in the opposite direction from the traditional model of the appropriation of
Christian salvation. Rather than unveiling a sense of guilt for sin, in Julian’s case, the
encounter with the Christ of lier showings uncovers a disorienting (because it challenges
lier attachment to shame and despair) but irresistable intimacy. This encounter causes lier
to have to discem something new whicli Christ intends for lier to understand about herself
and about suffenng and sin, and to relinquish lier assumption that what she knew before
was true. As we’ll see below, this revision of Julian’s understanding of lier liuman
anthropology and of suffering caused by sin, as mirrored in the face of the Jesus of lier
showings, becomes the means by which she is also freed for greater self-knowledge and
solidarity witli others.
3.0 Sin and responsibility from the underside
Explonng tlie correlation further, I will now look at wliat Crysdale understands to
be a more credible approacli to what personal responsibility might look lilce for tliose on tlie
underside of history wlio are undertaldng -- or ratlier resisting -- tlie joumey of ego deatlis
See for examples, JANTZEN, Grace, power gender and Christian mysticism, Cambridge, Cambndge
University Press, 1995, P. 182: “Julian’s refusai to question the church is even more disturbing because the
church of her time was badly corrupt, and Juiian knew it”. Also, BAUERSCHMIDT, 1999, p. x, where
he writes that “there is a certain thwarted quality to Julian’s imagining of the social because it was a
mythos that was virtually impossible to perform under the conditions of late medieval christendom
See LAMM, Julian, “Revelation as exposure in Juiian of Norwich’s Showings”, Spiritus, 5, 2005, p.
69, emphasis added.
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which would bear fruit in profounder self worth and solidarity with humankind. This
forms the other side of Crysdale’ s double-s ided approach to redemption.
Crysdale adapts Moore in proposing that those the underside of history will
discover themselves in the crucified Jesus, initially at least, as the cmcified, not the
crucifier. But none of us is sinless. How then to understand the peculiar responsibility for
sin on the part of those whose lives have been deeply marked by the effects of the social
systemic sins of patriarchy, racism, familial or ecclesiastical neglect or abuse, etc., over
which they have littie if any control?
I propose that the revision of Julian’ s understanding of suffering caused by sin is
seen to expose her to sins she had flot recognized before. Seeing nothing, when she
expected to see sin -- and nothing but sin, is simultaneously for lier an experience of a new
centre of selfhood in Christ experienced as unknown and empty. 5m for Julian cornes to be
identified as blindness in relationship to God, which she recognizes under two forms, as
impatience and despafr.35 This blindness I suggest, insofar as it is clung to as a kind of
victim ïdentity, represents for Julian the phenomenon of resistance to the salvific process of
disillusionment and deatli to false ego. The blindness in these two forms keeps the soul
from experiencing transfonuation in the self-God relationship in the sight of God. And
over time, between the Short and the Long Texts, I propose that we see lier conscious
discemment of complicity in such blindness deepen. At the same time, her union in Christ
is more and more deeply rooted in lier self acceptance of her temporal or sensual nature,
and compassion for lierseif in union with Christ becomes a means to greater solidarity with
others.
3.1 Complicity as sin for those on the underside of history
The suffering, which Crysdale identifies as that which can corne to be interpreted as
the locus of encounter witli God, begins in the conscious recognition of helplessness.
Christians have aiways insisted on the utter helplessness of human persons before
the enormity of sin: to insist that one can reverse the cycles of alienation, can solve
See NUTH, ban, Wisdom’s daughter: the theology of Julian of Norwich, NY, Crossroad, 1991, p. 128,
where she makes the connection between Julian’s expenence of sin as despair and contemporary feminists’
reversai of sin:
Feminist scholars point out that unhealthy self-denïal and seif-loathing, rather than the self
aggrandizement of pride, are the sins to which women are particularly prone. Juiian’s emphasis
upon depression and doubtful fear of one’s self-worth lends support, from a distant century, to this
view.
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the problem of evil with one’ s own abilïties, is simply to perpetuate the distortion
that is at the heart of sin.36
The awareness of one’s helplessness before systemic types of sin, I would add, is
nonethess an experience which is resisted whether one is on the underside of history or
flot. In the context of narcissistic woundedness in terms of grandiosity and shame resulting
from familial neglect for example, helplessness is a condition of awareness which is to be
avoided at ail costs. As I have observed above in light of Rossiter’ s work, women’ s
resistance to yielding to the true self involves self-sabotage, and this may stili involve
attempts by the ego in retationships to control the other, control the outcomes of future
events, as well as other forms of evading the experience of fundamental lielplessness. Yet
without a clear sense of one’ s helplessness, the notion that God is the agent of salvation
and of grace does flot make real sense, even if religious language is invoked. More
specifically, Jesus’ condition of helplessness on the cross will not be a point of self-
identification.
In order to understand better how God could be an agent of salvation and grace for
people on the underside of history, Crysdale draws a contrast between Walter Wink’ s
description of redemption conceived as a domination system, and another kind of
redemption, which she calis an ethic of risk.37
Crysdale describes Wink’ s understanding of how the domination system operates
by locating evil outside itself, and producing the myth that violence and control will be
redemptive.38 This system, where it has infiltrated the Christian tradition, lias led
historically to systemic injustice and therefore contributes to the incredibility of Christian
soteriologies of the cross
Looked at through the lens of women and others who have been the object of
domination, another twist in the insidiousness of this system must be taken into account in
making sense of the cross and of responsibility for sin in a credible and liberative way.
Crysdale finds Wink’ s categories
36 CRYSDALE, 2001, P. 34.
For this latter ethic, Crysdale draws on WELCH, Sharon, Afeminist ethic of risk, Minneapolis MN,
Fortress, 1990, 206 p.
38 CRYSDALE, 2001, p. 44. See WINK, Walter, Engaging the powers: Discernment and resistance in a
world of domination, Minneapolis MN, Fortress Press, 1992, pp. 19, 22.
As Wink puts it:
the dream of the New Reality of Jesus bas long since turned into a nightmare, first of
Christendom, then of our more recent secular totalitarianisms. In ail this, the conquest of women
went hand in hand with the exploitation of the poor, the conquest of weaker nations, and the rape
of the environment. WINK, 1992, p. 46.
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presume overt power to be the cuiprit. But just as the category of “victim” needs to
be added to a theoiogy of sin as pride, so also the “power of capitulation” needs to
be added to the analysis of domination. The flip side of the myth of redemptive
violence is the myth of redemptive suffering. While some participate in the
domination system through overt power, others participate through socialization
into being the objects of redemptive violence. Rather than projecting evit onto
others, these introject it onto themselves. The solution to evil is thus seen as
self-denigration, sacrifice and suffering. Whule the myth of redemptive violence
relies on the projection of evil and then ils destruction, the myth of redemptive
suffering depends on the introjection of evil and its deserved punishment.
The most important point here is that suffering, though in some senses the
opposite of domination, is not its antidote. The two simply form a symbiosis that
perpetuates evil. The solution demanded here is to break the cycle altogether. What
is needed is some “third” way that embraces yet goes beyond the cycle.40
Crysdale then describes how the domination system or ethic of control has been
used to produce distortions in Christian soteriology. But she proposes a different way of
looldng at Jesus’ death and resurrection, a form of resistance related to the “ethic of risk”:
[U]nless one discovers oneseif in Jesus, discovers oneseif as both victim and
crucifier, this resistance runs the risk of either succumbing to suffenng and yieiding
to the Powers, or of turning into a vengeful violence that neyer estabiishes
justice.... Redemptive heating and resistance involve the withdrawal of
projections and acceptance of the evil within. They also demand rejection of
fatsely introjected sin and the naming and heating of injustice. This reversai,
and the restructuring of meaning, the renaming of oneseif that it invoives, is flot a
precursor to authentic resistance but is integraiiy woven into it.... As one takes
responsibiiity for oneseif and embraces pain, one is empowered to discover new
meanings and to take action to change oppressive structures.41
She observes that Jesus did not “take our sins upon him” as a kind of false or codependent
introjection of evii any more than he projected it onto others. Rather Jesus’ “refusai to
project or introject evil meant that Jesus bore the effects of evii in their extreme. In this
sense he did take our sins upon him, embracing suffering as the necessary outcome of his
refusai to distort evii through biame or self-denigration”.42 Crysdale remarks that in so
doing Jesus accepts the iimitations of his creatureliness. The freedom and significance of
Jesus’ actions derives from the intimate relation Jesus shares with Abba, and expresses the
dying to ego of continuai encounter of the finite in the presence of the infinite. Crysdaie
describes Jesus’ awareness of his finitude as a surrender to suffer.
40 CRYSDALE, 2001, p. 46, emphasis added.
41 CRYSDALE, 2001, pp. 55 - 56, emphasis in text.
42 CRYSDALE, 2001, P. 56, emphasis in text.
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But this surrender is quite different from the myth of redemptive suffering. It is the
acceptance of suffenng flot as an end in itself, flOf as a means to an end --
redemption. Rather, it is surrender as recognition of both finitude -- one cannot by
fiat erase moral evils -- and the law of the cross -- that the cycle of victim and
perpetrator can only be reversed through someone suffering rather than
retaliating.43
The cross and resurrection forego control, setting up a matrix of new meanings that are
“potentiatty, flot necessarity, transformative”.44 They therefore can raise relevant
questions for both perpetrator and victim, though they do flot answer those questions a
priori, but only if one is willing to enter the nsk of embracing travail, embraced by God.45
The kinds of questions the cross and resurrection raise for the personal
responsibility of the victim for sin have to do with one’ s response to one’ s compticity in
the structures which have brought about the domination and suffering. To recognize one’s
complicity is to recognize that one is at one and the same time victim and sinner, a mixture
of innocent woundedness and complicit distortion in one’s relationship to God and others.
It is to acknowledge and accept one’s vulnerabilïty to capitulating to others’ defimtions of
oneseif. It is to recognize that projecting and introjecting blarne are of a piece; that one lias
creaturely lirnits and is powerless to change the structures of the environment alone. It is to
accept that one is helpless to change the pattem of self-sabotage in isolation. One cornes to
see one’s cornplicity when one becomes willing to experience and gain new meaning ftom
the “limit experience” of one’ s helplessness, disillusionrnent and grief and to find solidarity
with others risking the sarne suffering. The awareness of complicity cornes through
acknowledging confusion (because things are not what they seern), grief and healing, and a
willingness to persist in dying to the false ego of the non-self. Recognizing one’s
complicity in tlie denial or abandonment of one’s true self gives new mearnng to identifying
with the crucified as the lieu of this dying to false self and rising in assuming one’s
personal and corporate human dignity and creatureliness in Christ.
It is at this level of cornplicity that we can begin to understand what sin is for those
on the underside of history, as a cornplacency with the introjection of 5m and evil onto
oneself, an abandonment or abortion of one’ s true self in the symptoms of a relentless
attitude of self-hatefulness and self-punishment -- tlie reverse side of an ethic of control and
domination. The solution to evil appears to be self-denigration, sacrifice and suffering,
CRYSDALE, 2001, P. 57.
CRYSDALE, 2001, p. 57, emphasis in text.
‘ Anderson does flot include Ciysdale in his thesis, but I suspect he might find her project a more adequate
response than that of feminists whose vision of empowerment seems at times to participate in Wink’s
domination system. See ANDERSON, 2005, pp. 45 - 51.
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but these only produce more of the same ambiguous, confusing and painful effects of
systemic sin. I suspect that resentment, envy, anger, and isolative self-righteousness
which are expressed in futile attempts to control relationships or future outcomes are simply
some of the more easily criticizable symptoms of women’ s complicity in sin as self-
abdication to the other.
And it is at this level that we can begin to understand what an authentic response of
taking responsibility for oneseif would be to this condition, a response which Crysdale
characterizes as risk. The response of risk leads out into new meanings, a new self
understanding of one’s dignity and of one’s real limits, and a new understanding of
salvation in community as grief and compassion for the other (as continuous with the grief
and compassion one lias for oneseif) rather than a reversion to the pattems of isolative and
distorted suffering and self-sabotage. To risk is to surrender to open-ended hope, as
distinguished from clinging to expectations ofpreconceived outcomes.
Surrender for those on the underside of history is also a cail to resistance against
deeply engrained pattems of silencing. Crysdale writes, “For those with relative ‘speaking
privileges’, surrender for the sake of solidarity involves learning to listen attentively. For
those who have been traditionally silenced, learning to speak may be the risk they need to
take”.46
Crysdale goes on to argue that within the Christian theological tradition, it lias been
a rational elite who lias decided what evil, sin, woundedness and salvation would be for the
rest of humankind wlio have endured the cross. This amounts to a perpetuation of the
domination system. However,
[tJhe meaning of salvation today, especiallly if it is to incorporate tlie cross, must
include the power of naming. Those who are the cmcified must have the power to
discover for themselves the nature of their victimization and their healing.... In
short, no one person or group can define for another the travail they must endure.47
In the process of naming it becomes clear that for those who historically have wielded such
power to speak and decide, 5m 5 appropriately described as pride, usurping the role of
God and forgetting our creaturely finitude. For others, the problem of 5m “lias anotlier
face, tliat of too much limitation”.48 The overcoming of 5m for the first, slie says, has
been “the humility of faith, modeled after the kenosis of Jesus himself’, but for the latter,
overcoming sin invoïves claiming the transcendent dimension of themselves. Crysdale
46 CRYSDALE, 2001, p. 67.
CRYSDALE, 2001, p. 71.
48 CRYSDALE, 2001, p.129.
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makes the daim that “[hJumility and kenosis, in this case, only further promote the illness
that needs curing”.49
Ciysdale understands grace as overcoming the sin of complicity in those who are
voiceless in this important “naming” or recognition of sin on the part of the victims
themselves. She describes the risk response in those on the underside of history as making
one available to the liberation of the operation of grace to transform people’s inner and
outer lives and the desires which motivate them:
The deep longing to be a whole human person... is often truncated, both by our
own sabotage and by the actions of others. Our socialization into fear of others and
accommodation to their needs damage this deepest Desire, which is a yearning to be
a whole Self that is met fully only in union with the Divine. The cycles of
alienation begin to be transformed when something outside the system shifts what
the fathers of the church called our “appetites”. A taste of fulfihiment of this deep
Desire stirs up power, courage, deeper yeamings, willingness to pursue fulfiliment
of Self at ah costs. Hunger overtakes fear”.50
Crysdale’s finding no place for humility and kenosis in women’s experience of sin
and salvation is eclioed by many other feminists. Perhaps this is a case of the meaning of
these cultural symbols being flot yet fiully moumed. It would seem that for Crysdale the
significance of “humility... modeled after the kenosis of Jesus himself’ is stiil too tied to
its patriarchal meanings as to have found new meaning to correlate with the reversai of
other elements of lier account of salvation. I suggest that the kenosis of Jesus and the
grace of humility, while they have been twisted to perpetuate abuse in women, can, like the
cross itself, come to mean more than just women’ s experience of being depersonalized and
silenced. The effect of Crysdale’ s judgment is to cut off lier understanding of the
predicament of women’s complicity in sin and its resolution from a sotenology of
transformation, fulfiilment and flourishing of one’ s identity in the cmcified One whose
kenosis is bis Incarnation.
It suggests that despite ber concem for the Christian life and conversion process,
Crysdale’ s account of sin and its resolution stili tends to be limited to the epistemological
model of sin, that consciousness-raising is the solution to the problem of sin.5’ It hints at
CRYSDALE, 2001, p.129.
50 CRYSDALE, 2001, p. 35.
51 ANDERSON, 2005, p. 53.
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an absence in practices which might lead to greater non-defensiveness, which for Moore is
an essential category for doing theology.52
Let us tum now to explore how Julian came to retrieve, name and transform her
experience of sin, responsibility and God’s saving response. Julian’s showings helped lier
to appropriate a credible and intelligible soteriology which takes seriously the problem of
sin, for those whose predicament is one of abandonment and vulnerability, neglect and
abuse on the underside of history.
3.2 Julian’s naming of reverse sins
Julian’s methodology is like Crysdale and Moore’s in the following respect. As
Crysdale writes “[wJe don’t begin with God and then make sense of suffering and sin,
rather we begin with our experience of pain and alienation and, in maldng sense of it,
discover God and the mfinite breadth of her embrace”.53 I suggest that Julian likewise
looks to the effects of sin in lier confusing pain and suffenng and seeks their intelligibility
from the Christ of her showings. The effect of this is to clarify a startlingly different
salvific work and identity in God.
Jantzen observes that the question of sin “could be called tlie central question of
[Julians] book”.54 Interestingly, one finds an avoidance of sin in some of the current
popular interest in Julian that focuses on lier creation spirituality, as though that stood alone
and apart from lier concern with sin.55 In fact, however, the embracing, compassionate
52 Thus, Janet Ruffing, responding to the feminist fear of humility and kenosis as “seif-negating”, asserts
that this aspect of the spiritual tradition can stiil have significance.
[T]he “self’ in these teachings about seif-negating is flot ordinarily our vital aliveness, the ongin
of our choices and desires, namely our authentic graced selves. These teachings are better
reinterpreted as resistance to self-centeredness or selfishness....
Drawing on Dorothee Soelle, Ruffing continues:
This teaching presupposes the universal need to decenter our needy, noisy ego clamoring for
attention....
A woman who can embrace self-naughting [sïcJ, seif-denial, leaning toward ego-lessness in a
disceming and critical way, can teil the difference between self-destruction and self-transcendence.
Surrendenng when it is appropriate bnngs women to self-possession and choice after they have
grown through a healthy stage of refusing to consent to their own oppression.
RUFFING, Janet, “Spiritual direction with women: Reclaiming and reinterpreting key themes from the
spiritual tradition”, Presence, an international journal of spiritual direction 12, 3, p. 43.
CRYSDALE, 200f, p.31. See my observation in fa. 1 of this chapter regarding Anderson’s application
of the opposite methodology to bis study of Julian’s soteriology.
54JA.ïzEN, 1987, P. 167.
5 FOX, Matthew, “Creation-centered spirituality froru Hildegard of Bingen to Julian ofNorwich: 300
years of an ecological spirituality in the west”, in Cry of the environment: Rebuilding the Christian
creation tradition, eds. JORANSON, Philip and Ken BUTIGAN, Santa Fe NM, Bear and Company Press,
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love of creation and of her whole self in it in the sight of God, which is so profoundly
developed in Julian’s spirituahty depends upon her growing discemment, through the gift
of the visions, of what sin and its purpose is. Jantzen writes that
[p]robing sin and pain is both theologically and psychologically threatening because
it strikes at the root of thinking about God and ourselves as good. Yet if we shy
away from II in fear or distaste (perhaps disguised as optimism, prefening to think
of more cheerful things) nothing can be resolved, because we have refused the
knowledge of oursetves and God which alone can reunite our sensuality and our
substance and thus bring healing. Julian characteristically faces the issues
relentlessly, at both the theological and psychological levels.56
What is equally true, I suspect, is that “thinldng about God and ourselves as good” already
presumes a projection of sîn and evil outward onto others. One can also be threatened by
probing sin and pain if it strikes at the root of thinking (unconsciously) about God and
ourselves as bad. This would be the case of those who have unconsciously introjected sin
and pain in one’ s family system dynamics and social location. And this is compounded
when the soteriological tradition of Church teaching simply does flot recognize how these
introjections affect the human predicament of sin. Julian’ s problem is not just the right
judgment of her sin which she believed God was revealing in her showings, but how to
reconcile it with what the Church was teaching and its effects on the human predicament of
the larger community of her even Christians.
Earlier in this developmental study I noted Julian’s pre-visionary desire to see
herseif as sinless, and speculated that this led to a pattem of anxiety and perfectionistic
religious aspiration. Only much later was she was able to observe that, before the
showings, she had a tendency to blame God that sin was flot prevented.57 In ail this early
Julian there is a flavour of fear of finding sin in herseif, as this would amount to a
capitulation to the unthinkable anxiety of being damned. So it would appear that Wink’s
domination system was alive and well in the early Julian, and expressed itself as both a
projection of blame for the existence for sin onto God and an introjection of that blame in
Julian’s assumption of the need to suffer an unacknowledged sense of responsïbility for
Christ’s (and others’) suffering.
1984, pp. 85 - 106.
56JANTZEN, 1987, pp. 172 - 173.
SaIly Alsford raises the question “Who is to blame?” as a problematic in feminism generatly, and
observes that feminism, focused on objective and collective sin, is not much interested in the question of
personal responsibility. ALSfORD, Sally, “Sin and atonement in feminist perspective”, in Atonement
today, eU. GOLDINGAY, John, London, SPCK, 1995, p. 157.
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I have observed Juiian’s shock and astonishment that she couid flot sec sin, and,
when she saw instead that God is in ail things, was impelied to ask the Jesus of her
showings outright, “What is sin?” (SI 8; LI 11.) It is in the context of Julian’s
acknowledgement of her “pride” (grandiosity?) in projectÏng the blame for Sin onto God58
that she receives Jesus’ response that sin is behouety, that is, necessaiy or fitting, and
leams that it is known oniy by its painful effects. (SI 13; LT 27.) The fittingness of sin is
that its pain can teach Julian what in her needs purgation. Like Crysdaie’s point that no
suffering is redemptive or unredemptive in itself but rather depends on the interpretation
given it, Julian’ s showing that sin is behouely or fitting allows that it is the meaning given
to the suffering at any point in time which identifies whether it is the nawghting of cvii or
the noughting in Christ. The pre-visionaiy Julian seems on the other hand to have
beiieved in the necessity of unrelenting suffering (practising acts of contrition, penance,
compassion, desiring physïcal illness etc., as in effect ends in themseives), even though
there are intimations that this produced confusion, anger and no feit sense of growth or
transformation. And yet, this is exactiy Moore’ s point that the resistance of sin effectively
prevents the challenge to grow from presenting itself.59
That resistance in Juiian has been melted in the showings and the confusion
exposed. The working through of Juiian’s mirroring transference with the Jesus revealed
to her in the showings is, simultaneousiy, a progressive dying to sin and heaiing of her
resistance to accept her creaturely iimits and poweriessness in the face of the authority and
irreconciiable teaching of the Church. Moreover, out of a new centre of seifhood, Julian is
leaming to distinguish the effects of sin from lier core sense of self and the authonty of
Christ within her. The pain of the effects of sin comes to have inteliigibility and meaning,
heiping lier recognize and mm from its “secret” symptoms. Cieariy, Julian is doing lier
part in the work of naming
-- but aiways in the relational context of her mirroring
transference with the Christ of lier showings.
3.2.1 Discerning sin in the common teaching of Hie Church
But the question remains as to how to discem wlien pain or suffering is caused by
sin when this is linked with a tradition which is itseif operating under distortion. Julian
58 The projecting of blarne for sin onto God for sin could also signal that Julian enjoyed some status
associated with a privileged social class. In other words, perhaps this could argue for Julian having corne
from a more privileged economic social location. In this case Julian would know both pnvilege (as coming
from a wealthy family) and its underside (as a wornan).
MOORE, 1989, p. 32.
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describes, late in the $howings, that some forms of suffering based on fear and ignorance
of God’ s love are falsely called virtuous. (ST 24; LT 73). And it is in this context that she
names what, for her are the two kinds of sickness or secret 5m which “most belabour and
assail us”, that is, sloth or impatience, and despair.6° These oppress Julian and keep her
from deiighting in and contemplating love. It is ignorance of love which rnost hinders
God’ s loyers for, as she puts it in the Long Text only, even after
we begin to hate sin and to amend ourselves according to the laws of Holy Church,
there stili persists a fear which hinders us, by looking at ourselves and at our sins
committed in the past, and some of us because of our everyday sins, because we do
not keep our promise or keep the purity which God has established us in, but often
fail into so much wretchedness that it is shameful to say it. And the perception of
this makes us so woebegone and so depressed that we can scarcely see any
consolation. And sometimes we take this fear for humility, but it is a reprehensible
blindness and weakness; and we do not know how to despise it like any other sin
wbich we recognize, and this cornes through lack of true judgment, and it is
contrary to truth. For of ail the attributes of the hiessed Trinity, it is God’ s will that
we have most faithfiilness and deiight in love. (LT 73.)
Until now, we might imagine, suffering and mouming were related to scmpulous
acts of contrition and penance as part of the conventional means of attaining salvation,
though in Julian’ s case, as I have proposed, this seemed to lead her into suent despair of
salvation.61 Now, out of the contrast experience which the showings presented, Julian
revises her understanding of what is redemptive about suffering. Scrupulosïty, she sees,
leads to despair and depression, and away from having faith and delight in God’s love.62
60 Anderson’s examination of sin in Julian’s showings is focused entirely on the overt violence of wrath
and blame. Julian’s hard-won naming of the obverse introjections of sloth and despair as her sins goes
virtually unmentioned. ANDERSON, 2005.
61 See ROSS, Ellen, “She wept and cried right loud for sorrow and for pain’: Suffering, the spiritual
joumey, and women’s experience in late medieval mysticism”, in Maps offtesh and light: The retigious
experience of medievat women mystics, ed. WIETHAUS, Ulrike, Syracuse NY, Syracuse University
Press, 1993, pp. 45 - 59, who gives a balanced description of the types of suffering which were to be
encountered in sin, contrition, compassion and unitive ionging, but does not recognize any tendency to
scrupulosity in Julian’s history. However, lulian herseif admits to scrupulosity in the quotation above.
(ST 24; LT 73.)
62 On this point, Anderson sees Julian’s revision of the notion ofpenance as the strongest evidence of
Juiian’s “editing” of theological commonplaces. He sees Julian transforming penance from being a form
of punishment (related to malting satisfaction) to being an opportunity for union with God. ANDERSON,
2005, p. 133. Anderson quotes from the Long Text in this place: “[The LordJ regards us so tenderiy that
he sees ail our life here to be penance... and he makes his penance in us, and mercifully he helps us to bear
it”. (LT 81.) In a subsequent section of this chapter I explore three sources of tradition from which I
suggest Julian retrieved. But the reversai ofroles we will see beiow is in evidence here, although Anderson
does not recognize the relational reversai explicitly.
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If this depression is the effect of sin, what is the cause? With the benefit of
contemporary cntical disciplines we may wonder to what extent sucli blindness and
wretchedness may be a result of early childhood neglect and inadequate mirroring,
compounded by the introjection of a societal projection of sinfiulness onto women, and
codified in a soteriological tradition which perpetuated such projections and inspired fear
and ignorance of God’s love. Julian does not explore causes of sin, except to ponder the
question of the Church’ s teaching on blame for sin. The pattem of introjected blame and
self-hatefulness is becoming apparent to Julian, however, in lier discovery of the secret
sins and their disguise as virtue. With a truer judgment of the effects of this pattem (as
hinderïng her delight in God’s love minored in Christ’s chere), she is learning a new
meaning, a new interpretation to give it. As the working through process of dying to the
false ego progresses, we see it represented in the Showings among other places in Julian’ s
observations that slie is to recognize suffering of a self-preoccupied nature and flot dwell on
it, but to pass over it as lightly and as quickly as possible (ST 19); and that she is flot to
accuse herself, such that it resuits in depression, false humility and sonow. (LT 47, 73,
77)63 In Julian’s clear articulation of these conditions -- and flot others -- as desolations
which perpetuate sin, it is clear these conditions have plagued lier throughout lier lifetime.
Julian’s insights have an extraordinarily contemporary ring to them, if read in light
of Crysdale’s observations. When 5m and its remedy are seen in this reverse light, our
response, like Julian’ s, is made more available to be transformed from one of confusion
and negative resistance into one of eagemess and desire for trusting relationship with this
healing Christ. Julian is learning the power of naming. But she sees sin as a human pliglit
that is not resolved simply by renaming it in its reverse form. She cornes to understand
more and more clearly, as the Long Text progresses, that the problem with blindness is flot
that she does flot recognize lier own spiritual condition, but that she does not see the God
ofher showings, so as to know how to interpret her own condition. (LT 47.) The
remedy for sin is flot just epistemological insight but also relational trust in the mirror of the
Jesus of lier showings.
3.2.2 Divine and human judgment and the true nature of wrath
In the Long Text Julian expresses herself on the subject of human and divine
judgment. She says that God judges us in our substance which is kept united and safe with
God. Divine judgment, “which is from God’s justice, is from lis own great endless love,
63 Interestingly Julian’s clarification of false humility does flot lead her to abandon the practice of humility.
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and that is that fair, sweet judgment which was shown in ah the fair revelation in which I
saw him assign to us no kind of blame”. (LT 45.)
Humanldnd on the other hand judges us in our changeable sensuaiity. But although
she lays no blame, she is in effect making a profound critique, implying that the judgment
of Holy Church is itself implicated in the changeable, sensual thing which humankind is.64
This is because
this judgment is mixed, for sometimes it is good and lenient, and sometimes it is
hard and painful. Md inasmuch as it is good and lement it pertains to God’s
justice, and inasmuch as it is hard and painful, our good Lord Jesus reforms it by
mercy and grace through the power of the blessed Passion, and so brings it into
justice. (LT 45.)
So it is she tehis us that, though the contemplation of God’s judgment
was sweet and delectable, I could not be fully comforted only by contemplating it,
and that was because of the judgment of Holy Church, which I had understood
before, and which was continually in my sight.... And by the same judgment [of
Holy ChurchJ I understood that sinners sometimes deserve blame and wrath, and I
could flot see these two in God, and therefore my desire was more than I can or
may teil, because of the higher judgment which God himself revealed at the same
time, and therefore I liad of necessity to accept it. And the lower judgment had
previously been taught me in Holy Church, and therefore I could not in any way
ignore the lowerjudgment.
This then was my desire, that I might sec in God in what way the judgment
of Holy Church here on earth is true in his sight, and how it pertains to me to know
it truly, whereby they might both be reconciled as might be glory to God and the
nght way for me.... And the more knowledge and understanding that we have by
the gracious leading of the Holy Spint of these two judgments, the more shail we
see and know our feelings. (LT 45.)
The only answer Julian was given to this was in the form of the exemplum (to be explored
in the next diptych), which became the focus for lier search for intelligibihity in this matter
“until the end of my life”. (LT 45.)
Julian wants above ail to have these two judgments reconciled.65 Despite their
apparent irreconcilability, however, the effect of her recognition of these two judgments
helps to put a limit to her introjection of others’ wrath, particularly as she secs how God
64 Compare frene Leicht on this: “Das genannte, unstete menschliche Urteil identifiziert Julian mit dem de
Kirche”. LEICHT, Irene, “Die Vorstellung von Erlôsung im theologischen Denken der Julian ofNorwich”,
in Denkmodelte von Frauen im Mittetalter, freiburg Switzerland, Universitatsverlag, Freiburg Schweiz,
1994, p. 193.
Anderson respects what many commentators of Julian wish to deny, that Julian does not resolve the
irreconcilability between ber showings and the Church’s teaching on sin. Rather, he says, she applies what
he cails a contrapuntal approach, holding the two in tension just as they are, leaving the reconciliation to
God. ANDERSON, 2005, pp. 109- 115.
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sees wrath. This leads her at this point in the showings into a contemplation conceming
wrath. What she discovers is that in God there is no wrath.
For I saw no kind of wrath in God.... For tmly, as I see it, if God could be angry
for any time, we should neither have life nor place nor beïng.... For thougli we
may feel in ourselves anger, contention and strife, stiil we are ail mercifully
enclosed in God’ s rnildness and in his meekness, in his benignity and in his
accessibility.... (LT 49.)
Julian sees that ail wrath is on the hurnan side. “For I saw no wrath except on man’s
side.... And it cornes frorn a lack of power or a lack of wisdorn or a lack of goodness, and
this lack is flot in God, but it is on our side”. (LI 48.)
.For we cannot be blessedly saved until we are tmly in peace and in love,
for that is our salvation.
So I saw that God is our true peace; and he is our safe protector when we
ourselves are in disquiet, and lie constantly works to bring us into endless peace.
(LT 49.)
It is clear enougli from this that Julian includes herseif in this human condition:
“For we through 5m and wretchedness have in us a wrath and a constant opposition to
peace and to love....” (LT 48.) She is acknowledging here, in the Long Text at least, that
she does feel anger within herseif, whereas, in the Short Text, ber silence suggests she was
much less confident about admitting such feelings.
But it seerns to me that her acknowledgement of wrath in lier in this context is also a
recognition of ber reaction to the falseness of the Church’s human judgment, when set
beside the peacefiul judgrnent of God. Recail, from chapter 5 on her pre-visionary life,
Julian’ s muted anger at those who think tliey know more about God than they do. This
may give us a due as to Julian’s expenence with some sector of Church autliority, thougli,
as I have argued above, not that of lier spiritual advisor. And Julian’ s rnaturity becomes
evident as she witlidraws angry projections. For example, increasingly she recognizes the
futility of focusing on others’ sin (which she acknowledges in LT 76 to have been a
pattem), unless it be for their cornfort and help. (LT 79.) Indeed, she discovers that God,
in bis judgment, cannot even forgive liumankind because lie cannot lie angry. (LI 49.)66
There is no question anymore that “the mercy of God will be remission of bis wrath after
66 Tugwell makes an important etymological comment here:
Using the word ‘forgive’ in a way which is no longer current in modem English, Julian says that
there is no wrath in God for him to “forgive” (i.e., forego, give up), it is ouï wrath which he
“forgives” (that is to say, forgiveness and mercy work in us to dispel our own inner disquiet at
oursetves).
TUGWELL, Simon, Ways of Imperfection: An Exploration of Christian Spirituality, Springfield, IL,
Templegate, 1984, p. 194. Tugwell’s comment suggests that God’s forgiveness is what is working in
Julian to heal her of introjected seif-blame.
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we have sinned”, as she had previously thought. (LT 47.) No, “where our Lord appears,
peace is received and wrath has no place”. (LT 49.) One implication of this is that, despite
the common teaching of the Church, which Julian teils us she had in effect introjected in
her feeling that “the blame of our sins continuafly hangs upon us” (LT 50), her showings
teach her that humanldnd wiil flot receive “pain, blame and wrath” from God, because God
is incapable of wrath.67
Julian’s point compares exactly with Crysdale and Moore’s desire to disentangle
God from being complicit in or even causing human suffering in the tradition’s ambiguous
and confiising soteriology. For Crysdale, as for Moore, it is imperative to hold that
because there is no evil in Jesus, ail evil is revealed on the side of those who wili his death.
Evil is restricted to bis crucifiers, an act arising from the human heart; it is not in God.68
Julian’s $howings explore how in our falien condition humanldnd can be mistaken
about what sin is and about what human responsibility for it is. As such, humans do flot
see how sin can have any purpose and so we fail to know ourselves. Moreover, if
humankind cannot properly understand what sin is in our condition, then our
understanding of God’s saving work will likewise be distorted, off the mark, sinfui.
Under these circumstances we have alienated ourselves from the One whose saving work
would be to help us know ourselves as we are known.
I propose that, in the condition of having suffered a history of compound neglect
and having a systemically overdeveloped sense of responsibility for others’ suffering,
Julian discovers in lier showings that it is off the mark to become preoccupied with seeing
one’ s suffering as an indication that one is at fault, and at the same time blame God that sin
exists. Rather wliat is to be attended to is the riglit naming of the condition of impatience,
shame and despair wliich fuels botli the biarne and the preoccupation with suffering, and
then, to respond to it in God’s sight. Easier said than done.
Julian liad to die to the attacbment to seeing suffering as an indication that she was
responsible for lier and Christ’ s pain. Ibis is, in effect, wliat she describes in lier early
sliowings: lier own suffering was withdrawn. Then she experienced a different kind of
suffering in union with Christ’ s bodily Passion in which she knew this as a suffering in
solidarity with humankind. Jesus, Julian discovers, suffers with us until we corne to see
our illusion for wliat it is.69 Jesus’s suffering is no longer an indication of lier sinfulness
67 Anderson explores this and other implications in the context of what he calls Julian’s editing ofseveral
theological commonplaces of her time, under the rubric of “blame” and in bis fourth chapter. See
ANDERSON, 2005, pp. 121 - 124, and ch. 4.
68 CRYSDALE, 2001, p. 9.
69 See BURROWS, Mark, ‘“Yett he sufferyth with us’: Divine asceticism in Julian ofNorwich’s
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causing lis suffering, which somehow she must remedy. Jesus’ suffering rather is now
seen as a sign of God’ s intimate solidarity with her suffering, and the suffering of
humankind.
Likewise her understanding of the God of the Christian tradition she inherited must
die too, to its false self, in order to become a saving God. Her union with Jesus in bis
suffering also exposes that which is illusory or non-redemptive in human suffering. It
exposes what is illusory about the God which the Church was teaching in practice. It
exposes a concept of god whose wrath and vengeance made it impossible to evoke in the
human person the response of trust and mature dependence, the response which makes
possible the beholding of God’s work of salvation in the human non-person on the
underside of history in this temporal world.
The meaning of 5m and so also of suffering is changed and, as Crysdale puts it,
given new meanings. Homans’ notion that cultiiral symbols which have lost their meaning
are moumed, and that it is in the transitional reaim of creative dying to ego that the lost
meaning of symbols gives way to the possiblity of new meaning, is important for
understanding the kind of participation in Jesus’ kenosis (dying to despair, turning to God
in reverent fear, faithful trust) whidli is necessary for Christ’ s saving work to be
meaningflfl to Julian.
Hence, Julian discovers that it is more faithful to pass over, as quickly as possible,
suffering that is “conducive to 5m”, i.e., suffering which is predicated on the painfiil
conditions of seif-preoccupation. And then to engage in a new kind of suffering, the
suffering of ego death that awakens lier to have compassion for herself and others in this
vuinerable condition, a suffering in union with Christ in lis compassion for humanity:
“Then I saw that every kind of compassion which one has for ones fellow Christians in
love is Christ in us.’ (ST 13.)
Julian’ s first taste of the Resurrection experience comes in the moment of the
change of chere in Jesus from dying to joy. What Julian leams from this is that, between
seeing Jesus as lier heaven on the cross, and seeing Jesus in heaven in glory, although they
are experienced at different times and associated with times of woe and well-being, they
will ail be one time. That is, she cornes to realize that death and resurrection
-- grief and
joy -- are simultaneous, as experienced increasingly out of a new centre of selfliood whidh
is in lier and in Christ. Julian is grieving a history of resisting an unrecogmzed centre of
selflzood that is relationally constituted in the sight of God in Christ, a self whidli lias
Revetation of love”, Studies in spirituality 7, 1997, pp. 99 - 112, on this original aspect of Julian’s
understanding of the ongoing suffering and crucifixion of Jesus.
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suffered silently, having been abandoned to isolation, non-existence and voicelessness.
This self, “knitted” or united in Christ and constituted in the sight of God delighting in
love, gives lier a truer judgment of lier sin and responsibility for herself. Tlie change of
chere to joy is tlie initial locus in Julian’s showings for Christ’s work of healing and
integration, a work whicli, whule it moves toward simultaneity in the death and
Resurrection experience, continues throughout lier whole life.
b conclude, I suggest that given Julian’ s difficulty reconciling the tradition’ s
teaching on sin and salvation witli lier experience of the showings, she learns tliat sin is the
cause of distortion both in tlie human soul and in the tradition’s teaching on sin and
salvation. In effect, it could be argued that, in the irreconcilability between what her
showings teach lier and tlie common teaching of Holy Churcli, she is making a subtle
distinction between the human predicament of tliose who are voiceless and vulnerable and
the predicament of the privileged, between those on the underside of history (the negiected
and systemically abused) and those who would judge them abusively. She does not use
this kind of language. But such an argument allows for a correlation to be posited between
lier lifelong dilemma and the contemporary feminist observation that 5m expresses itself in
opposite ways depending on one’s social location. The distortion she sees mamfest in the
liuman judgment of Cliurch teaching is wrath and biame. Psychoanalysis and liberationist
soterioiogy alike would describe this as a projection (or introjection) of the bad onto tlie
vuinerable. As Julian is able to distance herself from tlie introjected sins of guilt and
identify lier experience of tlie human predicament as exposure, vulnerability and
abandonment, the distortion slie discovers in herseif is that of self-preoccupied (introjected)
despair and depression in ignorance of God’s love. It is not a condition whicli is
blameworthy; it is a condition in need of grief and detachment, and then ofjoy in accepting
herself as a child of God’s delight and love.
Julian becomes convinced tliat God wants us to know that God creates, loves
restores us, and tliat sin is only rightly judged or discemed when tlie self, formed by mynd
of the Passion, knows itself to be relationally constituted in union with Christ in God’ s
siglit. She does flot know how the teaching of the Church will be reconciled with the
showings that slie lias received. From tlie centre of selfhood Christ lias given lier to know
in lierself, Christ’ s words of patience to Julian are: “Ail shail be well, and all shaii be well
and you shall see that all manner of thing shall be well”.
However, this does flot lead Julian to sit back and reiax. Juiian’ s demand for
inteiligibility in the contrast experience winch lier showings present leads lier to retrieve
resources from the tradition. However as I hope to show, eitlier Julian’ s retrieval reverses
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their significance to respond to the human predicament she is experiencing, or she uses
them because they are able to comprehend differences in one’s maturation of understanding
of the human predicament and human responsibility
4.0 What did Julian retrieve and transform from the tradition?
I propose to explore three medieval sources of symbolism from which Julian may
have retrieved for her original exploration of Christ’ s saving work. I seek to answer the
question wliat resources and practices might have helped her affirm and mirror her self
worth, and recognize lier own and others’ limited responsibility for sin. I suggest that
these retrievals assisted Julian in identifying and responding to lier condition and need in
such a way as to make sense of lier soteriological crisis, bring an intelligible response to
bear on lier experience of Christ’s work of healing axd transformation, and enable lier
appropriation of a credible soteriology.
Aithougli tlie influence of medieval imagery of the motherliood of Christ has been
well documented in Julian, I tum rather to influences and practices whicli rnight have
contributed to lier engagement with what I have identified as the mirroringfunction ofthe
Christ of lier showings.7°
The three retrievals I identify corne from tlie rnedieval tradition of soteriology,
anchontic literature and mysticisrn respectively.7’ The first symbol I want to examine is
70 Julian’s Christology (who Christ is) cannot be seen apart from her soteriology (what Christ does that is
salvific). In the history of Christian doctrine Christology is dependent on and historically subsequent to
soteriological explanations or narratives of what Jesus did, which are themselves presumably dependent on
how that saving action has been experienced in the life of the community. See HAIGHT, Roger, Jesus,
symbol of God, NY, Orbis, 1999, P. 155. I propose that this is no different in Julian’s case, that her
soteriology drives her understanding of Christ’s identity, indeed that of the Tnnity. In support of this
approach to the histoncal genesis of her theology, recali that her observation early on in the Long Text that
“where Jesus appears the blessed Trinity is understood” (LT 4) bas no equivalent in the Short Text. See
WATSON, Nicholas, “The trinitarian hermeneutic in Julian of Norwich’s Revetation of love”, in The
medievat mystical tradition in England, ed. GLASSCOE, Marion, Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 1992, pp. 79 - 100. Exeter symposium V.
71 As mentioned above, Derek Anderson identifies several medieval theological commonplaces which, he
suggests, Julian edits in ber own soteriology. His list includes blame, debt, satisfaction, penance,
harrowing of heu, and motherhood. ANDERSON, 2005, ch. 3. In what follows, I subsume blame, debt
and penance under the one theme of satisfaction. Julian’s transformation of other soteriological themes
such as the harrowing of heu and Cbrist’s work of mothering will be explored only in the tbird diptych, in
light of the exemplum.
Anderson’s analysis is helpful because it makes explicit reference in each case to the sources ofthe
“common teacbing of Holy Church” (Anselm, anchoritic literature, English lyncal literature, Corpus
Christi plays, etc.) that Julian borrowed from but edited in each of these theological commonplaces.
Moreover, Anderson’s intention is to make explicit through bis study how Julian’s soteriology responds to
the contemporary feminist search for nonviolent soteriologies. My own approach to the question of wbat
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that of satisfaction, drawn directly from Anseim’ s theory of satisfaction to account for
Christ’s saving work, but reversed in its significance, as we’ll see below. The second
symbol derives from the anchoritic vocation and looks at the methods and objectives of the
bodïly and spiritual practices which promoted the experience of union with Christ as a
joyful crucifixion. I draw on Nicholas Watson here, whose study shows that the methods
and objectives of the anchoritic vocation were also, in some sense, the opposite of those of
active apostolates. The third symbol is that of the mirror and its function in medieval
mysticism of disceming maturation in the spiritual life. I propose that ail three of these
retrievals seem to have had a significant positive influence on the maturation of Julian’s
appropriation of a soteriology of minoring in her conversion process toward acceptance of
her full humanity in the sight of God.
4.1 The glorious asseth making: Christ’s satisfaction of humanity
Julian understood the Anselmian sotenology of the satisfaction of God’s honour in
the redemption of humanldnd by the God-man Jesus Christ, as she received it from the
Church’ s teaching. But she retneved its categories in a way which reversed the
assumptions of guilt and responsibility for sin which Anseim made. Julian’s
understanding of asseth making, involves a transformation and reversai of the roles and
logic of Anselm’ s satisfaction theory. The effect of this is, I propose, that “satisfaction”
comes to function as an activity of mirroring in the Christ of lier showings. Since mirroring
is an important function of “good enough mothering”, this study may enable us to grasp
how the seeds of lier much later reflections on the matemity of Christ were sown mucli
earlier, in lier pre-oedipal sotenological crisis.
Nutli holds that the belief tliat God was wratliful was the problem for which Julian
sought intelligibility.72 I would suggest tliat one reason it was a problem for Julian was
because of the tenonzed false self slie liad introjected, which the image of a wrathful god
reinforced in her, and to wliich slie lierseif was extremely sensitive. In Julian’s near mortal
condition of heiglitened weakness, dependence and vulnerability, a wrathful God was not
only not salvific; I suggest it brouglit ber to a recapitulation of tlie “unthinkable anxiety” of
damnation. The showings revealed to her vivid images of a different way of beholding lier
relationship to God in Christ.
Julian edited or retrieved tries to get at what rnotivated Iulian to corne up with this soteriology. It turns on
the hypothesis of this thesis that Julian’s showings prompted a healing and maturation in early mirroring
need which can be correlated with a liberative conversion process in her appropriation of a soteriology of
mirroring.
72 NUTH, 1991, p. 60.
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The problem of God being wrathful was directly linked to the medieval Church’ s
interpretation of the satisfaction theory of Anseim. Bradley writes about how the Church
interpreted the satisfaction theory at this time:
But some incorporated into the teaching on satisfaction the notion that God flot only
demands a recompense for sin but is moved by vengeance and wrath to exact a
terrible punishment to repair the injury to his honor. The motif was neyer fully
uprooted, even from the Catholic mystical tradition....
Julian would surely have known this view of vengeance, which was
wïdespread in oral and written treatises available in the fourteenth century. Since
she was an anchoress herself, a likely place for her encountering Anseim’ s words
on the subject is the Ancrene riwÏe. As quoted in that manual for anchoresses,
Anselm had explained the anger of the father against the sinless Christ by appealing
to the doctrine of the union of Christ and sinful humanity in the Incarnation --
through Christ’ s talting of our fiesh: ‘How bitterly did God the Father Almighty
strike his dearly beloved Son, Jesus our Lord, who had neyer sinned, only because
He had taken on fiesh like ours, which is full of sin!’73
Julian speaks of Christ’s saving work as the glorious asseth or asyeth (ST 14; LT
29.) Asseth in middle English can have different connotations. In their edition of the
$howings Colledge and Walsh translate it as atonement, but also, in LT 60 (a seeth) as
fulfilment, in which it is God’s work in Christ which is signaled.74 Other meanings
Bradley cites are satisfaction (as a component of penance with contrition and confession)
where it is, rather, the penitent sinner’s work.75
Bradley observes that Julian’s use of asseth making and related words, such as
bowte (bought) and dettor (debtor) is distinctive. (One might add reward to this list too.)
In discussing the saving work of Christ as Julian describes it in these expressions, Bradley
links them to Julian’ s later articulation of Christ as mother. In this context of discussing
the theory of “satisfaction”, Julian’s meanings take on a radically different colour from
Anselm’s understanding of satisfaction. Anselm’s premise was that an offense had been
comrnited against God’s honour by humanity and therefore required an infinite satisfaction,
which sinful humanldnd could not pay, and which required therefore satisfaction by the
God-man Christ.
BRADLEY, Ritamary, “Julian of Norwich: Everyone’s mystic”, in Mysticism and spirituatity in
inedievat Engtand, eds. POLLARD, William and Robert BOENIG, D. S. Brewer, 1997, p. 152, citing
Ancrene wisse. See SAVAGE, Anne and Nicholas WATSON, eds., Anchoritic spirituality: Ancrene
wisse and associated works, NY, Paulist, 1991, p. 182. The classics of western spirituality 74.
COLLEDGE and WALSH, 1978a, vol 2, p. 749.
BRADLEY, 1997, P. 144.
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Julian’s premise was “focused on the weakness of humanity: man could no more
restore himself than he could have made himself in the first place”.76 This is the human
predicament to which Christ’s saving work must respond. To that extent, the signs of
Julian’ s resolution of this pre-oedipal sotenological crisis through her extraordinaiy
reverse retrieval of asseth making from Anseim’ s satisfaction theory can already be
found embedded in the Short Text. In Julian’s meaning of satisfaction there is no sense of
appeasing an offended divinity, because that is an image of the heu she is living, flot the
salvation she is seeking. “[R]eparation is made by overcoming the harm that sin has
wrought, flot in ‘maldng amends’ to God”.77 Anderson makes an even stronger argument
than this in bis thesis, in which he argues that Julian’s soteriology is a form of
recapitulation theory. “The suffering Christ endures is, in [Julian’s] view, a profound
identification with the condition of liuman weakness in Christ’s representative humarnty,
and in bis death lie becomes like ail humans who die so that lie may restore ail to life in bis
own humanity”.78
Likewise, for Julian, Christ did flot buy back alienated liumankind from the devil.
Rather we are bought by our spiritual birth in Christ, the divine mother, who by paying the
price of pain gives us a share in lier nobility. And it is Christ who is our debtor, aiways
wanting more and more to satisfy liumankind with Christ’s love.79
It is in the context of Julian’s meditations on the motherhood of Christ tliat Bradley
finds that asseth making comes into its full meaning. Bradley cites from LT 60 in which
Julian marvels that even our being bom to bliss through Cbrist’s suffering and deatli miglit
flot makyn aseth to lis marvelous love:
And when he had finished, and had borne us so for bliss, still ail this could flot
satisfy lis wonderful love. And he revealed this in tliese great surpassing words of
love: If I could suffer more I would suffer more. 11e could not die any more, but
76 BR.ADLEY, 1997, p. 145.
BRADLEY, 1997, p. 145.
78 ANDERSON, 2005, p. 147. See also pp. 30 - 32 of his thesis and the whole of bis cli. 4. He finds the
source of recapitulation theory in frenaeus of Lyons’ Against heresies. ANDERSON, 2005, p. 30.
Anselm’s understanding of the reward the Father gÏves Christ for his saving work is transformed too.
For Julian, reward is shared around liberally. We wilI have Christ as our reward. But humankind is also
the reward which the Father gives to Christ: “We are his bliss, we are bis reward, we are bis honour, we are
bis crown”. (ST 12.) Further, I mentioned above Anderson’s observation that Julian’s editing of lier
contemporary understanding of penance transformed it from being a fonn of punisbment to a joyous
occasion of union with Christ. See ANDERSON, 2005, pp. 131 - 134. As Julian puts it:
for the substantial and natural Ionging in us for him is a tasting penance in us, and lie makes
this penance in us, and mercifully lie lielps us to bear it.... For tliis is our Ioving penance... for
this penance neyer leaves us until the time when we are fulfihled, wlien we shah have him for ouï
reward. (LT $1.)
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lie did flot want to cease working; therefore he must needs nourish us, for the
precious love of motherhood lias made him our debtor. (LT 60.)
Bradley says that Christ’s work of asseth making is referring to an “insufficiency for
satisfying a depthless desire.... The asseth demanded to be paid [by ChristJ is to satisfy
love”.80 God is flot our creditor but our debtor, because God as Mother “owes’
unconditional love to us, her children”.81 Bradley shows how, in Julian’s late
meditations on the maternai works of the whole Tnnity, Mother Jesus’ work is taken up
into our creation, into our rebirth in Christ’s Incarnation and Passion and into our new
beginning without end in the Holy Spirit. The important point here is that “[ut is flot a
matter of a reversai of a spoiled relationship with God but ‘of the maturing and completion
of a relationship that already exists”.82
Bradley looks at other commentators’ views of what Julian means by asseth
making, and finds tliem wanting, in effect, stiil too marked by Anseim’ s satisfaction
theory.83 Bradley concludes by saying
Asseth means satisfaction -- but in a new way: it is aiways a ‘glorious asseth’;
bowte has a new meaning which Julian presents by reversing the usuat roles of
creditor and debtor and by encoding the bowte in the motherhood metaphor....
Thus, the asseth, the making good (and making better) which only God can
work, can only be properly read in the light of the whole divine plan, including
individual reconciliation, our partnership in God’s good deed in restoring ail
creation, and a consummation in heaven.
Julian ... fully accepts the teaching that ‘our good Lord Jesus Christ lias
taken upon himself ail our blame’. But she reverses the reasoning: it is flot that
Christ has suffered the wrath of an angry God in our stead, like a scapegoat.
Rather, therefore ‘our Father may flot nor will not assign any more blarne to us than
to lis own dearworthy Christ’.... The satisfaction God seeks is a sufficiency of
love, like a mother. In our wretched state, however, it is flot easy for us to grasp
liow God is both awesome and humanly familiar in ail ways... •84
80 BRADLEY, 1997, pp. 146 - 147.
81 BRADLEY, 1997, p. 149, emphasis added.
82 BRADLEY, 1997, p. 147, citing PELPHREY, Brant, Love was his meaning: The theology and
rnysticisrn ofJulian of Norwich, Institut fOr Anglistik und Amerikanistik, Salzburg, Universitat Salzburg,
1982, p. 136.
83 See LOGARBO, Mona, “Salvatïon theology in Julian of Norwich: Sin, forgiveness, and redemption in
the Revetations”, Thought: Review of culture and ideas 61, 1986, pp. 370 - 380; and Doyle’s
interpretation in PEPLER, Conrad, “Creation theology”, Mystics quarterly 15, 1989, pp. 86 - 89.
Bradley does not examine either the fine balanced contrast of Anseim and Julian in their respective
soteriologies by Joan NUTH, “Two medieval soteriologïes: Anseim ofCanterbury and Julian ofNorwich”,
Theologicat studies 53, 1992, pp. 611-645, or the article by Lillian BOZAK-DELEO, “The sotenology of
Julian of Norwich”, in Theotogy and the university, ed. APCZNSIU, John, Lanham MD, University Press
of America, 1990, pp. 37 - 44.
84 BRADLEY, 1997, pp. 154 - 155, emphasis added. See also NUTH, 1992, p. 640.
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I am struck by Nuth’s and Bradley’s intuition of the reversai of roles and reasoning
in Julian’s retrieval of of the notion of satisfaction in the redemption of humankind. This
reversai could also, to some degree at least, reflect a more profound intuition on Julian’ s
part of reversai in social location between Anseim and Julian. Male clerical privilege,
status, readership, societal recognition and acceptance ail would be assumed by Anseim.
Julian could assume none of these.85 Nuth observes that sin was understood by Anseim
as an active free choice of evil on the sinner’ s part resulting in social disorder and
disobedience toward God. In utter contrast to this basic “situation”, the only sin which
made sense in Julian’ s experience was despair bom of self-hatred, flot with some
conscious intention of choosing against God’s purpose, but rather with creamrely ftailty
and ignorance (fear of trusting God) in the process of trying to do God’ s will.86
It is ail the more significant then that in Julian’s Showings “From the vantage point
of God’s loving gaze, ail other viewpoints, including human experiences of guilt and
responsibility for sin, become relativized”.87 Nuth wants to distinguish Anselm’ s
soteriology as oriented toward those in the purgative way from Julian’s unitive way. I do
not think Julian would want to be so classified, as witnessed in her leveling and
universalizing of her “audience” in the Long Text, and aiso in the nature of anchoritic
spirituality as we’ll see in the section below.88 Given her lifelong preoccupation with the
sin of despair, my argument here is that God’s beholding her in a way which gives her
85 Although Nuth’s excellent article compares Anselm and Julian on a number of points it fails to
recognize this difference in social location, with its contrast between privilege and oppression. NUTH,
1992, pp. 611 -645.
86 Joan Nuth’s article compares Julian’s exemplum with another exemplum written by Anselm. The full
weiglit of the contrast between the two will become clearer in the third diptych. Stili, Anselm’s exemptum
is worth reading here. It reads as follows.
Suppose that a man enjoins some task on his servant, and charges him flot to throw himself into a
pit which he points out to him, out of which lie cannot possibly escape. But that servant despises
the command and the warning of his master and, of his own free will, throws himself into the pit
that has been shown him, so that lie is unable to carry out his assigned task. Do you think that
this inability is worth anything as an excuse for flot perfonning the assigned task?
ANSELM, St., Cur Deus homo, in A scholastic miscellany: Anseim to Ockham, ed. and transl.
FAIRWEATHER, Eugene R., Philadelphia, Westminster Press, p. 142. Library of Cliristian classics 10.
See NUTH, 1992, p. 611.
87 NUTH, 1992, p. 642.
88 On the question of presumed audience see WARD, Benedicta, “Lady Julian and lier audience: ‘Mine even
Christian”, in The Engtish retigious tradition and the genius ofAngticanism, eU. ROWELL, Geofftey,
Wantage England, Ikon, 1992, pp. 47 - 63.
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satisfaction that she is loved is the essential, indeed the only efficacious, response to the sin
of despair.
I suggest that Julian knows Anseim’ s satisfaction theory to ring false because she
lias learned, from the contrast which lier showïngs brouglit home to lier, that it leads to
unredemptive and unnecessary suffenng in her experience and to a terror of God such that
humans flee from God in their time of greatest need. Instead, what lier showings revealed
to her is the compassionate suffering God-man wlio is irresistably satisfying to
humankind because trustworthy, a GoU who knows and suffers with us, mirroring back
our condition in order to show us what we can be in the changing chere of Christ, and to
liberate liumankind’s desire to trust in God. Julian leams that she
sliould behotd the glorious asseth... So then this is our blessed Lord’s intention,
and in this teaching we should pay heed to this: For since I have set right the
greatest of harms, then it is my will that you should know through this that I shah
set right everything whicli is less. (LT 29.)
As the foregoing discussion lias shown, Julian’s original understanding of asseth
making contributed to, and was amplified by, lier late reflections on the motherhood of
Christ and the Trinity. Before Julian ever spoke of the matemal functions of Christ
explicitly (in LT 58
- 63), however, slie explored the saving work which Christ effected in
lis glorious asseth making througli the contrast experience whicli the sliowings aroused in
lier already in tlie Short Text, in what amounts, I suggest, to a reverse satisfaction. What
Christ accomplishes is the satisfaction (both theologically and psychologically) of the child
-- the human soul
-- in its utter vulnerability, helplessness and need, not the satisfaction of
a needy, wrathful parent-god. Christ suffers lis Passion until each human soul is satisfied
or pleased [payde]
-- and so saved --by the overwhelming love Christ depthlessly desires
for us to know. Looked at in this way, ït is flot surprising it took Julian years to
appropriate.
In this sense even Bradley’s comment that “what the satisfaction God seeks is a
sufficiency of love, like a mother....” is open to misinterpretation.89 It would be possible
to read into this that the mother needs the child’s love in order to be satisfied herseif But
this would represent a similar kind of relational distortion as that which lias resulted in the
effective histoiy of Anseim’ s satisfaction theory. Rather, it seems to me tliat, for Julian,
wliatever desire Christ has for a response from humankind must be a desire to see
hurnankind satisfied in our need to trust in God’ s love. In this sense it can be correlated
9 BRADLEY, 1997, p. 155, emphasis added.
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with Sebastian Moore’ s Jesus, who is the liberator of the desire to trust. I refer back to
Bhattachaijï who recognized that in Julian’s Showings neither God nor Christ need a
loving response from humankind in order to love humankind.
A mother, however, cares for lier child in order to develop it as a person and to
prepare it for life; seeing the child develop is lier chief reward. For a motlier, then,
the greatest threat is flot so mucli the child’s unresponsiveness, as misfortune or
death to the cliuld.90
4.1.1 Christ’s mirroring as satisfying
Conelating the psychobiographical with the soteriological, I propose that the
transformation in Christ’s mirroring chere and comforting words “Are you satisfied
JpaydeJ...?” ($T 12) were essential elements in Julian’ s experience of conversion to a new
sense of beloved selffiood or self wortli in relation to tlie Christ of lier sliowings.9’ I
suggest that whatever slie liad retrieved from Anseim of Christ’ s saving work as
satisfaction was transformed in this new and radically reversed mearnng given through lier
encounter with tlie Christ of lier sliowings.
The chere of Christ satisfied lier deepest need to trust in salvation in lier most
vuinerable near-death condition, and in that sense I would argue that tlie seed for her
motherhood motif was sown in the potential space of this transitional visionary activity of
wliat Winmcott would cail “good enough mothering”. It is flot divine motherhood per se
that saves. As I am arguing, Julian seems to be experiencing Christ’ s saving activity in the
sliowings as first of ail an act of mirrorïng which responds appropriately to tlie
maturational condition and need of tlie beholding human in a condition of radical
vulnerability. As her maturation in tlie appropriation of trust develops, tlie chere of tlie
minoring Lord diversifies and becomes yet more fulfiuling, but always responsively to the
90 BHAITACHARJI, Santha, “Independence of thought in Julian of Norwich”, Word and spirit 11, 1989,
p. 87.
Bynum and others argue that there is no crisis, no radical transformation in Julian’s showings, only
continuity and fulfiilment. BYNUM, Carolyn Walker, Fragmentation and Redemption: Essays on gender
and the human body in medieval religion, NY, Zone, 1992, p. 154.
I am sympathetic to her logic which draws on Chodorow’s psychology ofwomen, but I am
arguing for the presence in Julian’ s showings of a soteriological crisis which is pre-oedipal in both a
personal, psychobiographical sense and in a soteriological sense of causing Julian to experience a contrast
between what the Church would teach ber of sin and salvation, and what her showings revealed. Moreover,
there is the evidence of the radical transformation in Christ’s chere in which Julian beholds herself
participating at the critical point in ber own life of being mortally ill. All of this impels Julian to seek
greater intelligibility of her experience and spiritual maturation. The fulfillment Bynum speaks of wïll be
more clearly seen in the exemplum.
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need of the beholder. The third diptych will explore the later expressions of this dynamic
in the Long Text.
4.1.2 Saving God
At the level of soteriological crisis, Julian’s transformed understanding of asseth
making as satisfaction raises further speculation along this une. Could it be that the Christ
of her showings is also making God “good enougli”, “saving” God from the false, rageful
abusive caricature into which humankind in its fallen, wrathfiil and despairing condition
had made God? This would put into a clear light for lier the suffering which Julian and lier
even Christïans had experienced at the hand of the common teaching of Holy Church.
Again, the mirroring of Christ’s transforming chere is that which gives Julian tlie
assurance she needs to know that lier true self-in-Christ lias suffered enough. As I
suggested in tlie last chapter, for liumans like Julian to corne to know God as God wants to
be known, Christ’ s substantial nature in lis incarnate humanity would indeed need to be
kept intact in the godly (substantial) will of humanity, if that humanity is identified
explicitly as those whose social location (and early child neglect or abuse) would have them
introject that they are intrinsicafly sinftl, less than human, and so constitutïonally incapable
of union with God.
Julian’ s movement toward resolution of her soteriological crisis results in her
appropriation of a credible and coherent grasp of Christ’s saving work which is more
responsive to lier psychospiritual need and social location. I suggest that tliis could have
helped lier in the work of understanding lier predicament of vulnerability and abandonment
more realistically, and in the challenge to name correctly what sin, in lier predicarnent, was.
Appropriation, however, is not effected simply by means of tlie new cognitive
awareness which the showings brought about, important as that is. The work of
appropriation occurs daily and is a lifelong process. In tliat sense, it could be correlated
with tlie life long work of transmuted intemalization of the function of the mirroring Otlier.
For Julian to be increasingly disposed to tlie condition of union (as she describes it in terms
of substance and sensuality), she draws on tlie practice of beholding.
4.2 The anchoritic identification with Christ in the joyful
crucifixion
My reflection in tlie first chapter of the first diptych (chapter 7) included traces of
influence of anchontic tradition as functioning for Julian as a holding environment whicli
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functioned as the transitional space for tlie maturation of the mirroring transference. In the
following paragraphs I wish to explore some of the practices and symbolïsm of the
anchontic tradition as a possible source of retrieval in lier appropriation of the saving work
of Christ, a source which is able to make sense of lier sotenological contrast experience and
meet her urgent need for mirroring.
These paragraplis will explore further how her prior familiarity with anchoritic
symbolism might function as a source both for Julian’s working througli of the minoring
transference with the Christ of her showings for lier own maturation of lier mirronng
needs, and, for Julian’ s retrievat from that tradition in lier process of finding a resolution
to lier soteriological crisis in tlie surprisingly parallel generous and homety mirroring of the
Christ of lier showings. I will argue that the anclioritic practices wliicli foster tlie
identification with Christ may have been a unique resource for Julian wliose social and
psycliodynamic location would situate lier more clearly among the cmcified than tlie
cmcifiers.
I suggest that from this source Julian was able to retrieve both meaning and
practices which would contribute to and confirm Julian’s expenence of union, comfort and
joyful transformation in these showings of Christ’ s suffering, particularly as described in
her beliolding of the clianging chere of Christ in ST 12. It offers a source from whicli she
might have retrieved a repeated confirmation of the intelligibility and limit of sin and
suffering.
4.2.1 The Other who satisfies the needs of those dying to ego
I suggest tliat the anchorliold, or at least the generous symbolism sunounding the
anchoritic vocation could have played a significant minoring, affirming role and assisted in
enabling Julian both to let go of lier resistance to entering into a mouming process mirrored
in tlie suffering Christ of lier showings, and to retneve from this tradition tlie paradoxical
objective of uniting witli Christ.
Taldng the position that Julian liad familiarity with the specialized anclioritic
literature prior to lier reception of tlie showings is helpful in distinguishing, from within
that context, what some of tlie units Julian bonowed from that literature would be. The
theology embedded in this literature (drawing heavily from Anselm) is an ambivalent
source for retrieval. Drawing on an article by Nicholas Watson whicli looks ratlier at the
methods and objectives of the anchoritic life, I will explore liow Julian seems to have
drawn from the practice of tlie anchoritic life in unique ways to render tlie soteriology more
responsive to lier need.
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Watson’s study identifies the objective ofthe anchontic martyrdom, the
identification with Christ in lis death, as “ajoyfut cructflxion: the transformation of
suffering into joy that deserves spiritual reward. .
if Julian were flot already enclosed in the anchorhold, I believe she was familiar
with the anchoritic literature pnor to her reception of the showings as we have them
recorded in the Short Text. Unlike the meditations on the Passion whicli had become quite
widespread by the l4th century, the anchoritic literature was specialized, written oniy for
those who were living the vocation of anchoritic enclosure. I believe that sometime before
she had the showings Julian retrieved from this latter literature more than just lier
knowledge of contemplative aspirations as this was reflected in her request for the three
graces .‘
As well as noting its specialized nature, Nicholas Watson observes two other
cliaracteristics of tlie anchontic literature which distinguishes it from later l4th and l5tli
century piety. One is that it does flot speak of mystical ascent. The other is that anchoritic
texts
refer to or imply the external world of their readers.... [WJhereas I suggested that a
major function of the later passion meditations... is to absorb the imagination and
hence to occupy the part of the mmd wliich is most hable to eartffly distraction, the
anchoritic works habitually return the reader to a sense of lier own external
conditions by recalling the anchorage.... [lit is life within the ceil that the anchoritic
works transfigure, and their most characteristic movement is not away from the
reader’ s imprisoned state but back into it. This is presumably because for the
intended audience the best possible image for spiritual reality is tlieir own extemal
circumstances; the anchoresses in a real sense embody spiritual reality as perceived
by these works, and need flot to forget their extemal circumstances but rather to
understand the spiritual significance of their condition.... [T]he anchoresses are
already as it were enclosed within a poweiful imaginative structure, and require
only a personal and affective realisation of its significance. The anchontic works
assist in and enact the process of realisation by presenting the life of the anchorage
in a variety of images that possess an underlying and unifying coherence. There is
a reciprocal relationship, an interpenetration, between these images and the
anchontic image which they ‘interpret’
92 WATSON, Nïcholas, “The methods and objectives of thirteenth-century anchoritic devotion”, in The
medieval mystical tradition in Engtand, ed. GLASSCOE, Marion, Cambridge, D. S. Brewer, 1987, pp.
143
- 144. Exeter symposium W, emphasis added.
See BAKER, Denise N., “Julian of Norwich and anchoritic literature”, Mystics quarterty 19, 4, 1993,
p. 158. See also McTNERNEY, Maud Burnett, “In the meydens womb’: Julian ofNorwich and the poetics
of enclosure”, in Medieval mothering, eds. PARSONS, John Carmi and Bonnie WHEELER, NY, Garland,
1996, pp. 157 - 182.
WATSON, 1987, pp. 140 - 144, emphasis added. See also SAVAGE and WATSON, 1991, pp. 15 -
28; and GEORGIANNA, Linda, The solitary se1f Individualizy in the Ancrene wisse, Cambndge MA,
Harvard University Press, 1981, 169 p.
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Watson cites from the literature to show how the most important image of the
anchoritic life, that is, martyrdom or crucifixion, is used to evoke in the anchoress an
identification with Christ and a sense of his companionship in the anchorhold, so as to
transfigure lier life of enclosure lived until death. This, he says, was conceived as a
“sweet martyrdom”. The death tlie anchoress lived was seen as having a positive meaning,
as
a joyfut crucifixion: the transformation of suffering into joy that deserves
spiritual reward.... Sucli an activity is based on the ability of the anchoress to
comprehend and to realise the spiritual reality which underlies lier way of life, to
penetrate the image which she is herseif living.95
In the literature written for anchorites, tlie “external world” of tlie anchorhold is
variously symbolized as Maiy’s womb (the lieu of Incarnation), Christ’s tomb, a prison, a
castie, tlie soul, etc., and the texts are intended to assist the anchoress in living out tlie
suffering of Christ in lis Passion and in undergoing tlie transformations of participating in
the Incarnation, the Passion and ultimately the Resurrection of Christ under the
“humiliating, mundane appearance” of daily life in the anchorhold. As I noted earlier,
Watson identifies that the spiritual ascesis of the anchoress is not to escape but ratIer to
transfigure lier external reality. In this literature, perliaps because of the extremity of this
external context of tlie anchoritic ascesis, Christ speaks to tlie anchoress with extravagant
generosity, and as an all-loving mother.
Watson wants to show how tlie anchorite’ s interionzation and living of these
mysteries is ascetical, mystical and lieroic, and that, because it demanded such self
knowledge and subtlety on the part of those wlio attempted it, it needed no imageiy of
“mystical ascent”. It is sigmficant for the present study that Watson argues that tlie
methods and objectives for development in the spiritual life of the andliorite, when
contrasted with the active lives of those saints who preached, evangelized, and often moved
about in the world, are different, unique and indeed opposite. A great deal of Julian’s
propensity for reversing customary meanings could perhaps be linked to lier practising an
andlioritïc spirituality.
Watson’s point is that there is a common tendency to judge andlioritic literature as
someliow less than mystical because of its alien quality and that this judging tendency
reveals “an unwillingness to face or respect sucli a quality”.96 It seems to me tliat this
WATSON, 1987, pp. 143 - 144, emphasis added.
96 WATSON, 1987, p. 134.
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judgment, which Watson wants to reverse, contains a world of “neglect” of pre-oedipal
themes to be expiored!
This is affective mystïcal language of a sensual and commonpiace kind. What is
iess than commonplace, however, is its concretion; the failure to seize Christ
within is an internai failure, but is to be remedied by renewed commitment to the
external passion of the celi. Images... cannot in this spirituality become
disassociated from the external hardships of its practitioners [O]n earth sharing
in the love of Christ has to mean sharing in his pain. Thus the element of affective
devotion is of a piece with the rest of this anchoritic spirïtuality; there is nothing
rudimentary about it. Aithougli it employs fantasy, it does flot coflsist of fantasy;
its roots are physical, existential.97
Even in the Short Text I believe ït is possible to see the effect of these methods and
objectives on the themes and transfigurations in lier showings.
In particular, consider the moment in Julian’s eighth - to - ninth showing, when she
thinks the suffering Christ will die, and then beholds his chere change to one ofjoy,
bringing about the same interior transformation in lier. (ST 12.) What we see reflected in
the shift in Christ’s face from suffering at the point of death tojoy andin the surpfising
dialogue that ensues is, I am suggesting, a mirror of the context of the anchorhold and the
tradition of literature surrounding the anchoritic practice which promoted the transfiguring
experience of Christ’s crucifixion as joyfui. I see the context of the anchorhoid as
functioning as a kind of imaginative holding environment for Juiian, supportive and
encouraging of this transformative symbolic encounter with the crucified Christ, which
miglit otherwise have simply been an experience of overwhelming suffering in isolation.
Moreover, it seems tome that a close reading of Julian’s themes in relation to the
anchoritic literature, even in the Short Text, can reveal evidence of Juiian’ s attraction to a
symbolic environment conducive to the maturation of early infant mirroring dynamics.
What came about by means of the visions and lier continued meditation on tliem could be
seen then as a transformation of ber perhaps initiai desfre to escape from the world
without. By now it sliouid be clear that the anchoritic life was not an escape, for those
who endured it. Couid it be that with the showings and the mirroring transference with
Jesus which emerged, the anchorhold became for Julïan the lieu for immersing herseif in a
healing, symboiically rich environment whicli wouid aliow her, indeed require lier to
explore the world within and deepen her self-knowiedge? Couid the symbolism
associated witli anchoritic practices have become a powerful resource for lier in ber
WATSON, 1987, p. 145, emphasis added.
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reconstruction of soteriology according to lier heightened need for the presence of Christ
beholding lier and satisfying lier need for a mirroring Other?98
If indeed lier pre-oedipal preoccupation witli a need for mirroring was as
determinative lias I am proposing, the ancliorliold may well have been experienced
ambivalently by Julian at first, if she did expenence an unconscious identification “with the
state of deatli itself, reflecting an unconscious wish to achieve reunion with the lost parent”,
prior to her entry into tlie visionary activity99 This would argue in part for lier anxiety at
the prospect of assenting to die, as she liad flot yet experienced tlie ancliontic goal of
seizing Christ within, and so unconsciously could not feel trust in salvation.
4.2.2 Alone in the presence of Another
One significant speculation Bhattachaiji makes conceming tlie originality of Julian’s
vision of Christ’ s desire for seif-giving is tliat the separation from the frontiine of
theological activity which would be afforded by Julian’s being enclosed, may have
“allowed lier mmd to listen to its own depths; to bring, in the phrase of tlie Eastem
Ortliodox hesychasts, ‘tlie mmd into tlie lieart”)00 This would resonate witli tlie
perspective I take in this study, that the anchoritic practice of interpreting lier daily
experience in this reverse symbolic fashion, and using lier prayer of “beholding” to keep
the showings before lier, were significant for lier appropriation of tlieir salvific meaning.
98 See KRANTZ, Diane, The life and text ofJulian oJNorwich: The poetics of enctosure, NY, Peter
Lang, 1997, chapters 5 and 6, who examines literary images and structures of enclosure in the Long Text,
as images of limitation, protection, participation and indwelling. She offers a brief Jungian psychoanalytic
explanation for Julian’s motivation for entering the anchorhold at that later time, and makes much of
Julian’s “anxiety” at the prospect of entering the enclosure. Curiously she draws on two object relations
theorists Karen Horney and Melanie Klein, each of whom in her own way argues that a return to the mother
(in images of the breast, the womb etc.) is evoked in response to a “feeling of helplessness in a hostile and
overpowering world”. Horney is quoted here by Krantz on p. 21. Krantz uses these theonsts to support lier
daim that Julian’s choice of lifestyle was a response to the “exterior events” of the time, and not because of
any “mother fixation”. My psychobiographical antennae go up at this. Everyone in that period suffered
one way or another from those calamitous events. But flot everyone became an anchoress, nor had the
showings which Julian did, nor spent the rest of their life intensely meditating on and writing them.
Moreover, Krantz’ argument for a late entry into the anchorhold is partly based on lier postulation that
Julian’s mother died, and that Julian, who had a dependent relationship on ber mother, responded to this
exigency by choosing an independent relationslip with the Mother Christ of her showings and by entering
the enclosure. KRÀNTZ, 1997, pp. 22, 131. What is that if not a sign of something like a “mother
fixation”?
MEISSNER, W. W., Ignatius ofLoyota: The psychotogy ofa saint, New Haven, Yale University Press,
1992, p. 10.
100 BHATTACHARJI, 1989, p. 89.
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An Ïnteresting comparison could be made here with Winnicott’s exploration of what
is involved in “the capacity to 5e alone”.101 Winnicott observes that flot everyone can 5e
alone and enjoy solitude and that in fact this is a sophisticated development in childhood.
He writes that “the ability to be tmly alone lias as its basis the early experience of being
alone in the presence of sorneone” and that this is related to the infant’ s early relation with
the mother. Gradually the infant introjects this environment,
so that there cornes about a capacity actually to 5e alone. Even so, theoretically,
there is aiways someone present, someone who is equated ultimately and
unconsciously with the mother, the person who, in the early days and weeks, was
ternporariÏy identtfled with her infant, and for the tîrne being was interested in
nothing else but the care of her own infant”.102
I spoke earlier of the possibility that Julian’s personal history was sucli that she had
corne to identify “with the state of death itself, reflecting an unconscious wish to achieve
reunion with the lost parent”.103 I observed that, if she were afready enclosed, despite
lier religious aspirations this situation could be expenenced in ambivalence and isolation.
However, if, as I am arguing, Julian is fully engaged in a mirroring encounter with the
Jesus of her showings in the anchorhold or at least in some state of reclusion, slie would
be experiencing solitude in the presence of an other who responded adequately to lier need.
Julian does flot mention the anchorhold anywliere in the showings as such. It is tme
that Julian’s use of the verb “enclose” (beclose) is mucli more extensive in tlie Long
Text.104 About tlie absence of direct mention of the ancliorhold I observe that a holding
environment must be sufficiently trustworthy, if it is to function as sucli, as to 5e taken for
granted by the infant -- particularly in its first symbiotic stages.105 The absence of direct
mention of the anchorhold might, in tliat sense, reflect the power of its symbolism for lier
experience of dying and transformation into joy in Christ in tlie early showings.
101 See WINNICOTT, D. W., “The capacity to be alone”, Internationat journal ofpsychoanatysis 39, 4,
1958, pp. 416 - 420, reprinted in The inaturationat processes and thefacititating environrnent: Studies in
the theoty of emotionat devetoprnent, Madison CN, International Universities Press, [1958] 1965, pp. 29 -
36.
102 WINNICOTr, [1958J 1965, p. 36, emphasis added.
103 MEISSNER, 1992, p. 10.
104 McINERNEY, Maud Burnett, “In the meydens wornb’: Julian ofNorwich and the poetics of
enclosure”, in Medievat mothering, eds., PARSONS, John Canni and Bonnie WHEELER, N.Y., Garland,
1996, pp. 157 - 182.
105 Winnicott held that when it goes welI, good-enough mothering is flot noticed. WINNICOTI’, W. D.,
“The theory of the parent-infant relationship”, in The maturationat processes and thefacilitating
environment: Studies in the theory of emotionat devetopment, Madison CN, International Uiversities
Press, [19601 1965, p. 52.
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4.2.3 Seizing Christ within
To the extent that the symbolic tradition of the anchorhold is intended to assist the
anchoress to seize Christ within and to experience this as a joyful crucifixion, Julian could
be retrieving from tliat same tradition what she needed for Christ symbolically to fulfihi that
mirroring function. Wliat is very clear is that Julian, like the readers of the anchoritic
literature, only identifies with Christ in lier showings, and only with his suffering at point
of death, flot witli the other scenes or participants of the Passion. There is contained in tliis
identification the quality of a fused relationsliip, an interpenetration of the image of lier
suffering and Christ’ s suffering, which is encouraged in the anchoritic practice.106 It
could likewise be said to reflect lier engagement witli the Christ of lier sliowings in a
merged mirroring transference and her interiorizing of tliat missed parental mirroring
function by means of transmuted intemalization. If so, perliaps this also liad an effect on
how she appropriated a soteriology whicli responded to tlie contours of tlie liuman
predicament of neglect and vulnerability in lier social location as a woman.
Once tlie sliowings began, tlie crucifix seems to have functioned as a transitional
object for Julian because the anchorhold and its imagery of union witli Christ in death was
a preparation for experiencing Christ as a trustworthy empathic presence in the transitional
reaim. As sucli, tlie anchoritic context and practice of seeking to seize Christ within in a
joyful crucifixion would better account for the transformation in Christ’ s face and lier
merged response to it, whicli occurred in the limit situation of Julian’s near-mortal
suffering. If this were Julian’s context, tlien the showings themsetves brought about the
tonged for anchoritic mysticat experience of concretion in “seizing Christ within”. It
would lielp to account for the profound visceral transformation wliicli occurs in Julian as
she beliolds this change in Clirist’s chere.
If this were so, tliat tlie sliowings brought on tliis anchoritic mystical experience of
seizing Christ witliin, then the link between Julian’ s retrieval from the metliods and
objectives of tliat tradition to resolve lier sotenological contrast experience would be
significant. Tlie transformation of suffering “whicli deseiwes spiritual reward” resonates
witli Julian’ s wliole reversai of the satisfaction tlieory’s understanding of debt, reward and
satisfaction in Christ’s saving work. Moreover, the symbolism of the ancliorliold as
106 See Andrew SPRUNG “We nevyr shah corne out ofhyrn’: Enctosure and immanence in Julian of
Norwich’s Book of showings”, Mystics quarterty 19, 1993, pp. 47 - 62, who argues, using Winnicott,
that the image and concept of enclosure functions as the means for Julian’ s understanding of the union of
God and the human soul.
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Christ’s tomb and as Mary’s womb of Christ’s Incarnation would flot be lost on Julian in
lier death expenence umted in Christ and the “double” antliropology which emerges out of
lier experience.107
4.2.4 The anchorhold as lieu for the emergence of self
In the context of Julian’ s engagement with the visions, and specifically her working
through a process of disillusionment and mouming a false self (perfectionistic, isolated,
grandiose, yet shamefihled self) and also the mouming of a distorted understanding of sin
and salvation as that had been transmitted to her, the anchorhold served as the lieu for
transformation in self understanding as relationally constituted through a mirroring
transference with the transforming face of Christ. This relationality is flot exactly mutual;
there is no bridai mysticism in Julian. The relationality is familiar (homely) and familial.
As Julian understands it, she has everything to leam about who she really is in the eyes of
God from the chere of Jesus of lier showings, and in this sense she accepts dependence
and trust as intrinsic to the nature of the relationality. In Julian’ s case, I argued that this
acceptance of dependence entailed a coming to terms with powerlessness in the experience
of actually consenting to die, which brought on grief and loss, a death to a former ego and
to a whole cultural universe of meaning around the Church’s notion of sin, suffering and
salvation.108
107 Nancy Coiner concludes ber article with a comment on the anchorhold as providing interesung
symbolism for Julian’s activity in the Showings, and so in another way, is arguing that Julian retrieved
what she needed psychoanalytically from the anchoritic tradition. Coiner observes that Freud analyzed the
fear of being buried alive as, for many people, “the most uncanny thing of ail’ because it evokes their
repressed desire to rest inside the maternai body”. COINER, Nancy, “The ‘homety’ and the ‘heimtiche’: The
hidden, doubled self in Julian ofNorwich’s Showings”, Exemptaria: Ajournai oftheory in medievatand
renaissance studies 5, 1993, p. 323. Coiner’s Kristevan conclusion is that
Julian’s path is to confront the odd and disturbing images of Christian religious life, to immerse
herself in the uncanny as a way of generating insight. Furthermore, Julian’s text moves from a
concern with death and pain to a concern for transformation, rebirth, renewed life -- from images of
the Passion to images of the maternai body. With ail Julian’s imagery of motherhood as loving
enclosure [which cornes later in the LT 58 - 63], that anchorhold might have looked to her flot so
like a tomb as like a womb. COINER, 1993, p. 323.
108 This is flot quite the same thing as the Hegelian notion of selfhood as emerging out of an acceptance of
dependence as subjection, as one recent critïc has proposed. Cannon argues that Julian’s Showings are “the
culmination of a literature in which enclosure is the paradigm of the making of any self’. Cannon shows
how the anchoritic literature bears on work of the modem philosophers of the subject (Nietzsche, Freud,
Lacan etc.). He introduces a cntical hermeneutic which underiines that a sense of self emerges as a power
from a powerful other. Insofar as this leads back into a domination system (after Wink), and away from
Julian’s stress on the surprising character of the other reveaied, that is, the homeliness and intimacy of the
Christ of her showings, I sense that this argument only applies to Juiian in a limited way. CANNON,
Christopher, “Enclosure”, in The Cambridge compan ion to medieval wornen ‘s writing, eds. D1NSHAW,
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Julian’s expenence of conversion and maturation into a new centre of selffiood
mirrored in Christ’ s chere, implies a transformation from a former and inadequate
understanding of selfhood (defined by sin and suffering), which understanding was also
part and parcel of the then ideal of the anchoritic tradition. As Bradley puts it,
Julian’ s teaching... needs to be assessed against the background of another
dominant part of the Western tradition -- the position that the self is a hierarchy,
spiit between reason and passion, and between soul and body. Rooted in a
patriarchal view of the self, this concept assigns reason to the male part of the soul
and passion to the female part. Order is restored only when the dominance of the
male over the female is finally asserted. But for Julian, while there is indeed a
lower and a higher part, there is no male-female hierarchy.... Nor are the parts in
Julian’s teaching reason and passion, or body and soul. Rather, they are substance
and sensuality... •109
The actual contours of the self in relation to Christ which emerge in Julian’s living
the anchontic life are charactenzed by and made possible in a relationship of trust in that
condition of vulnerability while dying with Christ, and being changed into a shared joyfiul
crucifixion. The dependency in the relationship is nonetheless homely, non-hierarchical.
The point I want to stress here is that perhaps it was the concrete, non-ascent oriented
praxis of the symbolic daily dying and rising in the anchorhold which was being retrieved
and employed in the emergence of Julian’s non-hierarchical and capacious sense of self,
utterly contained in God.
The evolution of Julian’s showings into an anthropology involving a double
understanding of self that was aiways knitted to Christ in substance, and which Christ’s
humanity reveals and mirrors in human sensuality as well, could have reverberations with
the anchoritic methods and objectives. Take the sixteenth showing for example, of Julian
beholding Christ reigning in her soul, and set that beside the anchoress’ objective in
transforming the anchorhold into being a symbol of the soul in winch Christ is present.
This last showing, a visual image of the true self united to Christ in substance and
sensuality, would be essential for the transformation and fulfiliment of her humanity.
Julian’ s experience in the anchorhold would be a kind of symbolic experience of the
incarnation of Christ in the human soul.
Julian’s understanding of the self and the immanence of Christ in human creation
and salvation is in some ways a distinctive departure from what anchontic or other
medieval spiritualities had intended to produce, particularly in the way that ït responded to
Carolyn, and David WALLACE, Cambndge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 119.
109 BRADLEY, Ritamaiy, “Perception of self in Julian of Norwich’s Showings”, The downside review
104, 1986, p. 238. Certainly it is easy to see comparisons of that other, dominant tradition with the self
of the modem philosophers Cannon cites.
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the needs of one on the underside of medieval history. I suggest that in the context of lier
reception of the showings, the anchoritic methods and objectives were retrieved in these
ways to promote the healing and maturation of Julian’s authenfic self into full humanity (in
a family and society which did flot recognize lier capacity for full humarnty), and that the
dues for this retrievai can 5e found in lier forming of an intelligible anthropology in
identification with tlie kenotic Incarnate One.
4.3 The medievai mysticism of the mirror
For insights into Julian’ s maturation in the mirroring transference with the Clirist of
her sliowings and into tlie probiem of sin, another source from tlie medieval mystical
tradition may be helpful.
Ritamary Bradley describes the analogy and more specifically thefiinction of tlie
mirror in early Christian and late medieval English mysticism, as this draws on two Biblical
texts of 1 Cor 13: 12 and 2 Cor 3: 18.110 Her thesis is that
tlie mirror image in tlie Engiish mystics stays quite close to a single theme: the
matunng process within the mystical life. Hence it conveys a general sense of
moving from wliat we see in tlie mirror to what we shail become. Tliis sense
frequently links with the appropriate kinds of food on which the maturing soul is
nourished, and sometimes on being fed, according to childhood’s changing need,
by mother Christ or mother Cliurch.
In ail cases tlie influence of Platonism is minimal or non-existent. Tlie
image in tlie minor... is Jesus Christ. Occasionally, the image is Jesus Christ
united with ail tlie redeemed, and in this vision we see wliat humamty is to
become.111
Bradley devotes a whole section of the article to Julian. And aithough Bradley
observes that in Julian’s showings tlie “direct allusions to the mirror analogy are obscure
and almost negligible, tlie intent of the Biblicai mirror passages is empliatic and clear”)’2
I cannot here go into ah of Bradley’ s insights. Bradley integrates Juiian’ s later
reflections on the Tnnity and on Christ as motlier into lier article, as she did with the one on
asseth making. Tlie present chapter acknowledges this but again subdues il, partly
because tlie connection between the pre-oedipal minoring function and tlie mother-infant
110 BRADLEY, Ritamary, The speculum image in medieval mystical writers,’ in The medieval mysticat
tradition in Engtand, ed. GLASSCOE, Marion, Cambridge, D. S. Brewer Press, 1984, pp. 9 - 27. She
draws on HUGEDÉ, Norbert, La métaphore du miroir dans les épîtres de saint Paul aux Corinthiens,
Paris, Delachaux et Niestlé, 1957, 206 p.
BRADLEY, 1984, pp. 23 - 24.
112 Bradley concludes that, unlike the neo-platonists for whom the “pure ofheart’ couid see perfectly in
the divine mirror” (p. 11), for Julian “[un heaven indeed we shah know the fuhlness ofjoy; but meantime,
on earth, ail is by faith, and only in part”. BRADLEY, 1984, p. 24.
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relation (at least in relational psychoanalysis) is by now self-evident, but also because I am
attempting to stay close to the soteriological function of mirroring in Julian’s accounts of
the showings as that develops in the Short Iext and the Long Text.
But Bradley’ s attentiveness to the function that the allusions to Jesus as mirror play
in Julian’ s showings is fascinating, in the significance it lays on the human face and eye
contact as the locus for this analogical activity. She links it to Julian’ s understanding of
sensuality and substance, and how knowledge of God and even the Passion is only “in
part” in this life. “Full knowing of God”, says Julian, would require “that our sensuality
be brought up in the substance”, that is, that the human temporal condition be fully united
with our nature in Christ. (LT 56.) 5m is what keeps us from clearly seeing the blessed
face of God; however, the “more clearly that the soul sees the blessed face by the grace of
loving, the more it longs to see it in fuiness, that is to say in God’s own likeness”, which,
as Bradley adds, is in the humanity of Christ. (LI 72.)” The vision “in part” in this life
grows under the guidance of grace, linked as it is to our partial knowledge of the
substantial self which is neyer separated from Christ.
The influence of Julian’ s exemptum on lier retrieval of the function of Christ’ s face
as the mirror for maturation will be examined in the next diptych. But here in this context I
note already Julian’s development of the notion of the three cheres in Christ which she
correlates witli her lifelong request for the three wounds of contrition, compassion and
longing for God.
The first [chere] is that of lis Passion, as lie revealed when lie was with us in this
life, dying; and altliough to contemplate this be sorrowful and grievous, stili it is
glad and joyful, because he is God. The second is pity and mth and compassion,
and this le reveals to ail lis loyers, witli the certainty of protection which
necessarily beiongs to lis mercy. The third is that blessed chere as it will be
without end, and this was most often revealed, and continued the longest time.
And so in the time of our pain and our woe lie reveals to us the chere of lis Passion
and lis Cross, helping us to bear it by lis own blessed power. And in the time of
our sinning lie shows to us the chere of ruth and pity, mightily protecting us and
defending us against ail our enemies. And these are the two usual cheres which lie
reveals to us in this life, mingling with them the third, and that is lis blessed
chere, partly like what it will be in heaven; and that is wlien througli grace we are
touched by sweet illuminations of the life of the Spint, through which we are kept
in true faith, hope and love, with contrition and devotion and also witli
contemplation and every ldnd of true joys and sweet consolations. The bÏessed
chere of our Lord God works this in us through grace. (LI 71.)
Bradley speaks of these three “expressions of the divine countenance” as “special
mystical gifts” whicli are to be distinguished from the “ordinary ways God is present to
113 BRADLEY, 1984, p. 22.
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us”.114 I suggest that, in terms of Julian’s understanding of grace, shaped as it was by the
concrete, non-ascent spirituality of the anchorhold and engaging both atonement and
sanctification in one whole salvific work, Julian would flot necessarily have seen her
showing in such exclusivist terrns. Rather, I suggest, these three cheres are a way for her
to describe the process by whïch she -- that is, the soul which has been wounded
(familialy, societally)
-- bas corne to know herseif to be a beloved self, and to appropnate
ber salvation in conditions of wellbeing and woe. Just as she bas reversed the traditional
roles and reasoning in soteriology, so here, I suggest, ber understanding of the maturation
of the sensual condition of the self in its relationship to Christ is adapted according to the
need of the wounded pre-oedipal self.
I am suggesting that Julian’ s mirror of Christ’ s chere functions to reveal itself in its
three aspects in the soul or self of the pre-oedipally injured, systemically victimized person,
depending on lier variable, sensual condition of healing and salvation before God.
1) Crysdale spoke of the first rnovement toward the appropriation of a soteriology,
whicb works for those who have been wounded on the underside of history, as one of
grief and bealing of wounds ratber than of contrition and forgiveness of sins of pride. So
also Julian’ s siglit of the first chere, that is of Christ’ s Passion, reveals the existence of the
lost, tnie self in a condition of merged suffering and with Christ’ s suffering. It is a mirror
of Christ’s utter compassionate identtflcation with such a wounded, grieving soul
without reserve. This is the mirror of Julian’s first four showings of Christ in his
Passion. It is the condition of unbearable and unintelligible suffering, which, as Bynum,
Ruether and others have pointed out, is the condition in which medieval women were given
to appropriate their salvation in Christ, as we saw earlier. This is the movernent in which
the minor of Christ’s chere reflects the background of medieval devotion to the humanity
of Christ and which led, as Bynum observed, to the belief by women that “Christ is what
we are”.115
2) Once the identification of Christ with the true self s abject condition of suffering
long abandonment and neglect lias been appropriated, the mirror of Christ’s chere begins
to allow to be seen the complicity of the soul in the effects of sin. This is the movement
toward tbe empatbic exposure of the false self (or as Moore puts it the “early ego”) and
growth into a greater capacity to discem the effects of sin and tum frorn them, aiways
114 BRADLEY, 1984, p. 22.
115 BYNUM, Caroline Walker, Jesus as mother: Studies in the spirituality of the high rniddle ages,
Berkeley, CA, Uiversity of California Press, 1982, p. 130.
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under Christ’ s compassionate regard. What Julian sees in herseif while she is “working
through” this healing and exposing process are the shame-based sins of impatience and
despair, which underlie the introjected anger of the God of the Church’ s teaching and keep
lier from knowing herseif to be loved compassionately by Christ and joyfully united with
Christ in sensuality as well as substance. Here in the mirror of Christ’s chere she sees the
reversai of the traditional meaning of sin, to correspond better to the social location and pre
oedipal need and condition of lier soul. Thus the mirror functions at this point to reveal in
effect how the soul lias appropriated that Christ is what we are not (in our sensuaÏ
condition at that time) but also mirrors who we are to become in sensuaÏity and
substance
-- ie, fully human. However, although Christ mirrors her lack, tliere is no
wrath in God. Christ mirrors compassion which alone can reveal to the beholder lier
intenor condition of impatience (wrath) and despair as a lack of trust: “For we tlirougli sin
and wretchedness have in us a wrath and a constant opposition to peace and to love; and lie
revealed that very often in his lovely look of compassion and pity”. (LT 48). We’ll see
more clearly in the next dyptich how this exposure is necessaiy for Julian to grow into lier
full humanity in God’s siglit.116
3) Julian’s third chere is that of union with Christ in joy, as it will be in heaven but
can be beheld “in part” from time to time in this life by the soul so disposed. One early
image of this is in lier sixteenth showing where she sees Christ reigning in her soul.
Another way of putting this would be to see thïs union as mirroring Christ’s Incarnation in
the soul: in effect it says “we are what Christ is”, in sensuality and substance.
Bradley observes that for Julian full knowing in God is reserved for heaven, as the
revealing of the mysteries now hid to us. As Julian says, “[t]therefore when the judgment
is given, and we are ail brought up above, we shall then clearly see in God tlie mysteries
116 Concerning the full humanity into which Christ’s exposing and empathic chere calis Julian, Bynum
provides an elegant argument. Uniike medieval men whose use of religious (female) imagery was in order
to respond to their need for renunciaflon (self-deniai) and role reversai such that they developed “conceptions
of gender”, women transformed the meanings of the same reiigious images to respond to their need to
“develop conceptions of humanity”, that is, to see themseives asfutly human despite the status of
inhumanity to which the religious culture had relegated them. BYNUM, Caroiyn Waiker, Fragmentation
and Redemption: Essays on gender and the human body in medievat religion, NY, Zone, 1992, p. 156.
However, Bynum hoids that “women’s stories are less frequently told as stories of crisis and change,
regardless of the sex of the narrator, and women writers seem less interested in stories of conversion than in
stories of constant and courageous suffering”. See BYNUM, 1992, p. 154. Given the deveiopmentai thesis
being developed here, that these mirroring images were in fact how Julian expenenced her conversion from
the pattern of relentiess suffering, and that Julian expioited her original reversais of meaning so that the
religious symbolism couÏd respond to her condition, I can’t agree with Bynum’s global judgment in
Julian’s case.
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which are now hidden from us”. (LT 85.) Interestingly Julian says this in another way,
which to my mmd amplifies the mirroring function of Christ’s third chere when she says
that Christ “wili draw our outer chere to the inner, and wiil make us ah at unity with him,
and each of us with others in the true, lasting joy which ïs Jesus”. (LT 71.) It suggests a
unitive vision of restoration in the coherence of the self and of true knowiedge of self, other
and God in the mirror of Christ’s chere.
5.0 Conclusion
To conclude, in Julian’ s reformation of the satisfaction theory as asseth making,
there is a reversai of roles and reasoning. I suggested that this couid have heiped her in the
work of understanding her predicament of vulnerabiiity and abandonment and findmg
satisfaction of lier need for mirroring in the Christ of lier showings and in the chaiienge to
name correctiy wliat sin in lier predicament was. Likewise, in the influence of the methods
and objectives of anchoritic spirituaiity, bom, as that spirituality is, as tliough from tlie
dead, there is a reversai in perspective from other more active spiritualities which Julian
brings to lier soteriology. Rather than transcending the concrete, Juiian’ s doubie self is
anchored in her daily practice of seeking union witli the non-hierarchical, sensual and
joyfiul crucifixion of Christ through the prayer of behoiding. I argued that she retrieved
from the anchontic tradition, and shaped into lier double antliropoiogy, the symbolism of
the enclosed self as lieu for the kenotic Incarnation, k the influence of the mirror analogy,
as describing liow the mirror functions differently at different points in the maturation of
the spiritual life, tliere is a revelation first of identity and oniy later difference. The
exposure to the self which Christ as mirror provides Julian, particulariy in the early stages
of that encounter as represented in lier experience of comfort in Christ’ s intimacy witli lier
in the first showings of luis Passion, is the opposite of what the traditional experience of
purgation for sin was understood to be. But ht coheres with Crysdale’s grasp of liow
salvation begins to lue appropnated by tliose on the underside of history flot in guilt but
rather in grief and compassion. Only subsequently does a reverse understanding of
complicity in sm become intelligible. This process hints at a way througli the feminist
defensiveness toward a renewed meaning for the concept of Jesus’ kenosis in women’s
experience of salvation.
These reversais of order and expectation ail move in tlie same direction: tliat tlie
fundamental encounter with God mediated by Christ for Julian moves away from the
traditional one of recogmzing lier guilt and being moved to contrition and forgiveness of
sins. It becomes, rather, an encounter in grief witli Christ’s overwlielming compassion for
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the suffering endured tiil now, in bis disarming intimacy of regard and healing love. This
strikes a profound resonance with Ciysdale’s observation that for those on the underside of
history and who have internalized dysfunctional familial system pattems, transformation
works in the opposite direction from what the traditional understanding of redemption in
Christ’ s Passion has understood.117
This parallel of reversais in Julian and Crysdale, recognized in principle by Nuth,
Bradley and other feminist Julian scholars, but developed at more length here is a
significant piece of evidence which supports the psychobiographical and sotenological
hypotheses of this research on Julian. It highlights to what extent Julian’s soteriology is an
authentic and brilliant response to her social location, her personal need and lier
compassion for others in such need. Articulating the correlation in this way, I believe, can
help women and others who intuitively resonate with Julian’ s writïngs to understand better,
in terms of soteriological discourse, why this may be so.
117 CRYSDALE, 2001, p. 10.
DIPTYCH 3
CHAPIER 11
DIPTYCH 3.1 MIRRORING IN THE EXEMPLUM
1.0 Introduction
In this first chapter of the third and final diptych I explore the third phase of
Kohut’ s therapeutic process of maturation of mirroring need as applied to tlie Long Text.
In particular, this exploration will focus on the exemptum of the lord and the servant in LT
51, the most developed and dynamic expression of Julian’s soteriology, to explore Julian’s
resolution of the tension between fusion and isolation in the separation-individuation
process of maturation of narcïssism by means of the mirroring transference with the Jesus
of lier showings. I will also look at ber references to Jesus as mother insofar as they speak
of how the Jesus of lier sliowings is invested witli particular mirroring functions whicli
bring about maturation, aithougli I will flot attempt to provide any comprehensive account
of lier Christological and trinitarian theology along these unes.
One of tlie amazingly clear psychobiograpbical pieces of evidence Julian gives us is
to be found in tlie differences between the Sliort and tlie Long Texts. Julian telis us tliat
after tlie fifteenth showing slie doubted the trutli of tlie showings, telling the man of
religion that slie had been raving. (ST 21; LT 66.) At this point in the Long Text she
describes in greater detail tliat “at the end ail was hidden, and I saw no more”; lier sickness
returns, though slie senses that she will go on living, and “I was as barren and dry as if tlie
consolation which I liad received before were trifling....” (LT 66.) Paniclielli has made tlie
psychobiograpliical point tliat tbis loss of tlie immediacy of the showings and tlie condition
of denial and self-doubt wbicli ensued was flot resolved in Julian’s writing of tlie Short
Text and that Julian’ s understanding of the meaning of tlie showings only came as she
came to ternis with lier own liuman nature.1 Tlie Short Text ends heavily with the note of
doubt and despair at hand. Its final, twenty-fifth chapter describes the four kinds of fear.
Panichelli’ s point is tliat througli tlie rewriting of the Showings so many years later “tlie
centre of the short version, which is tlie area of liuman doubt and denial, eventually
dissolves as tlie centre of tlie conflict”.2
I PANICHELLI, Debra Scott, “finding God in the memory: Julian and the Ioss of the visions”, The
Downside review 104, 1986, pp. 299 - 300.
2 PANICHELLI, 1986, p. 302. See also BRADLEY, Ritamary, “Julian’s ‘doubrfutt drede”, The month
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I agree with Panichelli that what is described in Julian’s reactions to the “loss” of
the immediacy of the showings is lier primary fear of abandonment by God to a condition
of isolation, seif-hate and despair. And I have no doubt that the writing of the Long Text
had its own performative effect on Julian. But what happened in the twenty years or more
prior to the composition of the Long Text? I am proposing that Julian negotiated the loss of
tlie experience of immediate, fused union with the Jesus of her showings in the ongoing
transitional space of meditation in which tlie mirroring transference had corne into being.
In particular, she meditated on the exemptum, whose meaning was so unclear to her that
she could not even include it in the Short Text. It is in the exemptum, I suggest, that we
can see the main unes of Julian’ s long term healing and resolution of lier separation anxiety
with its concommitant patterns of self-hate and despair, and observe lier maturation of
mirroring need into mature self worth and object love.
Julian lierseif gives a kind of description of tlie time une in whicli lier self
understanding and mirroring transference clianged. Slie describes tlie three stages of
understanding of the exemplum which were given to her over time:
The first is the beginning of the teaching whicli I understood from it at tlie time.
The second is the inward instruction which I have understood from it since. The
third is ail the whole revelation from the beginmng to tlie end, which our Lord God
of lis goodness freely and ofien brings before the eyes of my understanding. (LT
51.)
Julian explams that
these tliree are so unified, as I understand it, that I cannot and may flot separate
them. And by these three as one I have instruction by which I ought to believe and
trust in our Lord God, that out of the same goodness and for the same purpose as
lie revealed it, by tlie same goodness and for the same purpose will make it clear to
us wlien it is his will. (LT 51.)
Wliule I respect Julian’ s a posteriori understanding tliat tlie three are unified, I propose to
follow Julian’s own histotical process of meditating on and coming to understand tlie
meaning of tlie exemplum, and to interpret each phase of understanding in terms of lier
experience of negotiating tlie separation-individuation process. It is this process which, I
suggest, allows lier to relinquisli or mature througli the need for tlie fused or merged
mirroring transference with the Jesus of lier early showings to one of mirroring proper. As
this takes place, I suggest, Julian is moving toward intenorizing the mature function of the
maternai mirroring need.
My evolving hypotliesis is that Julian’s maturation in mirroring need manifests
itself in a clear shift from wliat I am cafling merged subjectivism in the Short Text
21, Feb 1981, pp. 53 -57.
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description of the showings, to relational realism in the exemplum and her later theological
reflections in the Long Text. I use the phrases merged subjectivism and relationat
reatism to hetp describe the shtft in the qua lity of the experience of hersetf her
experience of God and her relation to others whicli seems to obtain througli the
evolution of her mirroring transference with the Jesus of lier showings.
After Koenig, I propose that tlie single most significant factor in this process as it
manifests itself in Julian’ s exemptum is the mirrroring flinction of tlie face of the lord in tlie
exemplum. Tlie present chapter will attempt to sketch the process and fruits of this
growth in narcissism aid object relations psychological maturation and their relation to lier
spiritual maturation througli the particulars of lier account of tlie mirroring dynaniic in tlie
lord - servant relationship in tlie exemplum.
2.0 A brief review of the third phase of mirroring transference in Kohut
and the signs of maturation in mirroring need
As we have said before, Koliut describes tlie process of maturation in the
therapeutic context as having three distinct phases. Having overcome resistance to
entering into a mirroring transference and having worked through tlie mirroring
transference to the point where new self structures of a more authentic or true self are being
laid down, the individual is enabled to begin to relinquish the mirroring transference in the
third and final phase of the therapeutic transference. The movement toward relinquishing
the early, fused mirroring transference requires that self and other become sufficiently
distinguished that the client can begin to intenonze the mirroring function lierseif.
This is seen in the mirroring transference of “mirroring proper” which, according to
Kohut, allows for more differentiation in one’ s sense of self and other.
In the most mature form of the therapeutic mobiization of the grandiose self the
analyst is most clearly expenenced as a separate person.... In this narrower sense
of the term tlie mirror transference is the therapeutic reinstatement of that normal
phase of the development of the grandiose self in which the gleam in the mother’ s
eye, which mirrors the child’s exhibitionistic display, and other forms of maternai
participation in and response to the lis narcissistic-exhibitionistic enjoyment
confirm the chuld’ s self esteem and by a gradually increasing selectivity of these
responses, begin to channel it ïnto realistic directions.4
KOENIG, Elisabeth, The “Book of showings” ofJulian of Norwich: A testcase for Paul Ricoeur’s
theories of metaphor and the imagination, Ph.D. dissertation, NY, Columbia University, 1984, eh. 7.
KOHUT, Heinz, The anatysis of the se Madison CN, International Universities Press, 1971, pp. 115 -
116.
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According to Kohut, a critical element in the successful therapeutic process is object
constancy.
2.1 Object constancy in relational psychoanalysis
Within the therapeutic mirroring transference, object constancy begins as a capacity
on the part of the therapist which the client cornes to develop and interiorize as a resuit. Let
us look at object constancy as this is manifested in the therapist first, then as it is
intenonzed in the client.
Object constancy in the therapist is essential. In Kohut’ s understanding of the
therapeutic process,
therapeutically most important is the fact that a workable object constancy in the
narcissistic reaim can be attained. The crucial function of the mirror transference is,
in other words, that it brings about a condition which maintains the momentum of
the therapeutic process.5
In the way that Kohut describes it here, object constancy in the mirroring transference can
be seen to be cntically important for the work of therapeutic healing and maturation of the
mirroring transference to be possible in the client.
What is object constancy and why is it so essential in the mirror transference?
Object constancy could be described as a quality of relational acceptance which the therapist
offers the client which guarantees that the clientfeeÏs that bis or her intenor life is
understood. Kohut gives bis reasons for the importance of the analyst’ s object constancy
within the mirror transference:
In order to actuate and to maintain in motion the painful process wbich leads to the
confrontation of the grandiose fantasies with a realistic conception of the self... a
mirror transference in one of its forms must be established. If it does not develop,
however, or if its establishment is interfered with by the therapist’s rejection, or by
bis premature or prematurely massive transference interpretations, then the patient’ s
grandiosity remains concentrated upon the grandiose self, and the therapist is
experienced as foreign and inimical and thus excluded from meaningful
participation. Under these conditions, the ego’s defensive position remains rigid
and ego expansion cannot take place.6
In effect, object constancy is dfrectly related to Kohut’ s therapeuflc method of empathy. if
the therapist is unable to sustain object constancy such that the clientfeets empathically
understood, then the mirroring transference is aborted. Winnicott and Kohut are alike in
emphasizing the importance of empathy as the necessary constant in the therapeutic
method. Kohut makes it bis therapeutic method explicitly. Winnicott does this by keeping
KOHUT, 1971, p. 192, emphasis added.
6 KOHUT, 1971, pp. 192 - 193.
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aiways in the forefront of therapy the ever-present image of the infant. As Amy Martellock
puts it, Winnicott’ s
image of the infant lost in unthinkable anxiety inspires sympathy for the struggies
of the psychotic aduit seeking safety when the possibility of a retum to that state
threatens.... In looking at any individual tbrough a Winnicottian lens, we do flot
start with the pathology of the aduit but with the baby, full of potential but
vuinerable and entirely dependent on the environment for how that potential will be
realized.7
According to Kohut the mirroring (proper) transference represents a later stage in
the infant’s negotiation of separafion from the mother. Earlier theorists understood object
constancy to refer to the infant’ s development of a representation of the mother at around
eight months of age. But more recent theorists have revised this to be a later development
around 18 months, and see it, flot as the intemalization of the mother, but rather, as the
intemalization of a particutar kind of experience of being seen by the mother. Kohut
and Winnicott would agree with this latter view that “[tJhe real theme of object constancy is
self constancy” and that this is foundational for the child [or clientJ to develop a separate
identity.8
Object constancy interiorized manifests itself in self esteem. Kohut describes this in
terms of the move from
an insecure existence dominated by rapid emotional oscillations
-- between
unbndled ambitions and a sense of failure, and between grandiose vanity and
searing shame
-- to that increased equarnmity, inner peace, and security which
result from the transformation of archaic narcissism into... self esteem.9
Kohut emphasizes the maturation of narcissism in the emergence of a cohesive self
expressed in realistic and effective goals and ambitions. As the client grows in tolerating
the expenence of the authentic self first as deprived and empty, that is, the experience of
neither grandiosity nor shame fragments of false self structure, she makes room for the
recognition and acceptance by the reality ego of appropnate mirroring and idealizing needs
within the authentic self.’° Over time in a successful therapeutic situation, the authentic
self is experienced with increasing cohesiveness and as continuous in time. Self esteem, as
Kohut describes it, is about this experience of self as cohesive and continuous through
7 MARTELLOCK, Amy King, She who is flot: A psychobiography of Catherine ofSiena using the
theories of D. W. Winnicott, Ps.D. dissertation, Massachusetts school of professional psychology, 2003,
p. 179.
$ SHERWOOD, Vance, “Object constancy: The illusion of being seen”, Psychoanatytic psychology 6,
1989, p. 22.
KOHUT, 1971, p. 192.
10KOHUT, 1971, p. 186.
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time. Thanks to therapeufic object constancy, the transitional creative illusion of being seen
and affirmed, self constancy becomes more prevalent. In its maturity the authentic self,
according to Kohut, is charactenzed by a consistent capacity to “have empathy for oneseif’,
Le., the capacity for consoling, soothing oneseif, and for affect mentalization, which
signais the point at which the mirroring function of the analyst lias undergone transmuted
intemalization by the client, thus allowing the transference relationship with the analyst to
be relinquished.
2.2 Maturation in narcissism and object relations
There are several other charactenstics of the authentic self and its relafional character
emerging from a successful therapeutic mirroring transference, as understood by relational
psychoanalysts such as Winnicott, Meissner, etc., as well as theologians, such as
McDargh, who draw on this school, whicli are significant to recali liere before exploring
Julian’ s exemptum.
This therapeutic phase would correspond to what Winmcott understood to be at
stake in the infant’ s negotiation of separation from the mother. Kohut sees narcissism as
maturing independently of object relations, and is focused pnmarily on maturation in the
cohesion of the self as that is marnfested in the realism of the individual’s goals and
ambitions. Other signs of psychodynamic maturation include empathy for others,
creativity, humour, etc. Winnicott, on the other hand, sees narcissistic maturation in self
esteem as essential for growth in self and reality acceptance. Winrncott sees the maturation
of mirroring througli disillusionment as essential flot just for the maturation of narcissism in
a cohesive sense of self but also for the creative work of relating inner and outer reality, for
the development of a creative and durable sense of botli self and extemal reality. Having in
effect thus successfiully reparented herself to accept lier own humanity in this empathic,
realistic way, the individual is also fteed to see the analyst, and others with whom
minoring transferences are developed in the vicissitudes of life, in a way winch is
accepting of their liumanity as “good enough”. Thus as Winnicott regards the progress of
maturation, there is a a shift from “object relating” (where the other is expenenced as an
extension of the self) to what he calis “object use”, a phrase winch refers to the sense of the
durable reality of the other.11 In Kohut’ s terms, the other shifts from being experienced as
an extension of oneself to becoming an “independent centre of initiative”. It is tins
il Object use as Winnicott means it bas therefore nothing to do with manipulation. See WINNICOTT, D.
W., “The use of an object and relating through identifications”, in Ptaying and reality, NY, Routiedge,
[1969] 1989, pp. 86 - 94.
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experience of the durability of the other which, for Winnicott, makes possible the capacity
for object love.
Relatïonal psychoanalysis, such as I am drawing on in the work of Kohut and
Winmcott and others, regards the self as relational throughout life, from less mature forms
of narcissistic, resistive, fusional and fragmented forms of dependence to more mature,
cohesive and differentiated forms of interdependence. This is significant for the
development of both women and men in theîr different ways of expenencing the separation
from the mother. With regard to the religious godobject of the mirroring transference,
therefore, Winnicott, Meissner, McDargh and others are clear that it is flot the case that the
transference is ultimately “relinquished” for some condition of presumably more mature
“autonomy” of self. Rather, in une wîth this psychoanalytic school, I will be looking for
signs of mature relational dependence, expressing greater flexibility and differentiation in
relationship. Relational dependence can, in that sense, move toward mutuality.
2.3 Narcissism, object relations and faith maturation
How does maturation in narcissism and object relations manifest itself in the
expenence of faith? Although this is a question which can only be touched on, it is
significant for the present work insofar as the Showings are an account of both
psychological healing and Christian spiritual and theological maturation. It may be possible
at least to correlate some elements of the development of trust in the maturation of Julian’ s
sense of authentic self with aspects of the development of trust in her faith experience.
Theologian John McDargh has drawn extensively from Meissner and object relations
theory in his work, privileging the earliest childhood expenences of trust, trauma, loss and
separation, and thus rooting the exigency of faith in narcissism)2 I draw on McDargh’ s
six developmental indices of maturation in faith experience. He names four of these as the
“from whence of faith”: the sense of being real, the sense of being in relationship to a real
and meaningfifl world, the capacity to be alone, the capacity to tolerate dependence. Two
others he calls the “to where of faith”: the capacity to tolerate ambivalence and the sense of
oneself as available for loving self-donation.13 Some of these are onented more toward
male psychological development than female, such as “self-donation”, for example. It is
12 McDARGH, John, Psychoanatytic object relations theory and the study of religion: Onfaith and the
imaging of God, Lanham MD, University Press ofAmerica, 1983, cli. 3. On page 71 McDargh defines
faith as that “human dynamic of trusting, relying upon, ami reposing confidence in, which (1) is
foundational to the life-long process of becoming a self, and (2) is fulfil]ed in the progressively enlarged
capacity of that self for love and self-commitment”.
13 McDARGH, 1983, pp. 72 - 102.
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flot seif-evident from the term that self-donation is a sign of maturation in women. I am
encouraged by the quote McDargh includes on the subject of self-donation that “[o]nly to
what fulfilis our being can we give ourselves without despair”.’4 Again, some of what he
calis the “from whence” capacities, might be better described for women as the “to where”
capacities. I am thinicing, for example, of the capacity to be alone. So in recogmzing any
of these as they manifest themselves in Julian’s later work, I will be filtenng them through
the lens of the more difficuit challenges facing this woman seeking full and flourishing
selffiood in her faith. 15
3.0 The exemptum of the lord and the servant
The exemplum is virtually universally agreed to be the core of Julian’ s soteriology
by Julian specialists,’6 although Julian’s theological reflections on the motherhood of
Christ have tended to overshadow thïs in feminist and lay appropriations of Julian’ s
spirituality. The exemplum can be said to include and subsume in one form or other, ail
of the showings of the Short Text, and it dynamizes Julian’s subsequent Christological and
tnnitarian explorations.’7 So in this final chapter of the psychoanalytic exarnination of
14 McDARGH, 1983, p. 98, quoting Daniel Day WiIliams.
15 Because the Kohutian orientation of this psychoanaly tic study of mirroring is concerned with the genetic
effects of the earliest period of human life, I have flot drawn explicitly on Liebert’s structural-developmental
study of stages of maturation through the whole life cycle in “symbolic communication” and “selfother
perspective” which she bas developed from Piagetians Jane Loevinger and Robert Kegan. See LWBERT,
Elizabeth, Changing trfe patterns: Adutt devetopment in spiritual direction, NY, Paulist, 1992, ch. 4. For
these two indices of maturation Liebert is drawing on the thesis of IVY, Steven, The structural
devetopmentat theories ofJames Fowier and Robert Kegan as resources for pastorat assessment, Ph.D.
dissertation, Southern Baptist theological seminaiy, 1985, pp. 147 - 151. Interestingly, Liebert recognizes
Kegan’s appropriation of Winnicott’s notion of “holding environment” to descnbe what is needed for
development from one stage to another to occur. See also LIEBERT, Elizabeth, “The thinking heart:
Developmental dynamics in Etty Hillesum’s Diaries”, Pastorat psychology 43, 1995, pp. 393 - 409.
Joann Wolski Conn has recently done a similar type of assessment with regard to Thérèse de Lïsieux. See
WOLSKI CONN, Joann, “Thérèse of Lisieux: Far from spiritual childhood”, Spiritus 6, 2006, pp. 6$ - $9.
16 ANDERSON, Derek, Jutian ofNorwich ‘s nonviotent account of satvation, Ph.D. thesis, Loyola
University, Chicago, 2005, pp. 151 - 152; BAUERSCHMIDT, Frederick, Jutian of Norwich and the
mysticat body potitic of Christ, Notre Dame, Indiana, Notre Dame University Press, 1999, ch. 4; HIDE,
Kenie, Gtfled origins to gracedfutfittment: The soteriotogy of Jutian ofNorwich, Collegeville MN,
Liturgical Press, 2001, p. 33; KOENIG, 1984, p. 112; NUTH, ban, Wisdom’s daughter: The theotogy of
Jutian of Norwich, NY, Crossroad, 1991, pp. 27
- 39; PELPHREY, Brant, “Leaving the womb of Christ:
Love, doomsday and space/time in Julian of Norwich and Eastern Orthodox mysticism”, in Jutian of
Norwich: A book of essays, ed. McENTIRE, Sandra, NY, Garland, 1998, p. 315.
17 Thus, for example, while I find her study quite stimulating in other ways, I disagree with Donohue
White who daims that “[wJhereas the symbol of lord and servant responds to Julian’s anxious questioning
on the universal level of salvation history, the symbol of mother and child dramatizes the divine-human
343
mirroring in the Showings, my attention will be largely focused on Julian’ s exemplum in
her Long Text 51.
Julian’s fourteenth showing, in which the exemplum is embedded in the Long
Text, reflects on her various conditions in prayer. (ST 19 and LT 42.) In a condition of
union there is no need to pray, Julian says, because we have what we desire. But in the
condition of absence of union with Christ in prayer, Julian is chronically vuinerable to self
condemnation, doubt and despair, expressed as her preoccupation with sin and seif-blame.
li is this preoccupation with the Church teaching and lier own introjection of
blameworthiness for 5m which leads into Julian’s account of the exemptum of the lord and
the servant in the Long Text, which is only alluded to, in the Short Text.
Julian longs for union with Christ. In lier early requests for the three wounds, the
final one was of longing for union with Christ. Perhaps it could be inferred that at that
early point in her life, union in death seemed to her to be the ambivalent solution to her
preoccupation with sin and lier unacknowledged fundamental doubt of the possibility of
salvation.
In the Long Text the fruit and end of prayer, she says, “is to be united and lilce to
our Lord in ail things”. What she means is that prayer “makes us like to hirnself in
condition as we are in nature” (LT 42), i.e., in sensualïty as in substance. The Lord is the
ground of our beseeching and so the one who prays does flot do this alone. Rather she is
first drawn to the activïty of prayer by the Lord. The goal of praying is to be “united
[onyd] into the sight and the beholding of him to whom we pray”. (LT 43.) Her
description of the condition of human sensuality united to its substance in Christ, the
ground of our prayer, includes ail possible feelings and senses:
And 50 we shah by his sweet grace in our own meek prayer corne into him now in
this life by many secret touchings of sweet spiritual sights and feelings, measured
out to us as our simplicity may bear it.... And then [when we die] we shah ail corne
into our Lord, knowing ourselves clearly and wholly possessing God, and we shah
ail be endlessly hidden in God, truly seeing and wholly feeling, and hearing him
spirituaily and delectably smelling him and sweetly tasting him. And there we shah
see God face to face, familiarly and wholly. (LT 43.)
The goal of prayer is unity of body and soul, and of the hurnan being witli God. And she
says, “God beholds us in love and wants us to be partners in his good will and work...”
encounter in the everyday life of the believing Christian”. DONOHUE-WHITE, Patricia, “Reading divine
maternity in Julian of Norwich”, Spiritus 5, 2005, p. 27. This division would seem to me to be an
example of the effect of the contemporary problem of the incredibility of the tradition’s soteriological
narratives, such that no assumption is made that the everyday life of the believing Christian and the grand
story of salvation history connect.
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(LI 43.) So human prayer in this life is part of God’s work of union or, to use her word,
oneing (onyng).
But despite this, despite her life consecrated to prayer, and despite the first thirteen
showings which spoke to her of the capaciousness and unconditional quality of God’s love
and immanence, Julian is blocked from experiencing “confident trust” (LT 41) in the
possibility of unity with God, because of sin.18 Julian’s narrative becomes intense as she
cannot reconcile her showings with what she has learned from Church teaching and from
her own introjected feelings that “the blame of our sïns hangs continually upon us”. (LT
50.) This acknowledgement of the teaching and feeling of “blame” is explicit in the Long
Text (although it was certainly implicit in the Short Text), and speaks of Julian’s ongoïng
preoccupation with this issue in the intervening years.
Julian cries out for an answer as to how to be appropriately present to her sin, in the
self-knowledge of it which God desires of lier, yet without blaming herseif for it and
absorbing herseif in despair. (LT 78.) She asks her question, what is sin, posed this time
with a clearer focus. Now Julian asks, flot “what is sin?” but, “how does God sees sin?”
so that she might know how it is fitting for her to see 5m. (LT5O.) She receives from the
Lord the example of the servant and the lord which, she telis us, was the only response to
her question she received. (LT51.)’9
Julian relates the exemptum very brïefly at first:
.1 saw two persons in bodily likeness, that is to say a lord and a servant; and with
that God gave me spiritual understanding. The lord sits in state in rest and peace.
The servant stands before his lord, respectfully, ready to do his lord’s will. The
lord looks on his servant very lovingly and sweetly and mildly. He sends him to a
18 In the Short Text she says that Christ rebukes her for thinking that it could be “that you would flot
have what you beseech... because we have flot the firm trust which we need”. (ST 19.) This is revised in
the Long Text where Julian writes “But let us do what we can... and everything which is lacking in us we
shah find in him... And... with the revelation I saw a complete overcoming of ail our weakness and ail our
doubting fears”. (LT 42.)
9COLLEDGE, Edmund and lames WALSH, eds., A book ofshowings to the anchoress Julian of
Norwich, Toronto, Pontifical Institute ofMedieval Studies, 1978a, p. 513 fn. 3 clarify that Jutian and ber
contemporaries used this word as a “technicai term of rhetonc to mean a preacher’s exemptum”. I prefer to
use this word exemplum, rather than “parable”, whïch is a popular way of refemng to the genre of narrative
in Julian’s LT 51. Watson and Jenbns observe that Julian’s exemplum is
a genre of narrative associated with Anselm and especially common in Ancrene wisse, in which
divine truths are described in closely analogous human ternis. Significance is generated flot by the
gap between vehicle and tenor, story and meaning
-- as is the case in some of lesus’ parables,
whose improbability is their point -- but by their contiguity. Here, the result is as close to
algebra as a narrative mode can be....
WATSON, Nicholas and Jacqueline JENKINS, eUs., The writings ofJulian ofNorwich: “A vision showed
to a devout woman” and “A revelation of love”, University Park PN, Pennsylvania State University, 2006,
p. 272. (RecalI Anselm’s exemptum, noted above in chapter 10.)
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certain place to do his will. Not only does the servant go, but lie dashes off and
mns at great speed, lovïng to do lis lord’ s wili. Md soon lie fails into a dell and is
greatiy injured; and then lie groans and moans and tosses about and writhes, but lie
cannot rise or help himseif in any way. And of ail this, the greatest liurt wliich I
saw liim in was lack of consolation, for lie could flot tum lis face to look on his
ioving lord, wlio was very close to liim, in whom is ail consolation; but like a man
wlio was for the time extremely feeble and foolish, lie paid lieed to his feelings and
lis continuing distress.... (LI 51.)
The rest of LT 51, whicli is mudh longer tlian any other chapter in the Long Text,
elaborates the details of the exemptum and offers reflection on its tlieoiogical meaning.
Ilius, although tlie exemplum may include what Jonte-Pace cails “borrowed units” of
rlietoric, tlie fact that the exemptum was not written in tlie Short Text, and that it took so
many years for Julian to understand its meanings, suggests tliat tlie manner of her coming
to record it may be psychobiographically revelatory.
Julian teils us in LT 51 that this exemptum was “misty”, that is, both obscure in its
meaning and mystical. It took her twenty years of meditation on it for many of tlie details
of this exemptum to become clearer to her, and even tIen it is stiil mysterious. In other
words, she is teliing us tliat she had the exemptum at the time of the showings, but only
wrote about it much later because of its misty meaning. Tlius, I suggest, we can see
something of Julian’s process of maturation as lier thoughts in SI 19 (on how slie
expefiences lierseif in union in prayer, tlien separated from God in desolation and then
reunited to God in prayer) connect to the initiai mearnng of the exemptum and
subsequently, to its “mistïer” meaning.
Aithougli tlie exemplum is itself short, Julian goes on at lengtli to understand every
aspect of its meaning. For the purposes of this psychobiographical study however some
aspects will be seen to be more significant tlian otliers. I have observed tliat Julian’ s
fourteentli showing on prayer, lier longing for union and lier stmggle to understand lier
conflicting feelings, are to be considered the context in wliicli to read tlie exemptum of the
servant and the lord. Foliowing the exemplum, Julian glides into the chapters where she
expands on tlie activity of the Trinity and introduces tlie work of Motlier Christ. Koenig
observes tliat throughout this section of the Long Text, tlie references to the face of the lord
are more frequent tIan in the Short Text or anywliere else prior to this in the Long Text.20
Ilius I foilow Koenig in postulating that the image of the lord’s face piays a “compensatory
function in lier own personal development”.21 For that reason, this chapter will have a
20 KOENIG, 1984, p.19l.
21 KOENIG, 1984, p. 185.
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sustained focus on the dynamic relationship between the servant and the face of the lord
which was the focus of the showing she receïved initially, and will have to ignore many of
the other details in the exemptum which Julian identifies in her later reflection in the
chapter.22
And at this point the example which had been shown vanished, and our good Lord
led my understanding on to the end of what was to be seen and shown in the
revelation. But despite this leading on, the wonder of the example neyer ieft me,
for it seemed to me that it had been given as an answer to my petition. And yet at
that time I could flot understand it fully orbe comforted. For in the servant, who
was shown for Adam, as I shah say, I saw many different characteristics which
could in no way be attnbuted to Adam, that one man; and so at that time I relied
greatly on three insights, for the complete understanding of that wonderful example
was not at that time given to me. (LT 51.)
Julian describes very deliberately the three insights conceming the attributes of the
servant which she understood over time.
The first is the beginning of the teaching which I understood from it at the time.
The second is the inward instruction which I have understood from it since. The
third is ail the whole revelation from the beginmng to the end, which our Lord GoU
of his goodness fteely and often brings before the eyes of my understanding. (LT
51.)
I propose to follow Julian’ s own interpretive process, but adding my interpretation of the
psychobiographical significance of each element to hers.
3.1 “The beginning of the teaching which I understood from it at
the time”: The servant Adam and the mirroring face of the lord
Julian studies the servant fallen into the ditch: “I looked carefully to know if I could
detect any fault in him, or if the lord would impute to bim any kind of blame; and truly
none was seen, for the only cause of his falling was his good will and his great desire”.
(LT 51.)
She also observes the face of the lord beholding the fallen servant:
And ail this time his loving lord looks on him most tenderly, and now with a double
aspect [chere], one outward, very meekly and mildly, with great compassion and
pity, and this belonged to the first part; the other was inward, more spiritual, and
this was shown with a direction of my understanding towards the lord, and I was
brought again to see how greatly he rejoiced over the honourable rest and nobihity
which by his plentiful grace he wishes for his servant and will bring him to. (LT
51.)
22 Koenig’s thesis examines several attributes of the servant including the fail, the clothing and the toil.
Sec KOENIG, 1984, eh. 6.
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Julian says that when she first had the vision she understood the servant to be
Adam. The fail of the servant Adam is the fali of humankind, visually represented as the
sin state of despair or shame. 0f ail bis pains the servant’s greatest hurt is
lack of consolation for lie could flot turn bis face to look on bis loving lord, who
was very close to him, in wliom is ail consolation; but like a man who was for the
time extremely feeble and foolish, he paid heed to bis feelings of continual
distress... [FJor lie neitlier sees clearly his loving lord... nor does lie truly see what
lie himself is in tlie siglit of bis loving lord. (LT 51.)
In this brief description is etched both Julians central concem around the sin of
despair and self-hate and the primordial human experience of the infant’s arcliaic false self
who has leamed flot to expect the maternai selfobject to be able to mirror the child’s need to
sec himself as beloved. Both tlie servant’s lack of eye contact with the face of tlie lord and
the servant’s feelings are powerful expressions of this Iearrnng.
Julian’s image of tlie servant would seem to be a picture of lier own unrelenting
condition of self-preoccupied suffering in isolation, lier archaic fragmented self, in both its
despairing and grandiose fragments. The despair is evident. But there is a kind of
grandiosity, easily overlooked, whicli is implicit both in the servant’ s futile desire to get out
of the ditcli without help, and behind that, in the impotence invested in the lord by the
servant’ s imagining the lord to be absent, unavailable and unsympathetic. By now it
sliould be evident that witli respect to Julian’s servant, this grandiosity must be understood
in a feminine form, focused on feelings related to an overdeveloped sense of responsibility
for relationships rather than on self-aggrandizement, and so related to systemic societal as
well as familial neglect.
But compare Kohut, particularly in the fear of destroying the motlier by the gaze:
Patient E., . . .wliose motlier had been chronically ill and depressed dunng bis
childhood was afraid of looking at the analyst for fear of overburdemng bim by bis
gaze. The gaze, however, was the carrier of the wisli to be held and carried by the
mother (and most likely also to suck at lier breast), and he feared that tlie fulfihiment
of this wish would be tlie sick mother’s undoing.23
By contrast, in the exemptum the lord’s face does not correspond to wliat tlie
servant imagines it would be, and Julian observes in amazement: “And the loving regard
[chere] whicli lie kept constantly on his servant, and especially [namelyJ wlien lie feu, it
seemed to me that it could melt our hearts for love and break them in two for joy”. (LT 51.)
What is amazing to lier is the constancy of the compassionate chere of the lord toward tlie
servant in bis predicament.
23 KOHUT, 1971, p. 119.
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Psychoanalytically it is hïghly significant that the exemplum distinguishes between
the condition of the servant suffering in bis seif-preoccupation with abandonment and
despair, and the condition of tlie face of the lord. The despairing condition of the servant
would seem to 5e identical to the sufferïng which I have suggested that Julian experienced
as the psychobiographical backdrop of the showings and as a pattem in her life and prayer.
I suggest tliat Julian’ s meditative attention to the exemplum for twenty years could
reflect her process of negotiating a bistory of separation anxiety in having missed the
mirroring function of the matemal parent, both as her mother and as Mother Church, and in
the more immediate loss of the Christ of lier merged or fused union after her recovery from
lier illness. Wliat lier initial understanding of tlie exemptum inadvertently describes is a
move toward greater differentiation between self and other, a new tolerance of the
othemess of tlie face of tlie lord than wliat Julian (tlie servant) liad learned to expect.
Notably, in the exemptum tliere is no bodily fusion or sign of enclosure as tliere was in her
earlier showings described in tlie Sliort Text. This new knowledge of the other lias an
effect on lier self-knowledge.
3.1.1 Object constancy in the exemplum
Julian, I hold, is in the process of relinquisliing her fragments of archaic self
invested botli in tlie bliss of fusion experienced in tlie merged mirroring transference and in
the despair of isolation and abandonment. Tlie core of wliat I will cali lier negotiation of
the separation-individuation process in tlie exemptum of the lord and servant is to be
located in her focus on the constancy of the loving regard ofthe tord, wliich sliows itself
in two different cheres depending on tlie changeable condition of the soul’s sensuality. (LI
51.) I observed that this function of mirroring proper (as distinct from tlie merged state of
bodily fusion witli Christ in suffering in the early showings) begins to emerge in the eiglith
to nintli showing (ST 12; LI 21) witli lier experience of engaging in eye to eye contact and
finding herself changed by the change of Cbrist’s chere. But the flowering of this
mirroring transference nanowly speaking, I suggest, is to be found in the exemptum. I
explore tliis by asking two questions.
First, how does Julian’s exemplum reveal object constancy in tlie face of the lord?
Object constancy in tlie mirroring other is essential for her to sustain a long-term mirroring
transference with tlie Christ of lier sliowings. Ibis is particularly so once the exalted
experience of the showings passed from ïmmediacy into memory and potential loss or
denial, as slie herself says: “tlie wonder of tlie example neyer left me”. As we witness this
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in Julian’s exemptum, the minoring transference with the Christ of her other showings is
engaged and maintained in the face of the lord. The face of the lord in Julian’s exemptum
seems to have sustained a focus for object constancy in Julian’ s transitional space of
prayer, enabling lier to maintain the mirroring transference for twenty years and more and
therefore enabling Julian to intenorize object and self constancy as she practises beholding
that face in meditation. Ml this confirms Koenig’ s hypothesis that the face of the lord
compensated for a lack in Julian’ s own history, and functioned to provide that mirroring.24
The consistent meaningfulness of the mirroring transference, and its “maintenance”
over the rest of lier meditative life, linges on Julian’ s capacity to identify witli tlie human
condition of the servant Adam and to trust that the chere of the lord in her exemptum will
recognize and affirm lier and also challenge lier, but flot change in sucli a way as to signify
rejection of lier.
In psychobiograpliical terms I suggest that tlie evolution in Julian’s visionaiy
mirroring transference would also argue forcefully for the pre- and post-visionary Julian’ s
having had some form of long-term relationship with a spiritual counsellor who mirrored
these mature qualities and so provided a source of confirmation, for Julian to intemalize
24 Contemporary examples of this transformation of intenor conditions to new states of cohesion and self
esteem, through meditative exercises that favour encounters with the Godobject Jesus, are numerous in
literature on meditation in the Ignatian tradition. Barbara Newman lias put a comparative interpretation on
such practices in lier article on medieval scripted visions. See NEWMAN, Barbara, “What did it mean to
say ‘I saw’?: The clasli between theory and practice in medieval visionary culture”, Speculum 80, 2005,
pp. 25 - 27. But here I prefer an interpretation that leaves open the possibility for psychodynamic
maturation. See for exampte Justin Kelly’s description of three sucli encounters. Although he does flot
draw attention to this, what is significant in cadi case is that the Jesus of the meditation makes eye contact
with the meditator. His third example is of a woman who had been “struggiing with feelings of shame,
guilt and anger stemming from lier early childhood”. In this guided meditation she was to imagine that a
sculpture of her had been made and she was looking at it. “It was the pose which startled and appalled lier:
she was standing there with lier hands over her eyes, covering ber face”. Near the end of the meditation,
she was to imagine Jesus coming into the room and standing in front of her statue.
But she could flot sec him, mucli as slie wanted to. What would lie say to lier? Unmistakeably,
she heard him say the words she had often heard from lier director: “Ann, look at me”. And he
gently touched lier stony hands and took them away from her face.
In that instant, she began unmistakably to feel differently about God and herself. This
change could not have happened, I am convinced, without the years of therapy and spiritual
direction that preceded it. Nevertlieless, it needed this imaginative encounter with God to bnng il
about. Something that was known before more imperfectÏy and abstractly
-- lier being loved and
accepted as she was by a personal other, by Christ -- became suddenly conscious and effective
through an act of imagining; what was absent fa significant part of herself) became present.
KELLY, Justin, s.j., “Absence into presence: A theology ofthe imagination”, Warren lecture 16, Tulsa,
University ofTulsa, 1991, p. 12.
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them as self constancy.25 This is the “assise anthropologique” which is suggested by the
constancy of the chere of the lord in the exemplum. 0f course, the exemptum takes on a
life of its own in the potential space of Julian’s ongoing meditation on it.
The most significant feature of the exemptum for this mirroring function is Julian’ s
insistence on the “loving regard [chereJ which [the lordJ kept constantty on lis servant”
(LT 51.)
And ail this time bis loving lord looks on him most tenderly, and now with a double
aspect, one outward, veiy meekly and mildly, with great compassion and pity, and
this belonged to the first part; the other was inward, more spiritual, and this was
shown with a direction of my understanding towards the lord, and I was brought
again to see how greatly lie rejoiced over the honourable rest and nobility which by
bis plentiful grace he wishes for bis servant and will bring him to. And this
belonged to the second vision. And now my understanding was led back to the
first, keeping both in mmd. (LT 51.)
The constancy of the lord’ s regard is developed in ber detection of two cheres in the lord,
one outward and compassionate, the other inward and joyful. In this early interpretation
Julian sees that the two cheres of the lord are appropriate responses to different conditions
of human sensuality. The lord’s inward chere ofjoy is recognized, but at the point at
which Julian was as yet too confused about the exemptum to include it in the Short Text,
the lord’s inward chere of joy seems to remain “misty” for Julian, in comparison with the
compassionate one. Julian discovers that the servant is Adam, ail humankind. And Adam
was injured in bis powers and made most feeble, and in bis understanding lie was
amazed, because lie was diverted from looking on bis lord, but bis will was
preserved in God’s sight. I saw the lord commend and approve him for bis will,
but lie himself was blinded and hindered from knowing tbis will. (LT 51.)
So the lord in the exemptum looks on the servant, as Adam, with an outer chere of
compassion, and an inner chere of joy. This, Julian telis us, is the beginning of the
answer to the dilemma about how God sees sin which she received from the exemplum.
25 Compare Jeanne Leber’s life long relationship with ber spiritual counsellor françois Séguenot who first
encouraged ber in ber intuition of a cal] to solitude in an anti-mystical Montreal in the early years of its
foundation in 1677:
Ce n’est pas facile de vivre hors normes, ni d’accompagner quelqu’un dans une voie inédite.
François Séguenot dans son rôle de conseiller est aussi étonnant que Jeanne dans sa détermination
de vivre dans la solitude. Il sort délibérément des sentiers battus en ce qui concerne les conseils
aux femmes. Et s’avère, dans son genre, aussi original que Jeanne. Malheureusement, cet homme
modeste est passé aussi inaperçu dans la grande Histoire que dans celle de la Compagnie de Saint
Sulpice qui n’a rien conservé à son sujet. DEROY-PINEAU, françoise, Jeanne Leber: La
recluse au coeur des combats, Montréal, Bellarmin, 2000, p. 72.
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At the same time, I would argue, it is the key to her long term transmuted intemalization of
a sense of lier authentic self.
Secondly then, how may we see Julian’ s internalization of the capacity for object
constancy as a work of separation from tlie mirroring other?
This is wliere, it seems to me, tlie exemplum as slie lias written it leaves open a
magnificently meaningful gap. Slie describes to us liow the servant, having fallen and hurt
himself in lis rusli to carry out tlie lord’ s request, is preoccupied with lis own changeable,
and indeed, despairing, condition. Again,
..tlie greatest hurt which I saw liim in was lack of consolation, for lie could not
turn lis face to look on his loving lord, who was very close to him, in wliom is all
consolation; but like a man wlio was for the time extremely feeble and foolish, lie
paid lieed to lis feelings and lis continuing distress.
And this is a great sorrow and a cruel suffering to him, for lie neither sees
clearly his loving lord, who is so meek and mild to him, nor does lie truly see wliat
lie himself is in the siglit of lis loving lord. (LT 51.)
Significantly wliat slie does flot actually describe in the text is tlie moment at wliicli tlie
servant presumably does tum lis face to the lord to discover liow lie is really seen by tlie
lord. Using Anderson’ s terms, this is a point in tlie narrative in whicli all four “trajectories
for reading Julian” converge. It is a gap in tlie narrative whicli is integral to tlie meaning of
tlie exemplum; it is meditative in tliat tlie reader retums again and again to reflect on ït or
imagine it as did Julian; it is contrapuntal in that the narrative omits this significant point
and rather darts back and forth between the perspectives of tlie servant and tlie lord; and it
is performative in tlie sense tliat it recreates tlie dynamism of tlie eye movement and cliange
in chere in tlie reader wliich Julian sought to comunicate of lier own experience.26 But we
know tliat in lier showings, and then again repeatedly in lier life of meditation on tliem,
Julian lias experienced this tuming of lier eyes in meditation toward the chere of tlie lord.
Slie lias told us that what she learned from Christ’s cliange of chere in tlie eiglitli to nintli
sliowing was tliat
.we are now on lis cross witli liim in our pains... until tlie last moment of life.
Suddenly he will dliange bis chere for us, and we sliall be witli him in lieaven.
Between tlie one and tlie other ail wiil be one time; and tlien ail will be brouglit into
joy. (LT 21.)
What is new in the context of the exemptum is tliat she describes this
transformative moment from the new perspective of one who is beholding the lord
behotding the servant, i.e., with tlie added contrapuntal distance of being an observer as
26 See ANDERSON, 2005, ch. 2, on these four trajectories for reading Julian of Norwich.
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well as the servant. She describes this as the sight which she understood from the
beginning of the teaching, i.e., as what slie received at the time of receiving the showings.
It remains the potenfially transformative moment in the exemplum until it is acmally
interiorized by Julian the beholder - servant in the act of tuming to behold the lord: “The
loving regard which [the lord] kept constantly on his servant, and especially when lie feu, it
seemed to me that it could meit our hearts for love and break them in two forjoy”. (LT 51.)
Thus Julian leaves us with the sense that, for lier, the act of interiorizing tlie object
constancy of the loving chere of the Lord is of paramount significance, but also a
changeable thing, like our sensual nature itself.
During our lifetirne liere we have in us a marvellous mixture [medlurJ of botli well
being and woe.... Dying, we are constantly protected by Christ, and by the
touching of bis grace we are raised to true trust in salvation. And we are so
afflicted in our feelings by Adam’s falling in various ways, by 5m and by different
pains, and in this we are made dark and so blind tliat we can scarcely accept any
comfort. But in our intention we wait for God, and trust faithfully to have mercy
and grace; and this is bis own working in us, and in bis goodness lie opens tlie eye
of our understanding, by whicli we have sight, sometimes more and sometimes
less, according to the ability God gives us to receive.... And tifis mixture is so
marvellous in us that we scarcely know, about ourselves or about our even
Christians, what condition we are in, tliese conflicting feelings are so
extraordinary.. . . (LT 52.)
Indeed, she intimates tliat it is only escliatologically that beholding the face of the lord will
become the human’ s constant response, when tlie servant will see clearly bis loving lord
and see tmly wliat lie birnself is in the siglit of bis loving lord. “And I know well that
when these two things are wisely and tmly seen, we shall gain rest and peace, here in part
and the fulness in the bliss of lieaven, by God’s plentifiul grace”. (LT 51.)
The interionzation of object constancy is significant for tlie dilemma wbich
provoked the exemptum in the first place. As Julian herself sees,
.this was a beginning of tlie teaching which I saw at the same time, whereby I
miglit corne to know in what manner lie looks on us in our sin. And tlien I saw that
only pain blames and punishes, and our courteous Lord comforts and succours,
and always he is kindly disposed to the soul, loving and longing to bring us to bis
bliss. (LI 51.)
Julian’s deepest need is to know how -- with what kind of face -- the Lord looks on
lier 5m, 50 that she miglit know how she is to see it within lier. Tlie constancy of the lords
loving regard recognizes and does flot deny or neglect tlie servant’s experience of despair.
It is this image of tlie fallen servant Adam in the exemptum wbich teaches lier what lier sin
is in the siglit of God: she leams that lier despair “makes us afraid to appear before our
courteous Lord”. The constancy of the chere of the lord teaches lier tliat it is precisely in
those moments of being in a despairing condition of sensuality tliat she is to ftee to the
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Lord whom she will recognize because lie speaks compassionateÏy to lier: “Do flot accuse
yourself that your tribulation and your woe is ail your fault, for I do flot want you to be
immoderately depressed or sorrowful”. (LI 77.) Julian liad interpreted the interior
condition of despair as evoking the threat of real relational abandonment (damnation) by lier
godobject. Now she sees that while despair is her intenor (sensual) condition, the relational
(substantial) reality is flot that she lias been abandoned, but that she is loved
compassionately. Her despairing condition is a condition in which tlie exemptum helps lier
to gain some distance on tliat condition, and to know herseif lovingly related to by God in
it. I propose that Julian’s practice of beholding the exemptum over the years helps to bnng
about tlie transmuted intemalization of object constancy in her and so bring about the
healing and transformation of her core sense of identity and self worth.
Kohut empliasizes that the mirroring transference proper, in the “third and narrow
sense”, like the mirroring mother who supports the child’s normal narcissistic development
at the appropriate phase, allows the development “from the stage of the fragmented self...
to the stage of the cohesive self - i.e., the growth of the self experience as a physical and
mental unit which has coliesiveness in space and continuity in time”.27 The manifestation
of self-cohesiveness is in “the sense of the reality of the self’ as opposed to the sense of its
unreality and fragmentation.28
In regard to this, notice the distancing effect of the “two persons” in the exemplum,
upon Julian’s third presence as both observer (studying both the lord and the servant) and
participant (identifying with the servant in bis fallen condition). Unlike the other showings
in which Julian was herself bodily, visually or viscerally enmeshed with tlie Jesus of her
showings, this distancing effect allows for greater differentiation in Julian’ s self
understanding in the sight of, or in relation to, the God of her showings from what slie liad
previously assumed. In particular, in place of the self fragments of impatient, bliss-seeking
grandiosity and seif-blaming, seif-accusing shame and despair, Julian’ s mirroring
transference witli tlie servant-in-the-sight-of-tlie-lord in tlie exemptum establislies a visual
relational image whicli allows lier to intenorize tlie capacity for empathy for herseif. It
gives her a means to objectify lier condition of self-preoccupied despair and impatience and
to intenonze tlie capacity for consoling and soothing herseif, as well as for affective
mentalization of such a condition. Moreover, it enables lier to have empathy for the rest of
humanldnd contained in the image of tlie servant. Ml of this reflects, in Koliut’s terms, a
27 KOHUT, 1971, p. 118.
28 KOHUT, 1971, p. 119.
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greater “sense of the reality of the self’ (and, Winnicott would add, the reality and alterity
of the world) which Julian is discoverîng and creating within the mirroring transference.
Kohut’ s description of the self as continuous in time is likewise represented in the
exemptum, by means of the constancy of the regard of the lord for the servant. Julian
takes from the exemptum that sin is flot seen in God’s siglit; God only sees the godly will
of the servant. The godly will in the servant is continuous, though flot conscious, in the
servant’ s fallen condition. The servant’ s godly or substantial will wïll become more
conscious, and the sensual will become more continuously united with the godly will, as
the servant increasingly practises seeing himself as lie is seen.
if it is the case, as Winnicott holds, that in early infant-maternai relations what the
infant sees in the face of the mirroring mother is flot initially the mother as a separate person
but rather the child’ s own nascent self, then, in this face of the lord, we can take it that
Julian is being given an iniding of lier own trne identity in God’s siglit. This could be
described as the servant’s potential for becoming conscious of the godly will, in
experiencing contÏnuity or union between the godly and the sensual wills at times in tins
lïfe. Tins intemalization of object constancy in the successful tlierapeutic mirroring
transference of Julian’ s exemptum depends on the mirroring dynamic of the face of tlie
lord. Like tlie servant, she cannot give it to berseÏf. Julian expresses the self constancy
winch is bom of tins mirroring dynamic in the revelation or discovery of the full, double
identity of the servant.
3.2 “The inward instruction which I have understood from it
since”: The double identity of the servant as Christ and Adam
In chapter 9, which explored Kohut’s stage of working through the mirroring
transference (in the accounts of tlie showings winch are common to both the Short and the
Long Texts), I argued that Julian’s double anthropology of substance and sensuality plays
a fundamental role in healing and encouraging her to revise a deeply engrained pattem of
doubt or despair of lier self worth and ber human acceptability, of her inclusion among the
saved. It helped her to be delïvered from the unconscious grandiosity of overresponsibility
for Christ’s suffering. I proposed there that the anthropology winch Julian draws from
these showings serves to foster in Julian the transmuting intemalization of the function
of the mirroring mother and to allow her to interiorize the capacity for soothing, affect
regulation, perdunng self and reality acceptance and self esteem.29
29KOHUT, 1971, p. 199; KOHUT, Heinz, The restoration ofthe self, Madison CN, International
Universities Press, 1977, p. 53.
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In particular, I argued that the substantial union of Christ with humanitind in our
godly will, would need to be kept intact in fallen humanity, if that humanity is identified
explicitly with that of those whose early chuld neglect or abuse and social location would
put them in peni of self-fragmentation, having introjected that they are intrinsically sinful,
fundamentally flawed as humans and so constimtionally incapable of union with God.
It seems to me that the source and perduring dynamism of Julian’s double
anthropology is the exemplum, and that this is not unrelated to lier psychodynamic need.
What is significant about the servant’ s fail is the loss of consciousness of bis godly will
which nonetheless remains intact (in the siglit of the lord), which loss keeps bis sensual
will oppressed in despair. The servant lives in disunion with bis two natures until, by
grace, God gives bim sight of bimself in behoïding the face of the lord.
I propose that we can see the flourishing of Julian’ s tme and intrinsically relational
sense of self in ber mature reflections on the double identity of the servant in the sight of
the lord.
In LT 51 Julian notes that this servant had cliaractenstics which could not be
attnbuted to Adam and that the fulness of the revelation came only in the course of the
twenty years that followed. Dunng that time Julian was instnicted to “take heed to ah the
attributes, divine and human, which were revealed in the example”. She asks “I wondered
where the servant came from”. (LI 51.) What takes ber twenty years minus three months
to sort out is that the servant’s identity is double.
In the servant is comprehended the second person of the Trinity, and in the servant
is comprehended Adam, that is to say all men. And therefore when I say “the
Son”, that means the divinity which is equal to tbe Father, and when I say “the
servant”, that means Cbrist’s humanity, which is the tnie Adam.... When Adam
feli, God’s Son fell.... (LT 51.)
Julian’ s “godly will” of the servant is flot unlike Kohut’s repeated positive
evaiuation of the needs of the archaic grandiose self as phase appropnate in the mirronng
transference: there is nothing morally wrong in itself with the need to be seen and affirmed;
there is something morally wrong when that need is systematically unfulfilled. Kohut
would say it is a need which is part of our earliest human psychological constitution and
wbich matures into a true sense of selfhood. In its mature form, self esteem gives purpose
to one’s goals and ambitions. Julian puts it like this, that tbe servant’s fall is flot due to
some sinful cause in itself, but rather because of the very eagerness of tbe servant to do the
lord’s will. “The man was injured in his powers and made most feeble... but his will was
preserved in God’s sight.... [Hie himself was blinded and hindered from knowing this
will”. (LI 51.)
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Julian expresses the mixture of human fallenness and human goodness in the image
of the servant in simultaneously identifying the fail of Adam as the fail of Christ into the
womb of the Virgin, that is, the fali of divinity into hurnanity: “When Adam feu, God’s
Son feu”. (LT5 1.) Humanldnd is double. (LT52.) Our two natures are joined in Christ:
[FJor our nature [substance] is joined to God in its creation, and God is joined to
our nature [sensuality] in taldng flesh. And so in Christ our two natures are united,
for the trinity is comprehended in Christ....
And so in our substance we are full and in our sensuality we are lacking
[wefeyteJ, and this lack [feytyng] God will restore and fil by the operation of
mercy and grace....” (LT 57.)
To ïdentify the fall of humanldnd with Jesus’ Incarnation may seem at first blush
doctrinally heretical. How is ït that these two very different realities, of the fall of
humankind in sin and the fali of divinity into humankind, can, for Julian, be contained in
the one image of the servant? How Julian sorts out this identification of Adam’ s fali into
sin with Christ’ s fali into humanity is by means of lier double theological anthropology of
substance and sensuality, which both humankind and Christ share, although humankind is
variable in our sensuality.
However, I empliasize that in the exemptum narrative the dynarnisrn of the double
nature of the servant image cornes ftorn the constancy of the loving regard of the Lord as lie
looks upon the servant. “[HJis will was preserved in God’s sight”. (LT 51.) The double
identity of the servant is seen and recognized, one miglit say found and created, in the
double aspect of the loving chere of the lord. “The loving regard which he kept constantly
on his servant and especially when lie fell, it seemed to me that it could melt our hearts for
love and break them in two for joy”. (LT5 1.) As rnirrored in the lord’s compassionate
and joyful regard, the difference between the servant as Adam and the servant as Christ,
has to do with where the servant’s eyes are focused. Although nowhere does she actually
describe this, it is clear that the eyes of the servant (as Christ) are “inwardly” in constant
relation to the lord even as the servant Christ suffers cornpassionately with humankind. It
is the changeability of the servant Adam’s sensuality which is so poignantly described as
the servant’ s downcast chere (eyes and mood) in self-preoccupied feelings of isolation and
distress.
The work of healing or transforming or fulfilling lier hurnan sensual identity is at
once interior and a function of the therapeutic mirroring relation or transference which the
exemptum maintained in lier. As Koenig also concludes, “Julian’s preoccupation witli the
image of the lord’ s face seemed to be an effort on lier part to receive back a part of lierseif’,
and “tliere were significant indications that the vision of lis face confers self-knowledge on
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the beholder”.30 In lier earlier, reverse images of mutual enclosure, coliesion in space and
continuity in time expressed something of the union in self experience that each signified
for lier. In the exemplum, however, these dynamics are expressed simultaneously in the
bodily co-identity of the servant. The face of tlie lord is separate from tlie servant but it
fiinctions polysemously in relation to tlie servant. Inwardly in joy, it affu-ms the union of
the double liumanity of Christ, and the eschatological restoration of Adam. Outwardly in
compassion it mirrors Christ’ s activity of suffering-with the suffering sensuality of Adam.
It is the unseen movement to eye contact which functions to bring the servant Adam
(humankind) out of lis vascillation (despair, unreal sense of himself in lis sensual
condition) into object constancy, or conscious union witli lis true identity in Christ, in the
lord’s constant loving regard, in part already in this life. Ml tins in an image in tlie
exemplum which is left to tlie beholder to imagine, and yet winch moves or dynamizes the
text toward its fulfiulment.
I hold that the thrust of the exemplum and wlat Julian learns from it derives from
the creative, transformative effect of disceming the double regard of the tord for the
servant on lier perception of the identity of the servant, and hence of lierseif. The double
nature of the whote seif of the servant is recognized and contained without contradiction in
lier discemment of the two cheres of compassion and joy of the beholding lord.31 This
discemment of the two cheres of divine love quite directly transfonns lier perception of the
servant’s Adamic humanity as fragmented in disconnected and illusorily perceived
despairing (sinful) and grandiose (sinless) segments, and, creates in its place her perception
of the servants humanity as botli fallen and graced in one person.
It is tins work of discemment winch takes the twenty years of meditation on the
original vision. The exemptum expresses visually lier increasing capacity to contain two
meanings or conditions of self understanding at once: the meaning of lier expenence of
self-knowledge (the exposure of its pecular pain, winch is flot to be confused with despair)
together with the meaning of the experience of being beloved (flot to be confused with
being sinÏess) in this state. If coliesiveness and continuity in time are signs of the mature
30 KOENIG, 1984, pp. 217, 218.
31Contrast Koenig who does flot clarify the effect of these two regards of the lord’s loving face. She holds
that the image of the lords face does flot change from one state to another. “A constant image of the lord
beholding his fallen servant in love, it is flot, however, on account of its constancy, less powerful than
those images in which two meanings are held in tension (as in the servants fail) KOENTG, 1984, p.
216.
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self, then Julian seems to reflect that integration in lier twenty year meditatïon on the
exemptum’ s meaning.
The extent to which the twinned divine-human person of the servant functions to
help objectify lier intenor condition is extraordinary. Later in LT $0 Julian describes a
reverse image of the servant as Christ suffering alone, mirroring exactly that condition in
the despairing servant.
[WJhen we fail into sin, and neglect recollection of him and the protection of our
own soul, then Christ bears ah alone the burden of us. And so he remains,
moaning and mourning. Then it is for us in reverence and kindness to turn quickly
to our Lord, and flot to leave him alone. He is here alone with us ail; that is to say,
lie is liere only for us. And when I am distant towards him through sin, despair or
sloth, then I leave my Lord to remain alone, inasmuch as he is in me. And tins is
the case with us ail who are sinners.... (LT 80.)
Tins image lias the effect of empathically exposing lier to the fallacy of lier isolative and
despairing self-fragment and is a brilliant example of liow her mirroring transference has
been instrumental in helping her work through to maturation in liaving empathy for herself
and redefine the meaning of suffering.
Our Lord in lis mercy reveals our sin and our feebleness by the sweet gracious
liglit of lis own self.... It is lis wïll that we liave knowledge of... liow steadfastly
lie waits for us, and does flot change lis chere, for lie wants us to be converted and
united to liim in love, as he is to us.... And so by knowledge and grace we may
see our sin, profitably, without despair.... And so by this meek lmowledge,
tlirougli contrition and grace we shah 5e broken down from everything winch is flot
our Lord. And then will our blessed saviour cure us perfectly and unite us to 11m.
Tins brealdng and curing our Lord intends for men in general, for lie wlio is higliest
and closest to God may see himself sinful and needy along witli me. (LT 72.)
In Kohut’s terms, Julian’s beliolding the exemplum allows her to interionze the
consistently empathic minoring of the maternai selfobject winch alone can provide the basis
for tlie maturation of lier narcissistic needs and the development of a cohesive sense of self,
tlie authentic core self winch is intriniscally relational. Tins could 5e said to constitute the
transformation of tlie archaic prestructurai self-fragments into the domain of the reahity ego
-- tlie “breaking and cufing” wliich allows Julian to embrace the self-knowledge of lier
sensual self as a whole, in God’s siglit. Altliougli in Juhian’s mirroring transference witli
the Jesus of lier showings there is no ultimate relinquishing of the transference, the later
chapters of the Long Text show us how increasingly flexible, adequate and creative tins
transference has become.
In its totahity, tlie exemptum of the servant and the lord reveals a greater degree of
self acceptance in Juhian, as seen in the way in which it mirrors lier in Jesus’ humanity, and
Jesus in lier humanity. I would cahi it a kind of double vision, of the person of the servant
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containing the two humanities of Adam (fallen) and Christ (incarnate, kenotic, saving,
restoring) which Julian sees as one. It could be said to represent a shift from a merged
mirroring transference to one of twinship of the two humanities in one.32
Moreover, the distinctive aspect of lier vision of the servant and the lord for the
purposes of disceming lier progress in this mirror relationship is that in it she reveals
herseif merged or twinned in the double identity of the servant, and at the same time
distinct from and beloved (mirrored proper) in the face of the lord, i.e., the face of the
lord is separate from, but in relation to, the servant. This is to be contrasted with all of
the showings recounted in the Short Text in which Julian and the Jesus of lier sliowings
were bodily or visually merged exclusively. This distancing of the image of the face
paradoxically begins to make space for tlie wliole spectmm of humankind’s changeable
sensual condition in the servant, and the whole of the Trinity in tlie lord’s chere.
3.3 “Ail the whoie revelation from the beginning to the end”:
“Where Jesus appears, the blessed Trinity is understood”
Julian neyer explicitly identifies what she means by this third perspective on the
exemplum. But as the exemplum and subsequent chapters unfold, it is clear it lias to do
with the creative, saving and unitïng work of the Trinity. It would seem to include ail lier
sliowings taken together.33 Tlie psyclioanalytic focus of the present chapter means tliat I
will be searching within lier exemptum and the exalted tlieological reflection inspired by it
for signs of continuity and development in lier sense of self and reality.
3.3.1 Self and reality acceptance
Self esteem is one half of tlie double sided coin of of self acceptance and reality
acceptance. Not only is lier self-knowledge changing. So also is her knowledge of God
changing. Tlie development of tlie identity of the servant and of the lord in the exemplum,
found and created as it is in tlie transitional space of Julian’ s meditative beholding, could be
seen as a creative work of negotiating self and otlier, inner and outer worlds, and their
relations in more coherent and flexible ways. Perhaps tlie fact tliat Julian remained suent
about the exemptum in the Short Text, and that slie meditated continuously on it until she
had intemalized the multivalency of its significance to write about it (and probably long
32 Kohut describes the twinship or alter ego transference as one in which the object is experienced as being
like or very similar to the grandiose self. KOHUT, 1971, p. 115.
COLLEDGE and WALSH, 1978a, p. 519.
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after as well), is the strongest evidence for the argument that the exemplum, as transitional
object, was the locus of a long work of psychotherapeutic maturation in Julian’s mirroring
needs.
3.3.2 Distinguishing projection from reality
In discussing the change of chere in the eighth to ninth showing, I spoke of how
this inaugurated a sense of the durability of the Jesus of her showings beyond Julian’s
assumed omnipotent control. In Winnicott’s tenus, this would make the Jesus of lier
showings more available for object use, i.e., to function as an independent centre of
initiative in the showings. What is evident in the exemptum is that Julian further
differentiates the reality and relationality of Christ and the Trinity, in the figure of the lord
in relation to the servant/humankind, in a way that lier other showings do not.
One area in particular where this has major ramifications is in Julian’s insight into
the difference between God’ s judgment (as constant, having no wrath) and human
judgment (as variable, sometimes lenient, sometimes wrathfiil). It is a significant example
of liow Julian’s internalization of object constancy and object use has been made possible
by, and perhaps also contnbuted to, the extraordinary constancy of lier vision of God as
peaceful, incapable of wrath, and her discernment that ail wratli is on the human side. (LT
45
- 49.) I suggest tliat the maturity of recognizing that wrath is a human projection onto
God is only possible once Julian has interionzed her real human limits in relation to the
“independent centre of initiative” she encounters as God in the transitional space of her
meditation on the showings. It is her impatience and despair which had previously blinded
lier from knowing these creaturely limits.
One can identify here the locus for a great deal of Julian’s preoccupation with
sorting out where to locate wratli and how to understand her own and the Church’s
changeable judgments on sin. Her maturity in distinguishing the products of human
projection (and introjection) ftom divine object constancy in tlie Long Text are powerful
evidence of lier intemalization of self constancy.
Thus the face of the lord in tlie exemptum is the constant symbolic reference for
Julian’s insight into God’sjudgment. Recall that in LT 45 Julian observes that God’s
judgment is different from liuman judgment, the latter being based on “our changeable
sensuality”, and so, sometimes good and lenient, sometimes hard and painful. As Nuth
puts it,
[tJo the extent that they are liard and painful, they cause humans to experience
something they describe as the wrath and forgiveness of God. As such, they [the
361
human judgmentsJ need to be reformed by God’ s mercy and grace and brought into
harmony with God’s justice.34
We may assume Julian is taking this to lierseif, and that lier own harsh judgments
of herseif and others are to be seen in this exposing light.
Moreover, without entering into a wrathful condition herseif Julian exposes in a
compassionate and magisterial way the fragile sensual condition of Churcli authority as she
experienced it in its harsh judgments. Not only does she gain object constancy through
beholding the constancy of the regard of the lord for the servant in lier fourteenth showing,
but she is able to distance herseif from lier conflicted emotional enmeshment in
interpersonal relations, as well as from Church teaching (and even the Ancrene riwte) on
this point, whose judgment as to God’s wrath is at odds with the tmth of this showïng. It
is here that she reveals lier long term and liard-won interionzation of object constancy
through the beholding of the exemptum, in a world in which this was 50 evidently lacking.
3.3.3 Oneing: union in differentiation
Julian’s prayer for the wound of longing for God was her lifelong desire for union
with Christ. This longing for union nins througli the pre-visionary Julian’s relentless
desire to suffer as a means of coming into union with the suffering Christ, and through ail
the earlier showings, in the form of bodily fusion in extreme suffering, eye to eye contact
and transformation from death to life, and mutual enclosure. The exemptum and what she
draws from it, however, transform Julian’s understanding of what this union is. It is no
longer union as fusion. Rather, the exemptum takes up lier earlier showings and
introduces a new dimension of relational distïnctness. Union becomes union in
differentiation.
For example, both of the earlier sliowings of mutual enclosure (the tenth vision of
the suffering risen Christ inviting Julian’ s understanding to enter into the side of Christ,
and the sixteenth vision of of Jesus seated, reigning in lier soul, fully distinct, yet fully
realized interiorly) are incorporated into the double identity of the servant of the exemplum.
I suggested above that the tentli showing liad the effect of assuring Julian of lier enclosure
among the saved in Christ’s Body. The sixteenth sliowïng confirmed lier expeflence of all
the showings, that lier sensual liumanity was a wortliy enclosure for Christ through
knowledge of lierself in the sight of God.
NUTH, 1991, p. 80. drawing on LT 45.
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In the exemplum the meanings of each of these showings coincide in the one image
of the double identity of the servant. Christ’ s double humanity encloses humanity in our
substance and in our fallen sensuality. But human sensualïty becomes Christ’s place of
union as the servant is restored to his true self in beholding the face of the lord. I suggest
that her understanding of the image of the servant includes lier earlier showings of mutual
enclosure and yet, that the exemplum allows for still more distinct and multivalent
visionary meanings than either lier tenth or lier sixteenth showing, by separating out the
face of the lord.
Thus in the Long Text the sixteenth vision of Christ reigning in lier soul, which
might be considered to be the ultimate image of mystical union, cornes mucli later (LT 67 -
68.) In fact, it pales in comparison with the space which Julian devotes to the carefiul
narrative of, and reflection on, the exemptum. I suggest that this is because the sixteenth
showing, while it had been cntically significant to Julian as a confirmation to believe the
showings she had received in the face of her doubt and demonic assault during sleep, did
not show Julian the retationat differentiation in union which the exemptum afforded lier.
On its own the sixteentli sliowing did flot help lier to know how God sees sin. In that
sense, the exemptum reflects maturation in lier mirroring need toward relinquishing the
early merged mirroring transference for more realistic or adequate relations.
In fact, I suggest that we miglit see her sixteenth showing (LT 67 - 68) of Christ
reigning in lier soul, and that later image of tlie servant as Christ suffering alone in lier (LT
80) as complementary images of differentiation in oneing in lier sensuality which the
exemptum affords. Recail Julian’ s description of this latter image:
[W]lien we fali into sin, and neglect recollection of him and the protection of our
own soul, then Christ bears ail alone tlie burden of us. And so lie remains,
moaning and mourning. Tlien it is for us in reverence and kindness to tum quickly
to our Lord, and not to leave him alone. He is here alone with us ail; that is to say,
lie is here only for us. And when I am distant towards him through sin, despair or
sloth, then I leave my Lord to remain alone, inasmucli as lie is in me. And this is
the case with us ail who are sinners.... (LT $0.)
The exemptum, and the leaming which Julian interionzed from beholding it, lias enabled
lier to see sin in herself as God beholds lier. She lias become mucli more seif-accepting of
the various conditions of her sensuality (despair and self-neglect) whicli formerly Ied lier to
feel isolated because, as the later image reveals, Christ is stili in love-longing relationship
with lier. Indeed, she sees only Christ, mirroring her condition.
Julian’s theological and experiential understanding of oneing or union, as this is
evidenced in its use in the exemplum and later chapters of the Long Text, is tlierefore flot to
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be confused with our contemporary popular tendency to reduce union to some
undifferentiated fusion with the divine. This latter tendency is rather psychological
evidence of an undeveloped sense of self.35 Rather, as Kerrie Hide observes, Julian’ s
word oneing is virtually untranslatable:
To be oned in Middle English means to be one, united, joined, blended, or fused,
yet none of these words conveys the sense of this primordial interpenetration of the
divine and the human that preserves dtfference in identity. The concept is so
extraordinary that Julian uses oneing to describe the union between Christ’s
humanity and his divinity.36
Anderson further acknowledges that this
uniting of humanity and divinity in Christ is the model for ail other instances of the
oneing of humans to God. In this respect, oneing must imply for Julian a
profound, loving intÏmacy that does not admit of division, yet where the two
natures beïng united remain distinct and are not blended or combined to form a thfrd
thing. In the oneing of humanldnd to God, humans are granted to partake of the
peaceful, loving relationships that exist etemally between Father, Son and Holy
Spirit.37
Julian lias come to understand union in a way which preserves differentiation in
identity in tlie human-divine relation in the exemplum. I correlate this development in
Julïan with Winnicott’ s identification of the later, and potentially creative, penod of the
infant’ s negotiating separation from the mother. Even as self and notlself become more
clearly distiriguished, Winnicott insists that illusion and reality are “interpenetrating,
mutually inclusive categories”.38
Thus I perceive that the merged subjectivism perceived in tlie mirroring transference
reflected in lier early showings, in whicli there was no place for differentiation between lier
condition and that of tlie Jesus of her showings, sliifts to a more mature relational realism
in the later transference of mirroring proper. This realism expresses itself in lier greater
self-knowledge in relation to the God of lier exemptum in terms of both dependence and
mutuality.
Julian negotiates creatively the disillusionment of lier grandiose self-preoccupation
and the loss of immediacy of tlie showings, and develops a flexible distinction between
inner and outer worlds, specifically between her ïnner and outer reality and God’s. Tlie
See WOLSKI CONN, Joann, “Horizons on contemporary spirituality”, Horizons 9, 1982, pp. 60 - 73.
36 RIDE, Ken-ie, Gfted origins to gracedfiittment: The soteriology ofJulian of Norwich, Collegeville
MN, Liturgical Press, 2001, p. 53, emphasis added.
ANDERSON, 2005, pp. 176 - 177.
38 JONTE-PACE, Diane, “Object relations theory, mothering and religion: toward a feminist psychology
of religion”, Horizons 14, 2, 1987, P. 323.
364
separating out of the image of the servant from that of the face of the lord could be said to
symbolize Julian’ s hard-won acceptance of, and trust in, the independent centre of initiative
in God, and so of real relational dependence in the human-divine relation. This will be
explored below in Julian’ s understanding of Christ as Mother, and of herself as one of
Christ’s children.
3.3.4 Mother Jesus
Kohut identifies the mirroring selfobject as normally the figure of the infants
mother, who adapts herseif to the needs of the infant. Julian’ s exemplum leads her into the
striking parallel of the image of Christ as Mother, found only in the Long Text after the
exemptum. (LI 58 - 63.) Specifically ït is Christ who is our Mother, says Julian, because
it is Christ who took on our double nature, who in effect incarnates our whole being. (LI
58.) It is Mother Jesus who leads us into his breast through bis t1sweet open side” and
shows us there a part of the Godhead and says “see how I loved you”. (LT 60, 84.) The
soul can approach the Christ who mirrors human sensuality in likeness (as well as
empathically exposing conditions of unlikeness), as lie does in ail the previous visions, and
particularly in the tenth showing recalled here.
Julian goes on to distinguish the way of the good Mother Jesus with lier maturing
children in a description which is more significantly like the face of the lord in the
exemplum, reflecting the two cheres of love -- compassion and joy. The mother’s
behaviour changes according to the need of the child, but is constant in lier love for the
child. Kohut’s description of how the maturation of the narcissistic needs of the individual
is effected, through the natural or therapeutic mirroring transference and the use of optimal
frustration to encourage the graduai internalization of these needs, finds an easy parallel in
Julian’s language:
The kind loving mother who knows and sees the needs of lier child guards it very
tenderly as the nature and condition of motherhood will have. And aiways as the
chiÏd grows in age and stature she acts differently, but she does not change her
love. And when it is even older she allows it to be chastised and to destroy its
faults, so as to make the child receive virtue and grace. Ihis work... our Lord
performs. (LT 60.)
For Kohut, only the breakdown of identification with the arcliaic self-structures will allow
the individual to searcli for a new focus in the experience of a more autlientïc self.
Julian could be said to have come to value the importance of that breakdown of
identification with the archaic self-structures of despair and grandiosity tliat leads to greater
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relational realism, when, having ïnternalized the double vision of the servant, Julian says
that
[w]e need to fali and we need to see it for if we did flot fail we should flot know
how feeble and wretched we are in ourselves, nor too, should we know 50
completely the wonderful love of our Creator. (LT 61.)
This is one way of describing how Julian lias corne to understand that sin is behouety,
necessary and actually beneficial.39
For Koliut the empathic mirroring analyst exposes the client’s archaic self
fragrnents to a confrontation with reality. Likewise, for Winnicott the good-enough mother
allows the child to move out and begin to learn the limits of her grandiosity through tlie
bumps and scrapes of encountering the world. Just so, Julian sees Mother Jesus as
fiilfilling this wise and necessary but painful aspect of the mirroring role in the best interest
of her cliuldren’ s maturation:
The mother may sornetimes suffer the cliild to fail and be distressed in various ways
for its own benefit, but she can neyer suffer any kind of peril to corne to lier cliuld,
because of her love.. 40
And if we do flot feel ourselves eased, let us at once be sure that lie is
behaving as a wise mother. For if lie sees that it is profitable for us to mourn and to
weep, with compassion and pity lie suffers tliat until the right time lias corne, out of
his love. And then he wants us to show a chuld’s characteristics which always
naturally trusts in its mothe?s love in well-being andin woe. (LT 61.)
33.5 A littie child: the challenge to trust
Afier discussing the relation of the mother and chuld in these chapters culminating in
lier understanding that “ah bis blessed cliuldren who have corne out of him by nature ought
to be brought back into him by grace” (LI 64), it is fascinating tliat then, in tlie Long
Text’s version of the fifteenth revelatïon, Julian receives a brief image of a child, who
Simon Tugwell puts it another way which, although a good logical description of sensuality, seems to
iack the urgency oflulian’s need to make sense ofhersin:
[SJin is necessary’ because without it there would flot be sensuality” which is our whole bodily,
temporal life. Sin is part of what it means to live in time, with a history, as a changeable being.
Time is of no concern to substance, it is only sensuality which has a history, and this history
represents a genuine ‘increase’.
TUGWELL, Simon, Ways of impeifection: An exploration of Christian spirituatity, SpringfieÎd IL,
Tempiegate, 1985, p 197. It is our changeable sensuality which God takes up into Godself in Christ’s
Incarnation, such that sensuality is restored “by process of time”. (LT 57, 63
.)
40Here Julian specifically distinguishes Mother Jesus from human mothers who may well suffer peril to
corne to their chiidren. The healing capacity of these visions emerges as providing an alternative to the
self-definition learned in early childhood maternai seifobject interactions.
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sprÏngs ont of a shapeless body in a pit of mud. This littie child, she says, is the soul
raised from pain to heaven, now beautiful, fully shaped and lively. (LT 64.)
I find ït interesting that Julian’s images would become clarified in this way. Her
earlier images were of identification with Jesus in terms of merging, in mirror reversais of
containment, and later in twinning Christ’s double humanity with hers explicitly in God’s
mirroring sight. They ail served the important purpose of allowing her an unprecedented
homeliness and approachability to Christ.
In these images of Mother Jesus and the child one detects a new relational
distinctness, which assumes the background of that earlier merged identification, but which
develops both the maternai ftnction of the mirroring chere of the lord in the exemplum and
the fulness of the sensual condition of the child, as fallen (in despair) and restored to trust,
whole in the imago Dei.
Many feminists have seen in this image of the child rising from the pit of mud a
retum to a neoplatonism, a dualism which Julian has otherwise abandoned,41 or worse, a
failure to exemplify the western feminist ideal of maturity.42 While I certainly see the
point, I view this text rather as another example of Julian’ s contrapuntal trajectory. The
image of herseif as child is a recognition of real dependence, to be sure. But Julian’ s
41
“Simon Tugwell bas coffectly identified a decided shift in sensibility between the two versions [of the
ST and the LT] which can be summed up as the evolution from a neoplatonic spintuality of ascent to an
incarnational spirituality whercby redemption is a redemption of this life, not a redemptionftom it”.
DAVIES, Oliver, “Transformational processes in the work of Julian of Norwich and Mechtbild of
Magdeburg”, in The Medieval mystical tradition in England eU. GLASSCOE, Marion, Cambndge, D.S.
Brewer, 1992, p. 41. Exeter Symposium V. Davies is quoting TUGWELL, 1984, P. 201, emphasis in
text.
42 See for one example, WATKINS, Renée Neu, “Two women visionaries and death: Catherine of Siena
and Julian of Norwich”, Numen: international review for the history of religions 30, 1983, p. 194, who
finds this image ofthe child nsing from the pit an example ofJuiian’s “rejection of the maternai body and
idealization of the child-soul” which shows “severe dualism,
.. .contempt for the body”.
I observe the abhorence of the childhood image of trusting dependence in the fact that whereas there
are hundreds of articles on Julian’s understanding of Christ as Mother, I have located only one article from a
feminist position on spiritual childhood in Julian. LINDSTROM, Mary, “Julian of Norwich and the
motherhood of GoU”, Sisters today 54, 1982, p. 211:
This concept is critical for feminine spirituality because it can easily be misunderstood and
manipulated.... [Julian] showed how this condition of childhood, basically a sense of trust, arises
out of self autonomy, which is a prerequisite and ongoing condition essential to spiritual matunty.
However, more recently Donohue-White’s conclusion connects childlike trust with Julian’s eschatological
orientation, and with motherhood itself. See DONOHUE-WHITE, Patricia, “Reading divine maternity in
Julian of Norwich”, Spiritus 5, 2005, pp. 31 - 32. There are two older articles on the subject. See
MONSTWR du, Benoît, “Spiritual childhood and dame Julian ofNorwich”, Pax, 1935, pp. 281 - 284; and
S.M.A., [Sr Mary Albert] o.p., “Spiritual childhood and mother Julian”, The lfe ofthe spirit 2, 1945, pp.
81 - 83.
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acknowledgement of relational dependence is flot in itseif a sign of immaturity.43 It couid
be a sign of realism: The preoccupation with despair, which Julian flOW knew to name as
sin, could be weli described by lier image of the stinking pit of mud. The image of tlie cliuld
rising, at once this-worldiy and escliatological, wouid then flot signal a blanket rejection of
her sensuaiity in this world so mucli as it wouid be a sign of the fruit of her learning to trust
in a trnstworthy Mother Christ who shares that sensuality, exposes lier to the pain of lier
despainng condition, and liberates lier to abandon that sensual condition instead of
pursuing it.
In Julian’ s democratizing way, liowever, our customary assumptions about any
liierarchy in tlie relationai dependence of the child on tlie Mother, which couid keep the
child in an infantile state of maturation, are exploded.
Our saviour is our Mother, in wliorn we are endiessiy bom and out of whom we
sliali neyer corne.... And it is spoken of in tlie sixteentli revelation, wliere lie says
tliat he sits in our soul, for it is lis deliglit... to dweil endiessly in our sou!,
working us ail into him. (LT 57.)
Even wlien described in terms of motherliood, the paradoxical mutua! enclosures of
Christ’s double liumanity in humankind in tlie exemplum ensure that Julian’s
acknowiedgernent of dhuld!ike dependence on Mother Christ can tlierefore aiso be seen as a
sign of tlie interior wlioieness of Christ reigning in lier soul which Juiian had corne to
experience through repeatedly beliolding tlie face of tlie lord in the exemptum. Perhaps as
she was enabled to love lierseif in lier humanity, she could aiso recogmze Christ more
distinctiy as lier trustworthy Motlier within, in tliis life and as lier destiny. Julian’s
longing for God is no longer the desire for redemption from this world and from lierseif,
but rather tlie desire to see lier true self and to see lier wounds become lionours in God’ s
siglit, tlie desire to see God rejoicing over her. She trusts that it is God wlio wants to give
lier this siglit. As Sebastian Moore would put it, tlie desire to trust only increases. I
suggest that we understand her description of chuldhood in light of liow far slie lias corne
(from what I liave argued was a basic chuidliood stance of abandoned isolation) in lier gain
in “confident trust” in the trustworthy reality of the God of lier sliowings and in her self
acceptance of lier creature!y sensua!ity.
For the child does flot naturaily despair of tlie motlier’s love, tlie chiid does not
naturaily rely upon itself, naturaily the chi!d loves tlie mother and either of tliem the
other.... I understood no greater stature in this life tlian chuidliood, with its
Compare McDargh’ s sign of maturation in the faith as the capacity to tolerate dependence. McDARGH,
1983, pp. 83 - 87. For women this of course needs to be balanced by signs of the capacity for mutuality
and creativity, etc. But wealth and privilege in the West tend to mure men and women to admitting, let
alone valuing, dependence.
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feebleness and lack of power and intelligence, until the time that our gracÏous
Mother lias brouglit us up into our Father’s bliss. And there it will truly be made
known to us what lie means in the sweet words wlien lie says: Ml will be well, and
you will see it yourself, tliat every kind of thing will be well. And tlien will tlie
bliss of our motherhood in Christ be to begin anew.... (LT 63.)
Perliaps it ïs in this light too that Julian’ s vocation to the anclioritic life, the strange
combmation of radical cliosen dependence on her symbol-laden environment and relafively
radical autonomy for contemplative solitude, could be seen as lier coming to embrace lier
relational dependence on Christ in a relatïvely mature way, particularly if she liad so
unconsciously resïsted dependence from lier youtli. It is clear tliat lier creative retrieval
from the anclioritic life and symbolism (explored in cliapter 10) sustain Julian in the
therapeutic development I am suggesting, and that lier own vocational work as anclioress
lias become a joyftl crucifixion, self-identified in Christ’ s restorative work of salvation as a
joy. And, as Donohue-White puts it, “Julian’ s representation of divine motlier-work [is] a
model for aduit human spiritual practice, for if, as Julian believes, Jesus both reveals
divinity and models tlie perfection of humanity, ‘our motlier Jesus’ instructs both in lis
teadhing and by lis example”.44
Ultimately, for Koliut, througli the mirroring transference the individual gains a
new, more durable centre of selfliood, cliaracterized by self acceptance, self esteem, inner
peace, humour and a sense of wisdom which allows the individual to look kindly on lier
own impermanence. For Julian this wisdom is humility: “We do flot fail in tlie sight of God
and we do flot stand in our own siglit... It is most profitable that we see these two
together.” (LT 82.)
3.3.6 The Mother’s face
The face of the lord in the exemptum exerts a powerful influence over tlie wliole of
Julian’ s tlieology of Mother Jesus. I agree with Koenig that that face became for Julian a
means of intemalizing tlie missed parental fiinction of mirrorïng. Thus it enabled lier to
develop object constancy, grow in a cohesive and authentic sense of self, and mature in lier
mirroring needs. As Koenig lias observed, Julian’s theological description of Christ as
Mother “was motivated in part by lier need to compensate for what she had failed to receive
from her own motlier”.45 Koenig explores tlie question that if Julian had had a satisfying
44DoNoHuE-wHn, 2005, p. 26.
KOENIG, 1984, p. 218. This could provide a different source ofevidence for the “sparseness” which
Aers finds in Julian’ s appropriation of the theme of Christ as mother, as distinct from the physicality which
other medieval women associated with the theme. AERS, David, “The humanity of Christ: Reflections on
Julian ofNorwich’s Revetation of love”, in AERS, David and Lynn STALEY, The powers of the holy:
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relation with her own mother, as so many commentators tend to assume, “why does
[JulianJ, in every statement she makes about God as Mother, say in one way or another that
motherliood is an office that no human person could hope to fulfihi entirely, that only God
or Christ could do so?46
But given the importance of the face of the lord for this therapeutic work, Koenig
raises a significant question:
In her description of God or Jesus as Mother, nowhere does Julian mention the
mother’ s face. Given that the face of the lord in the parable and the face of God in
other chapters play such a salient role in the evolution of her meaning, and given
what we have leamed from Winnicott about the significance of the mother’s face in
individual emotional development, is it flot strange that Julian’s Mother God lias no
face?47
Whetlier this is for the psychobiographical reason Koenig gives, that Julian’s unsafisfying
relation with her own mother was so completely satïsfied in her contemplation of the lord’ s
loving face over twenty years, that she no longer needed the face in lier theology of the
motlierhood of God, is an open question.48 Julian certainly does not abandon the need to
speak of the “chere of the lord” in the chapters following the exemptum. Rather, as
Koenig observes, she increases her language of the cheres. Indeed, Julian uses language
which alludes to the maternai nature of Christ’ s double humanity and, at the same time, is
reminiscent of Winnicott’ s description of the mirroring role of the good-enough mother in
giving the child the sense of lier nascent selffiood. The vision of Christ abandoned in the
soul (LT 80), waiting and suffering patiently the retum of the soul to Christ within,
effectively exposes her to lier soul’ s sensual predicament in relation to Christ, and enables
lier to respond. Tliat late vision in LT 80 is strikingly parallel to the good enough mother
who waits as the chuld explores, and then delights in the chuld’ s retum. If we recail that,
for Julian, Mother Jesus is within, as in lier sixteenth showing, it gives sliape to lier
writïng that “by his grace lie lifts up and will draw our outer chere to the inner.... The
blessed chere of our Lord God works this in us by grace”. (LT 71.)
So, it could be argued that because of lier genetic history of flot being mirrrored by
lier mother, Julian could neyer put a face on Mother Jesus. Aware of lier human
Religion, politics and gender in the late medieval Engtish culture, University Park PN, Pennsylvania state
University Press, 1996, p. 97, after WATSON, Nicholas, “The trinitarian hermeneutic in Julian of
Norwich’s Revelation of love”, The medieval mysticat tradition in England, ed. GLASSCOE, Marion,
Cambndge, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 85. Exeter symposium V.
46 KOENIG, 1984, p. 212, emphasis in text.
47 KOENIG, 1984, p. 218, emphasis in text.
48 KOENIG, 1984, p. 218 - 219.
370
changeabilïty, Julian writes that “as long as we have anything to do with any kind of sin,
we shah neyer clearly see the blessed chere of God”. (LI 72.) But it is also the case that
Julian’ s Motherhood of God embraces the mistier joyful chere of the lord. This theme
cornes to take on many theological roles, most sïgnificantly situating Christ’s motherhood
within the soul, and also becoming co-extensive with her trinitarian theology.
Recail that in LI 71 Julian sees flot two but three cheres in the Lord, each
responding to a condition or chere in hurnan sensuality: the chere of Christ’s Passion
(pain, suffering), the chere of compassion (sin) and the chere ofjoy. The chere ofjoy,
the inward chere of the lord, which in LI 51 was seen spiritually “without bodily
likeness”, is “his blessed chere, partly like wliat it will be in heaven; and that is when
through grace we are touched by sweet illuminations of the life of the Spint....” (LI 71.)
The closest we get to seeing that chere in Julian’s other showings is in the sixteenth
showing, where it is interior: Julian sees her soul in the middle of her heart, with Jesus
sitting at rest contained within it. (LI 68.) It is an image of the imago Dei, the mystical
union of both human substance and sensuality in Jesus’ double humanity. The movement
from outer to inner chere, more explicitly worked out in LI 71, may be Julian’ s mature
way of describing the truth of the sixteenth showing as the work which Christ does in lier
of mirroring her mie self into being and union, where the inner chere is without bodily
hikeness.
Whether for theological, psychobiographical, or other reasons, I would tend to
argue that Julian’ s omission of any reference to the face of Mother Jesus which Koenig lias
observed is another magnificent and someliow intentional gap in Julian’s text, to be read,
according to lier “contrapuntal” and “performative” trajectories, as an “apophatic image”
which invites the act of imagining that face but leaves the act itself up to tlie beholder. Set
beside the unseen image of the servant’ s chere lifted from despair to beholding the lord,
these two unseen cheres are an apt image of Julïan’ s longing for total self-knowledge and
knowledge of God in union. I hold that this dynamism of the mirroring function of the
face mns throughout the exemplum and lier theology of Jesus as Mother. “And this makes
the soul which so contemplates lilce to him who is contemplated, and unites it in rest and
peace”. (LI 68.) “The blessed chere of our Lord works this in us through grace”. (LI
71.) But for Julian sucli knowledge is known here in this life only in part.
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3.3.7 Sharing in the Trinity
In the exemplum the servant shares in both humanity and divïnity. This means that
even as the servant cannot be separated from humankind, neither can the servant be
separated from the image of the lord as the whoie Tnnity at work in the substantiai nature
of the servant as Christ.
And our substance is in our Father, God almighty, and our substance is in our
Mother, God ail wisdom, and our substance is in our Lord God, the Holy Spmt, ail
goodness, for our substance is whole in each person of the Trinity, who is one
God. And our sensuality is only in the second person, Christ Jesus, in whom is
the Father and the Holy Spirit.... (LT 58.)
This subtlety insures that Julian’ s true or core sense of self is reiational, iocated in the sight
of God, who is also relational.
The counterpoint to the mature dependence I have described above is the relational
mutuality which Julian discovers in the union of prayer. God “teaches us to pray and to
have firm trust... for he behoids us in love, and wants to make us partners in his good
witt and work”. (LT 43.) This is the inward work of the Mother, as “il is spoken of in the
sixteenth reveiation, where he says that he sits in our soul... working us ail into him. In
this working he wants us to be his helpers... trnly trusting in hïrn, for I saw truly that our
substance is in him”. (LT 57.) This relationai mutuality is effected in Juiian’s
differentiated understanding of union with God’s trinitarian self. As Anderson puts it,
“{ïJn the oneing of humankind to God, humans are granted to partake of the peaceful,
loving relationships that exist etemally between Father, Son and Holy Spirit”.49 The
mirroring function active in the exemplum, which helps Julian internalize ber authentic
sense of self, bears fruit in the dynamic relational mutuality of love within God and
between God and the creature at the core of her trinitarian theology.
This mutuality is seen in the exemplum where it is hinted at in her account of the
restored condition of the double self of the servant in the sight of the inward, more exalted
chere of the lord in joy. She writes that
the life and power that we have in the [sensualJ part is from the [substantialJ, and it
cornes down w us frorn the substantiat love ofthe seJ by grace. In between the
one and the other is nothing at ail, for it is ail one love, which one blessed love now
has a double operation in us. (LT 52.)
In those exalted moments Julian is inspired to write that
I saw no difference between God and our substance, but, as it were, ail God; and
still my understanding accepted that our substance is in God, that is to say that God
is God, and our substance is a creature in God. for the aimighty tmth of the
‘ ANDERSON, 2005, pp. 176 - 177.
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Trinity is our father, for he made us and keeps us. And the deep wisdom of the
Trinity is our Mother, in whom we are enclosed. And the high goodness of the
Trinity is our Lord, and in him we are enciosed and he in us. We are enclosed in
the Father, and we are enclosed in the Son, and we are enclosed in the Holy Spirit.
And the Father is enclosed in us, the Son is enclosed in us, and the Hoiy Spirit is
enciosed in us. (LT 54.)
What makes this knowledge possible in the sensual self is faith, exercised in trust.
And our faith is a power whicli cornes from our natural substance into our sensual
soul by the Hoiy Spirit, in which power ail our powers corne to us, for wïthout that
no man can receive power, for it is nothing else than right understanding with true
belief and certain trust in our being, that we are in God and lie in us, which we do
flot see. (LT 54.)
As the identities of the lord and the servant of the exemptum become differentiated,
the servant into his double incamational identity, and the lord into the Tnnity, I suggest that
Julian is articulating a greater flexibiity in creatively negofiating and differentiating mner
and outer worlds. It is as if the relationsliip of tlie lord with the servant, reverberating witli
the function of mirroring, becomes imbued with the transitïonal quality of beïng both
subjective and objective. Her sustained focus on obtaining such a variety of lovïng and
paradoxical relationships within and among these divine and human persons (liberating
them to enclose and be enclosed by one another
-- and lier) allows for relational dependence
and mutuality to coincide, and enhance her relational realism.
3.3.8 Mother Jesus, her even Christians and Mother Church
The mirroring function active in tlie exemptum also bears fruit in Julian’s love and
empatliy for others. A sign of the maturity of narcissism in self esteem for Koliut is the
capacity not only to liave empathy for oneself but to have empathy for others, being able to
see oneself in anotlier person. With tliis capacity, presumabiy the possibility is opened of
becoming oneseif tlie object of another’s mirroring transference. Just as Julian lias needed
to be ernpathically “reparented” in tlie mirroring transference witli the Jesus of lier
showings, Julian becomes a trustwortliy, empathic parent for lier even Christians. For
Julian the capacity to see lierself in lier even Cbristïans is an important fruit of ail tlie
visionary expenence given to lier. “Then I saw that every kind of compassion whicli one
lias for one’s even Christians in love is Christ in us”. (SI 13; see LT 2$.)
Tlie arduous spiritual and psycliological joumey Julian bas made toward becoming
emptied of false selves and deepening lier sense of identity with the liumanity of Jesus and
of sharing in tlie liumanity of others througli Christ certainly strikes me as a developed
internalization and maturation of the mirroring need into self esteem. It lias given lier a
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centre of authority and integrity in her own time and through the centuries as spiritual
director and theologian, which lias stood vastly at odds with, for example, the misogynist
judgment of women by the ecclesiastical tradition.50
Bradley observes that “[a]s it is harder to know ourseif than to know God, it is also
harder to feei compassion for ail others than for the innocent sacrificing Christ”. 51 This I
suspect would be most true for Julian with regard to those even Christians in Hoiy Churcli
who seerned bent on teaching the wrath of God. Julian is quite conditioned flot to express
ber anger with others’ sins, which anger she admits only once she lias corne to some
distance from it. (LT 76.) Among these objects of lier anger sureiy are those she is so
evidently frustrated witli who think they know God’s privy counsel. (ST 14; LT 30.)52
Anderson has observed that it is one of the significant signs of Julian’s contrapuntal
trajectory that she neyer tries to reconcile the real difference between what her showings
have taught lier and what Holy Church teaches.
However and at the same time, Julian envisions that the whole of humankind is
enclosed within Mother Jesus
-- who for Julian is also Mother Church. This enclosure,
like the exemplum, allows for the variability of human sensual judgments to be seen as
empatbically accepted. It is the “bridge of simiiarity” among humankind in which Kohut
trusts, yet cannot name:53
Here we can see that we do not need to seek far afield SO as to know various
natures, but to go to Holy Churcli, into our Mother’s breast, that is to say, into our
own soul, where our Lord dwells. And there we should find eveiything, now in
faith and understanding and afterwards in himself, clearly, in bliss...
But let no man apply this particularly to hirnself, because it is flot so. It is
general because it is our precious Mother Jesus. (LT 62.)
It is likely that Julian had eariier in lier life been angry at Mother Church (as an object of
projection) for its incapacity to respond to the needs of its suffering chuidren. Julian’ s
capacity, as witnessed in the Long Text, to live with the ambiguity of embracing the
50Watson draws on frigaray to examine how Julian “converts subordination into affirmation” by tuming
medieval misogynist assumptions about the doubleness (weakness etc.) of women into assertions about
humanity. WATSON, Nicholas, “Yf wommen be double naturetly’: Remaldng ‘woman’ in Julian of
Norwich’s Revelation of love”, Exemptaria 8, 1, 1996, p. 32.
51BRADLEY, Ritamary, Jutian’s way, London, Harper Collins,1992, p. 175.
52 hear echoes of this frustration in Roger Haight’s conclusion that “in the measure that tnnitarian
theology gets completely absorbed in defining and working out the distinctions in God’s inner life, in the
same measure it misses the point”. The point, he says, is that “God... is o saving God”. HAIGHT, Roger,
“The point of trinitarian theology”, Toronto journal oftheotogy 4, 2, 1988, pp. 202 - 203, emphasis added.
53MOSS, David, “Narcissism, empathy and the fragmentation of self: An interview with Heinz Kohut.’
Pilgrimage 4, 1, 1976, p. 32. I would add that for Julian, this bridge of similanty includes difference.
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teaching of lier visions and tlie teaching of Holy Church together in Mother Jesus must be a
sign of psychological and spiritual maturation, of withdrawing projections.
I do flot mean this to suggest that this acceptance of ambiguity is equivalent to
complacency or compromise on lier part, though it does signal great patience. Julian
located that patience in Christ’s willing and generous ongoing suffenng “which transforms
sin into love”.54 But Julian’ s capacity to live with the separation between her showings
and the teaching of the Church is very remimscent of Winnïcott’ s conmient on originality as
related to the play of the trusting child in the transitional reaim, but translated into the
cultural reaim as the (potentially) creative negotiation of tradition. He says that in
any cultural field it is flot possible to be original except on a basis of
tradition.... The interplay between originality and the acceptance of tradition as the
basis for inventiveness seems to me to be just one more example, and a very
exciting one, of the interplay between separateness and union.55
Julian’ s identification of Christ’ s incarnational suffermg-with humanity as the location of
union, even whule that liuman sensuality is in a condition of separation, became the means
for lier growth in a tmstworthy God in the transitional reaim of lier sliowings. I will
explore below tlie idea that it also allowed her to “benefit” creatively from the tradition and
from lier expenence of separation from it.
Tlie fruit of Julian’s originality and ber empathy for others is in the fact tliat the
written texts of the Showings exist at ah. Julian desired that, mirrored through lier writing,
others might be given to know the love whicli Christ lias for them. The creative act of
writing of them lias made Julian’s Showings a locus for cultural meaning within tlie
Church. Perhaps slie trusted tliat lier writing miglit help to enable tliat reconciliation to
corne about in some future time, beyond lier own lifetime, as we’hl explore in the final
chapter. This, to my mmd, would amount to a real sense of self-donation (afler McDargh
and Wilhiams), as Julian’ s giving herself to wliat fulfiils lier being
-- without despair.
For any woman, mature self-donation must also be seif-loving. I wonder wliether
at another level perhaps, botli Juhian’s wnting and lier invisible yet powerful symbolic
presence as the anchoress in the Norwich community could be seen as a remarkable,
(apopliatic? kenotic? contrapuntal? performative?) way of having lier need to be seen,
affirmed and creatively fulfihled. As an anchoress Julian was neyer seen. Everything about
BALDWIN, Anna, “The triumph of patience in Julian ofNorwich and Langland”, in Langtand, the
rnystics and the medieval English retigious tradition, ed. PHILLIPS, Helen, Cambridge, D. S. Brewer,
1990, p. 76.
WINNICOTT, D. W., “The location of cultural experience”, International journal ofpsycho-anatysis
48, 3, 1967, pan 3, reprint in Playing and reatiiy, NY, Routledge, [1967] 1989, p. 99, emphasis in text.
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lier was shrouded. But lier presence in the community and lier contribution to the spiritual
health of its people, as well as being a satïsfying form of self-donation, perhaps also
contributed to the satisfying “illusion of being seen”. Her Showings were almost
unknown in her lifetime, were likely neyer copied in great quantities, and came close to
being lost in the time of the Reformation. She wrote them for others, lier even Christians.
But surely, as Homans would argue, the very composition of tlie $howings exemplifies the
relation between narrative and narcissism:
Wliat miglit the relationship be between narcissism and narrative? It seems
reasonable to suppose tliat the work of narrative building transforms some bits and
pieces of the selfs original, arcliaic narcissism (Kohut) and its residual,
unconscious memones of maternai and infantile omnipotence (Winnicott) into a
conversation witli the social order. This supposition is grounded in the social
cliaracter of ail narrative, on the one hand, and its roots in deptli-psyclioÏogical
personal experience, on the other hand. The most common examples are the
keeping of a diary, the reading or writing of an autobiography or novel, and the
viewing (or writing) of a play or movie. Complex as such experiences are, ai of
them include a fundamental transaction or interchange between indïvidual,
unconscious fantasy processes and socially and historically grounded and shaped
events and figures which play out liuman relations, situations and predicaments,
over a set time span. In imaginatively entertaining sucli experiences, persons work
out and over and build up relations between their ïnner worlds and the world of
shared collective meaning and memory. As old meanings are sorted out and
discarded and new ones entertained and formed, the distance between the ego and
the social order at first lessens but then also deepens. Such activities facilitate
transformations in persons’ narcissistic organization.56
Further below I will explore these thoughts in more detail.
4.0 Summary of the therapeutic mirroring function in Julian’s Showings
In this psycliobiography of minoring in Julian of Norwicli I have hypothesized that
Julian suffered a chronic lack in early infant minoring, both in lier farnily and in her culture
as a female, and that this lack had severe consequences for her capacity to mature to a true
core sense of self in mature narcissism and object relations. The study argued that there are
signs in the Short Text rather of a false bipolar self structure, represented in fluctuating
extremes of grandiosity and despair. Mthough Julian spoke of “trusting in salvation” on
her deathbed, the study revealed that the pre-visionary Julian dïd not show signs of a
capacity for relational trust but rather that she struggled with intenor resïstance,
ambivalence and conflicting feelings, and that the trust she spoke of at that time was of a
56 HOMANS, Peter, The abitity to moum: Disillusionment and the social origins ofpsychoanatysis,
Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1989, pp. 335 - 336.
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conventïonal nature. The study argues that in fact Julian dreaded death because of a
profound fear of abandonment and neglect, which translated into a fear of damnation.
The application of Kohut’ s stages of maturation through the therapeutic mirroring
transference, and of Winnicott’s concept of transitional space to Julian’s Short Text and
Long Text brought out how Julian entered the mirroring transference with the Jesus of the
crucifix set before lier, how she worked through the empathic exposure to the reality of
those false self fragments which the mimoring transference allowed, and came to
intemalize the missed parental function of minoring. Her exemplum and the later chapters
of the Long Text reveal a more cohesive sense of Julian’s true self in the continuous loving
sight of the Other. I argue that Julian in effect teils us (through lier account of coming to
understand the meanings of the exemptum) that this long-term therapeutic process was
maintained by the overwhelming significance of the mirroring function of the “constant
regard [chere] of the lord” beholding the servant in her exemplum. I suggest that this
served to maintain and promote object constancy in the visionary relationship. This was
particularly significant afier the comforting immediacy of the experience of the merged or
fused mirroring transference with the suffering
- joyful Christ passed, and she went back to
her despairing seif-preoccupation. Julian’s understanding of human anthropology is
double, and I believe it derives its distinctiveness from lier years of beholding the
exemplum. Human substance, neyer separated from Christ’s substance, was engaged in
the mirroring transference: each and every showing revealed the immanence of God in
humankind. Her distinction of the two conditions of human sensuality in the discovery that
the servant was both Adam and Christ, faflen (despairing) and restored (united with
Christ), further oriented her toward the intemalization of a true sense of lierself as cohesive
and continuous in time. This gave Julian the means to identify 5m correctly (in the siglit of
God) and so to distance herseif from the suffering self-preoccupation and despair of lier
false self-fragments. Indeed, lier mature understanding of the work of Mother Christ,
bringing human changeable sensuality into Cbrist’s own constant sensuality by grace in
this life, persists in lier mystenous use of the facial language which reverberates witli the
gracious activity of intemalizing the mirroring function: “[bJy bis grace lie lifts up and will
draw our outer chere to tlie inner, and will make us ail at unity with him, and each of us
with others in tlie true, lasting joy which is Jesus.... Tlie blessed chere of our Lord God
works this in us”. (LT 71.)
I have souglit to descnbe this process of maturation as a shift from merged
subjectivism to relational realism. The early Julian, in lier fragmented self structures,
seems to have assumed that if she was not fiised with Christ in a condition of unrelenting
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suffering or undifferentiated bliss, she was condemned to isolation. In her mature
developrnent she understands that her selffiood is relationally constituted in the sight of
God and that this is the case both in well-being and in woe. Whereas her pre-visionary
concern was for her own salvation exclusively, her compassion cornes to include ah
humankind as found in the servant Christ of her exempÏum. Whereas the early Julian was
riddled with doubt as to whether God was trustworthy, in her maturity she was convinced
that God wants lier and lier even Christians to know that God’s meaning is love, and, as a
trusting child, to flee to God who has the best interests of human flourishing maturation at
lieart.
5.0 Trust and faith maturation
Winnicott would say that the holding environment is essential for the intemalization
of the mirroring function, which enables the child to take the risk of trust in a relationship
with a reliable, mirroring other, while negotiating a nascent sense of self, and for its many
fruits of mature self esteem, self acceptance, reality acceptance, empathy and object love.
Julian’s early, conventional trust in salvation appears, in hindsight, rigid, fragile and
debilitated by doubt and fear. John McDargh’ s definition of faith as that
liurnan dynamic of trusting, relying upon, and reposing confidence in, which (1) is
foundational to the life-long process of becoming a self, and (2) is fulfihled in the
progressively enlarged capacity of that self for love and self-commitment ‘
ahlowed the present study to draw connections between the psychobiographical portrait of
Juhian thus sketched, and signs of maturation in lier life of faith which correlate with
maturation in mirroring needs. I observed how McDargh’s signs of maturity in faitli are
present in Julian’ s exemptum.
Taken together, Julian’s $howings reveal the evolution of a religious mirroring
transference to which we can look as a model for how narcissicticahly wounded persons
might mature psychodynamically and spfritually and which can give us help in disceming
rehigious narcissistic immaturity and pathology in our own day.
This is not to diminish the distinction between psychological maturity and the life of
grace. Eacli of these maturational processes
-- modem relational psychoanalytic and
fourteenth centuly Enghisli mystic -- speaks different languages and understands its goals in
very different terms. These differences cannot be levehled without loss. At the same time,
however, I hope to have shown convincingly that Kohut’s three phases in the therapeutic
mirroring transference do parallel the evolution of mirroring activity which pervades
McDARGH, 1983, p. 71.
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Julian’s Showings in this study, and that these parallels suggest a fresh way of seeing “the
mysterious working of grace with nature”.58 I suggest that in terms of dynamic movement
and transformation of self understanding and of relation to othemess, the parallels between
these two processes are significant, perhaps even diagnostic, and thus may be helpful in
further applications. It is hoped that this study can be a useful contributing to the critical
correlation of the work of Christian spiritual wnters and mystics with relational
psychoanalysïs.
k the final part of this chapter I retum to two of the areas which Meissner identifies
as areas for exploring religion through the transitional lens of object relations theory, as
these suggest themselves in this study of Julian of Norwich. (See the chapter on the
psychology of mirroring above.) The maturation I have traced in this psychobiography of
mirroring in Julian’s $howings gives us privileged material to explore the transitional
quality of 1) her experience of prayer and 2) lier expenence of the religious tradition, that
is, how religious symbolism îs appropriated and functions in ber $howings. My hope is
that this will help bring the relational psychoanalytic conversation into dialogue with the
soteriological in the final chapter of this diptych.
5.1 Mirroring, transitional space and prayer
Meissner’ s observation, that Winnicott’ s notion of transitional space can help us
understand the nature of the expenence of prayer, has been an essential premise for the
present study.
One might say that in prayer the individual enters the transitional space where he
meets bis God-representation. Prayer thus can become a channel for expressing
what is most unique, profound and personal in individual psychology. Ml the
elements of transference... can enter into the prayer experience and corne to shape
the individuals experience both of God and of himself in its context.59
Virtually ail of what Julian telis us about herseif and God is given and sifled through the
transitional space of lier showings and ber continued practice of beholding thern for the rest
of lier life. We might say there is a transitional quality to everything she writes. Medieval
58 WOLSKI CONN, 2006, p. 70. Although her method differs somewhat from that of the present work,
Wolski Conn is right in arguing simi]arly that “the great spiritual teachers promote cooperation with grace
by choices for greater self-knowledge, and surrendering love See also MEISSNER, W. W., Ignatius of
Loyola: The psychotogy ofa saint, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1992, ch. 20.
MEISSNER, W.W., Psychoanalysis and religious experience, New Haven, Yate University Press,
1984, p. 182
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affective devotional practices, spiritual counsel, anclioritic symbolism and the symbolism
of Christ as mirror must be seen as sources of nurture of that transitional reaim in Julian.
In Julian’ s case, her encounter and identification with the suffenng Christ which
began lier early sliowings led lier, through his change of chere to joy which transformed
lier interior condition mid-way through the showings, to identify both conditions of
desolation and consolation simultaneously in the identity of the servant, mirrored in tlie two
cheres of the lord in the exemplum. In this life long process, the prayer of beholding led
lier into a deepened sense of trust in the reliable compassion andjoy of God for God’s
creatures, where a rooted sense of her own self’ s worth and delight in God’ s sight could
develop Far from pathological, Julian’s showings, lier life long practice of writing and
meditating on them lead lier to greater integration and maturity. Tlie illusory nature of her
showings, 50 revelatory of lier personal history and subjectivity, her inmost desires and
wishes, are also a creative negotiation of lier culture and tradition.
The potential space of her showings, whicli she sustained througli lier wliole life in
the prayer of beholding, and which she recreates so skillfulty for the reader, supplies for
her and for her readers what may have been missed in infancy: “the baby’s trust in the
mother experienced over a long-enough penod at tlie cntical stage of tlie separation of the
flot-me from the me, wlien the establishment of the autonomous self is at the initial
stage”.6° Meissner argues that “[wJithin this potential space... man must revive the
roots of his capacity for creative living and for faitli experience”.61 In tlie case of Julian of
Norwich I believe lie would agree that the mirroring transference, in winch her experience
of faitli as trust was nurtured, “carnes witli it a transcendent element”.62 Julian ulfimately
identifies Christ as Mother and seems to imbue him with tlie function of enabling lier to
interionize a core sense of herseif. Meissner would likely agree that tins is a profound
appropriation of faith as trust and that it constitutes a bnuliant example of “die creative
moment in tlie illusion of faith”.63 Citing Erikson lie concludes:
[MJust we cal! it regression if man thus seeks again the earliest encounters of his
tmstfu! past in bis efforts to reacli a hoped-for and etemai future? Or do religions
partake of man’s ability, even as lie regresses, to recover creatively? At their
creative best, religions retrace our earliest inner experiences, giving tangible form to
vague evils and reaching back to the earliest individua! sources of trust; at the same
time, they keep alive the common symbols of integrity distilled by the generations.
60 WINNICOTT, D. W., Ptaying and reality, NY, Routiedge, 1989, p. 110.
61 MEISSNER, 1984, p. 183.
62 MEISSNER, 1984, p. 183.
63 MEISSNER, 1984, pp. 183 - 184
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If this is partial regression, it is a regression which, in retracing firmly established
pathways, retums to the present amplified and clarified.64
That Julian’ s $howings should seek to “perform” this work by grace, in her own
soul and in the souls of others whose past and present was anything but “trustful”, is
afready extraordinary. That she should seek to enliven those “common symbols of
integrity” of the teaching of Mother Church by those same showings, places courageous
paradox and prophetic ambïguity at the heart of her creativity.
5.2 Separation and creativity in the religious tradition
Meissner identifies the transitional quality of objects of religious symbolism (such
as the crucifix) as another fertile area for an object relations exploration.
[O]bjects as religious symbols are neither exclusively perceived in real and objective
terms, nor simply produced by subjective creation. Rather they evolve from the
amalgamation of what is real, material, and objective as it is experienced,
penetrated, and creatively reshaped by the subjective belief and patterns of meaning
attnbuted to the object by the believer.65
Just as aii abstract religious belief system would flot be able to be sustained without
sensory concretization,
[bJy the same token, the religious symbols would flot be able to serve their function
if they were flot received into the transitional reaim of experience of each
participating believer who brings to the reality of the crucifix, for example, bis own
creative impulse expressed in and through bis belief and its attendant faith.
Consequently, their meaning and significance are acbieved only to the extent to
which sucli symbols become part of the transitional reaim of the believer’s illusory
expefience.66
Like Winnicott, Meissner holds that a positive, and not just deceptive, relation may obtain
between religious tradition and creativity.
We cannot ignore the creatÏvity with which Julian appropnates the symbolism of the
Christian Biblical, theological and mystical traditions to serve ber needs. Creativity is one
of the key signs of mature narcissism.67 But it also cannot be ignored that this creativity
64 ERIKSON, Erik, Young mon Luther, NY, Norton, 1962, p. 264.
65 MEISSNER, 1984, p. 181.
66 MEISSNER, 1984, p. 181.
67By contrast, Kohut’s judgment of the relationship between religion (as a corporate, symbolic tradition)
and mature narcissism seems fettered, clogged with old, unresolved relational issues, or, in Kohut’s own
word, “archaic”. Perhaps Kohut’s fear of ‘tradition’ as destructive of individual creativity can even be seen
in his unwillingness to acknowledge the parallels between bis work and that of other object relations
theonsts? Compare Bacal and Newman’s similar observation suggesting that in so doing Kohut was
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came into play as Julian seems to have experienced a real disorientation with regard to the
meaning of Christ’ s suffering and lier sin, indeed, a crisis of meaning. The exemptum
became her focus of sustained desire to understand the misty meaning of what she was
seeing. Homans’ Kohutian study of how mouming the loss of meaning in Christian
religious symbols can lead to the creation of new meanÏng broadens the significance of
Julian’ s negotiating separation through lier sliowings.
The transitional space of her practice of beholding the exemplum became for Julian
the lieu for working out her rnost urgent concem that the god of tlie common teaching of
Holy Church was flot a saving God, but rather was implicated in her psycliodynamic
abandonment anxïety and confusion around sin. What began as a devotïonal practice of
meditating on the crucifix led Julian into an identification with tliat suffering Christ, which
was a mirror for lier own dying condition. I have suggested that the bipolar faise self
structure whicli I found reflected in the merged mirroring transference in tliose early
sliowings revealed a personal and social history of neglect and abandonment. Julian, I
suggested, liad introjected a desperate feeling of responsibility and blame for Christ’s
sufferïng, and expressed this in lier pre-visionary life as a spirituality based on suffering
relentlessly, longing arnbivalently for tlie pains of death, whïch nonetheless did not seem to
assure salvation. Altliough the cross is tlie Christian symbol of salvation, wliat the early
Julian seems to reveal is that the meaning of suffering which she liad mtrojected was very
ambiguous. Tlius it was necessary to argue that Julian underwent a process of
“noughting” or dying to this false self structure, and to tlie meaning of Christ’s and lier
suffering as slie had understood it.
Homans argues, following Winnicott’ s lead, tliat in the process of disillusionrnent
or mourning
tlie response to loss opens up the transitional space, which is botli social and
historical, and in this space persons construct a bridge of symbols between inner
and social worlds through fantasy and its implicitly narrative cliaracter.68
In the process of that mouming, individuation and the creation of new meaning, Hornans
argues, tlie ego cornes increasingly to recognize both its separation from the past and its
dependence on the past for the cultural symbols it lias been “given” as well as “created” in
that transitional space between self and social otlier.69 “The reality and recognition of
interdependence is tlie point at which a structure within the organism deeper tlian the ego
avoiding an “anxiety of influence”, in BACAL, Howard and Kenneth NEWMAN, Theories of object
relations: Bridges to selfpsychology, NY, Columbia University Press, 1990, p. 205, n. 2.
68 HOMANS, 1989, p. 333.
69 HOMANS, 1989, p. 334.
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begins to take shape. It is best to cail this structure the self.”7° Julian’s holding both the
teaching of the showings and the teaching of Holy Church to be in Mother Jesus is just
such an indication of lier awareness of Homans’ “interdependence”.
The emergence of Julian’ s authentïc self as a process of noughting or emptying of
the false selves is also the noughting of Christ’s liumanity in lier sliowings. From lier early
identification with Christ in his suffering, wounds and chere, and his with hers, througli to
the exemptum of tlie servant as both Adam and Christ in the siglit of the lord, to the vision
of Mother Jesus, wliat Julian sees mirrored in these images is the God wlio is transfigured
through dying to the old, distant, abandoning, unapproachable -- “divine” -- self.
Julia Gatta observes this explicitly about the exemptum:
The parable represents an imaginative reconstruction of the self-emptying described
in Philippians 2, the systematic divestment by Christ of his divine prerogatives and
even lis human dignity: ‘He.. .did flot count equality witli God a thing to be
grasped, but emptied himself, taldng tIc form of a servant’ •71
What Kohut describes empirically as the feeling of “empfiness or deprivation”
which a person encounters and needs to leam to tolerate as she begins to get some distance
from lier archaic self-fragments, and, wliat Homans cails the “resignation” or
“renunciation” which lie associates with the “sad peace” achieved througli disillusionment
and mouming, ïs for Julian flot just a feeling to be tolerated or a reality to which slie
becomes resigned. It is a desolation whidh cornes to be experienced simultaneously as
70 HOMANS, 1989, P. 334.
71GATTA, Julia, Three spiritual directors for our time , Cambridge MA, Cowley, 1986, p. 66.
Julian specialists think differently about how this kenotic Christ is expressed in Julian’s motlierhood of
God. Carotyn Walker Bynum observes that
[tJo Julian, God’s motherhood, expressed in Christ, is flot merely love and mercy, not merely
redemption through the sacrifice of the cross, but a taking on of our physical humanity in the
Incarnation, as a mother gives herseif to the fetus she bears...
BYNUM, Carolyn Walker, Fragmentation and Redemption: Essays on gender and the human body in
medievat religion, NY, Zone Books, 1992, P. 163. Bynum goes on to say on p. 164 that “mothering was
associated most clearly with eating and feeding, and with passio (suffering, which was in some sense
childbirtli).
David Aers, however, argues against Bynum that in Julian’s use of the Christ as mother theme “Julian lias
not, emphatically not, confined the figure of mother to the reaim of the stereotypically feminine, the flesh,
the dying and nutritive body of Christ: she lias exalted it into the mysterious reaim of the Trinity”. He
sees Julian’s sparseness in lier treatment of this theme as going against the pull of lier culture. AERS,
1996, pp. 96 - 97. In a similar vein, Watson says of Julian’s understanding of the motherhood of God that
it can be
defined as a divine equivalent oftlie sensuality, which bears the same relation to tlie fatherhood as
does the sensuality to the substance. While it partly functions as a figure for Christ’s human
nature, the motherhood is most importantly the principle of self-emptying (kenosis) within the
godhead itself, represented by God tlie Son, which brings about the Incarnation”. WATSON, 1996,
p. 26.
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consolation, as tlie place which Christ encloses and in which lie is enclosed, regardless of
our sensual condition. The outward, compassionate chere of the lord draws the
changeability of lier sensual conditions inward to the constant chere ofjoy.
Significantly, Julian’ s disillusionment around the meaning of relentless suffering
(whicli the crucifix seems earlier to liave symbolized for lier) becomes for lier an experience
of sacred emptiness or exposure to be sought after, in which to see clearly liow differently
the loving mirroring face of God beholds her to be from how she would define herseif (and
Christ) in suffering. The process of lier mourning tlie loss of lier old self-understanding is
seen in the kenosis or self-emptying of the servant. This self-emptying or exposure as an
experience to be sought is a sign of her becoming botli more familiar witli the work of
dying to false ego in union with Christ, as well as more whole in lier self-knowledge. So
far from being a kind of self-denial wliicli compromised lier human flourishing, it is ratlier
a source of liberation for lier flourishing and mirrors a new knowledge of herseif as
beloved in the siglit of God. Tlie effect of this on lier understanding of the mearnng of
the cross, of Christ’s Passion, suffering and death, is no less revolutionary. No longer is
it seen as something for whicli Julian is endlessly to blame. Rather, beholding Christ in tlie
condition of suffering becomes a signal to lier that she has abandoned Christ (LT 80) for
suffering whicli is conducive to sin, i.e., despair. Christ, she leams, lias other cheres
which mirror lier otlier sensual conditions, including and ultimately, joy.
II is clear that Julian’s individuation was hardly secularist, in Homans’ terms. It is
evident in lier Showings liowever that througli that mouming process “[w]liat was first
experienced phenomenologically to have been ‘on tlie outside’ (cosmology and mytli) was
retumed to its proper and natural place ‘on the inside’ (psychology).”72 This is clearly the
case with Julian’ s mature understanding of tlie nature of projection of wratli in the
changeable judgment of Holy Cliurch, as well as in lier understanding of the work of
Christ’s drawing tlie outer chere to the inner. Julian’s sliowings reveal just such a sense of
colierence and flexible interaction between inner and outer worlds. Taldng Homans’ lead, I
suggest that this is tlie fruit of tliat process of mouming the lost meaning of Christ’ s
suffering and lier 5m.
I suggest tliat Homans’ tlieoretical formulation can assist us to understand the
significance of what is going on in Julian’s transitional space for lier own therapeutic
72 HOMANS, 1989, p. 320.
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process and for her resolution of what I have described as her pre-oedipal sotenological
crisîs.
Julian’ s written record of the transitional space of beholding her showings,
especially the exemptum, transcends the intrapsychic symbolic reaim of traditional
psychoanalytic categones, and as Winnicott believed, becomes the lieu for the creative
work of “object gain” in the formation new symbolic understanding. for Julian this
involves an “object gain” with regard to the place of Christ’s suffenng in the whole of bis
work of salvation. I hold that the function of mirroring, so central to lier own therapeutic
process, pervades Julian’s saving God who, above ail things, is trustworthy, and wants us
to know it and practise it by beholding God’s chere.
At this point this psychobiography of mirroring converges with the soteriological
correlation I have been pursuing in the second liaif of each diptych.
CHAPTER 12
DIPTYCH 3.2 JULIAN’S SOTERIOLOGY 0F MIRRORING
1.0 Introduction to the chapter
These three diptychs have made thus far a close reading of Julian’ s two versions of
lier Showings and identified the contours of Julian’s healing and maturation in her pre
oedipal need for mirroring alongside her conversion process of working through a pre
oedipal soteriological cnsis. Ibis chapter wil extend the reading of lier sotenological crisis
to its resolution in the exemplum. Throughout the study I have remained close to lier
evolving understanding of sin, suffering and human anthropology as these are related to the
way in which the Jesus of lier showings is seen to function, psychodynamically and
soteriologically, as a mirror to reflect back to Julian what she most needs to see in lier
sensual condition in order to be healed and restored in lier self-knowledge in God’ s siglit
and to mature in lier human flourishing in union with Christ and lier even Cliristians.
It must be said, however, that Julian’s exemplum, whicli takes up and subsumes
ail the other sliowings, leads Julian to articulate a whole Christology and a tlieology of tlie
Trinity in active relation to liuman creation. This final chapter cannot attempt any
systematic conelation with these areas whicli nonetheless bear on Julian’ s mature
soteriology. That is anotlier project waiting to be written, tliat is, to correlate Julian’ s
rewriting of these areas of tlieology out of lier mature soteriological vision with, say, the
three final chapters of Elizabeth Johnson’ s feminist constructive theological project) M
1 See JOHNSON, Elizabeth, She who is:—’ The mystery ofGod inferninist theotogical discourse, NY,
Crossroad, 1992, chapters 10 - 12, where she works through the contrast situation of the theological
tradition’ s doctrine of God to appropriate a more credibie feminist trinitarian theology and theology of
Christ’s suffering. Johnson’s theologicai project responds to a number of the exigencies driving
contemporary sotenoiogy identified by Haight, and there are many parallels to be made between her project
and Julian’s maternai trinitarian theology and Christology. Bnefly, Johnson examines the patriarchal
influences on the doctrine of the Tnnity and then recasts the primary intention of the doctrine in terms
which are more credible to, and iead to the flourishing of, women. Thus, in chapter 10 she argues, with
Rahner, but using women’s experience to frame the symbol, that the Tnnïty must be driven
sotenologicaÏly, that the economic Tnnity is the immanent Trinity, a saving God. In chapter 11 she
identifies the problem that there is no real relation between the Trinty and creation in the theological
tradition we have inherited, and develops a Trinitarian theology which, in privileging women’s relationatity,
is constitutively related to creation. Both of these problematic doctrinal trinitarian concerns, as they express
themselves in Julian’s Showings, have been taken up by NUTH, ban, Wisdom ‘s daughter: the theotogy of
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that can be attempted here in the final section of this chapter is to focus on one theme which
is particularly pertinent to tlie present study, and reflect bnefly on some of the other themes
in sotenology raised by Haight (in chapter one) with the insights into Julian’ s own
theological responses which the present study lias made possible.
In a sense then, this final chapter can only be an abbreviation, since the third
movement in Jolinson’s feminist liberation dynamic of conversion leads to the
appropriation of a contemporary soteriology which transforms and gives new meaning and
intelligibility flot only to women’s suffering and to Christ’s saving work, but also and
necessarily to the whole Christian theological enterprise.
1. 1 Outline of the chapter
The primary focus of the present chapter will explore one issue in Julian’ s
appropriation of a liberative soteriology which seems to have escaped attention in
contemporary feminist and liberationist theological projects, however. By means ofthe
phenomenon of mirroring I wish to examine how Christ’s saving work (objective
soteriotogy) is related to Jutian ‘s and her readers’ appropriation in the present time of
that saving work (subjective soteriotogy). It addresses the theme of soteriology as
revelation, that is, how soteriology is real and can be expenenced in the present time. It is
this question which I will attempt to address in this final chapter.
After looking at the work of two Julian specialists who have approached this
question, the chapter will proceed in two parts.2 First, I explore the mirroring process as
Jutian ofNorwich, NY, Crossroad, 1991, 217 p. Bauerschmidt and Derek Anderson also address these
questions head on, although flot from an explicitly feminist perspective. See BAUERSCHMIDT,
Frederick, Julian ofNorwich and the mysticat body politic of Christ, Notre Dame, Indiana, Notre Dame
University Press, 1999, ch. 4; and ANDERSON, Derek, Julian ofNonvich’s nonviotent account of
sotvation, Ph.D. thesis, Loyola University, Chicago, 2005, ch. 4. See also DREYER, Elizabeth, “The
trinitarian theology of Julian of Norwich: Mysticism and theology - a test case”, Studies in spirituatity 4,
1994, pp. 79 - 93. Chapter 12 of Johnson’s study addresses the tradiflon’s view of impassibility in God
and the legacy of problems which that has raised with regard to the meaning of human suffering in relation
to Christ’s suffering. Not unlike Ciysdale, Johnson argues fora new understanding ofwomen’s symbols of
suffenng (grief, travail and birth, degradation and anger for justice) as evoking the mystery of God as capax
passionis, for the bringing forth of new life. See BAKER, Denise N., Julian of Norwich’s Showings:
From vision to book, Princeton NI, Princeton University Press, 1994, 215 p; and HIDE, Keme, “The
parable of the lord and the servant: A soteriology for our times”, ?acfica: Austratian theotogical studies
10, 1997, pp. 53 - 69. Thus, ail three ofJohnson’s chapter subjects find direct parallels in Julian’s late
theology. But given the limits of the present chapter, I will only be able to touch on them as they relate to
the functionality of mirroring in Julian’ s soteriology, which is the focus here.
2 Unlike Anderson who discusses objective soteriology and then its subjective appropriation in Julian, the
theological method I use works the other way, from Julian’s expenence of appropriation to her
understanding of what that saving work in God is. See ANDERSON, 2005, chs. 4 ami 5.
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that bears on her practice of the prayer of beholding, or contemplation. I argue that it
describes a fundamental dynamism in lier subjective soteriology, and by means of lier
“performing” the exemptum over time, she and lier readers are enabled to enter into the
same process of appropriating healing and restoration in God’s siglit. Witli Anderson I
hold that appropriation, understood as tlie graced fruit of an ongoing practice of
contemplative beliolding or, as I put it, mirroring, is Christ’ s saving work in the present
tense. Second, I explore tlie mirroring function of tlie face of tlie lord in tlie exemplum,
as, in effect, her way of coming to a more fully adequate understanding of what lier
objective soteriology is, in past and future tenses, given lier liuman predicament.
My evoïving hypothesis witt be that in Jutian subective and objective
soteriology find a coherent meeting point in the dynamic of mirroring. I propose that
the psychobiographicat analysis of Julian ‘s maturation in mirroring need into
relational realism, enabling her to see dtfferentiation in union in the human divine
relation, finds a correlation with the maturation of Julian ‘s soteriology into a
trinitarian relational activity intrinsically engaged in human creation and restoration.
I hold that the mirroring dynamic in the exemplum, as tliis is expressed in Julian’ s later
trinitarian soteriological reflection, gives rise to the thouglit of tlie Trmity in Christ as
Mother. Tlie Trinity’s mirroring activity in liumanldnd describes tlie dynamic quatity of
retationality of God as Motlier with whicli Julian invests ail tlie maternai activity of tlie
Trimty engaged in liumankind in Christ, past, present and future. Tliis activity, in the
present tense, enables Julian’s appropriation of tlie satisfaction and liealing of lier deep
wound of lack of self love and lier maturation and fulfihiment in leaming to desire to behold
herseif (and humanldnd) beloved as God desires and beliolds Christ in her. Tliese
observations confirm tlie psycliobiographical and feminist Iiberationist reading of lier
transformation of the meaning of suffering, sin and tlie Passion, and lier conversion
througli maturation in mirroring need. But tlie mirroring dynamic also lielps to put flesli on
the relation between liuman desire or affections, freedom and grace in Julian’s double
antliropology. For Julian, appropriation is flot only an epistemological activity; as
Anderson argues, it is also tlie fruit of practices which have relaflonal and ontological
consequences.
Reading her soteriology as a soteriology of mirroring furthers tlie work of Koenig
and Anderson in tlieir reading of the relation between objective and subjective soteriology
in Julian. It confirms their argument that Julian seeks to enable God’s saving activity to be
performed in lier readers’ lives. I conclude, tlierefore, by proposing that Julian’ s
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soteriology of mirroring can help to offer a coherent spiritual and theological response to
the contemporary search for a credible soteriology.
1.2 Contemplative action
Before proceeding, I need to make a comment about the way in which I will be
approaching the discourse of contemplation in Julian (as linked to that of mysticism). The
sustained focus of this thesis on the psychodynamic and the soteriological dimensions of
the phenomenon of mirroring in Julian of Norwich’ s Showings lias required an attention to
the historically mediated contemplative practices which assisted lier in lier psychodynamic
healing and maturation as well as her in appropriation of a credible saviour. I observe that
the prophetic, activist nature of much contemporaiy feminist and liberatiomst theology is
flot mutually exclusive of a prophetic, contemplative theology, but one frequently gets the
impression that it is. Roger Haight, in a section on participation in the process of salvation,
is critical of spirituality, as a domain in practical theology, for its diffuseness and
multiplicity of metliods which do flot emphasize that the appropriation of salvation and the
ground of spintuality is in action which takes place in and is a response to society. He
argues that
salvation is finally mediated through a form of human action.... Where there is no
liberating practice in the face of social oppression, then it is nonsense to speak
about salvation in this world. The language of salvation is precisely a language that
appeals to freedom to make satvation happen.. .
Compare Fredenck Bauerschmidt’ s cnticism of the contemporary discourse of mysticism,
as constmcting a space that is protected from the “political” and as sucli removing itself
from the reaim of the historical, the social and ultimately, “from the sway of Christ’ s
reign”.4
Clearly there is no intent to exciude spiritual practices from the domain of liberative
social action, but Haiglit gives the impression in this passage that it does, or at least that
salvation is to be identified with activism tliat changes the world, and “makes salvaflon
happen”. To be sure, Haiglit acknowledges that “[r]eligious salvation does not lie in tlie
degree of the the success of this action, but in the action itself’.5 Nonetlieless, in a culture
which prizes activism and abhors contemplation as passive, Haight’ s text could be
construed te mean that the latter does flot constitute an “action” in this sense.
HAIGHT, Roger, Jesus, symbol of God, Maryknotl NY, Orbis Books, 1999, p. 388, emphasis added.
BAUERSCHMIDT, Fredenck, “Julian ofNorwich - incorporated”, Modem theotogy 13, 1, 1997, pp. 96
- 97.
HAIGHT, 1999, p. 388.
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Even more to the point, Lanzetta observes that
feminists have been cautious of mysticism if it is used to mask differences, make
universal daims about women’s spirituality, avoid social jus, or confine women to
gender stereotypes. Feminists also contend that the characteristics usually
associated with mysticism, such as passivity, selflessness, silence, and absence of
desire, further women’s oppression by assigning normative expectations to their
behavior.6
But the contribution of Julian of Norwicli toward the shaping of a credible
soteriology is flot least in the witness she provides as to the imaginative contemplative
prayer practice of beholding winch undergirds lier own mature appropriation of that
soteriology, and winch she offers lier even Christians by means of the written text of the
$howings. Historically speaking, contemplation for Julian the anchoress was clearly a
prophetic action in the world. As Anderson observes, Julian’s soteriology does not engage
an epistemological appropriation (of consciousness raising) alone. It does do that to be
sure, but it also engages a relational and ontological appropriation, by means of the
perfonning of the text by lier readers.7
In 1984 Koenig observed the etincal thnist in Julian’s work winch
in its heuristic function as a redescription of reality... discloses a possible world in
which to live, and in so doing it demands a re-reading of reality. It communicates a
vision of unconditional love and acceptance that challenges every condemnatory
judgment human beings make against one another, especially those judgments
pronounced in the name of God and/or scripture.... Ricoeur believes that the acts
of imagination winch... produce new meanings also engender analogous acts of
imagination on the part of the reader. These imaginÏngs then enable the reader to
see and create new possibilities for his or lier individual and social life.8
More recent Julian specialists such as Anderson and Bauerschmidt should be seen as
following Koenig’ s cali for further studies which link an empliasis on subjectivity in self
understanding with community and history in human reality in a non-solipsistic way.9
Indeed, Anderson’ s thesis is that Julian’ s soteriology is non-violent in its content, its
structures, and in the performative trajectory engaged in reading Julian.10 And
6 LANZETfA, Beverly, Radical wisdom: Afeminist mystical theology, Minneapolis MN, Fortress Press,
2005, P. 38.
ANDERSON, 2005, pp. 45 - 57.
8 KOENIG, Elisabeth, The “Book of showings” ofiulian ofNonvich: A testcase for Paut Ricoeur’s
theories of metaphor and the imagination, Ph.D. dissertation, NY, Columbia University, 1984, pp. 222 -
224.
KOENIG, 1984, p. 231. To ber comment that the possible world Julian describes “challenges every
condemnatory judgment human beings make against one another” I would add “or introject”.
10 ANDERSON, 2005, p. 152.
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Bauerschmidt’ s whole point is that Julian “imagines the political”, and breaks down such
distinctions between inner and outer, private and social, worlds. Thus we must approach
her contemplative practice, lier “mysticism” if you will, cogmzant that it is intended to
effect change outwardly, in temporal, historical social relations, in the Church and its
theological tradition, as well as inwardly in conscious self-knowledge and union with God.
In effect, the Winnicottian notion that the negotiation of inner and outer worlds is a
continuai play of findïng and creating reality would lielp us to grasp that the terms
subjective soteflology and objective sotenology are tliemselves much more dynamically
interrelated than they would seem in the history of the soteriological tradition.
Appropriation (subjective soteriology) is neyer simply a “subjective” creation, as it
creatively engages the found, or given social realm of religious symbolism, historical
tradition, practices and community. Objective soteriology, that is, the saving work of
Christ, is neyer simply “objective” as if it were simply “found”, “out there” in the tradition,
and flot also ïmaginatïvely reworked and created by persons and communities (with and
witliout voice) within that historical and ecclesial tradition of Biblical and soteriological
reflection.
Moreover, I pointed out in the introduction to this thesis that a major problem of the
credibility of sotenological narratives in our contemporary situation is tliat, between the
account of the saving work of Christ received from Christian tradition and our
appropriation of it, there is, at best, meaninglessness and at worst, abuse. “If it doesn’t
save, don’t cail it salvation”. The problem of the credibility of the soteriological narratives
we have inherited is to some degree perhaps a function of the historical division between
these two reaims of subjective and objective soteriology in the theological tradition.
Homans’ exploration of this historical loss of meaning of these mediated cultural symbols,
and the process of disillusionment, mouming and creative negotiation by which symbols
retum with object gain lias lielped us to address this crisis of soteriological incredibility in
Julian and in contemporary theology in correlation with object relations theory. Because
the sotenology of Julian’s $howings emerges in and througli the transitional space of her
ongoing meditation, it is possible to see there a negotiation flot only of her self
understanding, but also of her relation to Mother Church and its soteriological tradition.
2.0 Two recent attempts to link objective and subjective soteriology in
Julian’s exeinptum
I draw now on the work of Derek Anderson and Elisabeth Koenig to help me frame
tlie primary contribution which this last chapter makes to understanding Julian’s $howings
as a resource for a credible sotenology in our own day.
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Anderson has begun to explore a major gap in contemporary sotenology as that
manifests itself in a failure to treat Julian’ s showings senously “as a resource for
addressing contemporary concems for the violent implications of Christian teaching about
salvation”.’ 1 Specifically, Anderson argues that in Julian there is a relationship between
Christ’s saving work and Julian’s (and our) appropriation of it.
Briefly, Anderson sees in Julian’s soteriology of Christ’s saving work a
recapitulation theory of salvation. He identifies the Incarnation as the saving work of
Christ; it is Christ’s identity (as the double identity of Christ the servant in the exemptum)
which is salvific, and pacific, according to Anderson. Our appropriation of this mysteiy of
salvation, lie argues, is flot simply epistemological, by means of consciousness raising,
however important that is. The cognitive recogmtion “that in Christ the remtegration lias
already taken place, and [human beings are toi live in that growing realization” is
important, but flot sufficient for Julian’s appropriation of its truth, according to
Anderson.’2 For Julian, our oneing in Christ also requires the practice ofbeholding
Christ, so that the work Christ is doing is contemplatively “performed” in us.
Julian envisions a process through whïch the work performed in Christ becomes
actual in human beings in the present life. That is to say, the saving work of Christ
does flot remain abstract in Julian’s view, performed by God in some distant time
and place; the healing of fallen sensuality and the oneing of that sensuality to
substance is performed by God’s grace in the lives of each subsequent generation
of Christians....
[T]here is evidence from the way Julian lias stmctured her Revetation that this
contemplative activity is just the sort of exercise tliat she is trying to teach lier reader
to perform as they leam to read and to understand lier book.13
Later in lis thesis, Anderson explains more explicitly how he sees Julian to be
consistent in lier understanding of Christ’ s saving work and in lier (and our) appropriation
of it. lii his terse account Anderson writes tliat if
Julian’ s account of salvation in the present life entails the healing and restoration of
human sensuality and the graduai transition to Christ-likeness, tlien her this-worldly
soteriology is consistent with her recapitulation-type account. The healing of the
sensuality that is entailed in receiving grace to live authentically Christian lives is
likely also the starting point of the reunion of substance and sensuality that lias been
accomplished in Clirist’s representative humanity. This point of contact is a
reminder that Jutian produces only one account ofsalvation in A revelation of
love, but that this account occupies more than one temporal dimension.14
11 ANDERSON, 2005, p. 63.
12 ANDERSON, 2005, p. 181, quoting JANTZEN, Grace, Power, gender and Christian rnysticisrn,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 151.
13 ANDERSON, 2005, pp. 180, 182.
14 ANDERSON, 2005, pp. 223 - 224, emphasis added.
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In effect, Anderson seems to be saying that the past and future tense of Christ’s
(trinitarian) saving work are Christ’s identity in our creation and in the Incarnation
(including Jesus’ life, suffering, death on the cross and Resurrection), and in the eschaton,
respectively. But what about the present tense? As Anderson puts it, “the great majority
of Julian specialists fail... to pay sufficient attention to Julian’ s account of salvation in the
present time”.15 Anderson is at pains to connect what Julian is saying about humans
sharing in the pacific relations of the Trinity with how humans appropriate salvation in the
present tense. His point is that the present tense of Christ’s saving work, it woutd seem,
is Jutian ‘s and our appropriation ofthis saving work. This is the first time I have seen
Julian’ s soteriology understood in this way as embracing ah time, yet differentiatmg the
past, future and present forms of that saving work in sucli a way as also to embrace both
objective and subjective soteriology. It is coherent with what she herseif came to leam that
“between the one and the other ail will be one time; and then ail will be brought into joy”.
(LT 21.)
I draw on Anderson’s theological ngour in identifying the link between Christ’s
saving work and our subjective appropriation of it in the present tense as Julian
understands this, because I believe that Anderson’ s insight, that “Julian envisïons a process
through which the work performed in Christ becomes actual in human beings in the present
life”, will help the present thesis to pinpoint the relationship between Julian’ s subjective
and objective soteriology in the discourse and dynamic of mirroring.
I take as my other starting point for this soteriology of mirroring in Julian’s
Showings a comment made by Elisabeth Koenig in her doctoral thesis, to which thesis the
present study has been significantly indebted. In the seventh chapter, Koenig abandons
Ricoeur temporarily to use Winnicott and Alice Miller for a relational psychoanalytic
understanding of the significance of the face of the lord in the exemplum. At one point
Koenig says that Julian’s description of the image of the lord’s face “reveals not onty its
affective power, but her understanding of its objective satvtfic power”.’6 To my
kriowledge, Koenig is the only Julian specialist who has noticed this contiguity in imagery,
between the objectivity of the saving work of Christ and the subjectivity of its appropriation
in the image of the face of the lord beholding the servant in the exemplum, in terms of its
minoring function. However, in lier final chapter, Koenig backs off from this intuition.
15 ANDERSON, 2005, p. 214.
16 KOENIG, 1984, p. 190, emphasis added.
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She is prepared to see the image of the face of the lord as having a “pre-verbal and
compensatory effect”, but says that its influence “does flot operate so exclusively in the
objective reaim of the text”. Rather,
[uts primary thrust is subjective. We have shown how this image moves the reader
back to a prior stage of emotional development and thereby assists in the
redistribution of psychic energy. Julian’ s contemplation of the lord’ s face enabled
her tofeel herself worthy of love. A similar awareness may arise in the attentive
reader.17
In this final chapter I argue from Koenig’ s original intuition, that the face of the lord
engages Julian and lier readers both in an active subjective appropriation of the salvific
work of Christ, but further, that the mirroring function of the face serves to dynamize ah
that the other showings point to as the objective salvific work of the Trinity through Christ,
as well as lier later tlieological reflections on the work and nature of Christ our Mother.
The mirroring function I propose does have a regressive, compensatory effect, as this
thesis lias amply developed. But I am arguing that the maturational development of the
minoring function, which I suggest the exemptum represents in Julian’s psychobiograpliy,
also expresses a maturation in lier appropriation of an objective soteriology of Christ’ s
saving work as the empathic, object constant quaiity of retationaiity of the Trinity at work
in creation -- in other words, as the work of mirroring. Are there signs of this mirroring
dynamic in God’s relation to creation through Christ reflected in lier creafive integration of
aspects of more traditional elements of Christ’ s saving work in history, and in the end
time? The next two major sections of the chapter will examine each of these questions in
turn.
3.0 Appropriation as objective soteriology in the present tense:
Beholding as mirroring
Anderson identifies aspects of Julian’ s understanding of Christ’ s saving work in
the past, present and future. He is the first Julian speciahist to propose that
Julian envisions a process through which the work performed in Christ becomes
actual in liuman beings in the present life. That is to say, the saving work of Christ
does flot remain abstract in Julian’s view, performed by God in some distant time
and place: the healing of fallen sensuality and the oneing of that sensuality to
substance is performed by God’ s grace in the lives of eacli subsequent generation
of Christians.18
17 KOENIG, 1984, p. 229, emphasis added.
18 ANDERSON, 2005, p. 180.
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Anderson, extending Hide’s notion of Julian’s liermeneutic of beliolding, proceeds to
identify Julian’ s practice of beholding as how she appropriates Christ’ s saving work of
oneing in the present tense, and enables others to appropnate that same work tlirough the
performative trajectory engaged in reading lier text. He argues that, in Julian, appropriation
is Christ’ s saving work in the present tense. The effect of this is that Julian and lier
readers’ affections are transformed over time: “tlie activity of the Trinity in tlie world
trains human beings to love trinitarianly”. Anderson argues liere that “this training occurs
as humans leam to desire tlie way the Trinity desires” and that “the outcome of this training
is nonviolent habits that mirror the cliaracter of God’ s own nonviolent acting”.’9
The present chapter applies Anderson’ s insights into Julian’ s practice of beholding
and how this enables lier to appropriate God’s saving activity, but correlates Julian’ s
contemplative practice witli the therapeutic process of mirroring.
Applying the psychoanalytic understanding of the mirroring process to Julian
helped us to grasp Julian’ s early entry into lier intense experience of beholding the face of
the crucifix as lier assent to engage in a mirroring transference with this face in lier
condition of extreme pain and unthinkable anxiety. And we saw liow she worked through
the transference to receive healing of lier fundamentally wounded sense of selfliood. In the
last chapter we saw liow lier continued practice of beholding tlie exemptum enabled lier to
mature into a very profound sense of union witli Christ which allowed lier to understand
and accept lier variable sensual conditions as enclosed in tlie mirroring transference
proper.2° Throughout, we argued that this mirroring transference compensated for and
assisted Julian in intenorizing the missed parental and societal function of mirroring. Julian
19 ANDERSON, 2005, p. 208.
20 Unlike some who argue that in Julian there is no sense of transformation of human anthropology, only
fulfiulment, I argue for a bothland position. In arguing thus, I repeat that it is essential to revise our
customary understanding of what sin is, i.e, what it is that is in need of being transformed. I have
suggested that Julian’s process of appropriation is a conversion process which begins in healing
transformation of both false self structures and of a distorted understanding of die symbolic meaning of
Christ’ s suffering. I argue also however, with regard to the exemptum, that this process of appropriation
matures in fulfiulment. Over time there is resolution in Julian’s mature appropriation of a soteriology
which responds to her needs. for some examples of those who see only fulfiulment in Julian’s
anthropology see ANDERSON, 2005, p. 158, drawing on BRADLEY, Ritamary, “Perception of self in
Julian ofNorwich’s Showiitgs”, Downside review 104, 1986, p. 236; HIDE, Kerrie, Gtfted origins to
gracedfidflhlment: The soteriotogy offulian of Norwich, Collegeville MN, Liturgical Press, 2001, 233 p;
BYNUM, Carolyn Walker, Fragmentation and Redemption: Essays on gender and the human body in
medieval religion, NY, Zone, 1992, p. 175: “Women’s religiosity was less characterized by conversion
and inversion; their sense of self and of Christ as physical stressed continuity between their social and
biological experience, on the one hand, and the experience of encounter with God, on the other”. It should
be clear, however, that I use the word conversion, after Johnson, to describe what I perceive to be a
liberation hermeneutic at work in ber Showings.
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received bodily sights, spiritual siglits and words formed in her understanding. The bodily
feelings and fusion, the eye contact, the words spoken to her, and her working out the
meanings of lier feelings aIl speak of the therapeutic function of the mirroring transference,
engaging movement responses of a narcissistic order.
Julian’ s language is far from psychoanalytic. And in the present context, a leap in
the discourse is being made, from the language of Kohut and Winnicott to that of Moore,
Crysdale and Koenig. In this context, Julian’ s practice of beholding the showings can be
said to be a practice of assenting to divine therapy. Julian’ s method of beliolding is a
prayer practice which fosters in lier the healing of her arcliaic false self, the interiorization
of lier mirroring need and tlie restoration and maturation of her authentic sense of selffiood
in relation to Christ wlio is also revisioned as responsive to lier need. Interpreting
beliolding as a process of receiving tlierapeutically satisfying mirroring tlirougli the face of
tlie crucifix helped us grasp liow it lielped lier lieal lier profound condition of self-hate and
sort out tlie meanings of lier and Christ’s suffering. Likewise, I suggest, Julian’s
beliolding the exemptum over the years can be interpreted as enabling her to mature in her
sense of autlientic selfliood as she can see ail lier sensual conditions mirrored in the
servant, belield in the constant, loving chere of tlie lord. Interpreting ber practice of
beholding as a process of receiving satisfying mirroring can lielp us understand how slie is
appropriating Christ’s saving work over time in a way whicli is dynamic, existential and
profoundly responsive to lier need.
I believe tliis leap of discourse is a very significant one to make if, as Anderson and
Koenig would argue, wliat is going on in Julian is transferable to our contemporaiy
situation, and is to speak to feminist issues. Kerrie Hide, in principle, believes tliis too.
Spealdng of beliolding as the means by which Julian’s tlieology is communicated, Hide
writes that
in order to interpret this literature we must be aware of liow theology was
communicated to Julian and the way slie gave concrete expression to
understanding. This awareness enables the reader to engage in Julian’s way of
interpretafion and facilitates interpretation in this generation.2’
Hide discusses Julian’ s way of interpretation as a “hermeneutic of beholding”.22 Hide
21 HIDE, 2001, p. 21.
22 Hide draws on Lonergan’s transcendental method arguing that the theology that emerges from the
subjectivity of her visionary experience is flot some intrusion into theology of alien matter from an alien
source, but rather simply makes transparent “the fact that theologies are produced by theologians, that
theologians have minds and use them, that their doing so should flot be ignored or passed over, but
explicitly acknowledged in itself andin its implications”. HIDE, 2001, p. 20. See LONERGAN, Bernard,
Method in theotogy, NY, Seabury, 1972, pp. 24 - 25.
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gives the Middle English Dictionary definition for beholding as “looking, gazing, or seeing
a visual appearance, applying the mmd in thought, meditation or contemplation, and being
in a state of relationship or connection”.23 Hide observes that Julian expands its meaning
to its lïmits: Beholding involves seeing but also ail the other senses. Hide observes that
“[sJeeing and behotding God involves ‘truly seeing, wholly feeling, spiritually hearing,
delectably smelling’ and ‘sweetly tasting’. Thus for Julian the more complete the
beholding, the more ail the senses are involved”.24 But instead of explonng the potenfial
implications for this embodied prayer for its potential dues as to Julian’ s human
predicament of narcissistic need for mirroring as that would dispose lier to need to be fed
bodily and visually by the face she beholds, Hide quickly goes on to say that “Julian’s
reference to the senses, however, includes more than bodily knowing. The senses are
‘organs of mystical knowledge”.25
Hide sees that for Julian beholding is a way of interpreting revelation; beholding
needs time to contemplate beyond bodily sight into spiritual sight, and 50 enables Julian to
interpret meaning, to create theology and to articulate her soteriology. Thus, beholding is
Julian’s theological method as well as being her method ofprayer: a contemplative
hermeneutic of beholding.26 Ultimately Hide says that “beholding creates what might be
called a mystical rather than systematic soteriology”.27 Julian, she says, associates
beholding with being oned into the Godhead. The deepest knowledge of God whicli
human beings can have is the face-to-face beatific vision which involves intellectual vision
and a non-cognitive experience of love engaging feit knowledge with ail the senses.
Unfortunately, Hide’s decision to remain within the language of mysticism to
articulate Julian’ s theological method seems to me to leave out a whole world of Julian’ s
concrete, psychodynamic and sociocultural expenence which might give us dues as to
what prompted the showings to take the form that they did, and how we might relate to
them in an embodied way. With ail the language about oneing into God, Hide gives little
or no attention to Julian’ s growth in self-knowledge by means of the practice of beholding,
and even there, where Hide discusses oneing in the Holy Spirit, there is no sense given
23 HIDE, 2001, p. 23, drawing on KURATH, Hans, Sherman KUHN and Robert LEWIS eds., Middle
English dictionary, Ann Arbor MI, University of Michigan Press, 1954-, pp. 835 - $38.
24 HIDE 2001, p. 25, emphasis in text. Hide is quoting LT 43.
25 HIDE 2001, p. 25.
26 HIDE, 2001, p. 24.
27 HIDE, 2001, p. 26
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that Julian is experiencing or resolving a soteriological crisis.28 The mirroring process as
Julian’s way of appropriating Christ’s saving work of oneing in the present tense can
describe what is going on in Julian’s prayer of beholding in a way that also enables the
possibility of a contemporary correlation.
The contemporary psychoanalyfic language of mirroring may be foreign to Julian.
But the medieval symbol of the mirror of Christ, reflecting maturation in the spiritual life, is
flot. In the second diptych I explored Julian’ s retrieval of the medieval symbol of the
mirror, which Bradley has identified as articulating the process of maturation in the spiritual
life. In that context I identified that the mirror of Christ reflected three different conditions
of Julian’ s interionty in the process of the maturation of the sensual condition of the self in
its relationship to Christ. I correlated this process with Julian’ s account of the three cheres
in LT 71. I argued that in Julian we find this process adapted according to the need of the
wounded pre-oedipal self, and culminating in her psycho-spiritual maturation into
flourishing self esteem and healthy love of others, a relational realism. In the present
chapter, I revisit the threefold function of the symbol of the mirror to reflect her
appropriation of salvation as a mirroring process of conversion and maturation in the faith,
this time with the added perspective of the exemplum. Julian’ s appropriation of the
medieval symbol of the mirror offers some historical and Biblical basis for the present
correlation.
3.1 Mirroring, behoiding and Julian’s appropriation of the
ex e mp tu m
Julian’s appropriation of the exemplum endows a newflexibility to Julian’s
psychological and theological understanding of herseif in relation to the God of her
showings. Indeed, it allows her access to a new perspective, which is no longer framed
simply from the side of the human situation in a condition of suffering vulnerability and
powerlessness, although it neyer abandons that situation. Mediated by her years of
meditative beholding and reflection, Julian’ s visionary experience of the exemptum opens
to Julian a glimpse into God’s perspective, how the God of her showings sees sin and
suffering, the situation of humanldnd and its liberation. Beholding the relationship
between the lord and the servant in the exemplum over time allows Julian to come, I
suggest, to a profounder understanding of the human predicament she was suffering, in its
28 HIDE 2001, pp. 163 - 174. Anderson makes a similar observation ofthis gap in Hide’s study, in
ANDERSON, 2005, pp. 183 - 184.
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psychoanalytic and systemic social dimensions, though these are flot discourses she uses.
By reflecting back to her how her every interior condition of sensuality is seen lovingly in
God’ s sight and enclosed in the servant, Julian’ s beholding the servant in relation to the
constant chere of the lord in the exemptum helps her to intenonze the message or meaning
of the variable cheres (dispositions, conditions) of lier sensual selffiood and corne to more
consistent consciousness with regard to the unbroken union of lier substantial will witli
Christ, and greater sensual constancy in Clirist’s sensuality. We might use the language of
object constancy here, such that tlie effect on Julian of beholding the face of tlie lord in
relation to tlie servant is the intenorization of a sense of self constancy. Beholding the
exemptum enables Julian to gain new understanding as to the meaning of lier sensual
subjectivity (affective mentalization), enabling her mirroring transference to evolve from its
merged subjectivist beginnings witli the suffering Christ. It helps lier interiorize the
mirroring fiinction of tlie loving chere of tlie lord. To extend the psychoanalytic language
of Kohut, tlie practice of beliolding the exemplum becomes the locus for Julian ‘s
appropriation of the saving work of Christ, both in his suffering condition and in his
participation in the loving relations of the Trinity engaged in creation, as a work of
enabting in Jutian the transmuted internatization of the betoved goodness of lier
creation. Ibis saving work dynamizes the distinctive complexity of Julian’s
understanding of tlie doubleness of that creation by means of Christ’s Incarnation in the
relation between substance and sensuality: Julian cornes by a different way frorn Augustine
to see that the wliole uncreated Tnnity is at work in lier created trinity. (LT 55.)
This leads her to a lively sense of participating in that saving work in lier vocation
to mirroring otliers in her conternporary world. In effect, it enables her to devetop a
dynamic understanding of Christ’s saving action which corretates with the function of
mirroring, not only for lier own appropriation and maturation in trust, but with the
resuit of engaging her in Christ’s saving work in her vocation with others in this world,
and through lier composition ofthe Showings. In the visionaiy experience of tlie
exempium and in her years of meditation afterward slie cornes to be able to see her own
condition and tlie situation of hurnankind with God’s suffering compassion and God’s joy,
interiorized from beholding tlie chere of the lord in the exempluin. In short, God’s chere,
beliolding hurnanity lovingly in its variable sensuality, becornes lier own, by a process aldn
to transmuted internalization. This is God’s saving work in hurnan creation, drawing our
outer, sensual chere to the inner: “The blessed chere of our Lord God works it in us by
grace”. (LI 71.) The ramifications of this are great, I suggest, both theologically and
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pastorally as Abbott has observed, or as Anderson puts it, in the structure, the content and
the practice of lier theology.
There is the obvious pastoral implication that in the years following tlie showings
Julian practises this work of mirroring in the pastoral dimension of lier vocation as
anchoress. Julian can respond to the situations to wliicli humanity, coming to lier window
for counsel, exposes her. Julian can mirror tlie empatliic, exposing, yet compassionate
regard of the lord to tliose wlio corne to lier in blind suffering or sunk in despair, blind to
wliatever is keeping tliern lost in tlieir seif-preoccupation and isolation. She can also mirror
to others, (like Margery Kempe) seeking to live the life of grace, the joy of union tliat tlie
lord atready lias in tlieir human nature and condition, enabling them to see for thernselves
how it is Christ’s substantial union and Christ’s sensual thirst in them wliicli is at work
afready here and now in tlie exigencies of their present condition. To tliis effect, Julian
says that we are to be in effect co-workers with Clirist: “In this working lie wants us to be
lis lielpers... desiring everything to be done wliicli he does, truly trusting in him, for I saw
tmly tliat our substance is in liim”. (LT 57.)
From tliese observations about the access Julian is given by means of tlie
exemptum to understanding si the human situation and its liberation from God’s side, I
suggest tliat Julian’ s long process of learning to see the human situation through the eyes of
the lord of lier exemptum dynamizes tlie mirroring function of the face of the lord
beliolding the servant in such a way as to elicit lier participation in that relational dynamic.
If this is so, tlien Julian’ s appropriation of tlie mirroring function of tlie face of Christ may
be an adequate description of tlie temporal process of conversion of her changeable liuman
sensuality into Christ’s constant liurnan sensuality beheld in the Tnmty.
3.2 Beholding the three cheres
3.2.1 The chere of the Passion
The face of the lord in the exemptum as it is fully articulated in LT 51 may seem a
long way from Julian’ s bodily sight of Christ’ s Passion in the opening cliapters of both
texts. Yet it is Julian’ s experience of suffering, both alone and then united with Christ in
that early rnirroring transference (of a fused or merged nature) of her bodily siglit of Christ
in his suffering humanity, which rnotivated and sliaped the rest of the showings. And it is
the exemplum whicli helped lier over tirne to appropriate lier early experience of the bodily
sight of the face of the crucifix, and the change of chere, meaningfully, in a more flexible
and differentiated mirroring transference (narrowly understood as mirroring proper). So,
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in exploring Julian’ s appropriation of the exemplum as the maturest expression of lier
interiorization of a process of mirrroring, we are bound to ask where is the Passion, that
is, the face of the crucifix, in the exemptum?
Hide observes that early on, in LT 20, “Julian sees oneing take place in three
manners of beholding the cross that arise in lier understanding: beholding suffering,
beholding love, and beholding joy”.29 This seems to anticipate Julian’ s later description of
the three cheres in LI 71.
The double regard of the lord for the servant in the exemplum in Long Text 51 is
expanded in Long Text 71 into three cheres or regards (as we saw above in discussing
Julian’ s use of the medieval symbol of the mirror). I suggest that this expansion of the
double regard of the lord in the exemptum to tliree cheres in LI 71 is a recurrence of the
tlireefold beholding in LI 20 but with the explicit empliasis on the face or chere of each
condition of Clirist in lier beholding of the cross. These three cheres reflect the sorting out
of Julian’ s confusion around the meaning of suffering and sin, as this confusion was itself
associated with the Passion.
The first [chere] is that of bis Passion, as lie revealed when lie was witli us in this
life, dying; and although to contemplate this be sorrowful and grievous, stili it is
glad and joyful, because he is God.... And so in the time of our pain and our woe
lie reveals to us the chere of bis Passion and bis Cross, helping us to bear it by lis
own blessed power. (LI 71.)
Recali that the context of the emergence ofJulian’s showings is, I suggest, lier
crisis of umntelligible suffering. This is the confusion in suffering which Sebastian Moore
lias identified in the tradition of soteriology. And Cynthia Crysdale lias put a finer point on
it in identifying the first movement toward the appropriation of a soteriology, for those who
have been wounded on the underside of history, as one of grief and liealing of the wound
of seif-hate rather than of contrition and forgiveness of the sins of pride. But even the
desire to appropriate one’ s grief requires a context of nurture and trust and, as Moore
observes, it can be resisted. Ibis, I believe, is what we saw in Julian’s resistance to
beholding the crucifix, in the eighth showing. “At tliis time I wanted to look away from tlie
cross, but I did flot dare”. (LT 19.) As Bauerschmidt points out, there is a connection
between Julian’s choosing against the temptation to “look up to heaven to bis Father” at that
point and assenting to behold Jesus in pain, and lier coming to her unique understanding of
29 HIDE, 2001, p. 99.
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substance and sensuality. He observes that Julian describes the simultaneous opposition
within her between the two choices “as one between outward and inward”:30
The outward part is our mortal flesh, which is now in pain and distress and aiways
shah be in this life, of which I was very aware at this time, and this was the part
that repented. The inward part is a high and most blessed life, which is entirely in
peace and love, and this is more secretly feit; and this is the part by which, with full
power, wisdom and will, I chose Jesus as my heaven. (LT 19.)
So Julian’s sight of the first chere, that is of Christ’s Passion, provokes a crisis of
choice. Having made her choice, “to choose Jesus for my heaven, whom I saw only in
pain at that time” (LI 19), Julian is also in effect maldng a choice that goes against the
experience of her feeling life thus far: the inward choice was flot consciously, but rather
“secretly”, feit. She chooses not to resist new knowledge of herseif in lier sensual
condition as tliat may be mirrored back to her by the chere of Jesus in his Passion, but
rather to embrace it, entering into a noughting of lier false ego. As Crysdale observed of
those on the underside of history, Julian’ s appropriation of salvation began with an
identification with tlie Crucified. Julian’s powerlessness and confusion in lier critical state
of suffering were mirrored symbolically in lier bodily fusion witli the Jesus of her early
sliowings. As we explored earlier, this reveals to Julian the existence of lier lost and
wounded true self in a condition of merged suffering witli Christ’s suffering. Tlie chere of
Christ’s Passion whicli Julian beholds is a mirror of Christ’s utter, compassionate
identification with sucli a wounded, grieving soul witliout reserve. This chere is the mirror
of Julian’s condition of unbearable and unintelligible suffering, wliich, as Bynum, Ruetlier
and others liave pointed out, is the condition in wliicli medieval women were given to
appropriate their salvation in Christ, as we saw earlier. It is tlie movement in which tlie
mirror of Christ’ s chere reflects the background of the medieval devotion to the suffering
humanity of Christ by women, and whicli led, as Bynum observed, to tlie belief tliat
“Christ is what we are”.31
As Bradley pointed out, this is the function of the mirror in the earliest steps of
growing in the experience of God, where Julian’s knowledge of the substantial self (and, I
would add, the meaning of her sensual condition) are undeveloped.32 Correlating this
with the psychoanalytic interpretation given above, this first chere reflects Julian’s
30 BAUERSCHMIDT, 1999, p. 145.
31 BYNUM, Caroline Walker, Jesus as mother: Studies in the spirituatiry of the high middte ages,
Berkelyey, CA, Uiversity of California Press, 1982, p. 130.
32 BRADLEY, Ritamary, “The speculum image in medieval mystical writers”, in The medieval mysticat
tradition in Engtand, Cambridge, D. S. Brewer Press, 1984, p. 22.
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unconsciousness of lier fragmented self. In assenting to behold this first chere, Julian is
letting go of lier resistance to experiencing union (in her sensual condition of extreme pain)
with Clirist’s sensuality in pain, and to the eventual undoing of lier sensual confusion (or
ignorance of love, as she puts it) around the meaning of suffenng and sin.
As the two cheres of the lord (i.e., compassion and joy) in the exemplum are
expanded to include this first chere of Christ’s Passion, I suggest we see Julian
integrating, into the mirroring function of the cheres, lier initial, confused understanding of
lier suffering which was beyond wliat the liuman creature in her fragility could be
responsible for. For one like Julian coming ftom tlie underside of liistory and a victim of
systemic and familial sin which had beleaguered lier sense of self worth, the first chere of
the Lord in his Passion was expenenced as an initially ambivalent choice to identify witli
Christ in lis kenotic suffering. As Julian relates it, the reason for lier suffering was
obscure, but the comfort of sliaring in identity with Christ was healing and transformative,
leading lier to experience inwardly Christ’ s Resurrection in tlieir mutual cliange of chere.
Julian found it necessary to expand tlie two cheres of the Lord to three, to include
the Passion. Perliaps this first chere ofChrist’s Passion could be described as the sensual
chere of the servant, overtaken by despair, in the exemplum. This would consolidate the
identification of tlie sensual condition of tlie servant’s will whicli Christ assumes in bis
Incarnation. Seen in tins light, appropriating Christ’s Passion remained vital and
indispensible, as the chere of tlie Passion was integral to lier initial experience of lier
human predicament whicli brought about the showings. For tliis anclioress, leaving the
Passion behind in some mystical “ascent” from tlie sensual life was out of the question.
3.2.2 The outward chere of compassion
The otlier two cheres of the three cheres described in LT 71 correspond exactly
with the two clieres of tlie lord in the exemplum. Julian telis us that tlie exemplum was the
only answer slie received to the question liow sin is seen by God, and in it the lord’s chere
of compassion, as lie looks on the fallen servant, is what dominates lier early
understanding of its meaning. As tins is taken up into lier discussion of the three cheres in
LT 71 slie writes
[t]lie second [chereJ is pity and ruth and compassion, and this lie reveals to ail bis
loyers, with the certainty of protection winch necessarily belongs to lis mercy....
And in the time of our sinning lie shows to us the chere of rnth and pity, miglitily
protecting us and defending us against ail our enemies. And these are the two usual
cheres which lie reveals to us in this life.... (LI 71.)
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The chere of compassion is what the Lord shows Julian in the condition of sinning,
which is to be taken to mean here the condition of suffenng the effects of her fragmented
self in perpetual isolation, shame and despair and in the impotent impatience of flot
recognizing lier helpless condition on lier own. This is tlie exposing yet ever empathic
chere whicli reveals to Julian the secret sins by which she lias pattemed lier false self
(Moore’s early ego) in cornplicity and opens them to God’s healing and transforming
grace. This second chere corresponds well to Crysdale’s understanding of the need for
tliose on the underside of history to corne to understand tlie particular, self-hatefifl and self
victimizing nature of their cornplicity in structures of systemic oppression. Only then can
persons sucli as these begin to respond with a sense of limited responsibility, in ways tliat
are more truly loving of self and other.
We saw above tliat what Julian sees in herself, while she is “working through” this
healing and exposing process, are the shame-based sins of sloth and despair. These sins
describe well tlie effects of the introjected anger of the God of the Cliurch’ s teaching as
well as her fear of familial abandonment. They effectively keep lier from knowing lierseif
to be loved compassionately by Christ and joyfuily umted with Christ in sensuality as well
as substance. Here Koenig’s recognition of the cornpensatory dynamic of tlie face of the
lord is so lielpful. In the mirror of Christ’ s chere Julian sees the reversai of the traditional
meaning of sin, whicli corresponds better to the social location and pre-oedipal need and
condition of lier soul. Thus the mirror functions at this point to reveal in effect how the
soul lias appropriated that Christ is what we are flot (in our sensuat condition at that
time) but also mirrors who we are to become in sensuality and substance -- je, fully
liuman, in Christ’s humanity. Where Julian experiences lierseif as suffering the old
pattems of despair and impatience, beholding tlie servant beheld in compassion by tlie
chere of the lord enables Julian to leam over time that lier union with Christ is flot
dependent on lier variable conscious feeling life. The cornpassionate chere of the lord
regarding the servant in the exempluin reflects back or mirrors Julian’ s condition in such a
way as to enable her to objectify lier interior conditions of distress and fear of being left to
herseif. This enables lier to appropnate the compassion of Christ’s loving regard, which
then becomes itself a locus for transforming the meaning of shame and despair into an
occasion for oneing of her sensuality with her substance, in Christ’s. Julian’s
appropriation of the chere of compassion is strongly identified with lier maturing sense of
lier autlientic relational selfhood in Christ, united with other human souls, as beloved in
their variable sensuality in the sight of God.
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3.2.3 Ihe inward chere of joy
The third [chere] is that blessed chere as it will be without end, and this was most
often revealed, and contïnued the longest time.... [Mingled with the two usual
cheres] which he reveals to us in this life [is] the third, and that is bis blessed
chere, partly lilce what it will be in heaven; and that is when through grace we are
touched by sweet illuminations of the life of the Spirit, through which we are kept
in true faith, hope and love, with contrition and devotion and also with
contemplation and every kind of true joys and sweet consolations. The btessed
chere of our Lord God works this in us through grace. (LT 71.)
In bis account of Julian’ s appropriation of Christ’ s saving work in the present tense
as an account of how “human character is formed tbrough particpating in the peaceful and
loving relationships of Father, Son and Holy Spirit”, Anderson moves into trinitarian
language.
Humans receive training through the salutaiy presence of the Tnnity within the
economy of creation so that human affections take on the peaceful character of the
love of God. Not only does human participation in this school of charity allow
humans to 5e oned to God, but it also accounts for a graduai change in the quality
of human acnng. Leaming to love trinitarianly, Julian thinks, means that hurnan
acting will begin to reflect the nonviolent quality of God’s own peaceful and loving
action.33
Anderson daims that his is the “first sustained examination of the anchorite’s vision of how
hurnans begin to receive Christ’s gifts of healing and wholeness in the present, earthly
life”.34 Clearly, however, Koenig’s account of the mirroring function of the face of the
lord in the exemplum seeks to examine this same vision, and with the same purpose of
extending that vision into the capacity for Julian’ s texts to engage present day readers in a
similar process of appropriation. Koenig descnbed magnificently Julian’s appropriation of
the compensatoiy mirroring function which beholding the face of the lord had on Julian.
But Koenig, observing the constancy of the loving regard of the lord, did flot distinguish
between the lord’ s compassionate chere for Adam and bis blissful chere for Christ in the
servant.35 I would like to advance a further step. I want to suggest that Julian gives here
in LT 71 an account of how the chere ofjoy, which is constant, though inward, in the face
of the lord beholding the servant in the exemplum, is also appropriated in time. The
mirroring function in this latter chere is flot so much compensatory, I suggest, as unitive.
As such, it suggests that Julian may have corne to invest lier objective soteriology of the
ANDERSON, 2005, p. 184.
ANDERSON, 2005, p. 184.
KOENIG, 1984, p. 216.
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Trinity’s loving relation with creation through Christ with this mirroring function. But I
will retum to this further below.
In Julian’ s articulation of these three cheres, she is drawing on two Pauline texts.
“For now we see in a mirror, dimly, but then we will see face to face. Now I know only in
part; then I wili know fuliy, even as I have been fully known”. (1 Cor 13:12.) This text
supports her belief that tlirough the showings she lias been shown something of lier true
identity in Christ, as God is beholding Christ in her in this life, aibeit in part. The other
text helps ground lier eschatological trust in the meaning and transforming work of the
showings. “And ail of us, with unveiled faces, seeing the giory of the Lord as thougli
reflected in a mirror, are being transformed into the same image from one degree of glory to
another; for this cornes from the Lord, the Spirit”. (2 Cor 3:18.)
The third chere ofjoy, as hurnans shah know it fuiiy in heaven, is mingled with the
other two in this life, insofar as humans embrace their true selffiood as constituted in the
mirroring chere of Christ. Indeed, we can see the extent to which this mode of behoiding
lias enabled Julian to internalize and mature through the mirroring function of the chere of
the lord, where Julian says that this third chere “was most often revealed, and continued
the iongest time”. (LT 71.) Julian describes that the Lord “lifts up and wil draw our outer
chere to the inner, and wiil rnake us ail at unity with Mm and each of us with others in the
tnie, lasting joy which is Jesus”. (LT 71.) lier own experience of the change of chere of
the Crucified in the eighth to ninth showing becomes transposed into the exemptum.
The understanding of sensuality and substance as outward and inward cheres of the
human person, which Julian began to gain through that earlier transformative showing, is
now seen as a movement of appropriation: the outer chere of her variable sensuality is
drawn inward to the constancy of lier substantial chere or disposition in Christ, both in
body and soul. “The biessed chere of our Lord God works this in us by grace”. (LT 71.)
It is flot difficult to interpret tins maturation in Julian’s practice of behoiding, enabling lier
to interiorize profoundiy the minoring fiinction of the chere of the lord belioiding tlie
servant in joy, as lier appropriation of what Anderson cails “human acting [winch]
reflect[sJ the nonviolent quaiity of God’s own peaceful and loving action”.36 However, as
weil as being intrinsically nonviolent, Juhian’ s affections and actions, as they mirror tlie
God she beliolds, also becorne iess and less marked by despair and increasingiy reflecting
“true trust in salvation”.
36 ANDERSON, 2005, p. 184.
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far from remaining fixed on suffenng (least of ail suffenng which is falsely
interpreted as virtuous), Julian’ s appropriation of the mirroring dynamic in the exemptum
educates her in developing a Resurrection or paschal imagination in this life. The inward
chere of the lord in the exemptum enables lier to orient her life toward the appropriation of
mature and authentic relational selffiood as that whicli brings ber sensuality into union with
Christ’s sensuality in the loving sight of God. It suggests that Julian’s unitive vision of the
healing and restoration of the double human nature of the se1f and of mature knowledge of
self, other and God, is dynamised in the relatïonal mirror of the loving inner chere of God.
And, as Anderson underlines, tliis is flot simply an epistemological insiglit. Because Julian
is engaged in a daily practice of beholding which fosters this attentiveness, ber
appropriation is relational and ontological as well, reforming lier old pattems of
understanding, relating to, and being oned in, her God -- and lier even Christians. It
works on training her affects to love trinitarianly.
Union with Christ in joy, as it will be in lieaven, can be beheld “in part” from time
to time in this life by the sensual soul so disposed. The image of this union in lier sixteenth
showing, where slie sees Christ enciosed and reigning in lier soul, enables Julian to speak
of self-knowledge and knowledge of God in such moments as distinct, yet oned,
ontologically and relationally. Another way of putting this would be to see this union as
mirroring Christ’s Incarnation in the soul: in effect it says “we are what Christ is”, in
sensuality and substance, at least in part.
But there is more, if Anderson is right in drawing attention to the Trimty in Julian’s
(mature) appropriation of Christ’s savÏng work (which I believe lie is), in that it
corresponds to Julian’ s late understanding of tlie identity of tlie lord in the exemptuin.
Just as we saw in the last chapter that the distancing effect of the exemptum enabled Julian
to develop a greater capacity for object constancy, so also it could be argued that the
constant, thougli inward chere ofjoy of tlie lord beholding tlie servant functions to engage
the whole Trinity in Julian’s mature appropriation of Christ’s saving work. Not only does
beliolding the exemptum engage lier anthropoiogy of two natures sliared in Christ which
enables lier to flourish in tlie oneing of ber double self in Christ (as in the sixteenth
showing), but it also draws her into tlie loving relations of the Tnnity as these extend to ail
creation. Tliat this is effected througli tlie function of mirroring, witli which the iord’s
inner chere ofjoy is invested, would seem to be evident in Julian’s exhortation that the
Lord “lifts up and will draw our outer chere to the inner, and wiil make us all at unity witli
him and eacli of us with others in the tme, lasting joy whicli is Jesus”. (LT 71). The
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function of mirroring at this level animates in a very direct way the loving relations of the
Tnnity for humankind in Christ which Julian is so adamant to convey to lier readers. God
wants lier -- and us -- to know that humankind is enclosed in the loving relations of the
Trinity, and that the Trinity is enclosed in humans’ substantial nature. And God wants her
to know that “where Jesus appears, the blessed Trinity is understood”. (LT 4). Being
given to behold the joyful chere of the lord beholding the servant in the exemplum assists
Julian, and her readers I suggest, in appropnating the intimate engagement of the whole
Trinity in Christ’ s saving work of liealing and restoring humans to full flourisliing in tliis
life.
It seems to me that Julian’ s mature self-knowledge, as constituted in seeing and
being seen by the Trinity in Christ, is summed up in the mirroring action in the exemptum
which lias a perduring, transformative quality. It enables lier to see and know herseif
enclosed in the holding environment of trinitarian tnisting, loving relationality. It keeps lier
practising a daily contemplative prayer fonn of beliolding Christ in her for the rest of lier
life, in order to recognize lier changeable sensual condition at that time in the chere of
Christ she beholds, and so to be able to respond accordingly. $he cannot know God
except through knowing herseif, and this is to know ail the variablity of lier sensual
condition and lier substance in Christ, as beheld in God’s loving sight.
Particularly since Julian leams that humanldnd is to participate in this saving work
of Christ, the contiguity between the saving action of mirroring or beliolding, as tliat which
enables tlie creature to consent to be beheld in lier sensuality and brings the creature into lier
true selfhood in relation to Christ, and the human capacity to engage in this saving work in
mirroring and beliolding others, makes this participation a real human possibility.
3.2.4 The three cheres and the three wounds
Julian’ s reflection on the three cheres of Christ beliolding liumankind in different
conditions and situations of suffering and union connects with lier initiai three requests for
the wounds of contrition, compassion and longing for or union wïth God. However, I
suggest that we can see the effect of lier mature appropriation in the new way in whicli she
cornes to understand these wounds, that is, as Christ’s activity in lier. In eacli instance,
what tlie previsionary Julian seems to have taken for granted as a devotional act on lier part,
which was intended to produce certain prescribed resuits (although in fact producing
ambivalence), becomes transformed into accounts of spontaneously experiencing Christ’s
saving action within lier.
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Contrition, for example, becornes an inappropnate response to her pattem of feeling
blame, since Julian has corne to recognize the feeling of blarne, thanks to the exemptum, as
itself the temptation and flot a true understanding of her conftsed sensual condition of
suffering. In God’s sight there is no blame. Thus Julian cornes to appropriate a truer
meaning of contrition as Christ’ s activity which occurs spontaneously in lier as she is given
to behold lier condition of feeling blame as a blindness to lier tme condition of substanfial
union in Christ.37 Contrition, she learns, is flot an act on lier part alone. It is actually in
Christ. “It is God’ s will, as I understand it, that we beliold his blessed Passion in three
ways. Firstly, that we behold the hard pain he suffered with contrition and compassion”.
(LT 20.) Hide observes that
it is not usual in our contemporary use of the word to associate contrition with
Christ. The Middle Englisli text is clear, however. It is Christ’s contrition and
compassion, his sorrow for the incompteteness of humanity that Julian observes
in lier experience of beholding.38
Likewise, compassion is no longer a deliberate act of prayer intended to increase
lier desire to have compassion for others. Compassion for lier even Christians becomes a
spontaneous response to seeing Christ’s cheres of Passion and compassion at work in lier
and others’ suffering, as that encloses tlie whole of humanldnd. (LT 28.)
Julian’s understanding of the wound of longing for union with Christ has changed,
too. That longing for union with the suffering Christ, which was Julian’s previsionary
atternpt to resolve her extreme condition of feeling unending responsibility for bis
suffering, also kept her self-preoccupied and ambivalent about living or dying. As a resuit
of her appropriation of tlie exemplum, lier mature understanding of the wound of longing
for union with Christ is rather more oriented to the desire to see the inward chere of the
Lord reigning in her soul in peace andjoy and at work drawing lier every outward sensual
condition spontaneously to itself, in well-being and in woe. It is the constant regard of the
lord in which, regardless of lier sensual condition, she sees mirrored glimpses of lier tme
relationship of sensuality and substance at one within lierseif and united with Christ’ s
double nature as that is oned in the Trinity. It is tlie mysterious regard of tlie lord, too,
whicli is spontaneously changed in the process, from compassion to joy, and empowers
lier and her even Cliristians’ human flourishing in this life, and in tlieir destiny in God.
Likewise as we saw earlier, penance, which she initially understood to be a practice which would
increase compunction, becomes Christ’s work in ber.
38 RIDE, 2001, p. 99, emphasis added.
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The shift toward the spontaneous attribution to Christ in each instance of these three
wounds suggests that where before there was unresolved ambivalence and incoherence,
now there is an energetic coherence between Julian’ s appropriation of Christ’ s saving work
and the activity of that saving work in her.
3.3 Julian’s enabling the reader’s appropriation of the mirroring
face of the lord
Elisabeth Koenig and Derek Anderson corne the closest of any Julian specialists to
grasping the mirroring dynamic in the exemptum which Julian makes available for the
reader to appropriate, such that the reader is drawn into a mirroring transference with the
face of the lord something like Julian herseif had, and which she explicitly desired for
others to share.
In Anderson’ s language, the exemptum best exemplifies the “performative
trajectoIy” in reading Julian. Drawing on performance studies, influenced by linguisflcs
and the philosophical hermeneutics of J. L. Austin, he writes that
the idea that a text might somehow act out its own rnearnng as it is read is quite
close to what we will be looking for in Julian’s writing.... Performance, as it
occurs in Julian’ s writing, is an expression of lier apparent attempt to enact her own
understanding of her encounter with God within her reader’s understanding.39
His intent is to show how “Julian seeks to draw lier reader into the ‘performance’ of lier
showing by enacting the deflections of lier own attention that occurred as she received the
revelation and as she subsequently sought divine aid in understanding its meaning”.4° His
identification of every deflection or shift in focus in the exemplum covers the whole of the
extended chapter 51, and although he acknowledges that only a few of the 21 paragraphs of
LT 51 are usually ever studied, this he says is because of the “frequent interruptions and
changes of perspective [which] seem to mimic the darting of Julian’s gaze between
different features of the image she holds in lier memory”.4’ InterestingÏy, however, in this
section of Anderson’s thesis, lie uses the verb “mirror” several times, and in the end likens
Julian’ s performative trajectory to the act of meditatïng on the Rublev icon of the Trinity, as
it draws the viewer’ s gaze into the exchange of love etemalÏy occurring within the shared
3 ANDERSON, 2005, pp. 96 - 97. Ne distinguishes this mystical register of performative language from
the philosophical register of language which is used to convey information. See also MITLLER, Catherine,
“How to do things with mystical language: Marguerite D’oingt’s performative writing”, in Peifonnance
and transformation: New approaches to tate medieval spirituality, cd. SUYDAM, Mary, NY, St Martin’s
Press, 1999, p. 27.
40 ANDERSON, 2005, p. 105.
41 ANDERSON, 2005, p. 98.
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gazes of the three persons of the Trinity. He is arguing in effect that Julian’ s prayer of
beholding is taught to the reader by means of “pefforming” the mutual regard of the lord
and the servant in the exernpturn.42
Koenig is one Julian specialist whose doctoral thesis did study virtually every
paragraph in LT 51, and I find lier reasomng, for the fact that this chapter is the core of
Julian’s teaching, even more explicit and compelling than Anderson’s. In fact, she found
that the mirroring functïon of the face of the lord in Julian’ s exemptum (or parable, as
Koenig calis it) so transformed the reader’ s meditation on the rest of the parable as to
warrant a shift in lier theoretical approach. Koenig found Ricoeur inadequate to plumb the
preverbal and compensatory nature of this function and so turned to Winnicott. “Perhaps
this image of the face of God which, we remember, we discovered in a text, can educate us
as to how the verbal is at the service of the non-verbal”.43 Koenig writes:
Although both Julian’s Short Text and her Long Text begin with the vision of
Christ crowned with thoms and Julian dwells in both texts on changes in the face of
Christ as she sees him suffer his passion, it is significant that in the Long Text
before and after the parable, there are proportionally many more references to
God’s face, or his desire to be seen, or Julian’s expenence of seeing herseif
reftected in God’s face than there are in the Short Text. We may draw from this
that her long contemplation of the lord’ s face in the parable has, through the
phenomenon of intertextuality, transformed the entire narrative in a most
meaningful way. The mirroring effect of the face image and its contribution to
setf-knowtedge or identity have caused the text to corne alive with a dynamisrn
of reciprocity between God, or transcendent reatity, and the hurnan heing.44
Koenig is adamant that the image of God’ s face
affects Julian and the reader in a way that is tmly preverbal. Here, the image is
communicated by means of the word, to be sure, but it is the image, flot the word
that govems the transformation. In the image of God’s face metaphonc ‘seeing as’
is flot what new resemblance has been effected in the text, but oneseif seen asbeloved, flot blamed.... If this fact can be shown to be true, it will account,
perhaps in fuller ways than Ricoeur has in his semantic theory, for his belief in the
possibility of a genuÏne transfer of meaning from text to life.45
42 Anderson frequently describes Julian’ s intent and method as one of “wooÏng” her readers. ANDERSON,
2005, p. 220. Whiie I agree entireiy with Anderson’s strategy that this is to be contrasted with the
“iogical force” of scholastic writers’ discourse, I find myseif uneasy with the erotic implication of “wooing”
with regard to the Showings. Julian is flot a bridai mystic. I strongly suggest that the psychic energy in ber
own appropriation ofChrist’s saving work, which she senses that others in ber condition might also find
urgent, might be more cleariy identified as dynamized by a profound pre-oedipal soteriological need to be
seen, recognized, affinned and mirrored in ber humanity, than to be wooed.
KOENIG, 1984, p. 195 - 196.
44KOENIG, 1984, p. 191, emphasis added.
KOEMG, 1984, p. 199, emphasis in text.
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Koenig is speaking here of how this mirroring function of the face of the lord can
be appropnated by the contemporary reader of Julian such that a similar compensatory
function as that in Julian’s own personal development “may begin to take place in his or lier
life” 46
What Koenig does flot engage (nor Anderson for that matter, though I believe it to
be implicit in both of their arguments), is a femrnist examinadon of the human situation for
which Julian sought intellîgibility and for which a sotenology of minoring would be
credible. Koenig does identify that weeping and mourning, which Julian sees
as the inevitable outcome of blindness to God’ s presence, is especially important
for our understanding of the profound effect of the face image because, as she
descnbes it, this weeping cornes from a despair so deep that nothing on heaven or
earth can take it away.47
The present study confirms and enlarges the meaning of this despair for soteriology by
understanding ït both in its psychoanalytic and in its feminist dimensions. In this respect,
using Anderson’ s language, the most sïgnificant “deflection” in this part of the exemptum
is the face of the servant, tumed away from the lord in despair.
It is the face of the lord which teaches Julian to recognize the symptoms of
suffering associated with an identity (sense of selffiood) that is alienated from any
understanding of the ontological or constitutional relationality between herself and Christ.
In contrast to that despafring, blind suffering, suffering experienced from a true sense of
selffiood in relation to Christ is experienced very differently: “And if we were in ail the pain
that heart can think or tongue can teil, if we could at that time see lis blessed chere, ail this
pain would flot grieve us”. (LT 72.) In effect, it is the face of the lord who teaches lier to
distinguish between suffering which is resistance to dying to sin (as in the pattem of
accusing herseif and sinldng into despair), and the necessary paschal suffering, dying to
false ego which brings lier into union-in-differentiation in Christ’s liumanity. It is this
latter suffering, which amounts to Moore’s understanding of tlie liberation of human
affection or desire, to become the ftindamental desire to be in tmsting relationship with
Christ. li is this latter, paschal, suffering whidli Crysdale can see is necessary as the victim
sees herseif on the underside of history and accepts to undergo the conversion process
which requires lier to reverse the roles and meanings of the cross, grieve the self she neyer
had, see and be emptied of the false selfs pattems of complicity in her own suffering, and
become empowered to embrace a truer understanding of her wliole self constitutively
46 KOENIG, 1984, p. 186.
KOENIG, 1984, p. 196
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related to Christ. Julian’s performative text provides what Crysdale’s lacks: a
soteriological praxis. Julian’ s beholding of the cheres of the lord enables, over time in the
present life, a practice of healing transformation in the pattems of affection that lead to
despair, tlie restoration of human flounshing and the training and maturation of lier desire
to act in trusting ways that mirror the loving cliaracter of the relations of the Trinity in
Christ. I tum now to Julian’ s objective soteriological vision of the empathic, object
constant quaiity of reÏationatity of the Trinity engaged in mirroring the incarnate Christ in
humanity.
4.0 The mirroring function of Christ and the Trinity in the past and
future aspects of Julian’s objective soteriology
This second part of this chapter examines more closeÏy what the saving work of
Christ is in Julian’ s Showings in its past and future expressions, to see whether, or to what
extent, Julian also invests these aspects of lier objective sotenology witli the function of
mirroring.
Anderson is correct in identifying past and future as well as present dimensions of
this saving work in Julian’s Showings, although “past” and “future” must be understood as
limited expressions. Anderson describes his distinction in this way:
Given that it has its basis in the union of humanity and divinity in Christ, oneing
must already be accomplished from the point of view of Julian’ s readers. As we
have seen, Julian’ s recapitulation-style soteriology envisions Christ restoring
humans to wholeness by uniting sensuality and substance in bis own representative
humanity and bnnging that restored humanity into union with God in bis
resurrection. Likewise, from the point of view of Julian’s readers, oneing must
also be a future event. The past and future reality of oneing sliare the status of
being, as it were, out of reach for humans presently engaged in the mundane reality
of earthly life. Yet the past and future aspects of oneing are both completed from
tlie perspective of God’s eternal regard of humankind.48
Anderson sees the present dimension of oneing as standing
in a contrapuntal relationship with the past and future dimensions. Julian is
untroubled by the seeming contradiction between saying that the uniting of humans
to God is fully accomplished in Christ and tliat this oneing must be made actual in
those who are expenencing in this life tlie timebound process of receiving grace and
newness of life from Christ in the midst of their present, earthly lives.49
48 ANDERSON, 2005, p. 177.
ANDERSON, 2005, p. 177.
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Anderson describes the past and future dimensions as the Incarnation and the
eschaton respectively.5° The present study draws on Anderson’ s first rate account of
Julian’s nonviolent soteriology, but with a slightly different focus. Anderson, to my mmd,
succeeds in his strictly theological argument that Julïan’s sotenology is nonviolent because
the loving relations of the Trinity with created humanity are pacific. He draws on
quotations from Julian’s Long Text which make this abundantly clear. And, as we’ll see,
lie understands the complexity of Julian’s double anthropology and how Christ’s saving
work is a work of identification with humankind. Like Nuth, he is concerned to understand
how Julian conceives of God as incapable of wrath.
However, I note that Anderson approaches the human predicament as that of wrath,
which by now will be understood as having the same limitation which Crysdale observed
in Wink’s domination system. Anderson does not linger over the human predicament of
sin, as it is represented in tlie exemplum, as one of fundamental despair. Nor does lie
explore how Julian’s understanding of the Tnnity engaged in creation evolved out of a
sotenological crisis around the meaning of sin. His view of Christ’s saving work in tlie
past, in the future and as the work of appropriation in the present tense is not insensitive to
that predicament as experienced by those on the underside of histoiy, those whose very
sense of selfhood lias been beleaguered by a chronic and systemic lack of mirroring,
familially andlor socially. Indeed, lie spends considerable time in identifying tlie
problematic of violent sotenologies as urgent because of their effects on women.51
However, his reading does not address directly the predicament of internalized despair,
seif-hate, sliame and grief which Crysdale and others have described as more accurately the
situation or soul wound for which salvation is needed by women, and wliich would seem
to have been the case for Julian in lier lifetime.
The present study lias attempted to address this dimension of the human
predicament as constitutive of Julian’ s psycliobiography and of the urgency of lier
soteriological crisis. As sucli, I propose to explore Julian’s understanding of Christ’s
saving work, represented in the exemptum and as tliat extends to her reworking of otlier
traditional expressions to describe tliat work in the past and future tenses, as a clear
response to her predicament.
In this section I will show how Julian invests the saving work of God with the
function of the minoring face beholding creation in Christ in her reworking of tliose
traditional expressions. I hope to show how approaching lier objective soteriology in this
50 ANDERSON, 2005, p. 183.
51 ANDERSON, 2005, pp. 6 - 12.
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fashion helps avoid some of the pitfalls of traditional theological language and keep the
focus on the quality of relational dynamics among humans, Christ and the Trinity which
animates her soteriology. It also reveals that the mirroring function plays more than a
compensatory role in Julian’s soteriology.
4.1 Christ’s saving work in the past
In this section I outiine two aspects of Julian’ s understanding of salvation, already
accomplished in Christ, as others have described them. First in appearance (though flot
necessarily in time) is the saving work of Christ’s Incarnation, our “flesh taking” or our
“making again”. But Julian’s post-exemptum soteriology tums markedly trinitarian, and in
effect she describes the work of the Trinity in our creation or “first making”, as involved in
our salvation too. After these two accounts, I offer a third, describing the function of
mirroring as that which could be said to hold them together relatîonally in Julian’s visionary
account of the exemptum. Lastly, I draw on Koenig to explore Julian’s revision of the
theme of the harrowing of heu as a case in point of the use of the theme of Christ’s chere
beholding creation as investing her objective soteriology with the function of mirroring.
4.1.1 Incarnation (our making again)
Anderson sets out to argue that the Incarnation is the saving work of Christ.
Attendmg to what Julian says about the servant in the exemplum, Anderson writes that
Julian proposes that the servant’s identity is itself salvific. Because the servant is
Adam, whose humanity is united to ail humans, and because the servant is Christ,
in whom humanity and divinity are united, Christ is able to raise ail humanity from
its sinful fallenness.52
Anderson observes that, in Julian’s early showings of the face of the crucifix caked with
blood, Julian wonders why that face could be 50 discoloured and ugly when Christ is the
most beautiflul instance of humanity. (LT 10.) He shows that Julian appeals to the meaning
of the Incarnation to answer her own question. In Anderson’s words,
[ut is because Christ wishes to make himself like the human beings he loves that his
beauty is obscured in Julian’s vision.... It seems that the loss of beauty that results
when Christ unites humanity to bis divinity in the incarnation is the causative event
in humanity’s ‘making again’ into the image of Christ.... According to this
passage, it is not Christ’s passion and death that restores humanldnd to the likeness
of Christ, although this is clearly part of the story, but the event considered more
broadly of Christ effecting in himself the likeness of humanity.53
52 ANDERSON, 2005, p. 152.
ANDERSON, 2005, p. 150.
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Anderson stresses Julian’ s key soteriological statement in LT 51 that “when Adam feu,
God’s Son feu”. The true union between the Son and humanity is flot conditioned by time
or space. “What is decisive for salvation in Julian’s view is the intimate and permanent
solidarity between humanity and divinity in Christ that occurs in (and throughout) the
incarnation”.54 The harrowing, or bringing Adam out, of heu is the ultimate implication of
this union, which includes “the whole of Christ’s life, from conception to resurrection. To
be sure, Christ’s suffering and death is a part of bis incarnate life, but it is flot a matter of
particular emphasis in this part of Julian’s account of salvation”.55
How Christ saves is related to the double nature of Julian’s human anthropology.
“The servant’ s injuries are such that lie is estranged flot only ftom God, but also from
himseW’ and “Christ is able to heai the injuries caused by sin in bis own humanity”.56 The
loss of unity between human substance and human sensuality is remedied by reuniting
substance and sensuality in Christ’s own humanity. Christ’s incamational activity works
the healing of that seif-estrangement and the restoration of humans to their true self in
Christ. However, Anderson then begins to stress less the sensuality which Christ reunites
in himself than the substance which is eternally knit in the Trinity. For Julian, as we have
seen, it was neyer the case that human substance or godly wiil was harmed in the servant’ s
fail. Anderson sees this as significant for bis thesis because it explains how there is a fit
between the human condition and God’s own pacific life. In fact, lie sees Julian’s
understanding of substance as the pnnciple of iikeness or compatibility between human
creation and the Trinity, regardless of the sensual condition humankind is in.57
Anderson argues that the positive role Julian assigns to the Passion complements
both the recapitulation shape in her teaching and the nonviolent character of ber theology as
a whole. Christ takes into bis own humanity every pain of broken human sensuality (sin)
so that he can heal it and restore humans to wholeness. The enclosure of ail humarnty in
Christ ensures that God does not biame humankind for sin any more than God blames
Christ. There is no appeasing an angry god, since it is humans whom Christ seeks to
satisfy through lis suffering and death, not God. Christ’s soiidarity with those lie seeks to
save means that he refuses to avoid suffering by exercising divine power. li also means
that bis death was bis undertaking to embrace every condition of Adam’s humanity in bis
ANDERSON, 2005, p. 153.
ANDERSON, 2005, p. 153.
56 ANDERSON, 2005, p. 155.
ANDERSON, 2005, pp. 189 - 190, drawing on LT 44.
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own. “The harrowing of heu symbolizes the ultimate identification of Christ with injured
humanity”.58
Anderson takes Dearbom’s point that
Julian considers Christ’s death to be continuous with the saving work he
accomplishes by his incarnation and not the reat saving event, as it were, for which
the rest of Christ’ s life is merely props and scenery: ‘the incarnation is flot a means
to the end of the atonement. Rather, the atonement secures the end of the
incarnation, which is the ontologïcal recreation of our humanity in and through
Christ’. The only problem wïth Dearbom’ s expression is that it is becoming clear
that Julian’ s account of salvation bears little resemblance to the expiation-
satisfaction type soteriology. ..
The death of Christ is flot the end but the “starting point of new lïfe for humankind”.60
Anderson, along with many other Julian specialïsts, relates the power of Christ’ s
Passion to save to Julian’s treatment of the motherhood of Christ, likening the pains of
Christ’s Passion to the labour pains of childbirth. That new life is the life of human
sensuality united to substance.
[SJo our Mother is working on us in various ways, in whom our parts are kept
undivided; for in our Mother Christ we profit and increase, and in mercy he reforms
and restores us, and by the power of his Passion, his death and his Resurrection he
unites us to our substance. (LT 58.)
As I read him, Anderson sees Christ’ s saving work in the “past” as twofold. We
have seen how in Julian’s exemptum Christ heals and restores human sensuality to human
substance in his own representative humanïty. In effect, this ïs to restore human beings to
union with our true or authentic selfhood in Christ. What is left for Christ to do is the
oneing of those he lias restored to wholeness
-- to God.61 However, this is where it
seems to me that Anderson’s naming the Incarnation as the saving work seems to fail him.
Anderson goes on to focus on the oneing between the Trinity and creation which
is indissolubly and etemally unïted in Christ, but which is worked out in past, present and
future tenses such that “humans are granted to partake of the peaceftil, loving relationships
that exist etemally between Father, $on and Holy Spirit”.62 Anderson describes Julian’ s
tnnitarian theology at length, flot only to account for God’ s saving action in the past and
58 ANDERSON, 2005, pp. 168 - 169.
ANDERSON, 2005, pp. 169 - 170, emphasis in text. He is quoting DEARBORN, Kerry, “The
crucified Christ as the motherly God: The theology of Julian of Norwich”, Scottish journal oftheotogy 55,
2002, p. 292.
60 ANDERSON, 2005, p. 170.
61 ANDERSON, 2005. p. 176.
62 ANDERSON, 2005, p. 177.
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future only, but also to anchor bis argument that that saving action is ongoing in human
appropriation of salvation in the present moment. In this context it seems to me, the
language of Incarnation takes on a more relative status as Anderson proceeds to focus on
human oneing or participation in the relationships of trinitarian love.
It is universally agreed that what Julian has to say about the Trimty is only as it
concems lived Christian expenence rather than with abstract intratrinitarian life. Ihat this
derives from her exemptum is less universafly remembered. It is Julian’ s determination of
the identities of both the servant and the lord which dominate the exemplum, and
describe her own hermeneutical process of appropriating the mearnng of the exemptum
over the twenty years following. (LI 51.) As Anderson observes, “the important
comments are both christological and trinitarian”.63 Julian writes that “the lord is God the
Father, the servant is the Son, Jesus Christ, the Holy Spirit is the equal love which is in
them both”. (LI 51.) Again, as Anderson notes,
this is the first time she lias produced a trinitarian interpretation of the lord’ s love
for the servant. (The loving relationship between the lord and the servant is a detail
of the story that is available for such an interpretation: in Julian’ s first account of
this narrative she observes tliat “the lord looks on bis servant very lovingly and
sweetly and mildly”, and she mentions the lord’ s love ftequently when describing
the lord’s compassion for the servant’s injuries.)64
It is curious that Anderson should put in parentheses what is, in effect, the basis for
Julian’s whole shift in the Showings to the new perspective on the exemplum gained over
time, which I noted in the previous chapter. What Anderson puis in parentheses is what so
powerfully affected Koemg to speak of the compensatory mirroring effect of the face of the
lord on the servant. It is also what allows Anderson subsequently to argue that the loving,
peaceful relationships in the Tnnity also enclose humanity in the Incarnation. Ibis quality
of trmnitanan relationality engaged in creation is the basis on which he goes on to speak of
appropriation of salvation as how those relationships are participated in and practised in the
present tense. It would seem that what Anderson puts between brackets is the “detail”
which may be critical for lis, as well as the present, project of relating objective and
subjective soteriology in Julian’ s Showings.
63 ANDERSON, 2005, p. 198.
64 ANDERSON, 2005, p. 199, quoting LT 51.
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4.1.2 Creation in the Trinity (our flrst making)
Anderson discusses our oneing to God, as this ïs an event that lias already taken
place in the past, as Julian’ s understanding of the “original act of creating”.65 This would
amount to that union in substance between the Trinity and the creamre’s godly will which
enables humans to have a capacity for at-one-ness with God.66 Hide describes it as the
imago Trinitatis, that humankind, as Julian says, “was made like the Trinity in our first
making”.67
Even so, the Incarnation (that second past event), was needed to bnng humans into
union with God (in humans’ sensual condition oned with substance). This is humankind’s
making again, in the imago Christi as Hide puts it. “Our Creator wished us to be like
Jesus Christ our saviour in heaven forever, through the power of our maldng again”. (LT
10).
Anderson’s initial statement that the Incarnation is the saving act doesn’t say ail that
Anderson wants to say about the trinitarian implications of Julian’s soteriology. It would
appear that Julian’ s soteriology does flot stay in the neat categories of the tradition’ s
theological discourse. Anderson even recognizes this in noting Hide’s observation that, in
Julian’ s exemptum, unlike theologies of the “missions” of the Son and the Holy Spirit, it is
ail three persons of the Trinity who are at work simultaneously in liuman salvation. The
example is the image in the exemptum of the lord seated in a barren place (that is, in the
human soul) awaiting the retum of the servant.
[Tjhe anchonte envisions the saving activity of the Father within the economy along
with the Son and the Spint, who are usually thought to be those who are ‘sent’ to
work in the world. If in Julian’s view the Father, too, is present and worldng in
the world to save human beings, then there is effectively no distinction in her
thought between the economic and the immanent Trinity. if this is true, it serves to
underscore the urgency of the recluse’s insistence upon human sharing in divine
patterns of relating.68
65 ANDERSON, 2005, p. 177.
66 PALLISER, Margaret, Christ, our mother ofrnercy: Divine mercy and compassion in the theology of
the Shewings of Julian of Nonvich, NY, Walter de Gruyter, 1992, p. 48.
67 HIDE, 2001, p. 64, quoting LT 10. Hide elsewhere argues that Julian’s whole soteriology is
encapsulated in the first showing, which revealed that humans are enclosed in, and cannot live independently
of, the love of God. See HIDE, Keme, “‘Only in God do I have all’: The sotenology of Julian of
Norwich”, Downside review 112, 2004, pp. 43 - 60.
68 ANDERSON, 2005, pp. 195 - 196. See HIDE, 2001, p. 122. See also HIDE, 2004, p. 59, fn. 48,
where she writes, “for Julian, trinitarian properties are actually appropriations that can be applied to each
person of the Trinity in turn. Maker, lover and keeper, while specific to father, Son and Holy Spint,
equally belong to each person”. Hide is expanding on a note in Colledge and Walsh, which is their take on
Julian’s reference in LT 83 to the three properties of “life, love and light” in God, and which they describe
as a “recapitulation of ber Trinitarian teaching”. COLLEDGE Edmund and lames WALSH, eds., A book of
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This aspect of Julian’ s soteriology buzzes with the relational movement or perichoresis of
divine love oneing humans in the trinitiarian relationships. As Flide puts it, through the
“emphasis on mutuai enclosure between the Tnnity and humanity... Julian creates an
ontology of being-in-relationship” •69
4.1.3 The saving action in the past redescribed as the
mirroring relation in the exemptum
The discourse of mirroring, I believe, can assist us to bring together the language of
trimtarian and Christological sotenological motifs in the exemptum in a way which is
simple and highhights the quaÏity of retationatity which is uppermost in the dynamism of
Julian’ s soteriology.
Julian’ s initial understanding of the meaning of the exemplum corresponded to fier
experience of prayer in ST 19. In LI 51 the servant who leapt to do the lord’s will and
consequently feu into the ditch, injured himself and became helpless to get himself out, is a
description of the situation for which she was most in need of a response which would be
salvific. She spends a substantial amount of time descnbing the distress the servant finds
himself in; we may assume that she likewise spent a substanflal amount of her life in that
distress herseif, feeling abandoned in prayer, as in life. It was precisely the lack of
knowledge of any substantial union between herseif and Christ, in this condition, which
led lier to despair.
Julian’ s coming to identify that unbroken substantial union between the creamre and
Christ in tlie Trinity was significant for fier receiving a response which could make sense of
her predicament. In the performative allusion to the servant’ s act of looking up into the
loving face of the lord, Julian receives that salvific response. The substantial union of
humanity and Christ is secured by the lord’ s constant beholding of the servant. Ibis visual
image of the lord mirroring the servant communicates to Julian that it is God’ s will that she
know this. In this she sees that the desire to give creation what creation most desires is in
God and in creation. The conscious knowledge of this desire (which enables the servant to
showings to the anchoress Julian of Norwich, Toronto, Pontifical nstitute of Medieval Studies, 1978a, p.
722, fn. 5. Compare LaCugna on contemporary rethinking on the Trinity: “There is a lot to be said... for
any approach which resists easy correlation offather, Son and Spirit with creation, redemption and
reconciliation, since the biblical and patristic records on this score are mixed”. LaCUGNA, Catherine
Mowry, “Re-conceiving the trinity as the mystery of salvation”, Scottish journal oftheotogy 38, pp. 1$ -
19.
69 HIDE, 2001, p. 56.
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relinquish the desperate blindness that keeps him from beholding the lord), draws the
sensual self toward union with the substantial in Christ.
Her meditation on this exemplum over the course of twenty years produces an
astonishing message. The image of the servant in the ditch, who buzzes with vacillation
between self-preoccupied despair and half-seen moments of mysteriously anticipated
loolting up into the face of his loving lord, represents more than just a narrative account of
lier subjective appropriation of its salvific meaning, that is, that her humanity in ail its
vulnerability, helplessness and dependency in that condition is beloved. This sarne
narrative image dynamizes the objective work of salvation. Christ’s Incarnation in relation
to the constant chere of the lord, is understood as the Trinity engaged in creation. This
tnnitarian relational acflvity enables humanity to corne to sensual self-knowledge in the
mirror that Christ is for humanitind, and in the same process to 5e oned in the constant,
loving regard of the Trinity. Together, the quality of relationality between them is raised to
the status of objective soteriological narrative.
What makes Jutian ‘s Ïearning from the exemptum so powerfut is flot the
servant by himsetf but the servant as beheÏd by the lord. So the servant’s identity in the
exemplum, which takes Julian the twenty years to corne to understand, is constitutively
related to the face of the lord. The servant’ s identity, as Adam, is integrally Sound up with
the identity of the servant, as Christ. And the servant’s identity, as Christ and Adam, is
integrally bound up with the identity and activity of the face of the lord: Rather than
locating the saving work in Christ’s suffering or even Christ’s Incarnation atone, Julian
telts us that “where Jesus appears, the blessed Trinity is understood, as I see it”. (LT 4.)
As wetl as the person oJ Christ enctosing humankind, the loving chere of the tord in the
exemptum determines the constant, loving quality of relationality within the whote
Trinitarian commun ity enctosing humanity, which functions as the saving work.
Christ’s humanity and servanthood, regarding and being regarded by the Triniry in
love, enables the human condition to participate in that action in time and space, and
so enables Jutian and her even Christians to regard and behotd the Trinity beholding
their predicament in Christ.
I propose to cali this quality of relationality in her vision of the economic Tnnity
engaged in creation, Julian’s objective soteriology of mirroring. We are no longer
speaking simply of the compensatory function which the compassionate mirroring face of
the lord played in Julian’s psychobiography. The mirroring function of the lord’s inner
chere ofjoy reveals to Julian the work of the Incarnate Christ and of the Trinity through
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their relational differentiation in the restoration of humankind, although humans are only
able to recognize and appropriate this work in part in this lifetime.
4.1.4 The mirroring function of the Trinity’s saving work
focused in the three cheres of the lord
According to Anderson, Julian’s sotenologically and relationally dnven trinitarian
theology of engagement in creation enables humans to know God as pacifie, and to become
more pacifie in their desires and actions in the world. For women, we have seen that the
human predicament in need of salvation is despair, flot wrath per se, as Anderson would
have it. Thus, as I see it, Julian’s soteriologically and relationally driven trinitarian
theology, engaged in creation in mutual beholding, enables humans on the underside of
history to know God as trustworthy and to desire to practise trust in God, in themselves
and in human relations in the present time, in well-being and in woe.
In the later chapters following the exemplum the whole Tnnity takes on the
language of the Passion and the exemptum. In particular I note that Julian uses with much
greater frequency the word chere to describe what she beholds. This leads her, as we have
seen, to expand the two cheres of the lord in the exemptum to the three cheres of the
Passion, compassion andjoy. (LT 71.) Julian is in the pattem of gaining self-knowledge
through beholding her sensual condition mirrored variously in the Passion and the
exemptum. In LI 71 it is as if she is identtfying the face or chere of Christ as doing
tire work of empathicalty mirroring her, comforting her, exposing her, transforming her
or rejoicing over her, feeding back to her what she needs to know in order to respond
faithffilly depending on her condition. Here in Julian’ s late, mature reflection, it is the first
two of the three cheres which work the salvation of humanldnd through nature and mercy.
The third chere works too, to draw the sou! on to Resurrection joy in union with God in
sensua!ity as well as substance through those moments of grace when it mingles with the
other two. “What can make us to rejoice more in God than to see in him that in us... he
hasjoy?... This makes the soul which so contemplates like to him who is contemplated,
and unites it in rest and peace”. (LI 68.) What Julian describes here is a fulfiilment or
flourishing of her humanity through her participation in the mirroring qua!ity of relationality
in the economic Trinity engaged in creation in Christ’ s humanity. These three cheres
taken together could be described as the saving work of the loving relationality of the
economic Trinity beho!ding creation in the Incarnation. This saving work is thus described
in its largest sense as the Tnnity’s work of empathically mirroring humanity toward the
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sight of itself in Christ in every sensual condition and therein to glimpses or touches of
being beheld by God in sensuality as well as substance. Julian descnbes this savÏng,
oneing, mirroring “activity” well where she wntes that “he will lift up and draw our outer
chere to the inner” and that “the blessed chere of our Lord God works this in us by grace”.
(LI 71.)
It is then this same work of mirroring, as the Trinity beholds and encloses
humankind in Christ in these three conditions, which renders the creative work of the
Trinity, the saving work of Christ’s Incarnation and the sanctifying work of their Ioving
union in the Holy Spirit one coherent, contiguous work in Julian of Norwich’s soteriology.
The divine works of human creation, preservation and keeping ah become the saving
works through Christ in the Tnnity. In ber later reflections as we’ll explore bnefly below,
JuÏian cails these the Mother’s work. (LI 58 - 63.) Her recasting of the quaiity of
relationality in the economic Trinity in terms of matemal-offspnng relationality could be
said to be the development to its coberent conclusion of what I am describing as her
psychobiography and soteriology of mirroring. It resonates with the satisfaction of the
psychodynarnic need for mirroring, at both a familial and systemic, communal
-- ecclesial
-- level. One might put it this way that Julian’s flounshing depended on coming to terms
with the common soteriological teaching of Mother Church, as well as her familial history.
4.1.5 The harrowing of heu
Another aspect of Christ’ s savirig work in the pastis the medieval and Eastem
tradition of the harrowing of heu, which, as Anderson observed, underlines the radical
nature of Christ’ s solidarity with the human condition. My focus here will be to trace
Julian’s reworiting of tins aspect of Christ’s work by using the chere image. Recali that it
is with reference to the tradition of the harrowing of heil that Koenig makes her observation
concerning the objective saving power of the mirroring face of the lord. Koenig quotes
Julian:
The compassion and the pity of the Father were for the falling of Adam, who is his
most beloved creature. The joy and the bliss were for the falling of bis dearly
beloved Son, who is equal with the Father. The merctfut regard [behoiding] of
his tovety countenance [chere] fitled ail the earth, and went down with Adam
into heu, and by this continuing pity Adam was keptfrom endless death. (LI
51.)
Karl Iamburr shows how Julian transforms the traditionally violent depiction of the
harrowing of heli as a hiberation from prison into a nonviolent one as a birth from our old
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life of wretchedness into a new spiritual life.70 He identifies in this the maternai work of
Christ the mother who reforms and restores ail his obedïent chiidren, quoting LT 5$:
and in our mother of mercy we have our refonning and our restoring, in whom our
parts [natures] are united and ail made perfect man... and in him and by him we are
powerfully taken out of heu and out of the wretchedness on earth, and gloriously
brouglit up into heaven, and blessedly united to our substance.... (LT 58.)
As the Incarnation united Christ to our sensuality, so the harrowing is a kind of birth into
new spiritual life within the mystical body of Christ because by it we are joined in
substance to Christ.71 Tamburr emphasizes Julian’ s reference in the Long Text account of
her fourth showing to Christ’s blood descending into heu as medicine for the sin of Adam
and the nourishment to sustain us spiritiiaily. Julian declares:
Behold and see the power of this precious plenty of his precious blood. It
descended into lieu and broke its bonds, and delivered ail who were there and who
belong to the court of heaven. The precious plenty of his precious blood overflows
ail the earth, and it is ready to wash from their sins ail creatures who are, have been
and will be of good will. The precious plenty of his precious blood ascended into
lieaven in the blessed body of our Lord Jesus Christ, and it is flowïng there in him,
praying to the Father for us, and this is and will be so long as we have need. And
furthermore, it flows in ail heaven rejoicing in the saivation of ail manldnd which is
and will be there, and fihling up the number which is lacking. (LT 12.)
On the basis of this, Tamburr links the sacrifice of Christ’s blood with Julian’s
development of the motherhood of Christ.72 This, lie shows, is in stark contrast to the
consistently violent iconography associated with the harrowing of heu in the western
tradition.
It is important to remember how traditionai and resistant to change was the
depiction of the Harrowing by the later Middle Ages. In the West, the iconography
of the Descent shows little of the variety given the Anastasis in Byzantine art
For Julian to have reshaped the Descent shows the comprehensiveness of lier vision
of salvation.73
Tamburr associates this comprehensiveness with the permeation of Julian’s Long Text by
the motherhood of Christ theme. But extraordinarily, lie neglects the very text Koenig cites
concerning the descent of the compassionate chere of the lord to lieu in LT 51. In the end,
Tamburr is unable to link Julian’s radical reshaping of the theme of the harrowing of heli to
the exemptum: “Julian’ s images of masculine power such as the lord of chapter fifty-one
70 TAMBURR, Karl, “Mystic transformation: Julian’s version of the harrowing of heil”, Mystics
quarterty 20, 1994, pp. 60 - 67.
71 TAMBURR, 1994, 63, 65
72 TAMBURR, 1994, p. 64.
‘ TAMBURR, 1994, p. 65.
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are kindly and are finally subsumed by lier vision of Christ as mother that dominates the
end of the work.”74
Now, I have no problem with Tamburr’s conclusion that “Julian proposes a vision
of redemption that is ultimately more tolerant and universal”. However, I would hold that
her soteriology is driven by the exemptum and the trinitarian ramifications of its
significance, and that this leads lier into motherhood theme.
Ail lier reflections on the works of the Mother Jesus in LT 58 - 63 taken together
are very moving. But their power, I suggest, derives from the exemplum. Alone these
reflections do flot have this saine dynamic energy, to my mmd, as the relational activity
driving the exemplum which is engaged in the constant regard of the lord for the servant.
Rather, I would argue that the blood of Christ’ s saving Passion which harrows heu is
subsumed into the image of the beholding chere of the lord because Julian invests that
chere with the work of mirroring humankind into new spiritual birth in the likeness of
God’ s own self, even and especially here in heu, the situation of the damned. It seems to
me tliat the greater comprehensivity of the saving work of the mirroring face can be inferred
from the passage Tamburr quotes from LI 12. The ascent of Christ’s blood to heaven and
the work that the blood does there of “rejoicing” anticipates the resurrection chere of the
lord which mirrors joy and bliss in the restoration of the union of human sensuality and
substance in Christ in the Trinity.
4.2 Christ’s saving work in the future
Anderson speaks relatively briefly of Julian’s understanding of oneing as a future
event. Oneing as a past or future event, he says, “share[s] the status of being, as it were,
out of reach for humans presently engaged in the mundane reality of earthly life. Yet the
past and future aspects of oneing are both completed from the perspective of God’ s etemal
regard of humankind”.75 More particularly, he alïgns the future aspect of oneing with the
sense in which Christian authors often think of salvation as a future event. “Mthough
salvation is already completed in Christ, the effects of Christ’ s work are obviously flot yet
fiuly enacted in the lives of those immersed in earthly life”.76 But Anderson gives the
impression that for Julian what defines the incompleteness of salvation in this life is the
human condition of “having within us a marvellous mixture of both well-being and woe.
TAMBURR, 1994, p. 66.
‘ ANDERSON, 2005, p. 179.
76 ANDERSON, 2005, p. 179.
425
We have in us our risen Lord Jesus Christ, and we have in us the wretchedness and the
harm of Adam’s falling”. (LT 52.) As Anderson goes on to put it, drawing on Iulian’s
first showing of the littie thing like a hazeinut, Julian “means that she is flot wholly and
actually united to God as long as she is subject to mixture of well-being and woe that
characterizes eartffly life”.77 The future eschatological image which corresponds to
Anderson’ s point is that of the littie chuld who rises from the pit of mud.
The pit which was the body signifies the great wretchedness of our mortal flesh;
and the smallness of the child suggests the cleanness and the purity of our soul.
[Ouf Lord] wants us to be comforted in surpassing joy. And that he revealed in
these words: and you will corne up above, and you will have me for your reward,
and you will be fihled full ofjoy and bliss. (LT 64.)
Since the soul is both sensual and substantial, Julian’s account of the body is flot dualistic.
Her account of this future aspect of oneing is profoundly conditioned by the radical,
wretched experience of suffering she lias known in her life. I simply observe that the
image of the child rising occurs directly after Julian’ s chapters on the motherhood of
Christ, and so, to that extent, it emphasizes the retum of human nature to the matrix of
relationality from which humans corne forth, and to full self-knowledge in the beatific
vision: “This makes the sou! which so contemplates like to him who is contemplated, and
unites it in rest and peace”. (LT 68.)
Ju!ian a!so however speaks of a great “deed which the b!essed Trimty will perforrn
on the last day, as I see it, and what the deed will be and how it will be performed is
unknown to every creature who is inferior to Christ, and it will be until the deed is done”.
(LT 32.) Anderson omits ail reference to this. It is interesting that Julian’ s concem in
mentioning the deed is that God wants us to know that this deed will be performed, and
that through this deed “he wi!l rnake al! things wel!”, but also that we know nothing of the
particulars, “because he wants us to be at ease in our souls and at peace in love,
disregarding every disturbance which cou!d hinder our true rejoicing in him”. (LT 32.)
This is the one chapter in which Julian speaks of the damnation of many creatures as “an
article of our faith”, which had led her to think “it was impossible that every kind of thing
should be well, as our Lord reveaied at this time”. (LT 32.)
Nonetheless, Julian’s attention is on seeing how God judges differenfly. Shortly
after she writes that
so long as we are in this life, whenever we in our folly revert to the contemplation
of those who are damned, our Lord tenderly teaches us and b!essedly cails us,
saying in our souls: Leave me alone, my beÏoved child, attend to me. I am enough
for you, and rejoice in your saviour and in your sa!vation. And I am sure that this
ANDERSON, 2005, p. 180.
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is our Lord working in us. The soul which is pierced with this by grace will see it
and feel it. And even though this deed may truly be accepted as done for men in
general, stili this does not exciude particular men; for what our good Lord wishes to
do with respect to his poor creatures is flot known to me. (LT 36.)
What she takes from this is that “we ought to rejoice in him for everything which he
reveals and for everything which he conceals; and if we do so, willingly and meekly, we
shah find great comfort in it, and we shah have endless thanks from him for it”. (LT 36.)
It would seem that Julian allows God a large capacity for saving work which has a
future and unknown aspect. In a sense, where she hears lier Lord say, in response to her
preoccupation with the damned, “leave me alone, my beloved chuld...”, this work aiso
bears similarity to Julian’s reworking of the image of the harrowing of heu, since it would
seem that Christ is identifying with the damned. The “disturbance” in LI 32 that she would
have humans avoid is at the level of human sensual judgment, flot at the level of God’s
eschatological deed which, although kept in God’s privy counsel, will be consistent with
the character of God’s saving work which is begun in the present life.
4.3 Mutual joy: The eschatological face of God
It is the contiguity of the future aspect of Christ’s saving work with oneing, as
humanldnd can experience it in this lifetime, which commands Anderson’s attention.
The future dimension of oneing raises the question of what must happen in the
present life to prepare humans to be united to God. Julian envisions a process
through which the work performed in Christ becomes actual in human beings in the
present life.78
In our creation Julian says that we are enclosed in the trinitarian life of God. Because of
this, “our falling cannot hinder [God] in loving us”. (LI 39.) But we are to increase and
be fiulfihled in this trinitarian life here in this world in part, and fully in heaven. This
process involves two aspects. In order to participate in trinitarian loving, as Anderson puts
it, humans must undergo a “transformation of human affections” and a life-long process of
“salutary training” of those affections to desire what the Trinity desires.79 It is this work
which, as Julian aiways notes, is begun in this life, but is known in full only in heaven.
Anderson argues that in the exemptum the servant’s “longing and desiring” to do
the lord’s will, indicates that Julian sees the role of liuman affections (desire) and their
transformation, as essential to oneing in the Trinity.8° Substance unbroken in the
ANDERSON, 2005, p. 180.
ANDERSON, 2005, p. 208.
80 ANDERSON, 2005, p. 210, where he gives the antecedent for this idea in Augustine and finds a
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trinitarian - human relation allows for the likeness or compatibility between human and
divine loving, without which, Anderson writes “there would be no basis for human sharing
in God’s loving, trinitarian relationships.... God’s longing for humankind expressed in
Christ inspires humans to respond with loving longing for God”.81
Sebastian Moore’ s positing of the pre-religious human desire “to know ourselves as
loved, valued and the source of delight to a beloved other” cornes quite close to Julian’ s
description of that godly desire in the substantial will of the servant to do the lord’s will.
As I read the exempÏum, the human problem of estrangement and despair arises wlien the
servant is unconscious of that will in lis sensual condition of distress. “I saw the lord
commend and approve him for his will, but [the servant] himself was blinded and hindered
from knowing this will”. (LT 51.) But the likeness or cornpatibility of human desire for
growth in pattems of loving and oneing with God is nonetheless unbroken in Christ’ s
double nature.
Tlie servant’s double identity as mirrored in the exemptum actually allows Julian to
see the doubleness of lier desires in terms of a coincidence of substantial desire or “love
longing” and sensual despair. It also allows lier to see liow they are to be tutored or
trained so as to become oned in the Trimty, here in part and fully in lieaven.
Does Julian give any sign that the future aspect of oneing engages the mirroring
dynamic of the beholding chere of the lord in the exemplum? I believe slie does. Julian
lias negotiated a transformation in lier understanding of the meaning of certain kinds of
affections whicli are related to lier predicament of basic seif-liate. She lias identified lieu as
despair. (LT 17.) Slie lias become trained and tutored in tlie practices of beseeching and
beholding the constant chere of the lord, for true knowledge of lierseif in that siglit. The
future aspect of Christ’s saving work, described liere as tlie siglit of the Creator’s blessed
chere, enters into the present time (and is notably unrelated to wliether the creature is in
well being or in woe), wliere slie writes for example tliat
if ail tlie nobility which God ever created in lieaven and on earth were given to us
for our joy and our comfort, if we did flot see lis own fair blessed chere, stiil we
should neyer cease to moum and to weep in the spirit, because, that is, of our
painful longing, until we miglit see our Creator’ s blessed chere. And if we were in
ail the pain that lieart can think or tongue can teli, if we could at that time see lis
blessed chere, ail this pain would flot grieve us. So is that blessed vision tlie end
of eveiy kind of pain to loving souls, and tlie fuffihiment of eveiy kind ofjoy and
bliss.... (LI 72.)
contemporary to Julian’s idea in the “less sophisticated and less insightful” Cloud author on this point.
81 ANDERSON, 2005. p. 212.
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The closest Julian gets to describing the future aspect of this saving work, where Julian
sees it in one of lier moments of partial beholding its completion in GoU in this life, is again
lier description of the third chere ofjoy in LT 71, “that is bis blessed chere, partly like
what it will be in heaven....”
Glad and merry and sweet is the blessed and lovely chere of our Lord towards our
souls, for lie sees us aiways living in love-longing, and lie wants our souls to be
gladly disposed towards him, to repay him lis reward. And soI liope that by bis
grace he lifts up and will draw our outer chere to the inner, and will make us ah at
unity with him, and each of us with others in the true, lasting joy which is Jesus.
The blessed chere of our Lord God works this in us by grace. (LT 71.)
The future action here is, in effect, the bringing about of tlie beatific vision: “For now we
see in a mirror, dimly, but then we will see face to face. Now I know only in part; then I
will know fully, even as I have been fully known”. (1 Cor 13:12.) The Lord’s chere of
joy, enjoying hurnanity, will bring about oneing with Christ’s humanity in the double
human soul, lifting up and drawing ail hurnans’ variable sensual cheres or dispositions to
the inner, constant disposition of sensuality in union with substance in Christ: “And alT of
us, with unveiled faces, seeing the glory of the Lord as though reflected in a mirror, are
being transfonned into the same image from one degree of glory to another; for this cornes
from the Lord, the Spirit”. (2 Cor 3:18.)
The conclusion being drawn liere is that these cheres of Christ, lovingly mirroring
the variable condition of the beliolder, yet united in substance in the soul and drawmg the
sensual condition of the beholder to that intenor union, wliere the hurnan person is restored
both to lierself and to God, function as Julian’s objective sotenology of mirroring in past,
present and future expressions. Wliat I am calling Julian’s soteriology of mirroring is altin
to what Pezzim caTis Julian’s “real theology of Jesus’ face” in LT 71 - 72.82
5.0 The satisfying mirroring face gives rise to the thought of the Mother
In this section I argue that Julian’s further development of the trinitanan theology of
the motherhood of God, unique in the history of Christian theology,83 is the coherent
trinitarian and Christological outcorne of the mirroring function which dynamizes the
saving action in human and divine relationships in the exemptum.
82 PEZZNI, Domenico, “The vocabulary ofjoy in Julian of Norwich”, Studies in spirituality 4, 1994, p.
111.
83 Carolyn Walker Bynum descnbes Julian’s “vision of God as mother [asJ one of the greatest
reformulations in the history of theology”. BYNUM, 1982, p. 136.
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Haight has observed that in the historical evolution of doctrine, Christology
depends on sotenology. It is clear from the histoiy of Christïan doctrine that trinitarian
theology depends on soteriology too. In other words, who Christ and and the Trinity are
follows on the appropriation of what God in Christ through the Holy Spirit is doing that is
salvific. The present study leads me to see Julian’s exploration of the motherhood of God
as the Christological and trinitarian theological reflection on the sotenology of mirroring
which animates her exemptum.
Joan Nuth uses Ricoeur’s analysis of the process whereby “symbols give rîse to
thouglit” to distinguish the “primordial symbol” from the “mythic phase” and “fanciful
history” in Julian’s showings. The “primordial symbol” is found in the Short Text in
Julian’s expenence of the suffering Christ, a symbol of the love of God meant to give
comfort. It is clearly the Passion which becomes alive to her as Julian beholds the face of
the crucifix, drawing lier into the visionary experience of identification with Christ’ s
suffering. It is lier bodily sight of the face of the crucifix in its transformations which
remains the point of departure for ail of lier showings. However, Nuth goes on to say that
“[tJhe image that dominates the Long Text is no longer the Crucified, but the more elaborate
parable of the lord and the servant... [whïchJ places the symbol of the crucifixion within
the larger context of the whole scriptural story of God’s work of redemption”.84 It is the
parable (exemplum) which also gives rise to the fanciful history which “gives rise to
thought”, providing answers to the perpiexing questions Julian had about the inconsistency
between lier sliowings and Churcli teaching, according to Nuth. Subsequently, Nuth
describes Julian’s reflections on the motherhood of Christ as Julian’s “summary symbol of
soteriology”.85
Nutli speculates that “[a]fter recounting what the parable revealed about the love of
God for liumarnty, it is as thougli Julian searched for an image to sum up lier reflections on
the salvific work of Christ, and the image of mother seemed to suit her purposes best”.86
Julian’ s use of the maternai imagery is unlike what women’ s devotional practices of that
period were expected to produce. But to my mmd, Nuth’s comment makes Julian’s
theological reflection and method of interpretation sound very “second order”, cerebral and
disinterested, far from tlie suffering and confusion that catapulted lier into the visionary
84 NUTH, 1991, pp. 37 - 38.
85 NUTH, 1991, chapter 3, pp. 65 - 69.
86 NUTH, 1991, P. 66. The devotional tradition of Christ as Mother was very alive in Julian’s day. For
accounts of that tradition see CASSABUT, A., “Une dévotion médiévale peu connue: La dévotion à Jésus
notre Mère”, Revue d’ascétique et de mystique 25, 1949, pp. 234 - 245; BYNUM, 1982, pp. 110 - 169.
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experience, far ftom that rivetted gaze upon the crucifix which resulted in the first
surprising meanings of the bodily sight, and far, too, from the experiential constancy of the
chere of the lord for humanity in Christ which so dynamized ber long-term leaming from
the exemptum.
The psychohistoricai question would be why didn’t Julian pick up the theme of the
motherhood of Christ much earlïer in the Long Text or even in the Short Text, seeing as it
was so closeiy associated with Christ’ s suffering and Passion in medieval devotion? The
absence of the more conventionai function of Mother Jesus in Julian’s $howings suggests
to me that she had difficuity praying with that image and that that difficulty stemmed from
the familial and societal absence of mirroring.87
This study proposes, rather, that the work of mirroring which dynamizes Christ’s
and the Trinity’s salvific action in Julian’s exemptum soteriology, resonated for Julian in
the primordial symbol of the face of the suffering Christ, and in ail ber subsequent insight,
maturation and reflection on the quality of the loving relationality radiating between the
chere of the lord and the servant in the exemptum. I observe that the fact that Julian’s
economic Trmity is totally occupied with the needs and exigencies of creation suggests that
this economic Trinity, enclosing and enclosed in humanity, is functiomng to respond to that
pre-oedipal psychobiographical and soteriological need which I have suggested dominated
Julian’ s life. Wnt large, Julian’ s economic Trinity engaged in creation in the cheres of
Christ’ s Incarnation is a profoundly pre-oedipal, therapeutic soteriological response to the
creature’s early narcissistic condition of neglect, to her need to heal and mature in self
worth through a tmstworthy mirroring relation.
But more than this, what God does that is savïng in the exemplum leads Julian to a
fresh understanding of wlio God is. The mirroring function, as transposed into Julian’s
trinitarian Mother Christ, is lier description of the constancy of God’ s loving relationality
engaged in creation -- expressed as God’s own nature. In the exemplum Julian saw the
minoring activity in the mysterious divine - human relation from the human side, that is,
87 Compare Roberta Bondi, wnting about the relation between the effect ofthe healing ofher own lack of
familial and societal mirroring and its effect on her prayer life:
I had read a great deal of modem writings about God as mother and I was committed to spealdng
this way on principle. It had flot been clear to me, however, why such language had flot helped
my prayer, but rather, had fihled me with a sense of grief and loss. Now I understood the reason for
my grief. To know myseif as a woman in the image of God, to know God as Mother, and to
know my own mother as a window into God: these three are inseparable. If one is implausible, to
the heart, the other two are, as well.
BONDI, Roberta, Mernories of God: Theological reflections on a lfe, Nashville TN, Abingdon, 1995, p.
108.
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with great sensual variability. The exemptum visualizes in an empathic way both the
contrast situation and its potential resolution. It is this which engaged lier (and lier
readers’) desire in a process of self-identification or mirroring transference with the
servant.
In beholding Christ as Mother however, Julian is pracfising seeing how God
constantly sees human nature and the sin in the contrast situation, as they are restored in
Christ. Her problem with the Church’s judgment and teaching was that it smacked so
much of tlie very sensual variability which Julian found so troubling, and which rendered
its doctrine of God schizophrenic. Tlie nature of God which she received from Church
teaching was precisely not constant, and certainly not constantly loving. But the problem
of inconstancy, indeed of wrath and blame, as Julian saw, is flot in God. The problem is a
Yack of “object constancy” on the part of humans in their relationship with God.
Seen in this light, the emergence of the theme of the Trinity as Mother in Christ in
Julian’s comprehensive vision resonates as a profoundly coherent theological response to
the psychobiographical and sotenological predicament presented here in this reading of
Julian of Norwich. Just as in the history of the mystical tradition of Christ as mirror, in
which Christ was described as taking on maternai qualities of nurturing the spiritual
maturation of the Christian, so now Julian’s sotenology of mirroring matures into a
tnnitarian reflection on the motherhood of God in Christ with many of these same nurtunng
qualities which enable the believer to grow out of ambivalent suffering into aduit childlike
trust in salvation.88 The mutual enclosure of humanity in the matemity of Christ also
becomes a study in transforming affections and actions into those of Mother Christ.
Perhaps a doser correlation may now be fashioned between the psychoanalytic
function of mirroring in the good enough mother, and the function of mirroring in Julian’ s
88 Bradley notes that the connection between Christ as mirror and Christ as Mother is present already in
Clement. Echoing Paul, she says, Clement
presents imperfect mirror knowledge in the context of stages of instruction. He goes even further,
by attaching the mirror image, thus understood, to the metaphor of Christ, the Mother, who first
feeds at the breast, then gives himself as milk, and finally proffers solid food to the mature. This
consuming of solid food corresponds to the union of face-to-face vision....
The mirror knowledge which Clement speaks of is flot only inward but is also outward looking, to
the neighbour, and to Christ in the flesh.... Thus Jesus, visible to us, becomes the mirror in
which we discem what we should become. As Mortley has shown... Clement [makesJ the divine
element in us equivalent to Christ: ‘We have here a christological interpretation of the idea of self
knowledge through a mirror....’ BRADLEY, 1984, pp. 11 - 12, citing MORTLEY, Raoul, “The
mirror and 1 Cor 13:12 in the epistemology ofClement ofAlexandria”, Vigitae Christianae 30, 1976, p.
117. On p. 14 Bradley also notes Augustine’s use of the mirror image and bis correlation of it with the
“motherhood of the Church, as she is now in labour and will tater give birth”.
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objective soteriology, which miglit have contributed to lier trinitarian theological reflection
on Christ as Motlier.
First I will observe how Julian’s maturation of mirroring, i.e., lier psycliodynamic
and soteriological conversion process, affects her theoÏogical maturation. Second, I will
explore briefly tlie points along the cycle of motlier infant relations faciitating the
maturation of the mirroring fiinction, as Julian takes this up into lier vision of the nature of
maternai God-creature relations.
5.1 Theological maturation in the mirroring function
Relational psychoanalysis lias tauglit us tliat the maturation of the mirroring need is
recognized in the individual’s intemalization of tlie mirroring function and concomrnitantly,
in the capacity for what Winnicott called object use, or what Kohut described as the
capacity to recognize the reality or independent centre of initiative of the other. Tliis
maturation, enabled by the object constancy of the mirroring other in the mirroring
transference, allows tlie individual to internalize self constancy, and develop a coliesive
sense of liaving an authentic self, and endowing lier with greater flexibility in creatively
negotiating inner and outer worlds.
This maturation in lier internalization of the mirroring function of object constancy,
through lier mirroring transference with the Christ of lier showings, lias an effect on
Julian’s practice oftlieology. It is evident in Julian’s long and intense process oflearning
to recognize tlie activity and nature of tlie God of lier showings in liuman life. Julian lias
reflected long and hard on the sensual condition she was in wlien the Jesus of lier visions
was revealed to lier through a merged minoring transference witli him in lis Passion. As
lier own sensuality lias been reformed in tlie mirror of Clirist’s suffering andjoy, and
become more constant in tlie mirror of tlie constant, loving regard of tlie lord in tlie
exemptum, so also slie lias relinquished the need for the merged mirroring transference
with Christ in his suffering condition and internalized a maturer psycliodynamic and
theological grasp of the object constancy of the Tnnity’ s relations witli creation in Christ.
Even though liuman sensuality is neyer totally constant in tins life, mature human oneing
into God as differentiation in union is possible, and tins is at the core of the anthropology
in Julian’ s objective soteriology. Her early understanding of the Christ of lier sliowings,
experienced as merged subjectivism, lias given way to a relational realism in winch she
knows tlie Tnnity in Christ to be constant toward creation, even tbough created sensuality
is flot constant toward God.
For our courteous Lord does flot want bis servants to despair because tliey fail often
and grievously; for our falling does flot hinder him in loving us. Peace and love are
433
aiways in us, living and working, but we are not aiways in peace and in love....
(LT 39.)
As Julian cornes to understand the active, working nature of God as Mother, it
seems to me that we are witnessing the effect, in her theology, of the maturation of lier
mirroring need in lier object relations into tlie capacÏty for object use. In other words, she
has internalized the capacity to recogmze in the Trinity the independent centre of initiative of
love, working both in ways she knows and in ways that are hidden from her knowïng, but
aiways revealing that constancy of loving relation to creation.
And from the time that it was revealed, I desired many times to know in what was
our Lord’s meaning. And fifteen years after and more, I was answered in spiritual
understanding, and it was said: What, do you wish to know your Lord’s meamng
in this thing? Know it well, love was his meaning. Who reveals it to you? Love.
What did he reveal to you? Love. Why does he reveal it to you? For love.
Remain in this, and you will know more of the same. But you will neyer know
different, without end.
So I was taught that love is our Lord’ s meaning. (LT $6.)
As well as sigmfying a psychodynamic maturation, Julian’s naming of the God of
lier showings as Motlier reflects a negotiation of her ambivalent relation with tradition, that
is, Mother Church. Julian exposes in a compassionate and magisterial way the fragile
sensual condition of church authonty committed with transmitting the true faith. What
Julian seerns to be doing is practising a soteriology of mirroring from the perspective of the
mirroring God with regard to the common teaching of Holy Church. Thus she confides to
the privy counsel of Mother Christ ail lier “disturbance” about the common teaching of
Mother Church.
At the same time, Julian’ s liniting Mother Christ with Mother Church as within
enables her to mature in adult relational dependence on the tradition in which she is
embedded. Thus she writes in LT 62 that
[hJere we can see that we do flot need to seek far afield so as to know various
natures, but to go to Holy Churcli, into our Mother’s breast, that is to say, into our
own soul, wliere our Lord dwells. And there we should find everything, now in
faith and understanding and afterwards in himself, ciearly, in bliss.
But let no man apply this particularly to himself, because it is not so. It is general
because it is our precÏous Mother Jesus.
Her maturation in theological object constancy enables lier to see tlirough false teaching to
the spiritual and psychological relational lack which fuels it, but, rather than judge it
herseif humbly to mirror or expose, to any who were willing to see, what she sees as
Christ’ s own maternai response to it.
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A key element wbich drives Julian’s psychodynamic and theological maturation in
her sotenology of mirroring is her grasp of what the most profound human desire is,
whether or flot humans are in a condition of being consciously directed toward its
fulfiulment. Moore’ s description of the pre-religious desire “to know ourselves as loved,
valued and the source of delight to a beloved other” is an apt description of the kind of
maturation into relationally constituted seif-knowledge which, in Julian’ s soteriology, is a
reflection of the true self restored in Christ’ s union of substance and sensuality beheld in
the Trinity.
The challenge, which vanability in human consciousness of desire presents, is
great. Crysdale rightly wonders: “Given the pain and difficulty of negotiating this travail
[of conversion], of sustaining the Self, what can possibly be the incentive for accepting the
pain and working on the birth?”89 Crysdale’s answer is that the psychological
incorporates a spiritual process, engaging us in an encounter with a transcendent Other,
God in the Resurrection.
And though one’s glimpse of this resurrection reality, one’s sense of being divinely
embraced, is flot aiways immediately present, the undertow of one’ s deepest desire
for God nevertheless carnes one forward in what we have usually called the life of
faith.90
As Crysdale proceeds in her account of this process, the dynamic element of desire, the
desire for self worth and seif-knowledge in relation to the Risen Other, is liberated by the
“operation of grace”. Particularly as this is expenenced by those on the underside of
histoiy, “[al taste of fulfiliment of this deep Desire stirs up power, courage, deeper
yearnings, willingness to pursue fuffihiment of Self at ail costs. Hunger overtakes fear”.9’
In Julian’ s sotenology this desire is seen likewise to mature, increase and be
fuffllled by the operation of grace, and throughout, the mirroring activity is, as I see it,
what gives il its dynamism. The human desire for self worth, thus engaged in that
mirroring activity of being beheld by God in the transitional space of prayer, describes
well, from the human side, Julian’ s motivation for appropriating Christ’ s saving activity as
the quaiity of loving relations among the Trinity engaged in creation. I acknowledge that
this saving activity of beholding or mirroring the creature lovingly, which engages Julian’s
desire for the fulfihiment of self worth and relational self-knowledge, may seem to many to
be a non-activity. This perhaps is a signal simply that it is associated with matemal
89 CRY$DALE, Cynthia, Embracing travail: Retrieving the cross today, NY, Continuum, 2001, p. 27.90 CRYSDALE, 2001, p. 27, emphasis in text.
91 CRYSDALE, 2001, p. 35.
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activity, and taken for granted. Anderson observes of Julian’ s exploration of the nurturing
quality of Mother Christ in human spiritual rebirth that
[a]lthough the particular graces that Christ imparts to humans may appear at first
sight to have the quality of static, infused excellences, Julian’s comments about the
transformation of human loving makes it clear that humans are actively engaged in
the reception of these gifts. It is likely that the divine mother tutors her spiritual
offspring, improving their affections by allowing them to participate in the pattems
of her own loving.92
Describing Julian’s sotenology in terms of mirroring enables us to explore how this deep
human desire is engaged, worked through and brought to maturity and fulfihiment in the
saving work of the Trinity beholding humankind in Christ. In Anderson’s terms, by
practîsing beholding Christ, Julian’ s sensuality, the seat of lier desire, is transformed and
trained in the trinitarian pattem of loving relations. It is this maturity which Julian brings to
her theological reflection on the Trinity engaged in creation through the works of Mother
Christ.
5.2 Mother-child relations in God’s relation with creation
It is in the quality of loving relaflonality between the lord and servant in mutual
regard winch, translated into the mother-child relation in Julian’s economic Tnnity
beholding Christ enclosing our humanity, engages Julian in describing the different ways
the Mother Jesus behaves toward lis93 chiidren, depending on the child’s need and state of
maturation. The practice of beholding that relationality engaged in Christ’s double nature in
humankind elicits her desire to participate in those loving trinitarian relations in Christ
because it will reveal to her knowledge of herself and God, and also because it will disclose
to her liow she is to relate to others, including the religious tradition in winch she was
embedded This practice over time transforms her despairing, self-hateful affections, helps
her know herseif beloved, trains her in those loving pattems, disillusions her of the false
humility of her old despairing pattems, humanizes the face of Church teaching, and moves
her toward fulfiliment and flourishing in tins life in spiritual maturation. In tins spiritual
progress Julian discovers that the human soul encounters Christ in his maternai works of
gestating, birthing, nursing, disciplining, suffering-with in dying, and rebirthing the soul.
Christ, the mirroring Mother, reflects back to lier what, and how, the Trinity is working in
lier soul.
92 ANDERSON, 2005. p. 212. Sec LT 61.
Julian retains the masculine pronoun in her tanguage of Christ as Mother.
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Julian’s accounts of the “mother’s service” in the Trinity’s engagement with
humanldnd in Christ, engage the Mother’s work “in a complete, connected cycle of the life
from before birth through after death”.94 The quality of trinitanan loving relations
engaged in creation, when that is seen to be dynamized by the constant, loving chere of the
lord beholding the servant, correlates easily with the maturation process of the mirroring
function of the mother in early infant relations, from birth and fusion, tbrough the trauma
of separation and disillusionment, to maturation in aduit identity and relational dependence.
In the following paragraphs I explore a bnef conelation of Julian’ s identification of the
Mother’s works with the relational psychoanalytic description of the good-enough mother’s
facilitation of the maturation and internalization of the mirroring function in the child.
Julian’s consistent emphasis is on what is needed for human maturity and
flourishing to be possible in the present life. Bynum would put the point on it that, in
contrast to male medieval use of the motherhood symbol as a reversai and renunciation of
their maleness, Julian’ s emphasis expresses women’ s spiritual aspiration to befulÏy
human, as Christ was human.95 Julian’s tnnitarian Mother Christ is simply responding to
the maturing needs of bis human creatures at eveiy point in the human’ s life. In the same
dynamic of identifyïng with the humanity of Christ enclosing humankind, Julian is also
negotiating her relationship with the ambivalent, human face of the common teaching of
Mother Church. Perhaps this helps to account for why Julian’ s imagery does flot evoke the
maternai “physicality” Bynum associates with medieval women’s understanding of Christ’s
humanity,96 however, so much as it seems to engage the maturational dynamic of the
mirroring maternai presence.
Donohue-White reflects the concem of many feminists to critique interpretations of
“the maternai” wbich are “conventional, sentimentalized” and “essentialist, ahistorical
9’ HEIMMEL, Jennifer, “God is our Mother’: Julian ofNorwich and the medieval image ofChristian
feminine divinity”, Salzburg studies in English titerature 92, 5, 1982, Salzburg, p. 54.
95Bynum writes:
In the dominant theological tradition inhented by the later Middle Ages, nuile andfemale were
contrasted and asymmetrically valued as soul and body. Such values suggested that men were like
God in a sense that women could neyer achieve, that women ought to slough off femaleness in
rising to meet the divine.... [N]either maleness nor femaleness could serve for [women] as an
image of renunciation.
Women thus asserted and embraced their humanity.... To medieval women humanity was, most
basically, flot femaleness, but physicality, the flesh of the ‘Word made flesh”. BYNUM, 1992, p.
177 - 179, emphasis in text.
96 Aers critiques Bynum on this point with regard to Julian. AERS, David, “The humanity of Christ:
Reflections on Julian of Norwich’s Revetation of love “, in AERS, David and Lynn STALEY, The powers
of the holy: Religion, politics and gender in the kite medieval Engtish culture, University Park PN,
Pennsylvania state University Press, 1996, p. 85.
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constructions of maternity”.97 She assesses Julian’s “divine mother-work” as a praxis
and concurs that Julian’s understanding of motherhood in the Trinity does not function to
retard individuation and maturation, that it does flot rest exclusively on the imagery of the
maternai (witness the exemplum and her engagement of the Wisdom tradition), and that it
counters patriarchal models of God.98 Moreover, she describes the quality of mother
love in Julian’s divine matemity as “engaged responsiveness”.99 I want to extend
Donohue-White’s reading of divine maternity in the $howings by introducing into it the
neglected work of mirroring.
What Donohue-White calis the “Trinitarian womb-work” is God’s work of creation
which culminates in the Incarnation. She cites Julian’ s enclosure language, that “our
savïour is our Mother in whom we are endlessly born and out of whom we shah neyer
corne” (LT 57) to underscore “the radical dependence of ail things on God, but in an
internai rather than an external fashion [allowing us toi understand the world as in some
fashion ‘in’ God rather than God as ‘in’ the world”.100
The only problem with the language of womb-work for soteriology is that, even
when Julian’ s insistence on mutual enclosure is recognized, the symbol can becorne very
quickly literahized, and the relational work of the Trinity engaged in creation in the present
time can be obscured. Moreover, if we are to take seriously the idea that Julian’ s
sotenology in the present tense is the appropriation of it, the viscerality of the womb
syrnbohism to describe the Mother’ s creative work must be held in tension with the
awareness that this work is active in the present time, i.e., being appropnated, winch
means that there is sorneone actualhy beholding or expenencing this work going on in her
life, in the context of a corporate religious tradition, for Juhian, living the anchoritic
vocation, enchosed in a wornb-tomb, gave meaning to this symbol. Recail, too, that
Julian’ s “birth” into the transitional space of the showîngs came by way of such a merged
bodily communication with Christ, which she calhed her “bodily sight”.
Our saviour is our true Mother, in whom we are endlessly bom and out of whom
we will neyer corne. Plenteously, fully and sweethy was tins shown; and it is
DONOHUE-WHITE, Patncia, “Reading divine maternity in Julian of Norwich”, Spiritus 5, 2005, pp.
20 - 21.
98DoNoHuE-wI4n, 2005, p.25.
99DONOHUE-WHFCE, 2005, p. 24.
100 DONOHUE-WHITE, 2005, p. 27, citing McfAGUE, Sally, “Mother God”, in Motherhood:
Experience, institution, theotogy, eUs. CARR, Anne and Elisabeth SCHÛSSLER HORENZA, Edinburgh,
T & T Clark, 1989, p. 140. As Bynum puts it, for “Julian of Norwich, God was mother exactly in that
our humanity with its full sensuality was not merely loved and saved, but even given being by and from
him”. BYNUM, 1992, p. 172. See also LT 58.
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spoken of in the first revelation, where ït says that we are ah enclosed in him, and
lie is enclosed in us. (LT 57.)
The perspective of a soteriology of mirroring keeps before us the visual tensiveness of her
image of the loving relations of the Trimty as Mother as these are engaged in the work of
human creation in the present tense. Just as the good enough mother is afready actively
relatïng to, accommodating, and bodily communicating with the child even before the
child’s birth, so also the work of the trinitarian Mother in Christ, gestating and birthing us
in our creation, is a relational overflow of loving activity.
Julian’s vision of the creative womb-work of the Trinitarian Mother Christ,
bringing humanity into creation and culminating in the Incarnation, is kept visually
dynamized if we keep in mmd the mutual beholding of the lord and the servant. It might
even be possible to speak of lier “preverbal” reworking John’ s hellenistic mystical gospel
of the Incarnation as “the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us” (John 1: 14), for a
more pre-oedipal, visual-visceral relational mysticism, like “The chere was made flesli and
we beheld God beholding us”.
Donohue-White then speaks of the work of birthing/dying on the Cross. Julian
distinguishes between “our first making”, that is, the Mother’s work of creation and “our
maldng again”, that is, the Incarnation, although they are not necessarily distinguished in
time. This work of the Incarnation is the hard labour of Jesus’ Passion, sufferïng and
death on the cross as a giving birth. “But our very Mother Jesus, lie alone births us to joy
and to endless living, blessed might he be. Thus lie sustains us within him in love and
travail until the fullness of time when lie would suffer the sharpest thoms and grievous
pains....” (LT 60.) Donohue-White observes that whule Jesus as Mother suffers and dies,
and this reflects mother-love which is “self-sacrificing-unto-death”, the dying is flot an end
in itself. “Julian presents self-sacrifice as expressive of both need and gift love and as
aiming at... reciprocal satisfaction andjoy”.’°1
Read in terms of a soteriology of mirroring, I find this allows us to linger
meaningfuhly with the suffering which Christ, enclosing suffering human sensuality,
undergoes in an ongoing way, but without fear of it engendering false martyrisli self
sacrifice. This is because it helps us grasp how Juhian lias sorted out the pattern of
suffering which is a form of harbouring the secret 5m of despair from that which is the
noughtïng of ail that is flot Christ; the noughting of ail that inhibits lier from coming to true
self-knowledge. To behold Christ as Mother in this latter way is to behold, botli in times
of crisis and in day to day living, the suffering which Christ mirrors back when Julian is
101 DONOHUE-WHITE, 2005, p. 2$.
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distancing herseif from him. The mirroring mother exposes Julian to her absence of
relationality, which condition Christ as Mother suffers and compassionately mirrors for lier
learning. The patience which Julian beholds, in Christ’s kenotic suffering-with humans’
abandonment of Christ in them, enables lier to have patience and courteous acceptance of
lier and others’ limits, including those of Mother Church.
Winnicott speaks of the years it took him to withold expressing his psychoanalytic
interpretations to bis patients and to leam simply
to wait and wait for the natural evolution of the transference arising out of the
patient’s growing trust in the psychoanalytic technique and setting.... If only we
can wait, the patient arrives at understanding creatively and with immense joy, and I
now enjoy this joy more than I used to enjoy the sense of having been clever.’02
Just so, in LT 80 Julian acknowledges how painful it is for Mother Jesus to suifer alone
and patiently those periods in the creature’s spiritual growth in which the human leaves the
beholding of her true self in the Mother behind.
When we fali into sin and neglect recollection of him and the protection of our own
soul, then Christ bears ah alone the burden of us. And 50 he remains, moaning and
mouming. Then it is for us in reverence and in kindness to tum quicUy to our
Lord, and flot to leave him alone. He is here alone with us ail; that is to say, he is
here only for us. And when I am distant towards him through sin, despair or sloth,
then I heave my Lord to remain alone, inasmuch as lie is in me. And this is tlie case
with us ah who are sinners; but thougli it may be that we act hike this often, bis
goodness neyer ahlows us to be alone, but constantly he is with us, and tenderly lie
excuses us, and ahways protects us from blame in bis sight. (LT 80.)
And the joy of the creature’ s retum is Christ’ s resurrection in humans. First encountered
by Juhian in the mysterious change of chere from the dying Christ to joy, later anticipated
in the lord’s chere ofjoy in the exemptum, Julian describes this as a retum to beholding
tlie chere of our Lord God in oneseif: “The highest bhiss there is, is to possess God in the
clarity of endhess light, tmhy seeing him, sweetly feeling him, peacefully possessing him in
the fulness ofjoy; and a part of this bhessed chere of our Lord God was revealed”. (LT
72.) “What can make us to rejoice more in God than to see in him that in us... lie lias
joy?... ibis makes the soul which so contemplates like to him who is contemplated, and
unites it in rest and peace.” (LT 68.)b03
102 WINNICOTr, D., W., “The use of an object and relatïng through identifications”, reprinted in Playing
and reatity, NY, Routiedge, [19691 1989, P. 86.
103 Compare 2 Cor 3:18, one of the two mirror texts identified by Hugedé as primary for interpreting the
mirror images in the mystical tradition. The other is 1 Cor 13:12. HUGEDE, Norbert, La métaphore du
miroir dans les épîtres de saint Paul aux Corinthiens, Paris, Delachaux et Niestié, 1957, 206 p. See
BRADLEY, 1984, p. 11.
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Donohue-White’s third stage of mother-work is what she cails the work of
sanctification. By now we know that this is flot Julian’s effective theological language,
since ail the works of Mother Christ are part of the work of oneing and Julian neyer speaks
of sanctification, only salvation. Rather, fostered by Julian’ s grasp of the mystical image
of Christ as minor reflecting back the variable sensual condition of the maturing soul, and
by lier daily practice of anchoritic methods and objectives, Julian’ s understanding of
oneing stays close to her day to day negotiation of her sensual variability. Breastfeeding,
nursing and training are ail works in Julian’s trinitarian Mother Christ, but always, with a
view to providing what the Christian needs to increase and flourish in mature relational
trust. The constantly loving, though changing, cheres of the lord toward the servant in the
exemplum form the basis for Julian’ s identification of the different ways the mother acts
according to the child’ s level of maturation.
The kind, loving mother who knows and sees the need of lier chuld guards it very
tenderly, as the nature and condition of motherhood will have. And always as the
child grows in age and in stature, she acts dtfferently, but she does flot change
her love. And when it is even older, she allows it to be chastised to destroy its
faults, so as to make the child receive virtues and grace. This work, with
everything which is lovely and good, our Lord performs in those by whom it is
done. (LI 60.)
The medieval devotional focus on spiritual nounshment which connected breastfeeding and
the Eucharist is present in LI 60: “the mother may give her child suck of lier milk, but our
precious mother Jesus, he may feed us with himself, and does full courteously and full
tenderly witli the blessed sacrament, that is precious food of very life....” But it is tlie
office of the nurse who “lias nothing else to do but attend to the safety of ber child” which
is more pronounced in Julian’s account of how Mother Christ behaves as the mirroring
(m)other with the maturing child. (LT 61.)
The face of the lord in tlie exemplum could be said to be invested witli tlie function
of the minoring (m)other who, as Winnicott saw, enables the child to develop the
necessary sense of trust for the process of maturation of the true self and the creative
negotiation of reality. Just as this beholding, minoring “action” and its reception by the
beholder may seem like a non-activity, so also Winnicott observes the tendency not to
notice what is going on in the minoring activity between good-enough mothers and infants
-- until it breaks down. Similarly, Anderson points out that the nonviolent, peacefifi nature
of the Trinity’ s pattems of loving in Julian’s understanding of God is the reason for this
seeming “non-activity” in Julian’s vision of salvation, and that the manner in whicli
humans are trained in the peaceful loving relations of the Irinity is likewise, peaceful. I am
surprised that, unlike Donohue-White, Anderson does not draw on Sara Ruddick who
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defines matemity as a distinctive praxis which gives rise to distinctive modes of thought
and acting.104 Ruddick’s work is important because, among other things, it higfflights the
active agency of mothers in those areas of attentiveness, protection, nurturance and
training, which, by other criteria, might be neglected as passive or non-productive
activities. Moreover, Ruddick draws out the implications of maternai thinking for a praxis
of peace.105
Just as what is intrinsic to the quality of good mirroring is that it be effectively
intemalized over time by the child so as to enable the child to experience and develop into
lier core, or authentic, sense of selffiood as relational, so also what is intrinsic to Julian’s
trinitarian economy, in its loving relational activity of beholding and enclosing creation in
Mother Christ, is that it enables Julian to corne to self-knowledge in lier variable sensuality
reflected in the mirror of Christ in us. Christ, from this perspective, mirrors in his double
nature what Julian’s true, double, relational self is, and is to become, in God’s sight.
Just as the good enough mother enables the older chuld to intemalize the mirroring
function in order that the chuld may mature in object relations, such that the transmuted
intemalization of the mirroring function necessarily requires the good-enough mother to
disillusion lier child of its grandiosity, so aiso the loving quality of relationality in the
economic Trimty becomes objectivized in the Mother Jesus who gradually enables the older
child to recogmze its limits. Taldng up the theme of human “fallenness” so poignantly
expressed in the exemplum, divine maternai “chastisement” in LT 60 is anything but divine
anger)°6 It is, as the exemplum first revealed to Julian, simply what the creature ininally
experiences as the fail into despair before recogmzing the Mother’ s patient loving presence:
104 Ruddick defines maternai thinking in the foilowing way.
The agents of maternai practice, acting in response to the demands of their chiidren, acquire a
conceptual scheme -- a vocabulary and Iogic of connections
-- through which they order and express
the facts and values of their practice. In judgments and seif-reflection, they refine and concretize
this scheme. Inteilectual activities are distinguishabie but flot separable from disciplines of
feeling. There is a unity of reflection, judgment, and emotion. This unity I cali “maternai
thinking”.
RUDDICK, Sara, “Maternai thinking”, in Mothering: Essagys infeminist theory, ed. TREBLICOT,
Joyce, Totowa, NI, Rowman and Ailanheld, 1983, p. 214.
105 RUDDICK, Sara, Maternai thinking: Toward n potitics ofpeace, Boston MA, Beacon Press, 1995,
291 p.
106 Bradiey acknowiedges that many commentators draw similarities between Anselm and Julian,
particuiariy around her motherhood metaphors, but cautions that there are major differences as weii. “It does
flot matter much which writer may first have thought of Christ Incarnate as mother. It does matter, greatly,
how a writer uses this metaphor and how this usage integrates with the stoly ofsatvation”. BRADLEY,
Ritamary, “Juiian of Norwich: Everyone’s mystic”, in Mysticism and spirituatity in medievat Engiand,
eUs. POLLARD, William and Robert BOENIG, D. S. Brewer, 1997, p. 154, emphasis added. For exampie,
the Ancrene riwie is sometimes cited as a source for Juiian’s motif of divine motherhood, and in it Anseim
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The mother may sometimes suifer the child to fali and to be distressed in various
ways, for its own benefit, but she can neyer suffer any kind of peril to corne to her
child, because of her love. And though our earthly mother may suffer her child to
perish, our heavenly Mother Jesus may neyer suffer us who are lis chuidren to
perish, for he is alrnighty, ail wisdorn and ail love, and so is none but lie, blessed
mayhebe.
But often when ourfalling and our wretchedness are shown to us, we are so
rnuch afraid and so greatly asharned of oursetves that we scarcely know where
we can put ourselves. But then our courteous Mother does not wish us to flee
away, for nothing would be less pleasing to him; but lie then wants us to behave
like a child. For when it is distressed and frightened, it runs quicldy to its mother;
and if it can do no rnore, it calis to the mother for help with ah its might.
And tf we do flot then feel oursetves eased, let us at once be sure that he is
behaving as a wise Mother. For if he sees that it is profitable to us to mourn
and to weep, with compassion and puy he suffers that until the right tirne has
corne, out of his love. And then he wants us to show a child’s characteristics,
which aiways naturally trusts in its mother’s love in well-being and in woe. (LI
61.)
Julian teils us that the exemptum gave her the only answer she received to lier
sotenological crisis conceming the meaning of sin and suffenng. In the years which
followed Julian’ s reception of the showïngs, Julian’ s eye was on the servant, identifying
with him in lis condition of despair, and glirnpsing the chere of the lord. This work might
5e called the reparenting of Julian’s spiritual chitdhood, lier internahization of tlie mirroring
fiinction which taught lier how to trust.
In her later, theological recasting of the mirroring dynamism in tlie exemplum,
Julian’s eye is fixed on the whole Trinity, now internalized, at work restoring human
sensuality and uniting it to substance in Christ our Mother, whom she invests with the
quaiity of engaged responsiveness to the needs and desire of her liurnan condition in a
process of rnamration in self wortli and relational self-knowledge. As Hide puts it
is cited considerably. But as the Ancrene riwte shows, in Anseim the motif of Jesus as mother is
conjoined with the notion of divine wrath: Jesus “put Himself between us and His father who was
threatening to strike us, as a mother full of pity puts herself between her child and the stem angry father
who is going to strike it”. SAVAGE, Anne and Nicholas WATSON, eds., Anchoritic spirituality:
Ancrene wisse and associated works, NY, Paulist, 1991, p. 182. The classics of western spirituality 74,
cited in BRADLEY, 1997, p. 153. In Julian’s portrayal of Christ as mother, the child is about to be
chastened, rather than chastised, but there is no angry father in the picture. Rather, as Julian’s maternai
trinitarian economy develops, the Father too is motherlike and ah loving.
Interestingly, Sprung’s (initially) lacanian analysis of Juhian’s $howings argues that “the aspect of
Julian’s revelation that she herseif finds most troubhing, because apparently hereticai, might be stated quite
plainiy in psychoanalytic terms: there is no ùw ofthe Father”, in SPRUNG, Andrew, “The inverted
metaphor: Earthly mothering as Figura of divine love in Juhian of Norwich’s Book of showings”, in
Medieval mothering, eds. PARSONS, John Carmi and Bonnie WHEELER, NY, Garland, 1996, p. 185,
emphasis in text. Sprung ultimately finds Winnicott a more adequate theonst when it cornes to accounting
for mirroring in Juhian.
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Although sensuality is where we experience the effects of incompleteness due to the
Fail, more fundamentally sensuality is where we encounter the effects of oneing.
Sensuality is where we are open to the presence of divine lïfe in human lives
through Christ and are drawn into the process of growth or increasing until we
become fully Christlike.107
This might be called Julian’s appropriation of mature spiritual motherhood, such that she
was able to mirror this Mother Christ to her even Christians who needed to know
themselves beloved in God’s sight.
Not without some growing pains, which engaged Julian in a profound patient
acceptance of the ambiguous limitations of human society and the teaching tradition of the
Church, Julian appropriated the pattem of retuming from the temptations to isolation and
despair in her chosen solitude into the social relationality of Mother Christ known sensually
and, at Ieast in part, substantially, in the body of HoIy Church:
And he wants us to commit ourselves fervently to the faith of Holy Church, and to
find there our beloved Mother in consolation and tme understanding, with ail the
company of the blessed. For one single person may often be broken, as it seems to
him, but the entire body of Holy Church was neyer broken, nor ever will be
without end. And therefore it is a certain thing, and good and gracious to will,
meekly and fervently, to be fastened and united to our mother Holy Church, who is
Christ Jesus. (LT 61.)
5.3 The appropriation of lier soteriology of mirroring by Julian’s
readers
Julian understands that God desires humans to appropfiate the soteriological good
news embedded in her showings. What Julian has recorded in her $howings she hopes
will be appropriated in the lives of her readers in every generation.
frene Leicht argues that Julian’s sotenology answers the theological question not
“Why did God become human?” but rather “How did God become human?”°8 Julian’s
soteriology in the present tense, if it is to be appropflated in ways that encourage human
flourishing, could also be said to ask the further question “How does God become
human?” This engages the question how Christ’s saving work is ongoing, how it is
revealed and experienced as real, and how humans can participate in and appropnate it in
107 HIDE, 2001, p. 86.
108
“Sie fragt weniger, warum Gott Mensch wurde, also nach den Bedingungen fOr die Notwendigkeit der
Inkarnation, ais danach, wie Gott Mensch wurde”. LEICHT, Irene, “Die Vorsteliung von Eriôsung im
theologischen Denken der Julian of Norwich”, in Denkmodette von frauen im Mittetatter, Freiburg
Switzerland, Universitatsverlag Freiburg Schweiz, 1994, p. 203, emphasis added.
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the present time. In other words, how do even Christians like Julian become both mature
in childlike dependence on God, and like Mother Christ in mature human relations? How
does Julian envisage herseif and others mirroring the quality of loving relations among the
Trinity in the quality of theïr relations with their even Christians? This is where the
performative trajectory in Julïan’ s Showings is intended to enclose lier readers in tlie
mirroring dynamic of the quality of relationality of the Trinity as Mother Christ intimately
engaged witli raising her offspring to maturity and trust.
Moreso tlian any of the other maternai works the Mother does, I suggest that it is
tlie neglected work of mirroring which bears the weight of this performative dynamic.
Emerging most powerfully in the exemplum, traced tlirougli Julian’s treatment of the
trinitanan Mother Christ, and highliglited in LT 71 in lier description of the three cheres of
the Lord, it is the face of the mirroring (m)other which teaches Julian, and her readers, “to
know ourselves as loved, valued and the source of deliglit to a beloved other”. Mthougli
she does not cail these cheres the Mother’ s face, tliey emerge subsequent to the chapters on
the motherhood of Christ. And as they are invested with tlie work of drawing humans’
outer sensual chere, tliat changeable face of liuman desire, into the inner chere where
Christ reigns, they describe the objective saving work of the Tnnity lovingly and actively
engaged in oneing tlie human condition in the present time.
This work ofmirroring in Jutian’s theotogy, Ipropose, is ta bring into being,
nurture, reveal, hea1 liberate, train and transform (particularty, though flot excÏusivety,
in those on the underside of history), that pre-retigious human desire to be seen,
loved and known by the betoved Other and to know ourselves as we are known. We
are ta know its futfiltment in this tife, in part, and in fulness in the eschaton. As
Koenig observed, Julian neyer mentions the Mother’ s face. The reason Koenig gave was
that Julian had negotiated her relationship with ber birth mother. By the same token, it is
possible that this was because Julian was negotiating lier relationship with tradition in the
Church’s teaching. Then again, perhaps this was because the Mother’s face is tlie face of
Christ’s liumanity revealing the loving relations of the uncreated Trinity engaged in ail these
human, ambivalent relationships -- then and now -- and as sucli is an “apophatic image”,
better left to the working of the chere of Christ in the imagination of the beholder.
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6.0 Summary
The present chapter confirms that the exemplum is the core of Julian of Norwich’s
soteriology, and argues that it is dynamized by the neglected, yet essential function of
mirroring.
This mirroring function of the chere of the lord in the exemptum, as Koenig
observed, plays a compensatory role in Julïan’s appropriation of the meaning of her
Showings. I identify this mirroring function as one of object constancy. Not only is this a
reflection of psychodynamic negotiation of her ambivalent maternai relationship. It is also
a sign of negotiation of lier ambivalent relationship witli the teaching tradition of Mother
Church on matters of soteriology.
But this thesis also extends and confirms Koenig’s intuition that the chere of the
lord in the exemptum lias objective salvific power in Julian’ s mature exempÏum
soteriology. It dynamizes Julian’s mature understanding of the exemptum as revealing the
quality of the constant exchange of loving relationality among the persons of the economic
Tnnity engaged in creation. I have linked Anderson’s attention to the quality ofloving
relations among the economic Trinity engaged in creation witli the function of mirroring
and correlated it with Julian’s objectification of the work of the loving cheres of the Lord in
LT 71 as a mature development of medieval mirror symbolism into an objective soteriology
of mirroring. Drawing on Anderson’s temporal distinction of soteriology in its past,
present and future dimensions in Julian, I have shown that Julian’s objective soteriology of
mirroring has past and future “cheres”, in lier retrieval from the tradition. And lier
understanding of objective soteriology in the present time matured over many years into
simple but powerful insights into the Trinity’s constant loving activity mirrored in Christ’s
Incarnation, healing and restonng human antbropology to its true self in Christ. Julian’s
retneval of the medieval symbol of Christ as mirror, in whom God’ s constant regard and
humans’ variable desire for self-knowledge meet in the human mixture of sensuality and
substance, helps to anchor this understanding of lier objective sotenology of mirroring in a
historïcal context of socially shared symbolism. I argue, therefore, drawing on both
Anderson’ s thesis on the convergence of objective and subjective soteriology in Julian’ s
Showings and Koenig’s intuition about the objective salvific power of the mirroring role of
the face of the lord in the exemptum, that the function of the mirroring chere of the Lord
“works” this convergence in the present time. For Julian, this is liow Jesus saves.
Further, I show how this mirroring function is carried into Julian’s subsequent
theological reflection on the works and nature of Christ as Mother. Her choice of Mother as
her dominant Christological name for God is made a much denser symbol to appropriate
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when it is recalled that, for Julian, the work of Mother Jesus is embedded in and mediated
by that of Mother Church. Julian’s vocation as anchoress demanded profound self
knowledge in creafively and patiently negotiating her radical dependence on the Church, for
ber life of relative spiritual independence.
The psychobiographical and sotenological parallel correlation over the tbree
diptychs has shown how Julian’s soteriology mirrors and answers to her human
predicament, in both its psychoanalytic and its socio-religious dimensions. This human
predicament is characterized by a fundamental lack of mirroring, in which her (and others’)
needs and conditions on the underside of history were systemically ignored, neglected or
even abused, whetber in family systems andlor larger societal ones. This predicament was,
for Julian, and continues to be, compounded by the common teaching of the Church,
which created a profound confusion as to what sin and the purpose of suffering are. The
tmsting facilitaflng environment which could give rise to maturation in mirroring need was
lacking at every level.
Thus, healing and maturation of ber very capacity to grow into a cobesive and tme
sense of selfbood in mature dependence on God was, for Julian, salvific. I observed this
process as a shift in the nature of ber mirroring transference with the Christ of ber
showings from merged subjectivism to relational realism to help describe the shift in quality
of the experience of herseif, ber experience of God, and ber relation to otbers which seems
to obtain througb the evolution of lier mirroring transference with the Jesus of ber
showings.
The form tbat this process took, once the occurrence of tlie sbowings had passed, is
by means of Julian’ s ongoing contemplative practice of bebolding the exemptum and lier
other sbowings. I bave described this as a conversion process, ber appropriation of a
liberative sotenology. This conversion is clearly an epistemological conversion of ber self
knowledge or consciousness as beheld constantly and lovingly over time, and it is also a
conversion to knowing ber core sense of self as being constituted relationally in tbe sight of
the Christ of ber sbowings. Wliat becomes clear as well is that, as Julian reflects more and
more theologically on the nature of the God at work in lier sbowings, the fiinction of
mirroring is seen to determine lier understanding of tbe quality of loving relations of the
Trinity engaged in creation tlirough Christ our mirror-Mother.
finally, seeing tbe performative trajectory of ber Showings as Julian’s extension of
the mirroring dynamic into the lives of lier readers, I hold that Julian desires lier readers to
appropnate this minoring dynamic as Christ’s saving work in the present time.
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7.0 Is Julian’s a soteriology of mirroring for our time?
Julian’s theology lias had a history of being criticized as asserting an unorthodox
doctrine of unbroken union in the divine-human relation, represented by her concept of the
godly will which neyer assented to sin, which is thought to be inadequate to account either
for unintelligible evil in the world or for human fteedom.109 But a growing number of
theologians are finding in Julian’s sotenological narrative of the exemptum a powerful
response to the contemporaiy sotenological crisis of credibility.1 10
I return to Haight’s identification of themes in contemporary sotenology responding
to postmodem exigencies, which I described in Cliapter one. I identify Julian’s response
to several of tliese themes, insofar as they link with the present study.
First, there is the question what Jesus did for our salvation. This is the problem of
the meaning of Christ’s death on tlie cross, which is core to the contemporary problem of
the credibility of soteriological arri It must be admitted that Julian’ s
preoccupation in the fourteenth century with the humanity of Christ is flot the same thing as
ours in the twenty-first century with the life of the historical Jesus.112 Julian nonetheless
understands, like contemporary soteriologists, that the cross is revelatory of the love of
God by symbolic causalïty (flot efficient causality).”3 Julian and we can see revealed in
109 There are the historical voices such as the Anglican bishop Edward Stillingfleet in 1673, reprinted in
section 1.5 ofthe appendix in WATSON, Nicholas and Jacqueline JENKINS, eds., The writings ofJutian
ofNonvich: A vision showed to a devout woman and A revelation of love, University Park PN,
Pennsylvania State University, 2006, pp. 448 - 455; and Deryck Hanshell observes this judgment in two of
Julian’s translators, HUDLESTON, Roger, ed., Revelations of divine love shewed to o devout ankress, by
name Julian of Nonvich, London, Burns and Oates, 1927, 256 p., and WOLTBRS, Clifton, transl., Julian
ofNorwich: Revetations of divine love, Harmonsworth England, Penguin, 1966, 213 p. See
HANSHELL, Deryck, “A cmx in the interpretation of dame Julian”, Downside review 92, 1974, pp. 77,
87.
More contemporary voices are actually proponents of Julian of Norwich’s writing. See for examples
LEWIS, Munel, “After reflecting on Julian’s revelations of behovabil synne”, Studio mystica 6, 1983,
pp. 41 - 42. frene Leight describes Julian’s understanding ofsin as “soft” (“ein ‘sanftes’ SUndenversttndnis”)
in LEICHT, 1994, p. 199; Nuth holds that the weakness in Julian’s soteriology is the lack of a formai
treatment of human freedom, in NUTH, Joan, “Two medievai soteriologies: Anselm of Canterbury and
Julian of Norwich”, Theotogicat studies 53, 1992, p. 638.
110 As weIl as ANDERSON 2005, see for examples, HIDE, Kerrie, “The parable of the lord and the
servant: A soteriology for our times”, Pacifica: Austratian theotogicat studies 10, 1997, p?. 53 - 69;
DREYER, 1994, pp. 79 - 93.
111 HAIGHT, 1999, p. 345.
112 GALVIN, John, “From the humanity of Christ to the Jesus of history: A paradigm shift in Catholic
Christology”, Theological studies 55, 1994, pp. 252 - 273.
113 HAIGHT, 1999, p. 346.
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the Christ of her $howings what God’s love for humankind is lilce. There is no tallc in
Julian’ s Showings of Christ’ s death being a sacrifice or a satisfaction as traditionafly
understood. Rather, as we have seen, Julian’s bodily sight of Christ’s suffering taught her
that Christ’s work is about satisfying humankind’s (admittedly narcissistic but real) longing
to see and know ourselves beloved in the sight of God. The fact that Julian sees Christ’ s
suffering as ongoing is an indication that she understands Christ’s work of mirroring that
love in variable human conditions to be available for appropriation by Christians in every
generation. In lier this-worldly incamational soteriology the effect of Christ’s humanity at
work continues to have a real, symbolic effect on human consciousness in the present time.
Moreover, I would argue that examining the mirroring dynamic in Julian’ s method
of presenting her soteriology renders the motivation for the histoncal evolution of lier
sotenology to her christological and trinitanan theology more transparent.
I have afready adverted to the fact that Julian’ s soteriology is exphcitly
comprehensive, able to be interpreted socially as well as individually. It is here that the
question of the nature of sin as understood in this study of Julian’s Showings, is robust.
We have seen that Julian’ s bodily siglit of the suffering Christ begins as a response to lier
own experience of a context of unintelligible evil and suffering, and a condition of
suffering bordenng on unthinkable anxiety. What I am calling lier sotenology of mirroring
acknowledges that the systemic absence of mirroring in the sensual human condition is real
and lias grave consequences. If this is taken into account as a psychodynamic and
systemic familial and social determinant in the context which forms the backdrop of
Julian’s showings as I have tried to show here, it reveals a robust account of sin as despair,
located clearly on the human side, and having a systemic social quality. It is the whole of
humankind who is identified in Adam’s predicament.
Likewise, Haight holds that salvation must be integral, by which lie means that
salvation
cannot touch a so-called spiritual dimension of a person’s life and flot include his or
her activity in this world.... Salvation today cannot be interpreted as salvation from
the world.... The world is the full measure of the human body.. . .Salvation must
incorporate the world insofar as the world, aithougli in one respect over against the
self, is also part of the self’.114
Julian sees that human freedom in this world to respond to Christ’s saving work lies in the
sensuality, the seat of variable human will, and is enabled by the individual’ s engagement
with the mirroring function of Christ. Christ’s union of substance and sensuality in lis
114 HAIGIIT, 1999, p. 355.
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humanity is the meeting place in the exemplum between the Trinity’s beholding humanity
in Christ, and human beholding of itself in sensual variability. The mirroring ftnction of
the Tnnity enclosing humarnty through Christ endows humans with the potential freedom
to appropriate sin, understood as despair, and find it transformed into the locus of our true
selfhood as relatïonally constituted in God’s sight. The three cheres of Christ are,
potentially, both a mode! and a mirror enabling humans to mature in pattems of loving
relations in the world, thus mediating what God wants human beings to be. Thus for
example, Julian is adamant that every act of compassion for others is Christ’s compassion
in us. Through practisÏng or performing her soteriology of mirroring in tlie writing of lier
$howings Julian hoped to enable the wi!ls and actions of lier even Chrïstians, then and
now, to become transfonned into the !ilceness of the quality of loving relations among the
economic Trinity enclosing humanity in Christ. Julian understood that the loving and
pacific effects of this in the world of human relations would be real.
Related to tlie theme of the cross, the Resurrection must be important to the saving
action of Christ. The Resurrection experience is fundamental to Julian’s bodily sight of
Christ, and to lier appropriation of the exemptum. Indeed, this transformation is core to
the meaning of Ju!ian’ s soteriology, giving hope to those who have suffered from an
abused, beleaguered sense of selfhood in this world, and inspiring trust in the eschaton.
What I have called “object constancy” in the chere of the lord, which becomes the
basis for the identity of Julian’ s trinitanan economy engaged in creation, clarifies Julian’ s
stand on the question whether God’s creative work and God’s saving work are the same.
Julian’s soteriology of minoring renders coherent the work of Christ witli the activity of
the Creator in the bond of the Holy $pmt as the loving community of the Trinity engaged in
human flourishing. Julian was preoccupied in lier time, as we are in ours, with the fragility
of tlie human project and the unintel!igibi!ity of evil. In tlie face of this, Ju!ian’s
soterio!ogy enables the liberation and maturation of the desire of her readers to trust in the
constancy of the love of the Creator as that was revealed to lier in her Showings.
What can make us to rejoice more in God than to see in him that in us, of ail lis
greatest works, lie has joy? For I saw in the same revelation that if the blessed
Trinity couÏd have made man’s soul any better, any fairer, any nobler than it was
created, the Trinity wou!d flot have been fully pleased with the creation of man’s
soul. (LT 68.)
And by the same token, she hoped lier soteriology would enable humans to appropriate the
healing and restorative knowledge of their core self as constitutively related to God. Just as
contemporary soteriology understands flot only that God creates in order to save, but a!so
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that “God saves in order to create”,115 Julian is adamant that “sin is no shame, but honour
to man”, and that “ail shame will be tumed into honour and into greaterjoy”. ($T 17; LT
38.)
With significance that is heightened in our context of ecological fragility, Julian
even gives indication that the goodness of God overflows and fuis flot oniy humans
who are empty enough to receive it.... Critically, in Julian’s view, this fihling with
divine goodness is flot limited to human beings, it includes ail God’s blessed
works, ail creation. The vision of the hazeinut reveals that the cosmos is being
filled to overfiowing with divine love etemally.”6
Perhaps most significantly for the present study, Julian’ s soteriology speaks to the
contemporary concem that salvation be revelatory and transfonnative, not merely
knowledge or explanation, nor just a past or future reality, but the experience of
encountering God that is in some sense real in the present time. Julian’s soteriology of
mirroring makes the whole Trinity’ s activity in Christ present in a mediated, symbolic
reaiist way that recognizes both the subjective and the objective dimensions of that
encounter.
Anderson’ s thesis is significant in pointing out that Julian’ s objective soteriology is
expressed in past, future and present tenses. When looked at in terms of mirroring, her
subjective sotenology, that is, the appropriation of objective sotenology in the present
tense, involves a practice of beholding Christ and seeing one’s sensual condition mirrored
there, exposed, reflected and potentially transformed in God’s lovïng chere or regard.
Appropriation, as Julian’s Showings reveal, invoives a process of being confronted
with a contrast situation and then retrieving sources of symboiism in the tradition which
help make sense of the meaning of sin and suffering. Julian was shown that both the
condition of oneing and its absence needed in some way to be seen in her soteriological
exemptum in order for the human predicament to be consciously identified and objectified
in the human-divine relation. “We need to fail and we need to see it”. (LT 61.) This
contrast experience and its potential resolution is preciseiy what the exemplum mirrored
back for her integration.
But appropriation, for Julian, also necessarily engages an imaginative practice or act
of seif-recognition in relation to God, a life-long work of the transitional reaim of prayer,
which requires a facilitating, trustworthy environment if it is not to be hindered. This
gracious work, transforming Julian’s affections and training lier, over time, in the ways of
115 HAIGHT, 1999, p. 353.
116 HIDE, 2004, p. 55.
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trinitarian loving, is what Julian also seeks to enable in others, by means of the facilitating,
trustworthy environment of her Showings. For Julian, the practice of beholding demanded
that she behold lier histoncal situation and sensual condition consciously in relation to God.
It became part of the hermeneutical method of lier theology. This study puts significant
emphasis on the notion that the performative trajectoly in Julian’s Showings, by enabling
lier readers to engage in tlie practice of beholding Christ in a mirroring transference, helps
us appropnate tlie saving work of Christ in the present time. Julian describes this as
God’ s gracious activity of drawing human outer, sensual dispositions toward a condition
of inner self-constancy and oneing, by the working of Christ’ s chere.
In sum, tlie coherence between the saving work of tlie economic Trinity engaged in
creation througli Christ’ s Incarnation, in the past, tlie future and the present time, in wliat I
am calling Julian’ s sotenology of mirroring, is, I believe, a sigmficant response to tlie
problem of sotefiological credibiity in our postmodern context. Tlie objective and the
subjective dimensions of Julian’s soteriology of mirroring are coherent and contiguous,
and respond effectively to a number of aspects of the contemporary crisis in credibility of
soteriology.
CONCLUSIONS
First, this thesis gives substantial, new evidence for a psychobiography of Julian of
Norwich. Clearly, this reading lias limitations wliich are intrinsic to the
psychobiograpliical enterprise. However, it lias sought to remain attentive to the demand
for historical consciousness in its application. Most significantly, the choice of relational
psychoanalytic methodology, focusïng on the dynamic of the need for mirroring, is found
to be particularly fmitful in its application to this subject. b the extent that this
psychobiography is believable, it gives new evidence for Julian’ s lïfe which may 5e helpful
for other historical and theological studies of her Showings. Certainly, it lias served that
function for the other coi-relations in tliis study.
The evidence tliat Julian suffered a chronic failure in the parental function of
mirroring in lier early cliuldliood, which was compensated for to some degree by the
presence of an empathic spiritual counselor, reveals itself already in the profile of her pre
visionary aspirations and anxiety, and is supported, from the first to the last of her
showings, by Julian’s preoccupation witli behoïding the face of Christ and with seeing or
knowing herseif in relation to what that face or chere communicates to her. It suggests that
the Jesus of lier Showings flinctioned for lier as a sustained means of therapeutic healing
and intemalization of the mirroiing function.
The thesis has found that psychodynamic maturation in Julian’s mirroring need is
evidenced in her Showings over time in a developmental transformation or maturation from
wliat I have called merged subjectivism to relationai realism. This finding may be useful
for correlating spiritual and psychodynamic maturation in mirroring need in other
applications to liistorical and contemporaiy women.
The second hypotliesis, that the missed parental function of mirroring was
compounded at a systemic, societal level, and was codified in the common teaching of
Holy Church, was confirmed by evidence that suggests that Julian was suffering a pre
oedipal sotenological crisis at the time of, and perhaps as the cause of, the illness dunng
which she received the showings. The evidence for a conversion process bearing the
marks of a liberation liermeneutic of appropriation, (as that is being articulated by feminist
soteriologists Johnston and Ciysdale), is substantiated, in the case of Julian’s
understanding of sin and suffering, by her reversai of the meaning and logic of Anseim’ s
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satisfaction theory, by lier practice of anchoritic methods wliich also engage reversais of
customary sotenologïcal assumptions, and by lier retrieval of the medieval mystical symbol
of Christ as mirror. This thesis finds the exemptum to be singular as a soteriological
narrative that is responsive to lier predicament, in that in its imagery it retains the contrast
situation of Julian’ s liuman predicament of despair, as well as its liberative resolution.
Tliis study finds tliat what dynamizes Julian’s liealing and restoration of lier
mirroring need is lier appropriation of the meaning of the exemplum over tïme. The
dynamic mirroring fiinction of the chere 0f the lord in relation to the servant enables her to
clarify for herseif the meaning of sin and suffering, relinquish a preoccupation witli
Christ’ s suffering and discover tlie whole Trinity at work througli Christ’ s Incarnation, in
restoring creation. It gives lier profound relational understanding of herseif as beloved in
God’ s sight in well being and in woe. The dynamic mirroring function of object constancy
in the chere of tlie lord is found to be operative flot only in Julian’s this-worldly
appropriation of salvation but also in lier mature, trinitarian soteriology in its past and
future expressions, such tliat it is appropriate to cail it a soteriology of mirroring.
This finding confirms tliat, in the case of Julian’s $howings, tlie correlation of
relational psychoanalysis with feminist liberationist soteriology helps to advance the
dialogue between these disciplines.
Finally, this thesis contributes to tlie growing conviction tliat tlie soteriology of
Julian of Norwich’s Showings has much to contnbute to the crisis of credibility in
contemporary soteriology.
This tliesis’ articulation of Julian’ s maturation in her understanding of Christ’ s
suffering and Passion gives new meaning to the cross for women, which not only does flot
promote unjust suffenng but also helps women face the darkness of our soul wound, heal
from this patriarchal distortion in Christian sotenology and flourish in maturity.
Julian’s exemplum, flot lier tlieoÏogy of the motlierhood of Christ, is confirmed as
the core of her sotenology. Nonetlieless, the fact that lier reflections on the exemplum
should lead to a Cliristological assertion of Christ as Motlier (and as Motlier Church) is,
first of ail, anotlier confirmation of the argument that the mirroring function of the Jesus of
Julian’ s $howings enabled lier spiritual chuldhood to receive healing from a familial and
societal lack of minoring, and to mirror in her affections and actions as mature spiritual
mother in the Cliurch, the patience, compassion, trust and joy that Christ’ s chere
communicated to lier.
The tliesis shows, moreover, how the mirroring dynamic motivating Julian’s
soteriology can be seen to account for the comprehensive and integral nature of lier
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soteriology as well as the historical genesis of her theology of the Trinity ami the
motherhood of Christ. Julian’ s exemptum soteriology is also seen to respond to the
contemporary demand for coherence between the creative and saving activity of God.
One of the most exciting findings of this thesis, developed in the fmal chapter,
clarifies how objective soteriology in past, future and present tenses (the present tense
being subjective soteriology) cohere in Julian’ s exemptum. It is here that Julian’ s
exemplum soteriology of mirroring, understood as the Trinity’s saving work in Christ’s
Tricamation in the present tense, touches a nerve in the postmodem exigency that
soteriology be real, able to be experienced in this life. The relational psychoanalytic
discourse of minoring, which is expenence-near to contemporary readers, is given a
dynamism in this application which responds to an urgent contemporary need to
appropriate salvation both in ways of thinldng and feeling and in practices which transfonn
relational knowledge of self and God in this life. The study highlights that Julian attributes
to the chere of our Lord God the work of this mirroring activity in us by grace.
The historical divide between theology and the spiritual life, which so dommates the
present situation, has been traced to theological trends in the late middle ages. This study,
in both its psychobiographical and soteriological findings, helps to locate in Julian’s life a
prophetic historical voice, and to recognize ber soteriology as a lost vemacular tradition,
which was attempting to respond to that situation. One of the implications of this smdy
would be to contnbute in some small way to the contemporary search for soteriological and
theological sources, and for methods in the study and practice of spirituality, which would
help breach that divide in the present time.
This thesis hopes to contribute to the contemporary search for a credible
soteriology. At the same time, if Julian’s theology is to be taken seriously as a lost
soteriological tradition, it begs for more in-depth examination of the strengths and
weaknesses in her soteriology as a credible response to each of the themes in contemporary
soteriology identified in chapter 1, and to the postmodem exigencies propelling them.
Future Julian studies of this nature are needed.
The mirroring dynamic explored in this study invites further dialogue and possible
correlation between the disciplines of relational psychoanalysis and liberationist
soteriology, which respect both the soteriological demand for comprehensiveness, and the
human subject as locus for maturation which enables greater freedom and responsibility in
graced living. It may be that the study of other Christian mystics, using these two
disciplines in tandem, can make a particularly helpful contribution to this dialogue.
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